Duquesne University

Duquesne Scholarship Collection
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Spring 2012

Explaining the Role of Scripture in the Economy of Redemption as
it Relates to the Theological and Hermeneutical Contributions of
David Tracy, Hans Frei, Kevin Vanhoozer and Henri de Lubac
Kevin Storer

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Storer, K. (2012). Explaining the Role of Scripture in the Economy of Redemption as it Relates to the
Theological and Hermeneutical Contributions of David Tracy, Hans Frei, Kevin Vanhoozer and Henri de
Lubac (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1243

This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne
Scholarship Collection.

EXPLAINING THE ROLE OF SCRIPTURE IN THE ECONOMY OF REDEMPTION
AS IT RELATES TO THE THEOLOGICAL AND HERMENEUTICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS OF DAVID TRACY, HANS FREI, KEVIN VANHOOZER AND
HENRI DE LUBAC

A Dissertation
Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Kevin Storer

May 2012

Copyright by
Kevin Storer

2012

EXPLAINING THE ROLE OF SCRIPTURE IN THE ECONOMY OF REDEMPTION
AS IT RELATES TO THE THEOLOGICAL AND HERMENEUTICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS OF DAVID TRACY, HANS FREI, KEVIN VANHOOZER AND
HENRI DE LUBAC

By
Kevin Storer
Approved March 16, 2012

________________________________
William M. Wright IV., Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Theology
(Dissertation Director)

________________________________
Gerald Boodoo, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Theology
(Committee Member)

________________________________
Dr. Elizabeth Vasko, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Theology
(Committee Member)

________________________________
James M. Swindal, Ph.D.
Dean, McAnulty College and
Graduate School of Liberal Arts

________________________________
George S. Worgul, Jr., S.T.D., Ph.D.
Chair, Department of Theology
Professor of Theology

iii

ABSTRACT

EXPLAINING THE ROLE OF SCRIPTURE IN THE ECONOMY OF REDEMPTION
AS IT RELATES TO THE THEOLOGICAL AND HERMENEUTICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS OF DAVID TRACY, HANS FREI, KEVIN VANHOOZER AND
HENRI DE LUBAC

By
Kevin Storer
April 2012

Dissertation supervised by William M. Wright, IV., Ph.D.
This dissertation explores the hermeneutical impasses which have resulted from
the recent debates about the theological interpretation of Scripture between revisionist
theologian David Tracy and postliberal theologian Hans Frei and suggests that locating
the role of Scripture in the economy of redemption would ease many of these
methodological tensions. The works of Evangelical theologian Kevin Vanhoozer and
Ressourcement theologian Henri de Lubac, it is argued, provide helpful resources for
these discussions as these theologians explicitly seek to explain the role of Scripture in
mediating the relationship between Christ and the Church. The dissertation suggests that
examining the role of Scripture in the context of the economy does provide helpful
insights for hermeneutical method as it shows the intrinsic unity between the literal
reading of Scripture and Scripture‟s spiritual interpretation, as well as the intrinsic unity

iv

between Scripture and Church in receiving Scriptural mediation. It is concluded that
these insights ease ongoing tensions between Frei and Tracy by showing that Frei‟s
insistence on the plain sense of Scripture is compatible with Tracy‟s insistence on the
transformative disclosure of Christ in Scripture.
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INTRODUCTION
I. The Debate between Revisionists and Postliberals
In the closing decades of the 20th century, theological dialogues in the United
States were marked by a prominent debate between two major approaches to the methods
and purposes of theology, as these two schools engaged in a significant discussion about
the theological interpretation of Scripture for the Church. Both sides agreed on several
major points: first, that interpretation of Scripture must be seen as a privileged and
unique locus of the mediation of God; second, that the Scriptures are central of the life
and practice of the Church; and third, that Scriptural interpretation must go beyond
employment of higher critical methods in order to understand its subject matter. Yet the
discussions were also marked by very different understandings about the methods and
aims of theology, and these differences have led to a number of impasses in the
discussion about the interpretation of Scripture in the Church. This introduction will
acquaint readers with the main emphases of each side, so that the debate between David
Tracy and Hans Frei, two major representatives of each school, can be more clearly
explored.
Revisionist theology is a trajectory of theology committed to reforming Christian
belief and practice in dialogue with contemporary culture and philosophy. 1 One of the

1
See William C. Placher, "Revisionist and Postliberal Theologies and the Public Character of
Theology," The Thomist 49, no. 3 (1985), 392. Placher (ibid), claims that Revisionist theology should
probably be considered the most dominant theological trajectory in the United States in the last 50 years,
and notes such names (besides Tracy) as “Catholics like…Leslie Dewart, Gregory Baum, and Michael
Novak, and Protestants like Langdon Gilkey…Edward Farley…Schubert Ogden…Gordon
Kaufman…[and] John Cobb.”

xi

distinguishing emphases of this movement is a commitment to the public accessibility of
theological discourse, which tends to assume a general mode of human understanding by
which specific religious claims can be related to human reason. 2 The various Liberation
and Postcolonial theologies, which have redirected much recent theological conversation
throughout the world, are related to this trajectory in their insistence that theological
method continually reevaluate Christian symbols and dialogue based on some external
norm of reason.3 Among revisionist theologians, a group of narrative theologians has
recently arisen, who have used phenomenological hermeneutics as the starting point for
critical correlation. This group includes Paul Ricoeur, David Tracy, and Sallie McFague,
all of whom are “revisionist, hermeneutical, Gadamerian-inspired correlationists.”4 This
revisionist focus on narrative is often associated with the university of Chicago, and is
often called the “Chicago school.”
This “Chicago school” are also called narrative theologians because they suggest
that stories have a unique role in the shaping of human beings. Yet they argue that all
narrative, including the Scriptures, must be continually renewed and corrected through
the disciplines applied to all texts. The “Chicago school” begins their reading of
Scripture from a general hermeneutics, even though they admit that the very referent of
Scripture is so reorienting that it stretches the general hermeneutic beyond the

2

Placher (ibid, 397), argues that revisionist theologians “seem to presuppose a universal
human something-or-other which various religions, in their various ways, express.” Yet Tracy is insistent
that he and other revisionists have incorporated a hermeneutical turn into their theology (See David Tracy,
"Lindbeck's New Program for Theology: A Reflection," The Thomist 49 (1985), 463-65).
3

For example, see Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist
Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1992) and Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of Dogma,
trans. Phillip Berryman (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992). Both claim to work off an explicitly
“revisionist” model.
4

Gary L. Comstock, "Two Types of Narrative Theology," Journal of the American Academy
of Religion 55, no. 4 (1987), 688.
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explanatory power of general rules. Among these revisionists narrative theologians,
David Tracy‟s work has had perhaps the most significant impact on contemporary
theological method. Tracy insists on keeping theology public discourse by continually
working to find some ground of commonality between Christian faith and those outside
the Christian faith. Tracy grounds his Scriptural interpretation in the phenomenological
hermeneutical methods of Ricoeur and Gadamer, insisting on a “method of correlation”
which will keep Scriptural reading „public‟ for all contemporary readers.5
The revisionist project could perhaps be best described by three characteristics.
First, while revisionists typically advance the basic insights of Schleiermacher and liberal
Protestant theology, they differ from liberals in their partial acceptance of insights from
classical theology which have found new expression in “neothomism” and “neoorthodoxy.”6 Revisionists do not believe that the project of liberalism has been entirely
successful, and they attempt to integrate the insights of modern culture with insights of
the classical Christian faith in a critical way. Specifically, revisionists emphasize that
entry into Christian faith occurs neither through a category of human reason, nor through

5

See David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (New York:
Seabury, 1975)., 12-55, and Tracy, : Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York:
Crossroad, 1981), 59-62. For Tracy, revisionist method requires both a phenomenological and metaphysical
analysis about God. Tracy (Blessed Rage for Order, 152), claims, “A metaphysical system is a construct of
concepts designed to provide coherence for all „the facts‟ on the basis of a theoretical model drawn from
among the facts.” This is needed because, as Tracy (ibid, 136), claims “the objective ground or referent of
all limit-experience and limit-language is that reality Christians name God.” This understanding of God
requires some method of analysis that goes beyond simply phenomenological reflection.
6

James J. Buckley ("Revisionists and Liberals," in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction
to Christian Theology since 1918, ed. David and Rachel Muers Ford, The Great Theologians (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 214). Buckley (ibid), notes, “Today‟s revisionaries aim to resolve problems
left by the second stage [the reaffirmations of orthodoxy] precisely by creating a third stage which sublates
the first two.” Theologians as diverse as Paul Tillich, Karl Rahner, Edward Schillebeeckx, Jurgen
Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg, as well as most of the feminist and liberation theologies could be
characterized as revisionist.
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some philosophically demonstrable dimension of religious experience, but instead is first
a gift of faith. 7
Second, contemporary revisionist theology has incorporated a hermeneutical turn
occasioned by focusing on the linguistic constitution of the human being emphasized in
recent philosophy. 8 While the quest of contemporary revisionists is to show that theology
is public dialogue which relates to the common sensibilities of modern human beings,
revisionists do not necessarily assume that there is some universal pre-linguistic religious
experience to which all persons are drawn. 9 Instead, the group focuses on the
relationship between the linguistic constitution of experience and the universal religious
dimension of individuals.
Third, perhaps the most definitive characteristic of the revisionist project is the
insistence to employ some criterion of correlation between orthodox Christian thought
and contemporary modern society. Revisionist theology could be understood as a critical
response to modernity which seeks to place Christian faith in mutually critical dialogue
with postmodern philosophical thought. As revisionists think that the very understanding
of God, Christ and human beings revealed in Christian faith requires critical engagement
with the world, revisionists are interested in keeping theology in the public sphere in

7

See David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 50.

8

See, for example, Paul Ricoeur, "Naming God," Union Seminary Quarterly Review 34
(1979)., 216), claims, “In one sense, therefore, texts do precede life. I can name God in my faith because
the texts preached to me have already named him.”
9

Tracy (“Lindbeck‟s New Program for Theology: A Reflection,” The Thomist 49, 1985, 461),
claims, “The argument among explicitly hermeneutical theologians has been consistent: one can maintain
the richer and broader understanding of „experience‟ forged by the great liberals…only by dialectically
relating it to recent understandings of „language‟ (and thereby, inevitably, also to history and society.”
Placher ("Revisionist and Postliberal Theologies,” 397), argues that revisionist theologians “seem to
presuppose a universal human something-or-other which various religions, in their various ways, express.”
This seems to be true, Placher argues, in spite of Tracy‟s argument that he does not start from universal
human experience.

xiv

mutual dialogue with secular fields of thought. Revisionists agree that the Christian faith
makes truth claims which can be expressed in ways that are intelligible to modern secular
society. Revisionists further agree that to make this language intelligible, the language of
the God of classic theism must be continually corrected and refined through the various
historical critical disciplines to be “related to human, religious, or specifically Christian
experience.”10 Traditional language must continually be revised in light of contemporary
understanding. Revisionists emphasize that there are no pure or comprehensive texts or
traditions, and hence critical revision and development must take place in both with the
help of public criteria.
Postliberal theology is a recent trajectory of theology which is grounded in the
work of Hans Frei and George Lindbeck. The roots of the postliberal movement began at
Yale in the 1970‟s with the early work of Hans Frei and David Kelsey. 11 According to
George Hunsinger, the first significant use of the term “postliberal” occurred in Frei‟s
doctoral dissertation, where he compared Barth‟s movement from liberal to
“postliberal.”12 Yet the movement of “postliberal theology” became visible after the
publication of George Lindbeck‟s influential 1984 book, The Nature of Doctrine:
10

Buckley, "Revisionists and Liberals," 217.

11

See Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Century Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974) and The Identity of Jesus Christ: The
Hermeneutical Bases of Dogmatic Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975); as well as David H.
Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975). James Buckley
(Modern Theologians, 229), names influential representatives as Stanley Hauerwas, Romald Thiemann,
James Buckley, Joseph DiNoia, Garrett Green, George Hunsinger, William Werpehowski, Bruce Marshall,
William Placher, Katheryn Greene-McCreight, Serene Jones, Joseph Mangia, Eugene Rogers, and
Katheryn Tanner.
12
George Hunsinger, "Postliberal Theology," in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern
Theology, ed. Kevin Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 47. There, says
Hunsinger (ibid), Frei noted three key emphases in Barth that will be significant for the new project of
postliberal theology: “critical realism (dialectic and analogy), the primacy of God, and Christocentricity.”
To over-generalize each movement, it could be said that while the chief theological influence is of the
“revisionists” is Schleiermacher, the chief theological influence of “postliberals” is Karl Barth.
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Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age.13 Among postliberal writers, Hans Frei has
written the most influential material, specifically on the interpretation of Scripture. He
continually emphasized the particularity of Jesus Christ as the center for the Christian
faith and hence for all Scriptural reading.
Like revisionist theology, the postliberal trajectory also could be described by
several distinct emphases. First, postliberals attempt to understand Christian reality
primarily through a straight-forward reading of the Gospel narratives. Postliberals
propose a model which allows the Scriptural texts to form the identity of the individual
reader. Hans Frei‟s hermeneutical project of realistic narrative is driven by a desire to
allow a plain reading of Scripture render to the reader the unsubstitutable Person of Christ
depicted in the Gospels. Frei‟s goal is to eliminate those symbolic and mythical
renderings of Christ presented by liberals and revisionists in order to allow Gospelreading to render a straight-forward, orthodox Christology. Both Lindbeck and Frei
emphasize that the Scriptural narratives are the indispensable place to understand the
Christian God, as these narratives “render a character…offer an identity description of an
agent,” who is the God of Christian faith. 14 As Lindbeck puts it,
The narrative does this, not through accounts of what God is in and of himself,
but through accounts of the interaction of his deeds and purposes with those of
creatures in their ever-changing circumstances. These accounts reach their climax
in what the gospels say about the risen, ascended, and ever-present Jesus Christ
whose identity as the divine-human agent is unsubstitutably enacted in the stories

13

George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984).
14

George Lindbeck, "Toward a Postliberal Theology," in The Return to Scripture in Judaism
and Christianity: Essays in Postcritical Scriptural Interpretation, ed. Peter Ochs (New York and Mahwah:
Paulist Press, 1993), citing David Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology, 48.
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of Jesus of Nazareth. The climax, however, is logically inseparable from what
precedes it.15
The whole Christian canon must, for postliberals, be given priority in forming the
experience of the individual reader, as it provides the language through which the reader
can enter into religious experience. Postliberals insist on “the primacy of language as
creating the possibility of fully human experience, instead of prior experience which
could then be described in language.”16 Hence Lindbeck and Frei emphasize a return to
an understanding of the storyline of the Bible to structure the experience of the reader as
a Christian.
Second, postliberals propose that theology be developed through “intratextual”
reflection rather than by critical correlation. Postliberals are worried that “the liberal
tendency to redescribe religion in extrascriptural frameworks has once again become
dominant,” after the movement of neo-orthodoxy.17 Postliberals insist that “religion is
more like a cultural system that one linguistically inhabits, and within which one is
shaped into a form of life, so that becoming religious is something like learning a
language.” 18 One of the focuses of Lindbeck‟s “cultural-linguistic” program is to show
that experience is formed by language rather than experience forming language.
Postliberalism, then, “sees its primary task as descriptive rather than apologetic. Energies
are concentrated more on explicating the internal structures and logic of Christian life

15

Lindbeck, “Toward a Postliberal Theology,” 95.

16

William C. Placher, "Paul Ricoeur and Postliberal Theology: A Conflict of
Interpretations?," Modern Theology 4, no. 1 (1987), 38.
17

Lindbeck, “Toward a Postliberal Theology,” 99.

18

Hunsinger, “Postliberal Theology”, 54.
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than on translating them into contemporary idioms through thought patterns.” 19
Postliberals shun systematic correlation largely because they follow the trajectory
established by Karl Barth in emphasizing the priority of God and God‟s self-revelation in
Jesus Christ over any other reality. 20 Postliberalism‟s focus on intratextuality does not
mean that theologians simply recite the biblical narrative. Rather, as Lindbeck claims,
“intratextuality cannot be genuine, cannot be faithful, unless it is innovative. A condition
for the vitality of these traditions is that they redescribe in their own distinctive idioms
the new social and intellectual worlds in which their adherents for the most part actually
live and into which humanity as a whole is now moving.” 21 The primary task of
theology, then, is to continually describe the mysteries of the Christian faith in such a
way that believers can describe their own existence in light of the Scriptures and selfdescription of the Church.
Third, postliberals emphasize that apologetics must be undertaken in an ad hoc
fashion. Fodor defines the term ad hoc as when “the occasion arises, in connection with
a particular issue, relative to a specific context, with respect to particular interlocutors.”22
This shift from systematic correlation to ad hoc correlation is intended to prevent a
particular method or philosophical description from overrunning the self-description of
the Church and its beliefs and practices. This movement has led to a general tendency in

19

James Fodor, "Postliberal Theology," in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to
Christian Theology since 1918, ed. David F. and Rachel Muers Ford, The Great Theologians (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 231.
20
Hunsinger (“Postliberal Theology,” 52), shows that Frei emphasized in his doctoral
dissertation on Barth that “God‟s priority” was a major reason for Barth‟s rejection of liberalism. See Frei,
“The Doctrine of Revelation in the Thought of Karl Barth, 1909 to 1922: The Nature of Barth‟s Break with
Liberalism,” unpublished dissertation (Yale University, 1956).
21

Lindbeck, “Toward a Postliberal Theology,” 100.

22

Fodor, "Postliberal Theology," 231.
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Lindbeck to understand “truth” as a matter of internal coherence, as doctrine is
interpreted “in „cultural-linguistic‟ or „regulative‟ terms….as communally authoritative
rules of discourse, attitude, and action.” 23 Yet other postliberals, such as Frei, display
more of a method of critical realism in their ad hoc correlation, continually emphasizing
the need to implement conceptual schemes to relate the world of the text with the
contemporary world, yet in such a way that Christianity is not redescribed in terms of
contemporary experience.24
The distinctive characteristics of these different trajectories have been seen most
clearly in the debates between David Tracy and Hans Frei. Frei‟s chief and ongoing
complaint about Tracy‟s model of theology is that it employs a systematic correlation
between Christian tradition and human experience, which Frei feels grants authority to
human experience over text and tradition. The consequences of Tracy‟s model of
systematic correlation, as Frei sees them, are the following: Tracy continually gives
priority to a general philosophical scheme over specific Christian claims; he persistently
gives priority to apologetics over the internal structure of the Christian faith; he fails to

23

Placher ("Revisionist and Postliberal Theologies,” 397, citing Lindbeck, The Nature of
Doctrine, 18), suggests that Lindbeck sees doctrinal “truths” as more a matter of internal coherence to the
Christian system than “truths” based on some general form of logic.
24

Hunsinger (“Postliberal Theology,” 46), distinguishes between Lindbeck and Frei, calling
the former “neoliberal” and the latter “postliberal.” Hunsinger (ibid, 46), claims that Lindbeck‟s “culturallinguistic” program is so described because he promotes what Hunsinger calls a “pragmatist” theory of
truth where “both „doctrine‟ and „truth‟ are so defined as to make them significantly non-cognative” and
“any conceivable propositional content in theological language is relativized.” Thus where liberal theology
has described truth as “experiential-expressive,” and hence non-cognitive, Lindbeck‟s proposal “relativizes
doctrine‟s propositional content…by redefinition (the „rule theory‟) (47). Here Hunsinger emphasizes that
postliberals have largely not been convinced by Lindbeck‟s argument that doctrinal language does not refer
beyond the community, and concludes that postliberals wish to claim that the Scriptural narratives really do
render true (but analogical) claims about God, the referent of the text (46).
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account adequately for the particularity of Christ.25 Tracy‟s ongoing criticism of Frei, on
the other hand, is that Frei‟s exclusive focus on realistic narrative and the self-description
of the Church will prohibit the Church from developing a truly public engagement with
the world. 26 For Tracy, the consequences of failing to establish a correlational criteria of
intelligibility are the following: the Church may fail to make its message relevant to
modern culture; the Church may fail to incorporate truth found outside itself into its own
identity; and the Church‟s failure to be self-critical may stifle the necessary pluralism
within the Church rooted in Scripture itself. 27 These disagreements about the relative the
priority each accords to the relationship between Christian self-description and general
systems of meaning have tended to overshadow the strong agreement both theologians
for the primacy of the “plain sense” of Scripture, the need for narrative reading to render
the particularity of Jesus Christ, and the need to move from the text itself to the
disclosure of God in the Scriptures.

II. The Problem: Narrowing Hermeneutical Horizons to Text and Reader
The debate between Tracy and Frei about the relative priority of Christian selfdescription and general systems of meaning has caused their work on the interpretation of
25

I have adapted these three general criticisms from Mike A. Higton, "Hans Frei and David
Tracy on the Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Christianity," The Journal of Religion 79, no. 4 (1999).,
566-91, esp. 577-86.
26

For a summary of mutual criticisms, see David Tracy, "On Reading the Scriptures
Theologically," in Theology and Dialogue: Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck, ed. Bruce
Marshall (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 36-37; 58-59, nt. 16, and Hans W. Frei,
Types of Christian Theology, ed. George and William Placher Hunsinger (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1992), 60-65.
27

For these criticisms, see David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and
the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 113; Dialogue with the Other, the Inter-Religious
Dialogue (Leuven and Grand Rapids: Peeters Press and Eerdmans, 1990), 114; and "On Reading the
Scriptures Theologically," 43-57, respectively.
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Scripture to focus heavily on method as they seek to show how the subject matter of
Scripture is understood by readers. Tracy‟s emphasis on the public nature of theology
and his insistence that all religious texts are potentially disclosive of the divine cause him
to adopt the phenomenological method of interpretation developed by Paul Ricoeur to
show that the subject matter of the Bible confronts the reader in front of the text and
creates a “new-mode-of-being-in-the-world,” or allows the reader to experience new
existential possibilities.28 Frei‟s emphasis on the particular identity of Jesus Christ
rendered through a realistic reading of Scripture cause him to emphasize the literal sense
of the Gospel narratives as normative for Christian reading and to extend that story
throughout the whole Bible through the practice of figural reading. 29 The debate has
proven helpful in forcing theologians to more clearly articulate what is the subject matter
of Scripture as well as how the texts render that subject matter to readers. Furthermore,
the debate has forced theologians to reflect more precisely on the relative priority given
to Christian self-description in relation to apologetic explanations of Christian faith to
those outside the Church, as well as to gain a new appreciation for Scriptural narrative as
the normative means by which the Christian faith is mediated to readers.
Yet while the discussion between Tracy and Frei has identified some important
issues for the method of Scriptural interpretation, it has also drawn attention away from
important aspects of a Christian interpretation of Scripture. While Tracy argues that the
purpose of reading Scripture is the disclosure of the Divine who is always in radical
proximity to the reader, and Frei insists that the purpose of reading Scripture is to
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Tracy, The Blessed Rage for Order, 134.
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See Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 1-10.
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recognize the identity of the Christ who is present to the reader, the narrowing of focus
almost exclusively to the relationship between text and reader has caused considerations
about the way in which the Triune God uses Scripture in the economy of redemption to
be largely ignored.30 This attempt to treat the relationship of text and reader in biblical
hermeneutics in isolation from the larger discussion of Scripture‟s role in the economy of
redemption has forced a number of polarities which have created certain impasses in the
discussion about method. As a result, many important insights by both theologians have
been overlooked by later theologians who tend to choose one author‟s method over the
other and likewise focus almost exclusively on the relationship between text and reader.
This narrowing of the discussion about Scriptural interpretation to the relationship
between text and reader, ironically, has caused theologians to overlook the moment
which is most central to Tracy and Frei‟s understanding of Scriptural interpretation: the
movement from the texts themselves to the spiritual reality disclosed by means of the
texts. Central to the work of both Tracy and Frei is the goal of showing how Scripture is
disclosive of the Triune God. Both Tracy and Frei would insist that “positive historical
science is incapable of providing a complete interpretation of those spiritual realities
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The “economy of redemption” refers to the ordering of the various parts of God‟s action in
salvation history toward God‟s final plan for creation. See here John J. and R.R. Reno O'Keefe, Sanctified
Vision: An Introduction to Early Christian Interpretation of the Bible (Baltimore and London: John
Hopkins University Press, 2005), 37, where they give the examples of a “careful sequencing of events in
historical narratives,” a well plotted story, and an outline of a text. They also use the examples of narrative
sequencing which provides a pattern and demonstrates a predictive value about what will be next. Christ,
rightly understood, was this interpretive principle which established the meaning of the Scriptures for the
early Church. While the term “economy” often referred to the ordering of the Scriptures in light of Christ,
it also referred to the organization of the various parts of God‟s redemptive action among human beings.
Not only did God call out a people and establish covenants with human beings in the Old Testament, but
God continues to mediate salvation to human beings today through the New Covenant, the presence of
Jesus Christ through the Holy Spirit. According to Christian faith, God has established various realities to
mediate the Mystery of Christ to human beings for salvation.

xxii

which are the ultimate subject matter of biblical texts.”31 Consequently, both agree that
to read the Bible as Scripture, the reader must somehow make a move from text to
spiritual reality. 32 Yet when focus remains only on the relationship between text and
reader, neither is able to articulate this movement. Not surprisingly, as their respective
projects remain underdeveloped with regard to Scripture‟s place in the economy of
redemption (both in discussing the way in which the Triune God uses the Scriptural texts
for self-mediation to readers and in articulating the unique capacity of the Church to
receive Christ‟s mediation in the Scriptural texts), Tracy and Frei disagree strongly about
what it means to move from text to spiritual reality, how the reader makes such a move,
and what exactly is rendered when the movement is made. For Tracy, the movement
from letter to spirit occurs when the reader, through reading the text with the employment
of a phenomenological system of general hermeneutics, encounters a reality so great that
it leads the reader beyond what the hermeneutical system could render. Tracy most often
describes this as limit-experiences, and he is at times unclear as to whether the ultimate
referent of the text is human experience or God.33 For Frei, the referent of Scripture is
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Marcellino G. D'Ambrosio, "Henri De Lubac and the Critique of Scientific Exegesis,"
Communio 19 (1992), 384. D‟Ambrosio is speaking of Blondel and de Lubac, but the claim could
describe a persistent emphasis in Tracy, Frei and Vanhoozer as well, as each attempts to go beyond general
hermeneutics to account for the unique subject matter.
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This movement may be variously described as the movement from reading the Bible to
reading Scripture, as Joel B. Green, Siezed by Truth: Reading the Bible as Scripture (Nashville: Abingdon
Press, 2007), or as the movement from the realm of nature to the realm of grace as William Abraham,
Divine Revelation and the Limits of Historical Criticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). The
four theologians in this dissertation are by no means unique in this emphasis, but it is this movement which
will provide a lens for study since it is here that the crossroad between hermeneutical method and dogmatic
description most urgently presents itself.
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In this, Tracy follows Ricoeur‟s argument in “Biblical Hermeneutics,” Semeia 4 (1975), 34.
Ricoeur (ibid, 108), later claims, “These limit-experiences, redescribed by the limit-expressions of religious
language, constitute the appropriate referent of this language.” For Tracy‟s ambiguity about ultimate
referent, see especially Hans W. Frei, Types of Christian Theology, ed. George and William Placher
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the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ who cannot be thought of except as present to
the believer.34 Frei, then, emphasizes realistic reading (i.e. reading according to the plain
sense of the text) of the Gospel narratives as the means by which the movement from
letter to spiritual reality occurs as the risen, present Christ is mediated to readers.
While both authors disagree about this essential movement, it is difficult to know
how any further focus on only the relationship between texts and readers could advance
the discussion beyond its present impasse. It is only when the hermeneutical discussion
is broadened to include the way in which the Triune God uses Scripture for selfmediation to the Church in the economy of redemption that it is possible to show how the
Scriptures disclose spiritual reality. Where the relationship between Christ, Scripture and
Church is left implicit, general principles of method are naturally appealed to in order
settle theological issues. Such methodological principles, while important for describing
the relationship between texts and readers, are insufficient to overcome theological
lacunas. Consequently, these result in impasses in hermeneutical discussions.

III. Proposal: Widening the Discussion to the Economy of Redemption
The impasses in method between Tracy and Frei can only be investigated and
advanced by first locating Scripture in the economy of redemption, thus allowing
discussions of hermeneutical method to flourish within the framework of explicit
dogmatic concerns. Locating Scripture in the economy of redemption means to develop
Hunsinger (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) and William Placher, “Paul Ricoeur and Postliberal
Theology: A Conflict of Interpretations?” pp. 35-52.
34

See Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ. As Francis Watson (Text, Church, and World (Grand
Rapids: T. & T. Clark, 1994), 286, cited in Hunsinger, “Postliberal Theology,” 48), puts it, Frei‟s
“intratextual realism,” is “the irreducibly textual mediation of realities that nonetheless precede and
transcend their textual embodiment.”
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an explicitly theological articulation of the relationship between the Triune God,
Scripture and Church to show how both Scripture and Church participate in the Mystery
of Christ. To advance this discussion, I will explore the works of two other theologians,
Ressourcement Catholic Henri de Lubac and Evangelical Protestant Kevin Vanhoozer.
These two theologians have been chosen as dialogue partners to Tracy and Frei partly
because each represents a significant theological trajectory in the past half century which
is not frequently brought into dialogue with the revisionists and postliberals. 35
Furthermore, both have been chosen because they begin their hermeneutical discussions
with a theological description of the economy of redemption. This description explicitly
considers God‟s activity in Scripture and the responsive action of the reading community.
Vanhoozer‟s project is centered on his claim that God is the primary author of Scripture,
who uses it as a covenant document to address the Church. The movement from text to
spiritual reality, for Vanhoozer, takes place when the reader approaches the text with the
correct theological presuppositions, thus treating the text respectfully and allowing the
Spirit to apply God‟s canonical speaking action to the reader. De Lubac‟s project is
centered on his claim that the literal sense sacramentally renders the spiritual sense of
Scripture as Christ, who stands as active Subject of Scripture, uses the Scriptural texts to
communicate with readers and incorporate them into the Church, the eschatological totus
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The choice of a Catholic and a Protestant representing different theological trajectories is
also significant, as a number of traditional relationships are being reinvestigated. Since the Reformation, it
has been of great importance to Protestants to structure the Scripture/Church relationship in such a way that
Scripture is able to stand apart from the Church and critique it. In Protestantism today this separation is
being reevaluated, due in large part to new developments in hermeneutical theory. Ecumenically,
Protestants are learning that interpretive communities play an indispensable role in interpretation, while
Catholics, Evangelicals, and mainline Protestants are rediscovering the value of premodern exegesis.
Debates about Scriptural hermeneutics, therefore, are being reformulated around theological issues such as
the mediation of Christ to the Church, God‟s self-communication to redeem believers, and the relationship
between Scripture and ecclesiology.
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Christus. The movement from text to spiritual reality, for de Lubac, takes place as the
reader moves from encountering the events of salvation history recorded in the text to
incorporation into the totus Christus, the eschatological body of Christ. For both
theologians, then, reading Scripture correctly requires specific attention to the
relationships between theological realities in the economy of redemption. By adding
insights from Vanhoozer and de Lubac, it will be possible to see how the work of Tracy
and Frei could be appropriated within the larger context of the economy of redemption in
such a way that certain impasses between them are overcome.

IV. The Project: Sketching the Development of the Dissertation
This dissertation will seek to advance discussions for a theological interpretation
of Scripture by describing Scripture‟s relationship to Christ and the Church in the
economy of redemption. Chapter one will examine the distinctive methods for Scriptural
reading developed by Tracy and Frei in order to highlight both their unique contributions
to hermeneutical method and certain impasses which have arisen through their debates.
The chapter will discuss both constructions of method and ecclesiology to show that the
discussion of text and reader in Scriptural hermeneutics cannot be accomplished in
isolation from a discussion of the Church. This chapter will argue that these impasses
have been caused by a narrowing of hermeneutical focus to the relationship between text
and reader, and that such impasses could be overcome by placing Scripture in the broader
context of the economy of redemption.
Chapter two will bring Vanhoozer into the discussion to show how an attempt to
locate Scripture in the economy of redemption can expand hermeneutical discussion.
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Vanhoozer‟s early work will be used to illustrate a failure in hermeneutical method
because his singular concern to safeguard the authority of Scripture prevents him from
locating Scripture‟s place in the economy of redemption. This failure is corrected in
Vanhoozer‟s later work, as Vanhoozer specifically constructs a hermeneutical system
based on God‟s use of the biblical texts to lead the Church. Yet even in Vanhoozer‟s
later project his lack of ecclesiological reflection leaves him with hermeneutical
difficulties which significantly weaken his project.
Chapter three will examine the work of Henri de Lubac to show a different
attempt to locate Scripture and Church in the economy of redemption. De Lubac‟s
insistence that Scripture must move from the literal sense to the spiritual senses of
allegory, tropology, and anagogy will be examined within the context of his claim that
Christ uses Scripture, as an incorporation of the Logos, to mediate Himself to His body
the Church. Here it will be suggested that de Lubac‟s articulation of Scripture‟s place in
the economy of redemption has allowed him to identify an essential moment in Christian
reading, the movement from text to spiritual reality which de Lubac calls the “traditional
hermeneutic.”36 Furthermore, it will be suggested that the integral unity that de Lubac
finds between Christ, Scripture and Church will provide insights which could advance the
hermeneutical discussion among all four authors.
Chapter four will place all four authors in dialogue to advance a more complete
theological interpretation of Scripture within the context of the economy of redemption.
The first section will examine the relationship between Christ, Scripture, and Logos to
specify how Christ is both the subject matter of Scripture and the one who addresses the
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See especially Marcellino G. D'Ambrosio, Henri De Lubac and the Recovery of the
Traditional Hermeneutic (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services, 1991), 144-219.

xxvii

Church by means of Scripture. Here de Lubac‟s central claim that Christ is both Subject
and Object of Scripture will serve as the hermeneutical lens by which all four authors will
be evaluated and the dialogue advanced, as it shows the intrinsic connection between the
Church‟s traditional insistence on the plain sense of Scripture and the inevitable
movement from text to spiritual reality that takes place in Christian reading. This section
will show that when Scriptural interpretation is considered in this broader context, Frei‟s
emphasis on realistic reading and de Lubac‟s emphasis on spiritual interpretation appear
to be mutually complementary rather than in opposition to one another.
The second section will examine the relationship between the Scriptures and the
Church to specify the unique capacity of the Church to receive the mediation of Christ in
Scripture. Here de Lubac‟s articulation of the relationship between Christ as the
Incarnation of the Logos, Scripture, Church and Eucharist as incorporations of the Logos,
and all persons as bearing an imprint of the Logos, will serve as the hermeneutical lens
by which to illumine the varying degrees of participation in the Logos in the economy of
redemption. This distinction will show the integral correspondence between Church and
Scripture and will illumine the way in which the Church as a reading community stands
in a unique location to receive and participate in the mediation of Christ. De Lubac‟s
articulation of the intrinsic connection between Scripture and Church will be used to
show that the central concern of Vanhoozer and Frei to locate authority in either Scripture
or the Church is largely a false dilemma, as both Scripture and Church bear authority
through their participation in and mediation of the risen Christ. Having argued that the
problem of authority could be largely overcome by showing the intrinsic relationship
between Scripture and the experience of the Church, the chapter will return to the debate
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between Tracy and Frei to argue that Tracy‟s later work contains insights which could
illumine the relationship between Scripture and the Church and advance the
hermeneutical conversation.
Overall, then, the dissertation will seek to advance the discussion between Tracy
and Frei in several ways. First, it will highlight the movement from text to spiritual
reality, the illusive feature which both Tracy and Frei believe is central to a Christian
interpretation of Scripture but which neither can adequately articulate because their
projects narrow hermeneutical focus to the relationship between texts and readers.
Second, it will show the validity of Frei‟s project of realistic reading in fundamental
agreement with, and not in opposition to, Tracy‟s emphasis on transformative disclosure
encountered in reading, since the same Jesus Christ who is rendered to the reader in the
literal sense is the risen Christ who addresses readers by means of Scripture. Third, it
will show the validity of Tracy‟s emphasis on the experience of the reading community in
fundamental agreement with Frei‟s emphasis on the identity of Christ, as it demonstrates
the intrinsic correspondence between the Scriptures and the Church in the economy of
redemption. By examining hermeneutical debates within this broader context, the
dissertation will show how these impasses between Tracy and Frei can be advanced to
produce a more complete framework for the Christian interpretation of Scripture. Such a
complete framework for Christian interpretation, it is hoped, can provide guidelines
which apply to other theological trajectories beyond the immediate North American
discussion. 37
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It should be noted that this discussion about Frei and Tracy is predominantly a North
American discussion about narrative theology. Yet the debate between Frei and Tracy, as well as the
suggestions I propose to move beyond the impasse, do relate to a number of other theological trajectories.
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Frei tirelessly insists that what is “behind the text” can never replace what is “in the text” as an adequate
mediation of the particular Jesus Christ; he insists that a particular human ideal not replace the identity of
the Person of Jesus Christ; and he insists that philosophical correlation be subordinated to the content that
the texts render. Here I suggest points of contact between this debate and Latin American liberation
theology, North American feminist revisionist theology, and theologies forged in inter-religious dialogue.
First, Latin American liberation theologians such as Leonardo Boff and Jon Sobrino have emphasized the
plain sense reading of Scripture and the disclosure of Christ to the Church in ways that are somewhat
similar to the proposal presented here. Boff and Sobrino place considerable emphasis on the intrinsic
relationship between the historical Jesus and the risen Christ experienced by the Church, as the historical
Jesus provides not only the best model of one devoted to the poor and outcast, but is also the cosmic Christ
who encounters those who seek liberation today (here Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator: A Critical
Christology for Our Time (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1978), probably provides the most helpful model
as it connects the historical person of Jesus Christ with the present cosmic Christ which the Church
experiences. See also Jon Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator: A Historical-Theological Reading of Jesus of
Nazareth (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1993). This insistence on the historical Jesus of the Gospels is admirable, and
it keeps the Jesus Christ of history related to the Jesus Christ who addresses the Church today. Frei‟s
insistence on the identity of Jesus Christ as presented by the Gospel narratives would be largely in
agreement with this impulse. Yet Frei, for example, would be critical of John Louis Segundo‟s articulation
of Scripture as divine pedagogy rather than divine inspiration (Juan Luis Segundo, The Liberation of
Dogma, trans. Phillip Berryman (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), argues God is the director of a long
educational process, in which the Scriptures present a record of the ways in which God has caused the
community to experience divine values. Segundo (ibid, 119-20), emphasizes that the community must go
beyond the letter of the text, and uses the example of Jesus sending the Spirit to lead the disciples into all
truth.). Frei would insist that the identity of the Person of Jesus Christ not be subordinated to the idea of
liberation (however important is liberation). Frei would also insist that the texts themselves, rather than
historical Jesus research, be considered primary in formulating the Christian understanding of Jesus Christ.
Second, Frei has provided a valid critique for feminist revisionists such as Elizabeth Johnson and Sallie
McFague. The key challenge Frei sees for a post-liberal age is grounding the experience of the Church in
the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ. Frei would be concerned, for example, that Elizabeth Johnson
often gives the theme of salvation priority over the identity of Christ as provider of that salvation, thus
subordinating Christ to an idea of liberation (see, for example, Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The
Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1992), 6). Furthermore, Frei
would see in the work of Sallie McFague the worst of the liberal tradition, as she boldly constructs new
paradigms for theology which are not related to the plain sense reading of the Gospel narratives (see, for
example, see Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1987), 199, for an account of the resurrection which is completely separated from Jesus‟
historical life). Third, Frei‟s work provides a critique for certain theologies developed in the context of
inter-religious dialogue. For example, Frei would be wary of Raimon Panikkar‟s strong distinction
between the historical Jesus Christ and the risen, cosmic Jesus Christ which make it unnecessary to show
that the historical Christ is necessary for an understanding of the cosmic Christ (for Panikkar, the
particularity of Jesus Christ may be important for the Christian, but it is not necessary for those of other
faiths, and even Buddha, Siva, Krishna, etc. could be Christ, not as many Christs, but as various
expressions of Christ—see Raimon Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism (London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1964), 121). Frei would agree with Peter Phan that the relationship between Jesus and
other savior figures is “asymmetrical,” as Christ is the finality of revelation (see Being Religious
Interreligiously: Asian Perspectives on Interfaith Dialogue. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004, 67). Yet
this asymmetry, Frei would argue, should lead to intertextual readings of Scripture which seek to make
sense of all reality (including other religions) in light of Christ and His story. Overall, then, although this
dissertation explores only an American hermeneutical discussion about the reading of Scripture, the
conclusions which it will draw have relevance to other theological trajectories as well.
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CHAPTER 1:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND IMPASSES IN THE DEBATE BETWEEN HANS FREI AND
DAVID TRACY
I. Introducing the Discussion Between Hans Frei and David Tracy
David Tracy and Hans Frei both began their publishing careers at about the same
time, each proposing a very different trajectory for the project of theology. In 1974 Frei
published his first (and best known) major work, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A
Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics. By then Frei was already in
his 50‟s, and had been teaching at Yale University for over 15 years. This major work
was followed up with another book, The Identity of Jesus Christ: The Hermeneutical
Bases of Dogmatic Theology, in 1975.38 Frei was concerned because he felt that the
whole liberal tradition, and nearly all theology from the 18th century onward, had sought
to employ hermeneutics in the service of apologetic defense of the Christian faith, and
consequently hermeneutical method emphasized a combination of historical
reconstruction and philosophical rationale grounded in general human experience. 39 This
Liberal approach was destined to failure, Frei argued, because it pressed the plain sense
of the texts into the service of contemporary apologetics, thereby “eclipsing” the realism
inherent in biblical narrative. Frei calls for a reassessment Christian theological method
which would start from a return to the plain sense of the Gospel narratives. These two
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See here George Hunsinger, "Hans Frei as Theologian: The Quest for a Generous
Orthodoxy," Modern Theology 8, no. 2 (1992), 105.
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major works together argue that the only way to understand the meaning of Jesus Christ
for readers today is to understand the particular identity of Jesus Christ as rendered in the
plain sense of the Gospels.
As these two books were being published, David Tracy was finishing his first
major work, The Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology.40 At the time
of its publication in 1975, Tracy was only 36 and had been teaching at the University of
Chicago for five years. Tracy‟s concern was to keep Christian theology relevant to the
postmodern pluralistic situation, and in this book Tracy seeks to prepare theologians to
engage pluralism by forming a method of critical correlation by which to relate Christian
faith with contemporary meaning systems. Since Tracy had suggested that the two
principle sources for the development of theology are common human experience
(reflected upon best in language) and the Christian tradition (as preserved primarily in
Christian symbols and texts), Tracy argued that phenomenological hermeneutics provided
the best tools to carry out the task of mutually critical correlation. As a result, Tracy
adopts the philosophical hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer to
engage this correlational task.
Tracy does not refer to Frei‟s project until the publication of his second major
work, The Analogical Imagination in 1981. In this work, Tracy suggests that Frei‟s
project is reconcilable with his own system of phenomenological hermeneutics, as he
sees Frei‟s project as a helpful examination of the genre of narrative among other

40

Tracy‟s dissertation, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan (New York: Herder and
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genres. 41 In this book, Tracy develops a model of the classic to show that the way in
which texts and symbols in all cultures disclose truth to readers is analogous to the way in
which Christian texts and symbols disclose the God of Christian faith to believers. Each
genre in Scripture, Tracy argues, has disclosive potential as it is part of the whole
religious text of Scripture. Tracy insists that the very Christian understanding of God
requires discussion of God to be public, insisting that, “Any authentic speech on the
reality of God which is really private or particularist is unworthy of that reality.” 42 As a
result, Tracy argues that the theologian is obligated to establish a method which
correlates Christian theology with contemporary human experience.
For Frei, Tracy‟s work represented exactly the „eclipsing‟ of the identity of Jesus
Christ that was so pervasive in the Liberal theological movement, as Tracy‟s model
seems to start with some presupposed idea about human understanding and then adapts
the meaning of the biblical texts into that conceptual scheme. This method, Frei
believed, would change the referent of the Gospel narratives from Jesus to the existential
possibility of the reader, as the texts are said to envision a new “mode-of-being-in-theworld” for the receptive reader.43 In 1984, Frei‟s colleague at Yale, George Lindbeck,
wrote his influential work The Nature of Doctrine, accusing Tracy of being an
“experiential-expressivist” (a theologian who understands doctrine to be simply a witness
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to those common expressions of religious experience). 44 Lindbeck‟s book established
postliberal theology as an identifiable theological trajectory in opposition to revisionist
theology, and influenced Frei‟s influential 1986 article entitled “The „Literal Reading‟ of
Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition: Does it Stretch or Will it Break?,” which
was directed squarely against the phenomenological hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur and
David Tracy. 45 In this article, Frei criticized any attempt to start with a general
hermeneutical method for Scriptural reading, suggesting that general method can only
lead to a pre-conceived, general conclusion which will depreciate the uniqueness of Jesus
Christ. To make this argument, Frei abandoned his earlier claim that „realistic reading‟ is
a necessary feature of the texts themselves and instead claims that the Gospels must be
read realistically because the community has established this reading practice. To ground
his own argument for a literal reading of Scripture in the structure of the texts themselves,
Frei realized, would be to simply pose one general hermeneutical system against another.
Consequently, Frei decided to ground his argument for plain sense reading in community
consensus rather than in the features of the text itself.
Unfortunately, Frei‟s unexpected death in 1988 prevented him from completing
his anticipated work on the history of Christology since the Enlightenment. 46 Some of
Frei‟s preparation for that work was published in 1992 as Types of Christian Theology, in
which Frei compares the relative value accorded to philosophical reflection and Christian
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self-description by contemporary theologians in the construction of theological method. 47
In that work, Frei characterized Tracy‟s method as one in which “external description and
self-description” are grounded in a “foundational philosophical scheme,” and finds it
ultimately unhelpful to the development of Christian theology. 48 However, since it is not
known exactly when Frei wrote this portion of his work, it is not possible to say with
certainty how Frei viewed Tracy‟s later work.49
As early as 1981, Tracy had argued that there was no fundamental incompatibility
between Frei‟s project and his own correlational program. Throughout his career and
especially after Frei‟s death, Tracy has expressed appreciation for Frei‟s insistence on
realistic reading and has sought to incorporate Frei‟s insights into his own work. 50 Yet
Tracy remains wary of any hermeneutical project which does not seek to make Christian
theology public, and insists that the task of the systematic theologian is to show the
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Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 6), claims that Tracy “tries to have it both ways,” (i.e.
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relevance of Christian faith to contemporary human experience. 51 As a result, Tracy has
never accepted Frei‟s project as a “wholesale” program for theology, but sees it as
yielding one important about narrative reading which can be integrated into his own
larger correlational method.52
This chapter will provide an overview of the projects of Tracy and Frei and will
focus on the basic disagreements between them as they articulate a method for reading
Scripture in the Church. In the first section, I will examine the way in which each
theologian understands the relationship between text and readers in which interpretation
takes place. Then I will examine a key difficulty faced by each in articulating a model of
textual interpretation. I will suggest that Frei‟s greatest struggle is determining whether
to ground authority for the plain sense in the text or in the reading community, and that
Tracy‟s greatest struggle is determining how to let the particular claims of Scripture be
recognized in a way that is not muted by a general theory of interpretation. These
difficulties are heightened, I will suggest, by a nearly exclusive focus on the text/reader
relationship in the hermeneutical model. In the second section, I will examine the way in
which each theologian describes the Church as reading community in the process
interpretation. I will suggest that the almost exclusive focus on textual method has
caused both theologians to focus on the Church as a social reality instead of as a
theological reality. I will conclude by showing how an overemphasis on the text/reader
relationship has led to impasses in the theological discussion and will suggest that these
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impasses could be overcome, in part, by better accounting for God‟s active mediation to
the Church in the process of Scriptural interpretation.

II. Scriptural Interpretation: Emphasizing the Text/Reader Relationship
Tracy and Frei stand together in their insistence both that the Scriptures are
authoritative for the Church, and that the Scriptures are sufficiently clear to be read
plainly by all readers. Furthermore, both Tracy and Frei emphasize that the subject
matter of Scripture is so unique that it is capable of reorienting the very identity of the
reader who approaches these texts with an to understand it. Most significantly, these
theologians agree that both Scripture‟s authority and the way in which it renders its
unique content to readers must be identified and safeguarded through a particular method
of reading. Yet Tracy and Frei have disagreed sharply about the kind of method needed
to safeguard both the unique content of the text and the ability of the text to reorient the
reader. Early in his career Frei places emphasis on the text itself, arguing that the text
“renders” or “depicts” the truth contained as the reader simply reads it plainly. Later in
his career Frei continues to emphasize the straightforward reading of the plain sense, but
seeks to ground the use of the plain sense in the authority of the early Christian
community. Throughout his career, Tracy places most emphasis on the activity of the
reader in relation to the text, constructing a phenomenological system of understanding in
which the text discloses truth to the interpreter. Tracy makes it clear that his focus
“principally relates to the tradition which focuses upon the reader‟s response or the

7

reception of the work.”53 This disagreement on method between Tracy and Frei has
resulted in a number of impasses in Scriptural interpretation and has deepened divisions
between revisionists and postliberals.
This section will show the way in which each author focuses almost exclusively
on the relationship between text and reader to construct his respective method. The
tensions between the two theologians about method, I will argue throughout the
dissertation, can be eased (though not entirely overcome) as the text/reader discussion is
placed within a larger theological construct of the relationship between the Triune God
and the Church, and God‟s use of the biblical text for self-communication. Discussion of
the economy of redemption will place biblical text, individual reader and Church in
relationship to one another and understand all three as having a role in God‟s plan of
salvation. 54 Placing the Frei/Tracy debate in this broader context will broaden the
discussion of the relationship between texts and reading community.

A. The Focus on Method in Frei and Tracy: Aims and Influences
This section will examine the development of hermeneutical method by Frei and
Tracy, providing an analysis of the greatest influences upon each theologian‟s project. It
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will seek to show the contribution they makes to Scriptural hermeneutics as they employ
philosophical and literary resources to advance their central interpretive aims. As a result
of this examination of method, it will be possible to more carefully locate the
disagreements between Frei and Tracy.

1. Frei: Scripture Renders the Unsubstitutable Identity of Jesus Christ
Aims: The primary emphasis of Frei‟s hermeneutics is to show how the Gospel
texts render the identity of Jesus Christ, and through that identity, His presence today.
From the beginning of his career, Frei argued that primarily because of modern
hermeneutical endeavors “anthropological and Christological apologetics” have become
the primary concern of modern theology. 55 The chief goal of contemporary theologians
has been to try to fit the gospel stories into present-day criteria, focusing on historical
categories, apologetics, and general categories of meaning. Frei feels that this
preoccupation with explaining biblical events in terms of present experience has caused
an “eclipse” of biblical narrative as it has posited the necessity for an external criteria of
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Hans W. Frei, "Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal," in Theology and
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meaning to determine the validity of biblical stories, and hence has subordinated the plain
ascriptive reading of the biblical narrative to philosophical schemas. 56 To the modern
interpreter, both dogmatics and metaphysics must be bracketed in order to attend to a
critical reading of the biblical text. Yet Frei proposes that this bracketing has been
largely responsible for an external meaning structure eclipsing the biblical texts. For Frei,
modern theology must radically change its focus in order to return to a faithful rendering
of the essence of Christianity. 57
Frei, then, resists a system where anthropological or philosophical concerns
become the organizing or systematic principle for interpreting the Christian faith. Frei
believes that systematic correlation always gives the general philosophical system
priority over Christian self-description in determining meaning for Christianity, as it
continues the eclipse. Ultimately, Frei is worried that “the story of the gospel by itself
becomes an extended metaphor,” so that we again need “a correlation, a new disclosure
of a possible mode-of-being-in-the-world that will fit with our contemporary limit
experience.”58 To avoid this eclipse, Frei believes, modern theology must become more
self-critical about allowing general philosophical meaning systems to determine the
meaning of Christianity. Frei‟s earliest paper reflects his lifelong appeal: “My plea here
56
Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 1-10. Frei (“Remarks in Connection with
a Theological Proposal,” 28), notes, “If the aim of the theological enterprise has been almost wholly
apologetic, its organizing or systematic principle largely anthropological, its doctrinal content has been
well-nigh exclusively Christological.” The result is that modern theology has focused on salvation, which
has been oriented around a modernist notion of the human person in general, so that Christ‟s saving action
replaces his identity.
57
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is—the more formal, the less loaded one can make the notion of understanding, the
better.”59
Frei‟s goal in his first two books, The Identity of Jesus Christ and The Eclipse of
Biblical Narrative, is to restore a focus on the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ as
the center of the Christian faith through a plain reading of the Gospel narratives. In both,
his constructive proposal is that the text itself renders an unsubstitutable identity of Jesus
Christ in such a way that simply reading it plainly will lead the reader to acknowledge the
unique identity of Jesus. This unsubstitutable identity has been eclipsed, Frei believes, by
the modern quest for grounding all theological claims in categories of human
meaningfulness. This extrinsic structure must be removed to allow the Gospels to speak
for themselves. The Gospel narratives, he thinks, are quite plain in meaning, even if the
interpreter struggles to fit them into a general framework of meaning. 60 In Frei‟s early
work, then, all the emphasis is on the activity of the text—the text which “renders,”
“deploys,” “articulates,” “depicts,” “instantiates” its meaning to the reader as the reader
reads it plainly. 61
Influences: Erich Auerbach, New Criticism, Gilbert Ryle: Yet in order to show
that extrinsic meaning systems ought to be removed to read Scripture, Frei must show
how the texts really do render the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ plainly. Frei
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uses a number of concepts not taken from contemporary literary theory and modern
psychology to emphasize the plain sense of the narratives. It is clear, then, that Frei
intends to bring in extrinsic formulations for his explanation of the identity of Jesus
Christ, although he insists that they are less high-powered than full-blown systems of
meaning. This section will focus on Frei‟s use of three major influences: Erich
Auerbach, the New Criticism, and Gilbert Ryle. 62
Frei refers to the Gospels as “realistic narrative,” a category which he derives
from Erich Auerbach.63 Frei proposes that this genre works this way:
Realistic narrative reading is based on one of the characteristics of the Gospel
story, especially its later part, viz., that it is history-like…In other words, whether
or not these stories report history (either reliably or unreliably), whether or not the
Gospels are other things besides realistic stories, what they tell us is a fruit of the
stories themselves. We cannot have what the stories are about (the „subject
matter‟) without the stories themselves. They are history-like precisely because
like history-writing and the traditional novel and unlike myths and allegories they
literally mean what they say. There is no gap between the representation and
what is represented by it.64
Frei uses Auerbach because Auerbach recognizes a quality in the biblical texts
that began with Homer—a world is proposed into which the reader can enter, regardless
of if that world is actually existing or not.65 The intensity of this realistic quality is much
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stronger in the biblical narratives, however, because they involve not only the proposal of
a “realistic” world, but also the absolute belief claim that the world of this text is the
absolute world. Auerbach writes that the biblical authors‟
religious intent involves an absolute claim to historical truth…The Biblical
narrator was obliged to write exactly what his belief in the truth of the
tradition…demanded of him…What he produced, then, was not primarily
oriented toward „realism‟…it was oriented toward truth…The Bible‟s claim to
truth is not only far more urgent than Homer‟s, it is tyrannical—it excludes all
other claims. The world of the Scripture stories is not satisfied with claiming to
be a historically true reality—it insists that it is the only real world…The
Scripture stories do not, like Homer‟s court our favor, they do not flatter us that
they may please us and enchant us—they seek to subject us, and if we refuse to be
subjected we are rebels.66
This world of the text calls the reader to enter and adapt to its world, rather than
allowing the reader to adapt it to his or her own situation. As a result, “Far from seeking,
like Homer, merely to make us forget our own reality for a few hours, it seeks to
overcome our reality: we are to fit our own life into its world, feel ourselves to be
elements in its structure of universal history.” 67 This willingness to fit oneself into the
world of the text was quite “easy” until the Enlightenment when “through the awakening
of a critical consciousness, this becomes impossible, the Biblical claim to absolute
authority is jeopardized; the method of interpretation is scorned and rejected, the Biblical

“realist” tradition, where a “real world” was proposed, into which we can enter, of which “it does not
matter whether we know that all this is only legend, „make-believe.‟” Homer “does not need to base his
story on historical reality, his reality is powerful enough in itself; it ensnares us, weaving its web around us,
and that suffices him. And this „real‟ world into which we are lured, exists for itself, contains nothing but
itself; the Homeric poems conceal nothing, they contain no teaching and no secret second meaning...Later
allegorizing trends have tried their arts of interpretation upon him, but to no avail. He resists any such
treatment…” See also Auerbach, “Figura,” trans. Ralph Manheim, Scenes from the Drama of European
Literature, vol. 9 of Theory and History of Literature, eds. Wlad Godzich and Jochen SchulteSasse
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 11-76.
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stories become ancient legends, and the doctrine they had contained, now dissevered
from them, becomes a disembodied image.” 68 The Enlightenment, then, contributed to a
reversal from the “text absorbing the world” to the “world absorbing the text.”69 This
reversal itself must be reversed and realistic reading restored in order to reestablish the
primacy of the person and work of Jesus Christ as presented in the Gospel narratives.
The plain sense of the New Testament, for Frei, also includes figural readings. It
must, because the entire Bible must be read as a unified whole. Reading the gospel
narratives literally will mean that other parts of the Bible will have to be ordered toward
the Christ event as part of the literal sense. As a result, Frei includes figural readings in
the literal sense because it also is oriented toward the identity of Christ as the center of
the Christian Scriptures.70 Figural readings simply are not foundational—they are able to
arise only as they are grounded on the plain reading of the Gospel narratives. Frei
appreciates Auerbach‟s insight of the great change in the interpretation of the Old
Testament by the New Testament community. Auerbach had written,
“Paul and the Church Fathers reinterpreted the entire Jewish tradition as a
succession of figures prognosticating the appearance of Christ, and assigned the
Roman Empire its proper place in the divine plan of salvation. Thus while, on the
one hand, the reality of the Old Testament presents itself as complete truth with a
68
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claim to sole authority, on the other hand that very claim forces it to a constant
interpretative change in its own content; for a millennia it undergoes an incessant
and active development with the life of man in Europe.”71
Realistic narrative, or a plain sense reading, is oriented to the particular Jesus
Christ, and all else, including our human situation today is read in that light. Frei would
agree with Tracy that the interpreter must take the present situation of the reader into
account. But Frei would insist that the present situation will be reinterpreted in light of
the plain sense of the Gospel passion/resurrection accounts rather than the Gospel
accounts being interpreted in light of a general, extrinsic understanding of the situation.
This neglect of a realistic reading is the central concern of Frei‟s most influential book,
The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative. There Frei agrees with Auerbach that a realistic
reading is central to the Bible. Early in that book, Frei provides a definition for realistic
narrative:
To state a thesis: a realistic or history-like (though not necessarily historical)
element is a feature, as obvious as it is important, of many of the biblical
narratives that went into the making of Christian belief. It is a feature that can be
highlighted by the appropriate analytical procedure and by no other, even if it may
be difficult to describe the procedure—in contrast to the element itself. 72
Frei argues that interpreters all agreed that this specific feature of realistic
narrative existed, yet because they had no method to identify it, realistic narrative was
ignored.73 It was this eclipse which forced interpreters to abandon the plain meaning of
the text and search for some other criteria by which to understand the texts. Frei does not
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dismiss other readings of Scripture such as allegorical, metaphorical or even
mythological readings. Frei simply argues that they cannot be considered the plain sense
of the text and hence cannot be considered the normative Christian reading which
provides the identity of the Christian Church. 74 Once the ascriptive identity of Christ
through the Gospel narratives has been recognized, it is possible to incorporate many
other readings, or to employ all kinds of schema of general meaning to help illumine the
text.75
Frei also makes a second hermeneutical move which is influenced by Erich
Auerbach, extending the realistic narrative of the gospels to the whole canon by means of
figural reading.76 Frei claims that the literal sense can be extended to the whole of the
Scriptural canon, so that “Without loss to its own literal meaning or specific temporal
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reference, an earlier story (or occurrence) was a figure of a later one.” 77 This means that
the whole biblical canon is to be read as a unified “world of one temporal sequence” in
which “there must in principle be one cumulative story to depict it.” 78 Frei believes that
figural reading preserves the historical reality of both type and antitype, as an Old
Testament figure has a real and new meaning added by means of being incorporated into
a broader story so that they are “not only preserved but enhanced.” 79 Dawson claims,
significantly, that
Frei frames the relation between the two testaments using the comprehensive
category of story rather than meaning. The image, appropriate to narrative, is
linear rather than vertical: a single story, like a novel in which only the first half is
read, appears to be incomplete in itself and calls out of its own incompleteness for
the remainder of the storyline (a „sense of ending‟) that would complete it.80
Frei, following Auerbach, strongly distinguishes figural reading from allegory,
seeing the former as intratextual reading and the latter as extratextual reading. Allegory,
for Frei and Auerbach, is a universal meaning not grounded in a historical event (and
therefore abstract), which can be placed as a guiding structure to unify a story. 81 Frei
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thinks that Kant is the perhaps the best example of allegorical reading, as Kant develops
“a description of a stage-by-stage process, in which the stages of the narrative are
paralleled by similar stages in the real subject matter to which the narrative points, and
which we know independently of the narrative.” 82 Furthermore, Frei thinks that allegory
has often diminished appreciation for the Old Testament narrative and bordered on
Marcionite interpretation. 83 Frei‟s goal, then, is to establish the literal sense as the only
legitimate sense of Scripture and extend this unified story of the identity of Christ to both
the “figura” before and the contemporary reader after Christ.
Frei suggests that the better way to articulate this relationship is as “promise”
where there exists “the fulfillment of an earlier by a later historical event in a
chronological sequence,” and “earlier and later are at the same time related as trope to
true meaning.”84 Frei insists, then, on respecting the temporal structure of the canon,
reading patiently from figure to fulfillment to observe how the later fulfills the former.
All figural reading must take place as the reader reads the story in narrative sequence.
Frei claims, “Because interpretation is part of this flowing stream, meaning emerges only

which can be incorporated into a larger history-like narrative sequence, where a further, enhanced meaning
emerges in the antitype.
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as a sequence is narrated from figure to fulfillment.”85 Although the biblical reader
knows how the narrative will end, “The task of interpretation is to garner the sense of the
narrative, and not interfere with it by uniting historical and/or narrative sequence with a
logically distinct meaning…” 86 Frei, then, is wary of any attempt to read the Old
Testament in light of the New in such a way that meaning is accessed in a way other than
what the narrative itself renders on its own terms.
Figural reading extends the biblical narrative, as the “one and only real world,” to
“embrace the experience of any present age and reader.”87 As the figural reading is
extended to the reader, the reader finds his or her own identity in Christ. 88 Christ‟s
“identity as this singular, continuing individual, Jesus of Nazareth, includes humankind in
its singularity….To be „the first born among many brethren‟ (and sisters) is his vocation
and his very being.”89 Hence individuals find their own identity in extending the story of
Jesus‟ unsubstitutable identity to themselves. Frei realizes that the decision to read
figuratively is not an inherent quality of the text itself, but is grounded in a theological
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presupposition of God‟s providential action in history. 90 Both figure and fulfillment can
be considered as such because both are part of a larger providential ordering of history by
God.91 Hence in Christ all individuals find their own identity through incorporation into
the story of God‟s action in history.
Along with Auerbach‟s concept of realistic narrative, Frei also gained insights
from the literary development called New Criticism. New Criticism is not definable as a
movement, but is better understood a “reading practice” 92 in which the reader focuses on
the “system of relationships” within the text rather than those between the text and the
outside world.93 Thus the “literary text is a free-standing, autonomous object, containing
meanings that are specific to the context provided by the text.”94 Meaning is contained
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completely within the bounds of the text, and is thus “intratextual.” 95 The text must be
distanced from its original composition (the “intentional fallacy”) and tradition of
interpretation (the “affective fallacy”), in order to be freed to render its contents to the
reader.96
One effect of this isolation of the text for a plain reading is a denial of the
authority of the author. According to Wimsatt and Beardsley, there are two principal
reasons that the author is irrelevant to the judgment of the meaning of a literary text. The
first reason is that authorial intent is never quite clear and may always be disputed.97 The
second, and more important, reason is that “to invoke intention was to threaten the
integrity of the text by introducing the figure of the author. Once the text‟s boundaries
were threatened, then the text could not be seen as a system of language operating with
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its own rules.”98 The author must be removed if the text was to operate as its own
semiotic system. 99
Frei claims his own use of realistic narrative is similar to “New Criticism” in that,
Both claim that the text is a normative and pure „meaning‟ world of its own
which, quite apart from any factual reference it may have, and apart from its
author‟s intention or its reader‟s reception, stands on its own with the authority of
self-evident intelligibility. The reader‟s „interpretation‟ can, and indeed has to be,
minimal, reiterative, and formal, so that the very term „interpretation‟ is already
misleadingly high-powered. In the case of the „realistic‟ novel these are devices
such as temporal structuring, the irreducible interaction of character and plot,
ordinary or „mixed‟ rather than elevated style, and so forth. These devices are
said to be of the very essence of the text and of its quality as a linguistic
sacrament, inseparable from the world that it is (rather than merely represents),
but also the means by which that world is rendered to the reader so that (s)he can
understand it without any large-scale „creative‟ contribution of his/her own. 100
Frei appreciates New Criticism because it provides a model for reading plainly
that is “less high-powered than hermeneutical theory.”101 The interpreter is freed from
prolegomenal discussions of meaning and is able to simply interpret the text as it stands.
One of the benefits Frei sees in New Criticism is that it separates meaning from truth and
focuses only on meaning, since the text is a self-contained unit.102 Truth here refers to
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the actual occurrence of the referent of the text. Truth depends on the correspondence of
a text to a referent. Meaning, on the other hand, refers to the sense rendered by the
configuration of the text itself, irrespective of the referent. The reader can grasp the
meaning of the text without knowing anything about the historical referent mentioned by
the words. Because the text is a self-contained unit, it is irrelevant to the literary
approach whether or not the referent actually exists. What is important is that the reader
can understand the words of the text. As we have seen, Frei is suspicious of making
meaning dependent upon truth because he feels that determining what is true depends on
meaning structures that are extrinsic to the text, meaning structures that have often been
imposed on the text with “eclipsing” consequences. During the reign of Enlightenment
hermeneutics, Frei argues, the “literary or textual referent and the real or true,
extratextual referent were thought to be logically one and the same.” 103 The result is that
many well-intentioned interpreters were guilty of eclipsing the biblical narrative, from
fundamentalists on the right to liberals on the left.
Frei notices that secular readers of the text notice the text as a text, while
Christian interpreters tend, because of their very focus on apologetics, to gravitate from
“text” to “truth,” thus, perhaps unknowingly, neglecting to attend to the “meaning.” Frei

as not implicit rather than explicit, so that they must be exhibited in textual examples rather than stated in
abstract terms.”
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writes, “I do want to suggest that what has distinguished most recent secular interpreters
of the Bible from their Christian counterparts…is that the former want to emphasize the
text itself and that they do not wish its interpretation to be governed by a criterion of
meaning that is strongly connected to one of truth. 104 Thus for Christians, “There may be
reasons…to exercise reticence about the transition [from text to truth]. The move from
text to truth or from language to reality, which ever form it takes, is almost always
premature and some of us have found the secular literary readers of the Bible very helpful
in reminding us of the fact.”105 It seems possible, Frei observes, for readers (secular and
Christian alike) to simply read the text and understand its subject matter (the identity of
Jesus Christ) without employing any previous theory of meaning.
Proponents of reader-response theory have strongly criticized certain aspects of
the New Criticism. They found two significant problems with locating meaning within
the bounds of the text alone. First, the theory “devalues the power of literature to relate
to a real world.” When all emphasis is placed on the meaning of the text irrespective of
its referent, the text consequently cannot say anything about a referent. Second, the
theory “is not ideologically innocent, and the claim to focus on the bounded space of the
text was a gesture arising from a covertly held conservative position.” 106 Frei‟s own
reticence toward New Criticism, seen clearly in his later career, appreciates both of these
criticisms. With regard to the first, Frei has always understood the need to show that the
104
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Christ rendered in the Gospels is the real, living, present Christ who is head of the
Church. Frei emphasizes that at the resurrection, the story of Jesus does overflow the text
and have implications for all of reality. In this sense, Frei has always emphasized that the
implications of the Gospel narratives cannot simply remain immanent to their texts. With
regard to the second, Frei does acknowledge that New Criticism, and his own use of it, is
not value-neutral. 107 As a result, Frei‟s later work argues that a plain sense reading of the
Gospels is grounded not in a particular literary category, but in “the context of a
sociolinguistic community,” 108 a point to which I will later return.
A final significant influence on Frei‟s hermeneutical theory is Gilbert Ryle. 109
Ryle‟s great insight for Frei was in showing that there is no such thing as an “inner self”
which grounds all the actions and intentions of a human being. There simply is no
“Decartes‟ myth,” or the “myth of the ghost in the machine” (as Ryle calls it), no
discoverable “inner self” which can be accessed in its own rite. 110 Ryle would insist that
an action not consist of two actions, “an inner, mental act of will, and an external, bodily
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act of moving.”111 Ryle would say the action is one action, a deliberate action. Ryle
claims,
What makes the action deliberate is that it is done in a particular way, under
particular circumstances, perhaps as part of a particular pattern of action, not that
it is accompanied by some second act, invisible but independent. Similarly, to do
or say something intelligently is not to do two things—a physical act of speech or
movement and a mental act of thought—but to perform one action in a particular
way and context. It follows that the human self is not some unknowable inner
entity, of whose nature may or may not be revealed by the words and body actions
so mysteriously related to it. Rather, my words and actions constitute my
identity.112
This insight allows Frei to emphasize in Identity that all we can know of Jesus‟
identity is the sum of his actions in relation to others. We simply do not understand a
person‟s “identity” by looking for some interior intentional moment all by itself. Frei
claims that “For descriptive purposes, a person‟s uniqueness is not attributable to a superadded factor, an invisible agent residing inside and from there directing the body…An
intention is an implicit action, an action is an explicit intention.” 113 We simply do not
discover the identity of ourselves or others by,
[Entering] a mysterious realm of being and meaning, or an equally mysterious
private-subject world in order to discover what makes any intelligent action
publicly or commonly intelligible. Especially in narrative, novelistic, or historylike form, where meaning is most nearly inseparable from the words—from the
descriptive shape of the story as a pattern of enactment, there is neither need for
nor use in looking for meaning in a more profound stratum underneath the
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structure (a separable „subject matter‟) or in a separable author‟s „intention,‟ or in
a combination of such behind-the-scenes projections. 114
The import here is that a general theory of human existence, the self,
understanding, or meaning does not have to be developed before one can begin to
understand the text. This has consequences in two different directions: First, an
interpreter really can understand the text before a general theory of understanding is
developed. 115 Second, one can understand the identity of Jesus Christ only as the text
renders the movement of his intentions to actions. Frei writes, “Identity is essentially the
action and testimony of a personal being by which he lays true claim to being himself and
the same at an important point as well as over a length of time.” 116 Frei applies Ryle‟s
understanding of a human being to the narrative rendering of Jesus Christ:
What is a man?...A man—in this instance [i.e. in the New Testament depiction of
Christ] the fully human savior who, by his action peculiar to himself, bestows a
particular human identity upon the mythological savior figure—is what he does
uniquely, the way no one else does it. It may be that this is action over a lifetime,
or at some climactic moment, or both. When we see the loyalty of a lifetime
consummated at one particular point, but even if we see several hitherto
ambiguous strands in his character pruned and ordered in a clear and decisive way
at that point—then we are apt to say: „Here he was most of all himself.‟ 117
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Thus Frei, praising Karl Barth for bringing Jesus‟ person and work closer
together, argues, “Jesus was what he did and underwent, and not simply his
understanding or self-understanding…The unity of Christology and soteriology is their
unity in the narrative rather than a conceptual unity in which the two concepts „person‟
and „work‟ become perfectly integrated.”118 This identity is rendered through a plain
reading of the Gospel narratives, as the identity of Jesus Christ could not be discoverable
anywhere else.
Frei is unwilling to align himself closely with any theory of human personhood.
Frei does not reject the possibility that something of an inner self exists. He only argues
that at present such an entity cannot be known in itself. 119 Frei‟s goal is to show that
interpreters are not required to begin with a particular understanding of the self in order
to understand the plain sense of the text. In this light, Ryle proves a useful ad hoc ally in
combating both phenomenological hermeneutics 120 and the New Quest for the historical

118

Hans W. Frei, "Barth and Schleiermacher: Divergence and Convergence," in Barth and
Schleiermacher: Beyond the Impasse?, ed. James O. and Robert F. Streetman Duke (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1988), 184.
119

Frei (“Theological Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus‟ Death and Resurrection” 73),
claims, “What then do we mean by a man‟s identity? Until a supertheory comes along, we will be content
to say that we know him when we can say of him over a period of time or in a crucial occurrence, „when he
did and underwent this, he was most of all himself,‟ and when we can say of him, „his self-manifestation
was a rightful expression of who he was.‟ A person‟s identity is known to us in the inseparability of who
he was and what he did.”
120

Frei, (The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, viii), writes, “Ryle‟s work (although not directly
about hermeneutics and whether or not finally successful) is a marvelous antidote to the contorted and to
my mind unsuccessful efforts of certain phenomenologists and philosophers of „Existence‟ or „Being‟ to
tackle a similar dualism.”

28

Jesus.121 Only if identity is constituted as intentions become actions can the texts narrate
who Jesus really is.
From the very beginning, then, Frei thinks that the Gospel narratives can plainly
render their meaning to a responsible reader, provided that extrinsic meaning systems are
kept at bay so that the interpreter can plainly read the text. To make space for the texts to
render their plain meaning, Frei employs a number of low-level conceptual schemes as ad
hoc allies which allow the text itself to render realistically the unsubstitutable identity of
Jesus Christ. Authority for this rendering of identity is granted to the text itself, and
readers are required to recognize what the text plainly presents.

2. David Tracy: Scripture Discloses the Present Christ to the Reader
Aims: Public Theology and Disclosive Texts: David Tracy‟s theological project
focuses on the public nature of the Church and its theological discourse. As a result, the
primary emphasis of Tracy‟s hermeneutics is to show in a publicly intelligible way how
the biblical text discloses the existential significance of the Christ event for readers who
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encounter it today. Tracy frequently uses general explanatory schemes to articulate better
the meaning of the Christian faith.
The key to Tracy‟s argument about the publicness of the Church and its
theological discourse is “the classic.”122 For Tracy, classics are public and grounded in a
tradition. They become a primary source for the self-identity of the tradition which bears
them. Classics arise in every culture, and since a classic is grounded in a particular
tradition, it “will always be in need of further interpretation in view of its need for
renewed application to a particular situation.”123 A theory of the classic nature of the
Christian texts ensures that the Church, theology, and interpretation of the Scriptures will
all remain public, because classics appeal to our common human experience. 124
Influences: H.G. Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur:125 In The Analogical Imagination,
Tracy develops a model of the classic which owes much to Hans-Gorg Gadamer.126
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Tracy explores the nature of three categories of classics: general classics (disclosive of
some truth), religious classics (disclosive of a claim to the whole), and the Christian
classic (disclosive of the person-event of Jesus Christ). It is by subject matter that Tracy
categorizes classics into three groups. Each category of classic is specific in the kind of
content which it reveals, yet all classics are similar in the manner in which they disclose
that truth. A religious classic differs from a cultural classic in that while a cultural classic
discloses a truth about a particular dimension of life, a religious classic discloses truth
about the whole of reality. Tracy writes, those “explicitly religious classic expressions
will involve a claim to truth as the evidence of a disclosure-concealment of the whole of
reality by the power of the whole—as, in some sense, a radical and finally gracious
mystery.”127 As such, a religious classic involves a “risk” that this classic “may prove
genuinely disclosive of a reality that cannot be denied.” 128 The Christian classic differs
from the religious classic in that the truth it discloses is a particular one: the subject
matter of the Christian classic is the event of Jesus Christ. Thus while the manner of
disclosure is the same in all classics, the content of the disclosure is particular to the
particular kind of classic.
Classics for Tracy are not only texts, but can also be “events, images, persons,
rituals and symbols which are assumed to disclose permanent possibilities or meaning
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and truth.”129 The Christian faith, then, is bearer of a number of different classics. All
classics, are, by definition, disclosive of truth. Hence they have a certain authority within
their tradition to disclose that truth. The normative “classic” for the Christian tradition is
the “event and person of Jesus Christ.”130 The Christian Scriptures are a classic of the
Christian community, but they do not replace the primary classic. Rather, they are a
derivative classic, as they authoritatively witness to that primary classic. 131
The classic, “by definition, is assumed to be any text that always has the power to
transform the horizon of the interpreter and thereby disclose new meaning and
experiential possibilities” for Tracy. 132 All classics disclose truth analogously to the way
in which a work of art discloses truth.133 Following Gadamer, Tracy writes,
[W]hen I experience any classic work of art, I do not experience myself as an
autonomous subject aesthetically appreciating the good qualities of an aesthetic
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object set over against me. Indeed, when I reflect after the experience upon the
experience itself, shorn of prior theories of „aesthetics,‟ I find that my subjectivity
is never in control of the experience, nor is the work of art actually experienced as
an object with certain qualities over against me. Rather the work of art
encounters me with the surprise, impact, even shock of reality itself. In
experiencing art, I recognize a truth I somehow know but know I did not really
know except through the experience of recognition of the essential compelled by
the work of art. I am transformed by its truth when I return to the everyday, to the
whole of what I ordinarily call reality, and discover new affinities, new
sensibilities for the everyday. 134
Tracy claims that the disclosure in a work of art is an experience in which the
interpreter finds herself to be passively caught up in moment of truth. He writes, “When
anyone of us is caught unawares by a genuine work of art, we find ourselves in the trip of
an event, a happening, a disclosure, a claim to truth which we cannot deny and can only
eliminate by our later controlled reflection.” 135 It is the classic that encounters the
interpreter, and a genuine disclosure affects the interpreter. Gadamer has written, “In the
experience of art we see a genuine experience induced by the work, which does not leave
him who has it unchanged, and we enquire into the mode of being of that which is
experienced in this way. So we hope to understand better what kind of truth it is that
encounters us there.”136 The experience, then, is more disclosive than constructive,
giving priority to the subject matter of the classic. It must be the subject-matter which
controls the discussion between text and reader. As a result,
Real conversation occurs only when the participants allow the question, the
subject matter, to assume primacy…we are carried along, and sometimes away,
by the subject matter itself into the rare event or happening named „thinking‟ and
„understanding.‟ For understanding happens; it occurs not as the pure result of
134

Ibid, 111-12.

135

Ibid, 114.

136

Gadamer, Truth and Method, 89.

33

personal achievement but in the back-and-forth movement of the conversation
itself. 137
This experience of disclosure, Tracy thinks, is much like the gracious, gifted
moment of faith in Christian theology. In a footnote, Tracy specifically claims that his
argument about the religious classic “is directly parallel to the earlier claim for the classic
work of art,” and as a result, Tracy suggests, “The claims to truth in both art and
religions, I believe, stand or fall together.”138 Consequently, Tracy argues that the faith
encounter of Christians with the event of Jesus Christ occurs in much the same way all
classics disclose truth:
The interpreter may of course, in a later reflective, distancing moment, question
that original religious experience and reinterpret it as some „as-if‟ experience
produced by the human imagination. But in the moment of encounter-response
itself, the moment Christians call „faith,‟ there is no „imagine-reality-as-if-it-werethis-way‟ experience. There is, rather, the realized experience of a recognition as
that response of trust called faith to the reality of the whole disclosed in the
religious classic: a reality experienced as liberating one to trust that how we ought
to live and how things in reality are, are finally one.139
Here the “moment of encounter-response itself” is described as precisely “the moment
Christians call „faith.‟” This moment takes place, Tracy believes, in all religious classics.
The experience of disclosive truth in art is very much like the experience of disclosive
truth in religious faith, and, more specifically, in the disclosure of the Christ event.
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Yet Tracy, following Ricoeur, does not believe that his use of general
philosophical hermeneutics determines his reading of Scripture.140 In fact, Tracy believes
that he and Frei are both simply using a general hermeneutic which can “inform without
„taking over‟ a theological analysis of scriptural texts.” 141 Tracy insists that his
explanation of the Scriptural texts as a religious classic does not limit their contents to
that of a secular classic. Tracy specifies that his argument about the classic moves “from
the abstract to the concrete, not, as too often interpreted, from the concrete
(foundationalist) to the specific.” 142 Tracy does not think that he bases his analysis in
some general, identifiable human experience (i.e. foundationalism) and then arguing
particular Christian claims. Rather, he believes that he has found in the classic an
analogy for understanding how Christians experience disclosure in their Scriptures. I will
later discuss how this general model of disclosure affects interpretations of the
particularity of Jesus Christ. For now, it simply ought to be noticed that when Tracy
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Religion/Sciences Religieuses 5 (1975), 17), claims, “The task of interpreting these specific texts [the
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instance of interpretation: the general method guides; particular interpretations rule.”
142
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hermeneutical method to all texts, including Scripture.
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appeals to special hermeneutics, his emphasis is on the unique subject matter disclosed in
Scripture which may require a unique preunderstanding and a unique response, but not
necessarily a unique manner of disclosure.
For Gadamer, tradition is the major constituting force behind any act of
interpretation. 143 The interpreter engages in the interpretative work from within the
stream of tradition, and the fusion of horizons likewise takes place within this stream.
Tracy follows Gadamer in claiming,
Indeed, as Hans-Georg Gadamer…has argued on strictly philosophical grounds,
„belonging to‟ a tradition (presuming it is a major tradition which has produced
classics) is unavoidable when one considers the intrinsic, indeed ontic and
ontological historicity of our constitution as human selves. Moreover, tradition is
an ambiguous but still enriching, not impoverishing reality. Any serious
recognition of the radical finitude of any single thinker‟s reflection and the wealth
of experience, insight, judgment, taste and common sense which enculturation
into a major tradition offers enriches all participants willing to be „formed‟ by that
tradition. 144
As a result, “the theologian, in risking faith in a particular religious tradition, has
the right and responsibility to be „formed‟ by that tradition and community.”145 Tracy
typically understands the Church in much the same way that Gadamer understands
tradition. The Church, the tradition which bears the Christian classic, carries on the
memory of Jesus, so that Jesus is “the Jesus remembered by the tradition which mediates
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the event in the present through word, sacrament and action; the Jesus remembered as the
Christ, the presence among us of God‟s own self.” 146
Where Tracy parts company with Gadamer is in Tracy‟s emphasis on the need for
critical readings of Scripture. Specifically, Tracy thinks Gadamer gives too much
authority to the role of tradition in the interpretation of the biblical text. 147 Tracy affirms
a need, not only to be formed by tradition, but to be able to critique it. Although one‟s
preunderstanding is formed by the tradition, Tracy feels that Gadamer does not provide a
self-critical moment in the interpretative process by which the interpreter can question the
validity of a particular reading. Tracy worries that a “purely hermeneutical approach can
too often serve simply to affirm a tradition, to disallow the emancipatory function of
critical reason and eventually to capitulate to, not transform, the status quo.”148 Unless
the interpreter can provide a critical moment in the interpretation process, tradition may
hold a tyranny over the text itself. Consequently, Tracy shows an appreciation for the
contributions of the “Masters of Suspicion” who have shown ideological totalizing to be
the result of uncritical acceptance of text. Totalizing schemes are perhaps inherent to
textual privileging, and hence narratives, even the Scriptural narratives, Tracy feels, are
open to ideological critique. Tracy believes that Ricoeur‟s appreciation for a

146

Ibid, 234.

147
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Ibid, 73. Tracy appreciates Habermas‟s critique of Gadamer. Tracy (The Analogical
Imagination, 74), worries that hermeneutical theologians will be “too content with a relatively unexamined
trust that the rhetorical persuasiveness of those retrieved meanings will prove sufficient to transform
individual and societal practice,” and hence Tracy sees value in liberation and political theologies to call
continually into question the reformulation of Christian classics. The goal of all critical methods, for Tracy
(ibid, 324), is to advance the “necessary reformatory impulse at the heart of gospel and the Christian
tradition.”
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hermeneutics of suspicion provides more resources for the continual self-critical role that
theological hermeneutics must play. As a result, it will be helpful to summarize the key
points of Ricoeur‟s hermeneutics.
Paul Ricoeur starts his project from the presupposition of “distanciation,” the
ability of the interpreter to create critical space between him/herself and the text or
author.149 Ricoeur‟s theory requires the distinction between the “event” of discourse and
the “meaning” which results.150 Meaning, understood as the “propositional content” of
the sentence, gives the original event permanence 151 because it transcends the “utterer‟s
meaning” and becomes the “utterance meaning.” 152 As this happens, Ricoeur and
Gadamer agree, the interpreter‟s quest to understand the meaning of the discourse shifts
from trying to understand the author‟s intention to understanding the meaning of the text.
In written discourse, distanciation becomes more intense because it takes place on two
levels: First, the author is distanced from the text (so that the text now means more than
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Ricoeur (“The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,” 130), claims, “For me the text is much more than
a particular case of inherhuman communication, it is the paradigm of the distanciation in all
communication…Now discourse, even in oral form, presents an elementary characteristic of distanciation.”
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Paul Ricoeur (Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth,
TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 12), claims, “If all discourse is actualized as an event, all
discourse is understood as meaning.”
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Ricoeur (ibid, 146), writes, “An act of discourse is not merely vanishing. It may be
identified and reidentified as the same so that we may say it again or in other words. We may even say it in
other language or translate it from one language to another. Through all these translations, the
„propositional content‟ preserves its identity: the „said as such.‟
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Ricoeur (ibid, 12-13), writes, “Meaning can be understood as the utterer‟s meaning (what
the speaker means, the noetic aspect), and utterance meaning (what the sentence means, the propositional
content, the noematic aspect). Utterer‟s meaning should not be reduced to mere psychological intention. It
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itself. The utterer‟s meaning has its mark in the utterance meaning.”
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the author meant—a „surplus of meaning‟).153 Second, the text is distanced from the
original audience so that the text now requires a reader response. 154 As the reader
understands the text, he finds that the text refers beyond itself to the world outside the
text (here Ricoeur disagrees with the New Criticism, which argues that the text never
refers beyond itself to the real world). This reference to the outside world is called a
“split reference,” and includes both ostensive reference, a real event, thing, etc. to which
the text refers, and non-ostensive reference, a manner of being in the world disclosed
through the text.155 In poetry, fiction, etc. the non-ostensive reference replaces the
ostensive reference, so that the reader can encounter a text which refers to existential
possibilities.156
This disclosure of a non-ostensive reference (a world in front of the text) must be
engaged in a responsible manner. Ricoeur suggests a two-step process.157 The first step
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is the movement from what is essentially a naïve “guess158 to validation” of what the text
means as a whole. 159 Ricoeur‟s second step is a movement from “explanation” to
“comprehension,” as readers overcome the distanciation of the text in order to come to
understanding. Through studying the internal structure and content of the text, the
interpreter is led “from a surface semantics…to a depth semantics, that of the boundary
situations, which constitute the ultimate „referent,‟” as Ricoeur calls it. 160 Explanation is
the transition between the initial naïve guess and the moment of disclosure of the world
in front of the text to the reader. Understanding is the appropriation of the world of the
text to the individual. Hence the interpreter must move on from explanation to
understanding or appropriation. To do so, the interpreter must encounter the sense of the
text, the world in front of the text, which opens new possibilities for the interpreter.
Ricoeur claims,
The sense of a text is not behind the text, but in front of it. It is not something
hidden, but something disclosed. What has to be understood is not the initial
situation of discourse, but what points towards a possible world, thanks to the
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Ricoeur (Interpretation Theory, 76), writes, “The problem of correct understanding can no
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Ibid, 87. Ricoeur (ibid 81), believes the options here are either structuralism (suspending
the search for reference in the text), or proposing a “world in front of the text.” Hence Ricoeur, (ibid, 81),
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non-ostensive reference of the text. Understanding…seeks to grasp the worldpropositions opened up by the reference [i.e. sense] of the text.161
The world in front of the text is not, according to Ricoeur, simple projection of
meaning by the reader onto the text.162 Rather, it is the text which has the power to
disclose “new modes of being” or “new forms of life.” The interpreter “is enlarged in his
capacity of self-projection by receiving a new mode of being from the text itself…It is
the text, with its universal power of world disclosure, which gives a self to the ego.” 163
Ricoeur insists that priority in the interaction between text and reader be given to the text,
so that, “Only the interpretation that complies with the injunction of the text, that follows
the „arrow‟ of the sense and that tries to think accordingly, initiates a new selfunderstanding.”164
At this point it is possible to see how the concept of distanciation causes an
essential difference between Gadamer and Ricoeur and why Tracy sides with Ricoeur.
Where Gadamer understands interpretation as a game in which interpreters find
themselves being played rather than controlling the action, 165 Ricoeur inserts a moment
of explanation on the way to understanding which allows the reader a critical moment in
the interpretative process. As Gary Aylesworth notes,
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For example, Gadamer (Truth and Method, 420), claims, “The hermeneutical experience
must take as a genuine experience everything that becomes present to it. It does not have prior freedom to
select and discard.”
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On Gadamer‟s model, there is no distanciation of meaning from event. Rather,
meaning itself is temporal and processive. As the subject-matter of the dialogue
between text and reader, meaning is produced in an event of disclosure, not as
something fixed by the text, i.e., not as an ideal object, but as a third moment that
neither the reader nor the text already contains. 166
For Ricoeur, meaning is already codified in the text—it does not result, strictly
speaking, from the action of the reader in dialogue with the text. Instead, that dialogue of
interpretation “actualizes” a meaning that is already present.167 Meaning is a relatively
stable feature of the text, and a relatively stable self is able to analyze and actualize such
meaning. 168
Meaning is only relatively stable, however, because meaning emerges in dialogue
with the reader as interpretation takes place. Gadamer, Ricoeur and Tracy all agree that
understanding has not really taken place unless a fusion of horizons has occurred. This
fusion of horizons will necessarily change both the original meaning of the text and the
identity of the interpreter. Tracy claims,
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Aylesworth (ibid), argues, “On Ricoeur‟s model, then, philosophical hermeneutics is a
rehabilitation of the reflective tradition, and of Huserlian egology in particular. The ability to exercise a
critical moment in interpretation does not, despite Frei‟s contention of Ryle‟s „ghost in the machine,‟
propose a stable inner-self which is able to be analyzed on its own.” Paul Ricoeur claims, “The
philosopher trained in the school of Descartes knows that things are doubtful, that they are not what they
appear to be. But he never doubts that consciousness is as it appears to itself….Since Marx, Nietzsche, and
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(Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), 101). Ricoeur in this context highlights Husserl‟s conception of the inner-self as a
continuation of the problem which he is seeking to overcome. In his early writings, Tracy does not
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It is worth noting that every good interpretation is a new interpretation involving
application to the situation…It is important to note even here, however, that both
text and reader (as well as their dialogical interaction) are realities-in-process,
never purely static constants. All three realities (text-reader-interaction) include
the ambiguities intrinsic to the human situation. Interpretation is, by definition,
an ongoing process related to these realities-in-process. Even classic texts exist as
classics only when actually read; the reader exists as a good reader only by
allowing his or her present horizon to be provoked or vexed by the classic text
into dialogue. 169
The difference between Gadamer and Ricoeur, then, is the degree to which the interpreter
is able to distance him/herself from the tradition and critique it through interpretation.
Gadamer believes that application constitutes meaning in the fusion of horizons, 170 while
Ricoeur and Tracy believe that texts contain a meaning that is actualized in the
interpreter.171
Ricoeur appreciates the insights of the “masters of suspicion,” Marx, Nietzsche
and Freud. 172 Ricoeur thinks that these three writers have shown the fragmented nature
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Tracy‟s disagreement with Gadamer is first with “his understandable but strained polemic
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of all interpretation, and hence they have demonstrated that all interpretation must be
critical. There will never be absolute assurance of truth from now on—all interpretation
will require a wager of hope.173 Christian readings of Scripture as well must always be
subjected to suspicion, and this confrontation will necessarily change both parties. 174
Thus Ricoeur is committed to an ongoing ideological critique in the Christian reading of
Scripture.175 The primary benefit of suspicious readings is to allow a more fruitful
reading of the text to take place, in which the text may become more disclosive to the
interpreter. When idols are “destroyed” 176 and the ideologies of the reader are chastened,
the “matter of the text is allowed to emerge and present its fresh possibilities for the
self.”177

B. Hermeneutical Difficulties and Mutual Critiques

over the doubt as to consciousness by an exegesis of meaning. Beginning with them, understanding is
hermeneutics: henceforward, to seek meaning is no longer to spell out the consciousness of meaning, but to
decipher its expressions.” Ricoeur (ibid, 34), claims, “All three begin with suspicion concerning the
illusions of consciousness, and then proceed to employ the stratagem of deciphering; all three, however, far
from being detractors of „consciousness,‟ aim at extending it.” As a result, their skepticism, leading to selfcritical readings, is beneficial for all readings, including (perhaps “especially”) readings of Scripture.
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Having explored the aims and influences which have informed the projects of Frei
and Tracy, this section will specify the central hermeneutical difficulty in the method of
each theologian. The section will show the way in which Tracy and Frei have revised
their hermeneutical projects in light of criticism from the other. The section will suggest
that while each has developed significant revisions in method, impasses still remain
which cannot be resolved until Scripture is located in the broader context of the economy
of redemption.

1. Frei‟s Difficulty: Locating Authority in Interpretation
During the early part of his career, Frei placed all authority for reading in the text
itself, and called readers to be accountable to a realistic reading. 178 In fact, for Frei, the
very essence of Christianity is dependent on a realistic reading of the Gospel narratives.
Frei writes,
It seems to me that the crucial point about the authority of the New Testament—
and the beginning, at least, of an answer to the question, What is Christianity?—is
precisely that we must start at some point where meaning is firmly grounded in
the text and nowhere else. This identity or unity of text and meaning does not of
itself bestow authority, but without it there can be no authority. 179
If authority for defining the essence of Christianity lies in the assumption that
“meaning is grounded in the text and nowhere else,” then Frei must explain exactly how
178
Frei‟s early career could be characterized as the time from his first published book, The
Identity of Jesus Christ in 1973 until the late 1970‟s. During this time Frei emphasized realistic narrative as
a genre of Scripture, and felt that this genre would render plainly the unsubstitutable identity of Christ.
From the late 1970‟s onward, what I will call Frei‟s later career, Frei seeks to ground realistic narrative in
the Christian community which has insisted upon a literal reading of the Gospels. As a result, a shift of
emphasis from text to readers takes place in his writings.
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this is so. The difficulty of establishing an authoritative reading of Scripture is more
pronounced for Frei than it is for Tracy because, where Tracy develops a general theory
of Scripture as a classic, continually preserved and renewed by a tradition in a plurality of
readings, Frei desires to ground authority for Christian readings in a particular reading of
the text itself. As Frei becomes more and more self-critical about pressing meaning into
any external system, he moves from dependence on literary theories such as New
Criticism to an analysis of the Church as a socio-linguistic community. Frei does not
temper his insistence on the necessity of a plain reading of the Gospels, but he does
attempt to provide a somewhat different account of why the Gospels must be read
ascriptively.
Determining the relationship of the early Frei to the later Frei has proven
notoriously difficult for all interpreters of Frei‟s works.180 Does Frei abandon his literary
category of „realistic narrative‟ when he makes the cultural-linguistic turn?181 Does Frei
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religions are social organisms which construct the grammar through which religious experience takes place.
Religions are “comprehensive and interpretive schemes, usually embodied in myth or narratives and
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simply move interpretive authority from a quality of the text to the decision of the
Church? Frei‟s 1983 paper entitled “The 'Literal Reading' of Biblical Narrative in
Christian Tradition: Does it Stretch or Will it Break?” is often seen as the turning-point in
Frei‟s thought, due to his self-criticism of his conception of realistic narrative. In this
essay, Frei criticizes his previous work primarily because his attempt to hold meaning
and truth together in realistic narrative requires an explanatory model not found in the
text itself. Frei claims, “There may or may not be a class called „realistic narrative,‟ but
to take it as a general category of which the synoptic Gospel narratives and their partial
second-order redescription in the doctrine of the Incarnation are a dependent instance is
first to put the cart before the horse and then cut the lines and claim that the vehicle is
self-propelled.”182 In other words, Frei believes it is problematic to force readers to
engage the text according to a general schema like realistic narrative and then expect to
them derive the particular claims of the Christian faith from that general method. In this
sense, Frei judges his previous proposal for realistic narrative to have been unsuccessful.
Yet throughout his career Frei insists on grounding the essence of the „Christian thing‟ in
a plain reading of the Gospel narratives. But why must this be so, if the meaning of the
text is not based on a literary theory, and if not from the text itself? Frei realizes that he
needs to develop further the way in which the authority for literal sense is grounded in the

heavily ritualized, which structure human experience and understanding of self and world” (33). This
model places primary attention on the structure and rules of the Church as a foundation for Scriptural
reading. In his later work, Frei finds this to be a plausible model for grounding the authority of the literal
sense (see Frei, “Literal Reading,” 67).
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Frei, Literal Reading, 64-66. Frei‟s rejection of New Criticism seems to be based on two
criticisms. First, it also unconsciously places an external meaning system on the text, so that the reader
must make a prior commitment (by faith) to read the text in this way. Second, it “comes close to
enthroning verbal repetition as the highest form of understanding…” (64).
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Christian community. In a 1984 letter to Gary Comstock, Frei spells out his revised
understanding of meaning in Scripture:
For me „meaning‟ in the gospel narratives is more and more a combination of 1)
the communal-religious interpretive tradition and what it has seen as their primary
meaning; 2) the fact that the tradition has given primacy to their realistic,
ascriptive sense; 3) that outside of that tradition there is no reason to think of any
single interpretive move or scheme as the meaning of these stories; 4) and even
within it there is room for others, provided they do not conflict with the primary,
realistic or literal sense; 5) that subordination of understanding to the text…is in
no way the same as the elimination of interpretive understanding and of a possible
multiplicity of interpretations.183
Frei insists that no external system of understanding ought to be allowed priority
in determining what is the meaning of Scripture. The meaning of an amorphous text is
relatively indeterminate. Meaning is not self-evident simply because of the literary
structure of the Gospels. But it is bound up with the early Christian community‟s reading
practices. A text without a tradition cannot simply have a plain meaning. This decision
moves Frei toward grounding authority for a literal reading in the reading community
rather than in the text alone. 184
Frei must still explain why the community chose such a reading, and how the
Scriptures can critique the subsequent readings of the Church. According to Frei, the
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Frei, Letter to Gary Comstock, 5 (unpublished manuscript, 1984), cited in Higton, Christ,
Providence, and History, 84.
184

Certainly several influences have led to the change. First, different literary theories,
especially deconstructionism, had begun to pose new questions for literary theory. Placher (“Introduction,”
18), suggests that “one could to some extent map changes in Frei‟s account alongside changes of fashion in
literary theory—from the New Critics and Auerbach at the time of his early work—with their careful
attention to the formal structure of texts—to deconstructionists and Stanley Fish in the 1980‟s—with their
interests in the social context in which interpretations take place.” Second, the influence of George
Lindbeck‟s use of a “low-level theoretical…analysis of religions” as a “cultural linguistic approach” also
influenced such a change (see Frei, Literal Reading, 71). Finally, Frei‟s own studies in the history of
modern Christianity changed throughout the later 1970‟s from a history of Christianity in the academy
“towards a more sociologically aware form of writing” (Higton, Christ, Providence, and History, 178).
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“plain sense” (or “literal”) reading of Scripture was given primacy by the Church
precisely because such a reading of the Gospel narratives adequately rendered the
ascriptive identity of the unsubstitutable Person, Jesus Christ. Literal reading was not
something of a historical accident, but it is an outworking of the community‟s
foundational belief in the risen Christ. For Frei, a Christian must at least say “that the
subject matter of these stories is not something or someone else, and that the rest of the
canon must in some way or ways, looser or tighter, be related to this subject matter or at
least not in contradiction to it. This is the minimal agreement of how „literal‟ reading has
generally been understood in the Western Christian tradition.” 185 This plain reading, says
Frei, can be studied fruitfully in its development. In the early Church, we find that the
“narrative rendering of an intention-action sequence” became the orienting principle of
the Scriptures:
“Thus, the parables of the Kingdom of God, whatever their original intent, were
soon used as figurations of Jesus that substantiated his messianic identity as
enacted in his story so that their point of signaling the „limit experience‟ of the
Kingdom of God, although very real, was not logically independent of that other
theme. Jesus…was himself the subject of what he said in the use of the parables
by the interpretive tradition. The identity of the messenger became the clue to the
character of the message and this, in turn, was due to the priority of his
identification in agency or enactment over his identification as speech act,
linguistic performative or embodied, innovative metaphor.”186
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Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 5. Frei has already clarified (Literal Reading, 72), “The
reason why the intratextual universe of this Christian symbol system is a narrative one is that a specific set
of texts, which happen to be narrative, has become primary, even within scripture, and has been assigned a
literal reading as their primary or „plain‟ sense. They have become the paradigm for the construal not only
of what is inside that system but for all that is outside. They provide the interpretive pattern in terms of
which all of reality is experienced and read in this religion.”
186

Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 110-11.

49

Frei develops his thought on the relationship between the plain sense and the
reading community in Types of Christian Theology. Frei gives three rules which govern
the community‟s use of the literal sense. The first rule appears to make the literal sense
itself a function of community decision: “[T]he literal meaning of the text is precisely
that meaning which finds the greatest degree of agreement in the use of the text in the
religious community. If there is agreement in that use, then take that to be the literal
sense.”187 This rule seems to indicate a significant change from a self-evident genre of
realistic narrative to community use. Frei‟s next two rules serve to disarm the
contemporary reader from claiming interpretive authority over the text today. The
second rule states, “it is the fit enactment of the intention to say what comes to be in the
text…you cannot…go behind the written text to ask separately about what the author
meant or what he or she was really trying to say. You had better take it that the author
said what he or she was trying to say.” 188 This rule solidly reestablishes the authority of
the text by prohibiting the contemporary reading community from changing the decision
of the early Church. Authority is granted to the early community for establishing the
foundational reading, analogously to the way in which the early community
authoritatively established the bounds of the canon. In both cases (the canon and the
plain sense) the reading community exercises authority, but in neither case is the
contemporary reading community allowed to change that foundational decision. 189 The
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When Frei‟s argument is viewed in this way, criticisms such as Vanhoozer‟s can be
overcome. Vanhoozer (Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 174), writes, “In the end,
Frei‟s strongest argument seems to be that, as a matter of fact, the believing community decided to read the
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third rule simply clarifies the first two, as it “has to do with the descriptive fit between the
words and the subject matter” so that the plain sense establishes this “coincidence
between sense and subject matter.”190 The Church has reached such a consensus reading
(first rule) and the contemporary reading community cannot go behind what is written
(second rule) precisely because the words render the subject matter. Once again, the
foundational decision for the plain sense is similar to the Church‟s decision about the
boundaries of the canon. Different words (different canonical texts) or a different reading
(any other than the plain sense) would render a different subject matter (one that is not
Christian).
What, then, is the role of the Church in biblical interpretation for Frei? It appears
to be twofold: First, the early Church established the plain reading of Scripture as
normative. This decision is foundational, and the Church today must read literally in
continuity with the early Church. Second, however, the reading community today is to
employ all kinds of redescriptive schemas on an ad hoc basis in order to better
understand the ascriptive identity of Christ rendered in the plain sense.
Frei insists that explanatory models are always necessary for the Christian faith,
yet those models must be severely subordinated to the text itself. Frei claims,
The text means what it says, and so the reader‟s redescription is just that, a
redescription and not the discovery of the text as symbolic representation of
Gospels literally. But surely the centrality of the ascriptive subject Jesus Christ is a function more of the
literal sense of the text than of the historical decision (accident?) of the believing community to read the
Gospels literally? If this is so, then we must conclude that Frei‟s earlier insistence that the Gospels are
realistic narratives better preserves the indispensability of the unsubstitutable subject Jesus Christ.”
Vanhoozer would not suggest that the early church community chose their canon by means of historical
accident. In both cases, canon and plain sense, the community made their decision based on their
fundamental belief in the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ.
190

Frei, Types, 16.
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something else more profound. But in the process of redescription we can—and
indeed cannot do other than—employ our own thought structures, experiences,
conceptual schemes; there is neither an explicit mode for showing how to
correlate these things with the job of redescription, nor is there a fundamental
conflict between them…it is an article of faith that it can be done; it is done.191
Mark Allen Bowald concludes that Frei‟s later model establishes a “greater chastening of
the agency of the reader in his hermeneutic insofar as he now is more cognizant of the
inescapability of reading from a stance which, as part of its creaturely limitations, must
employ both descriptive and explanatory schemes.”192 Bowald continues, “In his early
work the literal meaning was defined primarily in terms of a quality of the text itself
which impresses itself on the reader. Now, the agency for the literal meaning is shared
between text and tradition.”193 This new equation, in turn, means that the Church
(tradition) acts in “codetermining” the meaning of the text,194 in a primary sense by
establishing the literal reading of the narrative as the normative reading, and in a
secondary sense by using its intratextual language of faith while incorporating all kinds
of external conceptual schemes. The twofold role of the Church in interpretation, then,
shifts Frei‟s focus from text alone to the interaction between reading, and text. If it is
truly an “article of faith,” as Frei claims, that there is no “fundamental conflict between”
what the text says and the contemporary Church‟s redescription, then it is the duty of the
interpreter to read within the bounds established by the Church.
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Bowald (ibid, 106), claims the later Frei “adds an emphasis on the role of the Church‟s
traditional reading in co-determining the meaning. Nevertheless, „truth‟ is still not directly attributable to
human agency but to gracious divine action which may indirectly assert itself via text, tradition and
community.”
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2. Tracy‟s Difficulty: Articulating the Uniqueness of Jesus Christ
Tracy‟s most acute hermeneutical challenge comes from Hans Frei. Frei‟s
sharpest critiques against Tracy fault him for failing to read Scripture in light of the
identity (and hence particularity) of Jesus Christ.195 Frei levels two criticisms against
Tracy in this regard. First, Frei thinks that when the general system of phenomenology is
applied at the beginning of interpretation, the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ will
always be reduced to a mode of consciousness. Frei thinks that within phenomenology,
“What narratives present…is not in the first place ascriptive selves that are the subjects of
their predicates…but the „mode-of-being-in-the-world‟ which these selves exemplify and
which is „re-presented‟ by being „disclosed‟ to „understanding.‟” 196 Consequently, Christ
may present a new existential modes of being for human possibility, but his unique
identity will be secondary. Frei harshly states that, “Tracy‟s…intention is clear. What
the story of Jesus is about is not Jesus storied or historical, but „existential possibility,‟
which is not a temporal cumulative qualification of a specific character in his or her own
story, but a successful or unsuccessful evocation of a mode of present consciousness.” 197
The identity of Christ, Frei fears, will be considered important only insofar as it discloses
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For example, Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 64), argues that for Tracy, “the apparent
literal sense of the New Testament, in which Jesus as „real‟ or „historical‟ seems to have an irreducibly
unique and unsurpassable place in relation to salvation, is quite dispensable… Symbolic-experiential
Christology thinks of Jesus or rather the story of Jesus (why not both?) as perhaps the highest representation of the authentic agapic mode, but certainly not unique or indispensable.”
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Frei, Literal Reading, 47. Frei (ibid, 48), is convinced that in Tracy‟s account, “the
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possibilities for human existence. Tracy is seen as a chief perpetrator of Ryle‟s “the
Descartes myth” because phenomenological method assumes an interior self which
experiences and an outer self which conceptualizes, both of which are held together by
meaning. 198 Tracy is accused of perpetrating the Descartes myth as he tries to explain
Christ in terms of existential meaning rather than through the narrative rendering of his
identity.
Frei repeatedly accuses Tracy of making the reading of Scripture a regional
application of a general model, fearing that the emphasis on the manner of disclosure will
determine the subject matter that is studied. Frei argues that for Tracy, “finally the
correlation is a matter of subsuming the specifically Christian under the general,
experiential religious, as one „regional‟ aspect.”199 Tracy‟s insists that the subject
matter,200 not a method, must be allowed to control the discussion. 201 Yet Frei would ask,
if the manner of disclosure is the same in all classics, how can the subject matter possibly
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Frei, ibid, 33. This means that “there is no cutting difference between external description
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control the text/reader interaction? Frei claims, “For the Christian theologian adoption of
this view of the description of religious phenomena will finally amount to a commitment
that theology must be grounded in a, or more specifically, this foundational philosophical
theory in order to be intelligible; and that the interpretation of Christian self-description
will never be more than a „regional‟ embodiment of this more comprehensive
undertaking.”202
Second, Frei thinks that phenomenological hermeneutics will tend to turn the
unsubstitutable person of Jesus Christ into a symbol. Frei claims, “For Professor Tracy,
the fruit of New Testament interpretation is that Jesus Christ is a most powerful symbol;
his reality, an idealization of the represencing, through the expressive and evocative
language of the story, of his life-stance.”203 As Frei (rather ungraciously) constructs the
argument, Christ for Tracy is reduced to a symbol, because it is easier to incorporate the
conceptualization a symbol into a phenomenological system then to incorporate the
ascriptive identity of a person realistically rendered. Frei suggests two hypothetical but
devastating consequences which could result from this reduction. First, Frei suggests that
if symbols can become outdated and die (as Tracy has argued), then it is hypothetically
possible that the symbol of Jesus Christ could die in the Christian community, and Christ
Himself could become expendible to the Christian faith. 204 Second, Frei argues that in
Tracy‟s system the historical Jesus could have never existed, so long as the existential
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story and the response remain. 205 Though Frei does not see Tracy employing either
reduction in practice, Frei believes Tracy‟s phenomenological method implicitly tends
toward these errors.
Both the charge of reducing Christ to a mode of conscience and the charge of
reducing Christ to a symbol are closely related. The second may be overstated, but it
may hold weight insofar as it is related to the first. Tracy has never specifically said that
Christ is a symbol. 206 Yet his language does approach making those events which are
most important to Christ‟s identity, His crucifixion, resurrection and incarnation, into
symbols. 207 Identifying these as symbols is a dangerous move, Frei would claim, because
all three constitute the identity of an unsubstitutable Person and identity is constituted
through the character‟s interaction with other events, characters, etc. These events are
not symbols of general meaningfulness in their own right, but only as they emphasize the
identity of Jesus Christ. Requiring that existential significance be the criteria for good
reading can make Christ‟s identity a means to an end—his identity is seen as important in
so far as it discloses possibilities for human meaningfulness.
The true enemy of the plain sense (and the cause of the eclipse of biblical
narrative), Frei believes, is any extrinsic principle of interpretation which is given power
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of the symbols of cross-resurrection-incarnation.”
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to orient all interpretation around itself. Such a principle will necessarily usurp and
replace the plain meaning of the text. One influential usurper today, Frei argues, is the
phenomenological tradition, which, Frei believes, cannot, of its very nature, allow for the
primacy of the literal, ascriptive sense of the text. Holistic employment of this general
method (as any general method) will result, Frei thinks, in the loss of the particularity of
Jesus Christ. Frei specifically criticizes Tracy for deciding before even engaging in
interpretation that there must be “compatibility between two apparently autonomous
factors” (i.e. Christian tradition and the situation). 208 As a result, good theology for Tracy
is seen to be largely a matter of showing the two to be compatible. Because Tracy has
chosen phenomenological hermeneutics as his philosophical system, Frei feels he will
always frame the distinctiveness of the Christian fact in terms of phenomenology, thus
limiting the message to those elements accessible to phenomenology‟s categories of
meaning. Frei argues that theologians as diverse as Schleiermacher and Barth understood
the need for ad hoc correlation, 209 but Tracy‟s project of systematic correlation ends
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Frei attempts to make Schleiermacher and Barth the champions of his concept of ad hoc
correlation. In Types of Christian Theology, Schleiermacher is contrasted to Tracy. For example, Frei notes
that for Schleiermacher, “Phenomenology and doctrinal content are correlated, but to talk of their identity
would be inappropriate. This is a far cry from David Tracy, for whom it seems to be the case that Christian
„meanings‟ may be fairly represented as one specific mode of general religious consciousness” (Types of
Christian Theology, 37). (See also Types of Christian Theology, 71, where Frei promotes his own project
of “ad hoc correlation” by claiming it has the same meaning as Schleiermacher‟s phrase, “A little
introspection”: “„A little introspection,‟ rather like common sense—nothing high-powered here! It‟s as
though the principle of correlation could have been something else if he hadn‟t lived in Prussia when he did
and experienced the philosophical possibilities of his time. General criteria for meaning on the one side,
the specificity of Christian faith and language on the other, and an ad hoc conceptual instrument for
bringing them together—distinctiveness and reciprocity together.”)
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either in the sublimating of Christianity by employing a general system of philosophy or
in “hermeneutical incoherence.”210
Overall, Tracy appreciates Frei‟s criticism. Tracy realizes he has not adequately
emphasized the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ in its narrative rendering, and
attempts to overcome this weakness. Tracy notes that Frei has clarified for him just why
the Gospel narratives are the key to understanding the Scriptures. Gospel is, Tracy
claims, “that peculiar, perhaps unique, compositional mode that unites Word-asproclamation and disclosive Word rendered present through written narrative,” and
serves as “the major genre for the original Christian communities‟ self-interpretation.”211
Thus, Tracy continues, the “passion narratives are the principle stories by which the
Christian community first rendered in written form its understanding of who this singular
Jesus of Nazareth proclaimed as the Christ is.” 212 Gospel narrative is foundational
because only Gospel narrative can render the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ.
Appreciating Frei‟s critique, Tracy claims,
The confessional genre and the kerygmatic categories state but fail to show what
can only be shown in explicitly narrative terms...just how and why the identity
and presence of Jesus as Jesus the Christ is indeed confessed in the common
Christian confession, but is rendered in its fullness only in and through the details
of the interaction of the unsubstitutable character of Jesus and the specific
circumstances of his passion and resurrection…This, for me at least, is Frei‟s
210

Frei (ibid, 6), claims Tracy “tries to have it both ways,” (i.e. allow for the particularity of
revelation and determine it by a general philosophical schema) yet in the end “either reverts to” type one
and allows philosophy to dictate the discussion, or it “simply ends in hermeneutical incoherence” of type
two. Frei‟s appropriation of Tracy in type two seems to reflect Tracy‟s Analogical Imagination, because
his first book, Blessed Rage for Order is noted by Frei as “returning to Kant,” and therefore would best fit
in type one.
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great contribution: to show, in narrative terms, how the Christian confesses not
merely through the genre of confession but through affirming the passion
narrative as the full meaning of that confession. The passion narrative shows us
how and why the Christian community „believes in Jesus Christ with the
apostles‟…only the narrative can show, and not merely state (confess), who this
Jesus Christ, present to us in word and sacrament, really is for the Christian. 213
Tracy says that while he always stressed the “proclamatory aspect of these
narratives as gospel,” he failed to “engage in the further task: an analysis of how the
highly particular narrative interactions of the passion accounts actually render the identity
and presence of Jesus Christ in order further to clarify my affirmation (then and now) of
the ecclesial „plain sense‟ of these narratives.”214 Thus Tracy believes that Frei has
uniquely demonstrated both the necessity of this hermeneutical task and has shown why
it provides an essential foundation for understanding the meaning of the Christian faith.
Tracy remains concerned that Frei‟s insistence on realistic narrative will restrict
legitimate readings of the Gospel narratives. 215 Yet Frei‟s understanding of the literal
sense may not be nearly as restrictive as Tracy seems to think. Frei‟s insistence is that

213

Tracy, “On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 39-40.

214

Ibid, 39.

215

See Tracy (“Dialogue with the Other,” 104-14), where Tracy calls Frei‟s “Literal Reading”
a “narrow” and “peremptory” reading of Scripture for its emphasis on the plain sense as realistic narrative,
and “On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 43-51. Tracy‟s own critique of Frei (and Lindbeck)
suggests that although their emphasis on the plain sense is extremely valuable and fundamentally correct,
their emphasis has become one-sided and results in a reductionistic articulation of Scripture. Tracy claims,
“The centrality of the plain sense of the passion narratives, moreover, should reopen rather than close
Christian theological attention to many other theological readings. As long as the plain sense reading of the
passion narratives is understood as the fullest rendering of the common Christian confession, then a
diversity of readings of both confession and narrative will inevitably occur” (“On Reading the Scriptures
Theologically,” 42). Specifically, Tracy thinks that the New Testament itself is quite pluralistic, even if it
is normatively oriented toward the ascriptive identity of Christ. “If one grants the importance of the plain
sense of the passion narratives, then a further question occurs. Should a theologian also affirm: first, all the
differences in the individual passion narratives; second, all the differences in all the other parts of the
gospels (the ministry and sayings); third, all the differences in all the other genres of the New Testament?”
(Ibid, 43). Hence Tracy claims, “A resting in „realistic narrative‟ alone may occasion a refusal to take those
other ways [namely non Anglo-Saxon readings] with full theological seriousness” (Ibid, 38). Under the
guise of „realistic narrative,‟ Scripture could, in fact, be muted.
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part of the Gospel texts, the passion-resurrection sequence, be read as realistic
narrative.216 These texts must be read plainly as a foundation for other readings of
Scripture, because they plainly render the identity of the unsubstitutable Person for the
Christian faith. Where Tracy is worried that realistic narrative may stifle the surplus of
meaning and hence the legitimate diversity of readings of the text, Frei would only insist
that the interpreter first attend to what is plainly written as foundational to the Christian
faith (the literal, ascriptive sense of the Gospels), and then he or she may add a wide
range of subordinate and secondary interpretations ordered to the plain, literal sense of
the text. Hence Frei would not see the plain/literal/realistic sense of the Gospels as
restricting interpretation—only establishing the ground of the Christian faith upon which
all subsequent interpretation may take place and must be continually ordered.
Tracy is convinced that he can incorporate Frei‟s insights into his own
correlational project without much amendment to his earlier works.217 Tracy emphasizes
here that Frei has developed “„fuller‟ not „different‟ criteria of appropriateness than
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Hans W. Frei, "Theological Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus' Death and Resurrection,"
in Theology and Narrative, ed. George and William Placher Hunsinger (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1993).113, claims, “I am speaking only of an aspect of the passion-resurrection sequence. Obviously there
are also other elements, e.g., tragic and epic motifs, about the Gospel story as a whole and the passion
narrative in particular…it is difficult and even undesirable to reduce the gospel story by formal analysis to
any one type of literature…” Furthermore, Frei (ibid), realizes that other kinds of biblical genres will
require different methods of interpretation: “Understanding texts may differ in accordance with different
texts and their differing contexts. Didactic letters may demand different skills from realistic narratives, and
parables may differ from both. This does not necessarily mean that „to understand‟ is many things, but
simply that it may not be of the sort for the unity of which an explanatory theory is available.”
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Tracy thinks that he has specifically incorporated Frei‟s critique into his model of theology
without changing his phenomenological model of interpretation. Tracy (“On Reading the Scriptures
Theologically,” 35-36), argues that while he remains an “unrepentant correlational theologian,” he has
“learned from the incomparable Hans Frei just how central that „plain sense‟ should be for all Christian
theology,” and how it orients the Christian confession to the unsubstitutable Person of Christ.
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those” previously employed by Tracy himself. 218 Frei‟s project provides “fuller” criteria
for Tracy because he had previously made two “valuable but incomplete genre moves”:
first by emphasizing the “„event and person‟ (not only the „event‟) of Jesus Christ,” and
second, by “reflect[ing] on the implications of the common Christian confession that „I
(we) believe in Jesus Christ with the apostles.‟” 219 These two criteria of adequacy, Tracy
believes, are capable of allowing for pluralism in Scriptural readings while still retaining
the essence of Christianity. Tracy claims that the “limitation” of his earlier work (which
Frei has helped him to see), is that even in his description of narrative, “„event‟ and
„person‟ remain merely implicit.” 220 “[T]hanks to Frei‟s work,” Tracy claims, “I would
not change the basic categories and genres of my own attempt at an analysis of the New
Testament. But I would reorder them so that the „realistic narratives‟ played a yet more
central role.”221
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Ibid, 39. Tracy (A Short History of the Interpretation of the Bible, 176), claims the
Scriptures “are nothing less than the authoritative witness to that event—a witness to which all later
Christian communities hold themselves accountable.” This criteria of appropriateness gives Scripture
authority to critique the Church and its subsequent interpretations. Tracy (ibid), continues, “To believe in
Jesus Christ with the apostles means, for the Christian, that every present personal and communal Christian
belief in Jesus Christ is in fundamental continuity with” the Scriptures. Such criteria are necessary because,
Tracy (ibid), says, “Criteria of appropriateness insist that all later theologies in Christian theology are
obliged to show why they are not in radical disharmony with the central Christian witness expressed in the
Scriptures. In that restricted sense, scripture…norms but is not normed…by later witnesses.”
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Ibid, 59-60, n. 20. See also Tracy, Dialogue with the Other, 104, where Tracy gives
additional praise to Frei and shows where he still disagrees with him. Tracy finds “persuasive” Frei‟s
description of the loss of realistic narrative, and admits that among religions, Christianity has a unique
appreciation for narrative because their gospels are the foundation of their faith. Gospel, Tracy claims, is
that “peculiar genre which unites proclamation, witness, and narrative…If one wants to know who Jesus
Christ is for Christians, the passion narratives are the first place to look. For there we find in realistic and
history-like fashion the central Christian construal of who this Jesus confessed to be the Christ is and even
why he and he alone is thus construed…Through the rendering of the singular identity of Jesus Christ in the
passion narratives, Christians also discover their principle clues to who God is and who human beings as
free agents are empowered to become” (114).
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As a result of Frei‟s critique, Tracy has seemingly added a second criteria of
appropriateness to his theological project, while still insisting that a responsible
theological program must include an overarching criterion of intelligibility (i.e. a general
system of correlation). Throughout his career, Tracy‟s chief criteria of appropriateness
was his insistence on theological continuity with the confessional formula, “I believe in
Jesus Christ with the apostles.”222 Tracy maintains that this remains a proper criterion,
but he now supplements it with Frei‟s criterion of realistic narrative. In his 1994 book,
On Naming the Present, Tracy suggests that it is “possible that these two…theological
candidates for unity-amidst-diversity: the common Christian confession and the common
Christian passion narrative…together may function to show a pervasive unity of
Christian theological understanding of the scriptures without in any way denying the need
for great variety.”223 Both the common Christian confession and a realistic reading of the
passion narratives are indispensable criteria of appropriateness. As a result, Tracy writes,
In sum, any Christian theology which confesses its faith in the presence of Jesus
Christ (and the Spirit released by Christ) „with the apostles‟ will always
theologically need the plain ecclesial (apostolic) sense of these narratives to
achieve what neither symbol alone, nor doctrine alone, nor historical-critical
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Tracy (ibid, 112), restates his insistence that Christians continue to use the confession, “We
believe in Jesus the Christ with the apostles.” This, in fact, will safeguard the Identity of Jesus Christ in the
way Frei envisioned doing so through realistic narrative. Tracy (ibid, 112-13), claims, “To eliminate any
element of this central confession is to change (sometimes radically, sometimes subtly) the Christian
understanding of all reality.” Three cautions follow from this: First, Tracy (ibid), claims “the confession is
not „We believe in Christ‟ so that the Sophia-Logos tradition unrelated to the ministry, teaching, death and
resurrection of this Jesus of Nazareth confessed to be the Christ can suffice.” Second, Tracy (ibid, 113),
claims “the confession is also not „We believe in Jesus‟ so that a Jesusology or an alternative portrait of
Jesus (e.g., the various quests for the „historical Jesus‟ can replace the ecclesial Christian confession „We
believe in Jesus Christ.‟” Third, Tracy (ibid), claims “the preposition „with‟…cannot be allowed to be
replaced by the preposition „in,‟” for if the Church believed in the apostles, “the tradition or doctrine or
church or apostolic office or text would replace Jesus Christ as that divine reality which the Christian
ultimately believes in.”
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reconstruction of the original apostolic witness alone, nor conceptual theology
alone, nor confession alone, can achieve: a theological clarification of how the
reality of Christ‟s presence is manifested through the identity of that Jesus
rendered in the realistic, history-like narrative of the passion and resurrection: a
narrative-confession of this one unsubstitutable Jesus of Nazareth who is the
Christ of God.224
As long as both the confession, “I believe in Jesus Christ with the apostles,” and the plain
rendering of the passion narratives are emphasized (the two criteria of adequacy), the
theologian may proceed boldly in adding a criteria of intelligibility (systematic
correlation) to the interpretative project without eclipsing the identity of Christ.
Tracy also realizes, as a result of Frei‟s critique, that his specific interpretation of
individual parables in the Gospels must be reformulated to better emphasize the priority
of the identity of Jesus Christ.225 Significantly, Ricoeur also changes his emphasis on the
role of parables, although he does not specifically credit Frei‟s critique. 226 Frei has
argued that Tracy‟s interpretation of parables shifts focus away from realistic narrative
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Tracy (“On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 59, n. 16), specifically admits that
some of his interpretations of parables in Blessed Rage for Order were “not specifically enough related to
the passion narratives.” Tracy cites Blessed Rage for Order, 124-46, as example of this, but insists that he
has not made such an error in the Analogical Imagination (see “On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,”
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It is significant to note that Frei‟s 1982 essay, “Theology and the Interpretation of
Narrative,” 94-116, was presented in a joint-presentation with Ricoeur, responding to Ricoeur‟s
hermeneutics. Hence they were, by that time, familiar with each other‟s arguments, and it is quite possible
that Ricoeur‟s perspective changed in dialogue with Frei. Later in his career, Ricoeur also admitted he has
failed to adequately appreciate “that the narrative-parables are narratives within a narrative, more precisely
narratives recounted by the principle personage of an encompassing narrative” (Paul Ricoeur, "The Bible
and the Imagination," in The Bible as a Document of the University, ed. Hans Dieter Betz (Chico, CA:
Scholars Press, 1981), 55). Ricoeur ("Biblical Hermeneutics," Semeia 4 (1975), 105), goes on to
emphasize, “The hero‟ of the Gospel narrative, who is also the „donor‟ of the parables as secondary
narratives tends to become the indirect referent of the parable as metaphor.” It is clear, then, that Ricoeur
wishes to understand the individual narratives in light of the realistic narrative, and not the other way
around. Yet Ricoeur does not, as William Placher ("Introduction," 45), claims, “go on to give a systematic
account of how to interpret that overarching narrative.”
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and hence the plain rendering of the identity of Jesus Christ. 227 Frei thinks Tracy‟s
interpretation of parables tends to predominate because parables better fit Tracy‟s
phenomenological description of religious language. 228 Ricoeur has explained religious
language as having a referent grounded primarily in religious experience: “What
religious language does is to redescribe; what it redescribes is human experience. In this
sense we must say that the ultimate referent of the parables, proverbs, and eschatological
sayings is not the Kingdom of God, but human reality in its wholeness.” 229 Frei worries
that human experience has shifted emphasis from the identity of Christ to the situation of
the contemporary reader.230 Tracy, however, thinks that through Frei‟s work he is able to
explain how parables can be subordinated to the identity of Christ. As long as
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Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 65), argues that Tracy naturally focuses his work away
from realistic narrative and onto parables which “disorient” and “re-describe” and disclose a world for the
reader, since these are better suited to bring out existential significance. Naturally, says Frei (ibid), this
linguistic “limit” situation is most likely to be found in “proverbs, eschatological sayings, and parables…”
and hence the realistic narrative is usurped.
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Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, 134. Tracy continually stresses the parables as disclosive
of limit. Tracy (ibid), writes, “In the peculiar limit-use of narrative and metaphor in the parables these
fictions redescribe the extraordinary in the ordinary in such a manner that the ordinary is transgressed and a
new and extraordinary, but possible mode-of-being-in-the-world is disclosed.” As a result, Tracy (ibid),
writes, “Religious language in general re-presents that basic confidence and trust in existence which is our
fundamental faith, our basic authentic mode of being in the world.” The reason parables are essential for
Tracy is because, as fiction, they disclose the “disorienting” and “reorienting” of a claim to the whole,
which is the basic thrust of the religious dimension.
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Ricoeur, “Biblical Hermeneutics,” 127. Furthermore, Ricoeur (ibid, 34), notes, “the
ultimate referent of parabolic (proverbial, proclamatory) language is human experience centered around the
limit-experiences which would correspond to the limit-expressions of religious discourse.”
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Frei believes that phenomenology will move toward something like Gnosticism in its focus
on teachings and sayings as the center of the text rather than the identity of Jesus Christ. It is worth noting,
however, that Frei is not against existential readings of parables, provided that they are directed toward and
grounded in the identity of Jesus Christ. Frei (“Conflicts in Interpretation,” 166), simply claims that in
parables “one moves better from the self-identification of Jesus through the Passion and Resurrection
stories toward the parables rather than the other way around.”
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interpretations of parables are grounded in the two criteria of appropriateness they should
be considered Christian readings of the text.231 Tracy claims,
[I]f the parables of Jesus are not explicitly related to the passion narratives (as
they are in the plain sense of Scripture), then it is true that the parables may begin
to play too solitary and too prominent a theological role for Christian selfunderstanding. For the full theological meaning of Jesus‟ parables of the Reign of
God is only clarified when the interpreter, through careful readings of the passion
narrative, shows how Jesus is fully manifested in the passion narratives, and not
earlier, as the enacted parable of God.232
So what of Frei‟s argument that phenomenological hermeneutics will “break”
rather than “stretch” the literal reading of Scripture? Will simply adding a further
criterion of appropriateness without eliminating phenomenological hermeneutics restore a
foundational focus on the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ as an orienting principle
for Christian identity? Frei would say no. Frei is bothered that Tracy (following
Ricoeur) posits a “split reference” for the Scriptures which places “meaning” in the world
in front of the text, hence making the existential significance of the passage for the reader
the ultimate referent of the text.233 The interpreter simply cannot give priority to both an
extrinsic system of meaning and the unique claims of the Christian texts. As a result,
when a systematic correlation becomes a requirement for theology,
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See Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 64-65, who claims that Tracy must “indicate that
the straightforward literal description or reference to the ordinary world is not what is at stake in the New
Testament.” To do this, Tracy follows Ricoeur in using a “double or split reference…in which the real
meaning is the innovative linguistic thrust from the first to a second level, to a newly created linguistic
world, and it is this second rather than the first referent that gives us the true referent or meaning of the
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[E]ither you provide an allegorical interpretation of the New Testament, in which
the predicate exemplified by Jesus overpowers the ascriptive subject himself and
then you return to Kant, as does David Tracy in Blessed Rage for Order, or your
interpretation ends up having two meanings or referents at the same time, Jesus
and some general experience, as Tracy does in a later book, The Analogical
Imagination.234
Frei explains that having two “meanings” is not a problem as long as one is
allowed to order them (as the four senses were used in premodern exegesis). The
problem with Tracy‟s later account, for Frei, is that a “systematic correlation of the two
meanings” (i.e. the incorporation of two ordering principles at the same time) forces him
into “hermeneutical incoherence.”235 In other words, Tracy may have to break his
hermeneutical rules to put the identity of Christ as rendered in the text ahead of the
existential mode-of-being-in-the-world rendered in front of the text. Within the world in
front of the text, will the meaning of the words or the meaning disclosed in a fusion or
horizons be granted priority? The claims of Scripture, he feels, are relatively clear, even
if a criteria for understanding is not clear. Frei insists,
There may well be an affinity, structural, moral, aesthetic, between reader and
text. On the other hand there may not be. The conditions for a proper reading of
biblical narratives may be quite accessible, even if one fails to discover such a
general type of affinity, especially a structural affinity…the specificity of the
narrative text, its literal sense if you will, is not to be ignored, no matter in what
way the reader may find (s)he adjusts to it.236
It seems that Frei is still concerned that Tracy‟s willingness to incorporate a
realistic reading of the Gospels has come about precisely because it is able to fit into
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Tracy‟s already established correlational model, and not because Tracy is now committed
to a plain reading of the biblical narrative. When tension does arise (as Frei believes it
does in the case of the particularity of Jesus Christ), Tracy has two options: either he can
give hermeneutical priority to the unique claim of Scripture (and hence break his own
correlational model), or he can incorporate the unique claim to the extent that it fits (and
hence reduce the claim to what can be articulated coherently in a philosophical model).
Either choice, Frei believes, will demonstrate the inadequacy of systematic correlation
and the need for an ad hoc alternative.

C. Scripture‟s Role in the Economy
In this dissertation I suggest that the way to ease the impasse of method between
Tracy and Frei is to locate Scripture in the economy of redemption, showing how the
Triune God uses Scripture to communicate to the Church. Despite their nearly exclusive
emphasis on method, I wish to argue that both Tracy and Frei see the movement from
text to spiritual reality as the central problematic governing their hermeneutical projects.
Frei insists on the plain sense reading of Scripture precisely because he desires to show
that the Jesus Christ rendered in the Gospels is the Christ who is present to the reader.
Tracy also develops his system of phenomenological hermeneutics because he wants to
show that Scriptural reading involves more than simply the interaction between texts and
readers, but leads to the very disclosure of the living, present Christ to readers. However,
because neither Frei nor Tracy examines this broader context of the divine economy, the
relationship between Christ, Scripture and Church is left undeveloped, resulting in an
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impasse in method. This section will show the implicit suggestions each makes about
God‟s use of Scripture and the movement from text to spiritual reality in a Christian
reading of Scripture in order to highlight essential hermeneutical discussions that need to
be developed.

1. God‟s Use of Scripture
Neither Tracy nor Frei says anything explicit about God‟s use of the Scriptural
texts in the economy of redemption. Throughout his work, Tracy‟s focus remains on the
reader‟s reorienting experience of disclosure in the text, and hence does not articulate the
way in which God uses the texts. Yet Tracy insists that the disclosure is always a gift. 237
Consequently, although Tracy never develops this idea, the reorienting of the reader in
encounter with the text must depend somehow on the action of God rather than being
simply a function of the interaction between text and reader. In his later work, Tracy
does suggest that the Logos is somehow uniquely present in the Scriptural texts, but he
never explains how this presence is linked to God‟s possible use of the texts for selfcommunication to readers.238
Frei‟s later writings at times seem to presume an ontology of God‟s action in the
text, although Frei makes only a few tentative suggestions about God‟s use of the text. In
a 1986 lecture, Frei makes an interesting comment that moves beyond the text/reader
relationship to a discussion of God‟s activity in the text. Frei writes, “The textual world
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as witness to the Word of God is not identical with the latter, and yet, by the Spirit‟s
grace, it is „sufficient‟ for the witnessing.” 239 The Scriptures are somehow sufficient
witness, and hence authoritative, because of God‟s gracious action (not specifically a
quality of the text or a decision by the reading community). Thus, “the reign of the One
who is beyond all description, beyond all metaphorical thrusts, is depicted fitly by
ordinary, realistic, literally referential language…” 240 Frei notes later that he has a
fundamental trust for the language of Scripture because God has caused this language to
be adequate.241 The only confidence the interpreter could have that God is indeed
sufficiently depicted in the text is if God caused that fit depiction to occur. Frei
concludes that this is the reason readers must trust in the adequacy of the literal sense:
I plead then for the primacy of the literal sense then and, it seems to me, its
puzzling but firm relationship to a truth toward which we cannot thrust. The
modus significandi will never allow us to say what the res significata is.
Nonetheless, we can affirm that in the Christian confession of divine grace, the
truth is such that the text is sufficient. There is a fit due to the mystery of grace
between truth and text…The Reformers saw the place where that fit was realized
in the constant reconstitution of the Church where the word is rightly preached
and where the sacraments are rightly administered.242
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Frei (“Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 110), claims, “Language is, for
Christians, a created good and not in principle fallen, and therefore it is not „absent‟ from the
truth…Language is not fallen, not absent from truth or meaning…We have language and that is all we
have, and to intercalate „meaning‟ into it is the very temptation we must resist. We have texts and
intertextuality and no other realm.”
242

Frei, “Conflicts in Interpretation,” 166.

69

Essentially Frei‟s cumulative argument is that the text of Scripture can be
considered sufficient in its plain sense because God has determined that Scripture will be
adequate as a witness to Christ. Scripture is adequate because God has somehow caused
it to be sufficient. The sufficiency of the text is constituted and preserved by “divine
grace.” This claim shifts the emphasis from the Christian community to God‟s action. It
appears that Frei is focused on God‟s providential action, seeing to it that these texts were
adequate and preserved, yet Frei never develops this aspect. Thus neither Tracy nor Frei
really explain God‟s use of the text, although the logic of each seems, at times, to press
them to say more about how God may use Scripture.

2. The Movement from Text to Spiritual Reality
Given their lack of explicit reflection on God‟s use of the Scriptural texts, it is
significant that Frei and Tracy both develop their respective projects with the goal of
showing that Scriptural reading leads to spiritual encounter with the referent of the text.
In fact, I suggest that although articulation of this movement remains implicit for each, it
is the central problematic in each of their projects. For Tracy, Scripture is significant
precisely because it can lead to disclosure with the divine, while, for Frei, Scripture is
significant precisely because it renders to readers the Christ who is present. Here it
appears to be the nearly exclusive focus on the relationship between text and reader
prevents each from describing this movement.
In his early work, Tracy‟s implicit movement from text to divine reality occurs at
the level of dialogical encounter between text and reader which occurs in any religious
classic. Hence Tracy‟s central claim is that “The Christ event, in sum, is re-presentative
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of the same „that-it-happens-now‟ event from the whole disclosed in every religious
classic.”243 The subject matter disclosed in the Christian classic texts is unique, but the
manner of disclosure is common to all classics. Each genre, in its own way, discloses
possibilities for human existence as it discloses a claim to the whole, which finds its
greatest instantiation in the event of Christ. The reader, in encounter with the text, is
brought by the text‟s unique subject matter to a moment of disclosure, in which a new
mode of being in the world is opened up. The subject matter disclosure is a dual referent,
simultaneously God as the ground of all reality, and a claim to the whole, expressed in
Christian faith as the “dangerous memory” of the person/event of Jesus Christ. As the
reader encounters this unique subject matter, he or she is brought by the text to an
experience of limit, in which the world of the reader is reoriented by the subject matter.
Later in his career Tracy also provides a deeper description of the movement from
text to spiritual reality. In a little essay entitled “Writing,” Tracy argues that all writing is
always fragmented, always constituted in absence. Consequently, “In Christian selfunderstanding, except for the unique status of Christ-as-Logos, there is no claim to full or
simple self-presence in either manifesting Word-as-Logos or proclaimed word as
rendering present the Word in distance (Bultmann) or sacrament. There is some
presencing, to be sure, but mediated in and through writing/scripture. Presence is never
full, simple, or whole.”244 Because there is no full presence of either author or reader to
writing, the interpreter must always be self-critical, lest a particular ideology drive his/her
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interpretation. 245 This articulation on the need for suspicious readings of Scripture
positively supplements Tracy‟s previous articulations of this subject, because he now
explicitly links Scripture to a theory of the presence of the divine Word.246 The promise
of presence allows the Church to understand their Scriptures as unique: “This decisive
Word-event of divine self-manifestation is understood among Christians as the divine
self-presencing in the currently enacted Word and Eucharistic sacrament and in the
written words of Scripture.”247 Yet Tracy struggles to show, in general terms of textual
interpretation, exactly how these texts are unique in their rendering of Christ. Locating
Scripture‟s role in the relationship between Christ and Church may allow Tracy to
explain the unique presence of the Logos in Scripture in a more complete way.
Early in his career, Frei makes an equally provocative statement about the
presence of God in Scripture. In The Identity of Jesus Christ, Frei claims,
The center of the Christian message is a mystery—the presence of God…the
feeble, often naïve and simple word of written Scripture…becomes a true witness,
yet more than a witness. The Word does indeed witness to that which it is not, the
presence of God in Jesus Christ. But far more important is the fact that indirectly
(rather than directly, as in the case of Jesus Christ) God witnesses to it, that he
makes himself present to it so that the Word may become the temporal basis of
the Spirit who is the presence of God in Jesus Christ. The witness of Scripture to
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Tracy (ibid, 391), claims, “Scripture and writing does not simply participate in presence
but can indeed function paradoxically as the warning of the idolatrous Christian temptation to illusions of
full self-presence or divine presence to the Christian.”
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The Word is both present and absent in these texts, and hence there is need for both trust
and criticism. Tracy (ibid, 389), notes the “originating Christian dialectic of revelation-as-Word: Jesus the
Christ understood as both self-presencing Logos and self-distancing Kerygma.” This “dual function” of
“proximity and distance, presence and absence, similarity and difference, participation and interruption” of
the self-understanding of Christ in writing demonstrates that “the Word, Jesus Christ, is for Christians
testified to and rendered present in written words, that is, Scripture.”
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God is sure, not by itself, but because the witness of God to Scripture is faithful
and constant.248
Here Frei seems to claim that the Scriptures are “faithful and constant” because
God “makes himself present to it.” Carter Aikin argues that implicitly in Frei‟s thought,
“[T]he reason that we can orient our own identity in that which is given in the Bible is
because God gives God‟s self as present in scripture.”249
Frei insists that this movement from text to the (indirect) presence of God takes
place in realistic reading of the Gospel narratives, where the unsubstitutable identity of a
Christ is rendered to the reader in such a way that the reader cannot think of Christ as not
present today. Realistic reading, for Frei, finds its climax in the crucifixion and
resurrection accounts in such a way that one who grasps the identity of Christ through
Scripture cannot but understand Christ to be resurrected and present today.250 As
Cowdell says,
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Summarily Frei (The Identity of Jesus Christ, 149), gives the “identity of Jesus Christ” as
rendered in the Gospels: “He is the man from Nazareth who redeemed men by his helplessness, in perfect
obedience enacting their good in their behalf. As that same one, he was raised from the dead and
manifested to be the redeemer. As that same one, Jesus the redeemer, he cannot not live, and to conceive
of him as not living is to misunderstand who he is.” Thus in reading the resurrection accounts literally, Frei
(ibid, 145), claims, “To know who he is in connection with what took place is to know that he is…What the
accounts are saying, in effect, is that the being and identity of Jesus in the resurrection are such that his
nonresurrection becomes inconceivable…however impossible it may be to grasp the nature of the
resurrection, it remains inconceivable that it should not have taken place.”
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[B]y giving a purely aesthetic (arguably) description of the text, [Frei] has made
the transition from text to reality claim. Thus the revelatory claim of the text does
not lie, as with Ricoeur, in the establishment of a moment of understanding in the
reader, but it remains an intra-textual event. Here the reader understands who
Jesus is and this understanding is identical with another understanding: that Jesus
is. 251
Frei claims that this move from text to divine reality takes place entirely at the
level of the literal sense, as the reader recognizes the unique subject matter of Scripture
rendered in a fitting way. Frei claims, “The primacy of the sensus literalis is in effect an
assertion of the fitness and congruence of the „letter‟ to be the channel of the spirit. It is
the assertion that the text is more nearly perspicuous than not….For the Protestant
Reformers, governance by the sensus literalis in the reading of Scripture as well as its
perspicuity entailed that in principle there is no interpretive outsider.” 252 Using the
exegesis of Calvin, Frei claims, “Calvin has it that our hearts and minds may need
illumination, the text does not. It is plain for all to read.” 253 Yet while this realistic
rendering is open to all readers, Frei admits that belief in the resurrection is a passage to a
different realm. Although “there is a kind of logic in a Christian‟s faith that forces him to
say that disbelief in the resurrection of Jesus is rationally impossible,” Frei says,
“whether one actually believes the resurrection is, of course, a wholly different
matter…no matter what the logic of the Christian faith, actual belief in the resurrection is
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a matter of faith and not of arguments from possibility or evidence.”254 Thus Frei implies
that while a straight-forward reading of the Gospels renders belief in this Christ logically
necessary, the logic of coming to believe is a gift given by God to which human beings
can only respond when given. Hence for the reader to move from reading realistically to
believing the implications of the realistic narrative is the passage to a different realm of
reality. A paradox, then, is present within Frei‟s work: The letter of the text realistically
renders the divine reality, but does not mechanistically lead the reader to an encounter
with that reality. Spiritual understanding is a movement beyond realistic reading. As we
will see, this claim brings Frei‟s realistic reading very close to de Lubac‟s move from
history to allegory, where the text is a reliable guide to and necessary sign of the spiritual
reality, yet it is the action of the Spirit which occasions the movement from one to the
other.
Frei also appears to articulate a movement from text to spiritual reality in a second
way which is dependent on the plain sense of the Gospel narratives. Here a move to
figural reading takes place which must be grounded in theological presuppositions about
God‟s providence and the meaning of history. It is here where Frei explicitly speaks of a
“spiritual understanding” of Scripture. For Frei, following Auerbach, spiritual
understanding appears to be the ability to recognize, through the lens of God‟s ordering
providential actions in history, the connection between figure and fulfillment.255 Dawson
shows that Frei, following Auerbach,
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restricts the scope of the „spiritual‟ by distinguishing it from the historical reality
of figure and fulfillment….Only the mental process by which a figural reader
„comprehends‟ their „interdependence‟ can be called spiritual….Like meaning,
spirit denotes a divinely enacted relation between two persons or events, a relation
altogether different from the causal connections of science or scientific
historiography. 256
Hence spiritual understanding is the grasping of the relationship between figure
and fulfillment which can only be understood in light of the theological presupposition
that God has ordered history into a unified whole. For Frei, “The only spiritual act is that
of comprehension—an act of mimesis, following the way things really are—rather than
of creation, if it is to be faithful interpretation.” 257 The movement from text to divine
reality, then, is first a realistic reading of the Gospels which render the unique identity of
the present Christ, and second a comprehension, through the use of theological
presuppositions, how the reader fits into the figural unity of the Scriptural world.
For both Tracy and Frei, then, these texts are unique precisely because they lead
the responsive reader to an encounter with God and they enable the responsive reader to
see all reality in the way God intends it to be understood. The Scriptural texts go far
beyond imparting information about God; they lead the reader to the self-disclosure of
God. For both, the theological interpretation of Scripture is intended to facilitate the
mediation of the same spiritual reality, yet because they both focus only on the way in

not only itself but also the second, while the second involves or fulfills the first. The two poles of a figure
are separated in time, but both, being real events or persons, are within temporality. They are both
contained in the flowing stream which is historical life, and only the comprehension, the intellectus
spiritualis, of their interdependence is a spiritual act.”
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which the reader encounters the text, and not on God‟s use of the texts for self-revelation
to readers, this discussion has reached an impasse.

3. Conclusion and Remaining Challenges
Observing the absence of discussion about the place of Scripture in the economy
of redemption reveals why certain methodological impasses remain between Tracy and
Frei. Frei‟s difficulty with locating authority and Tracy‟s difficulty in naming the
referent of the text, I will suggest, can only be resolved through explicit theological
reflection on the place of Scripture in the divine economy. Frei‟s attempt to establish a
realistic reading of the Gospels is an honorable attempt to preserve the text from
manipulation by human readers through engagement with contemporary literary theory.
Frei provides a strong argument that the Gospels, if read realistically, render a picture of
Christ that is relatively clear and determinate. Yet Frei‟s concern about the location of
authority for the realistic reading of the Gospel narratives, whether it arises from the texts
themselves or from the consensus of the Church, simply cannot be resolved until Frei has
articulated the relationship between Christ, Scripture and Church. Both Frei and Tracy
agree that only a plain reading of the Gospel narrative shows “just how and why the
identity and presence of Jesus as Jesus the Christ is indeed confessed in the common
Christian confession, but is rendered in its fullness only in and through the details of the
interaction of the unsubstitutable character of Jesus and the specific circumstances of his
passion and resurrection.” 258 Yet the extent to which this realistic rendering of Christ can
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be correlated to other philosophical disciplines can only be decided when Scripture is
examined in the broader context of the economy of redemption. The next section will
turn to an examination of the ecclesiology of each author to show how the understanding
of the Church influences the hermeneutics of each.

III. Ecclesiology: Describing the Church as a Theological and Social Reality
Both Tracy and Frei seek to ground interpretive authority for Scripture in the
reading community. 259 Consequently, a thorough description of the Church as a reading
community would seem to produce significant implications for hermeneutical procedure.
Yet here again the emphasis of each on method, along with the insistence of each that
Scripture can be plainly read by all readers, prevents Tracy and Frei from adequately
articulating the way in which the Church uniquely receives the mediation of Christ in the
Scriptures.
While Tracy and Frei argue that the Church must be described both as a
theological reality and as a sociological reality, their ongoing debate about correlation
appears to shift the emphasis of each to a one-sided description of the Church as a social
reality. This description of the Church which emphasizes the social dimension of the
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Because the Scripture is the Church‟s book, a more explicit articulation of ecclesiology
should seemingly produce a better understanding of the Scriptures. To decline attention to the character of
the Church in order to get a more “objective” reading of Scripture by the individual interpreter has been a
chief fault of modern readings, and both Tracy and Frei agree it must be overcome. For Frei (especially the
later Frei), the literal sense is to be taken as foundational to Christianity precisely because the Church has
decided to read their Scriptures in that way. Frei spends the later part of his career studying the continuous
identity and self-description of the Church throughout the ever-changing philosophical models of the
modern period. For Tracy, Scripture is the Church‟s book, the Church is the bearer of the Christian classic
texts, and the interpreter must not say anything that is in discontinuity with the confession, “I believe in
Jesus Christ with the apostles.” Both theologians believe it is necessary to ground Scriptural interpretation
in the Church.
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Church almost to the exclusion of the theological dimension has led to impasse between
the two theologians, as each uses a different model of social description to support
implicit dogmatic assumptions. Tracy typically describes the Church as a “tradition” in
the philosophical sense used by Gadamer and Ricoeur. Thus the Church can be fruitfully
described in terms of a general philosophical system of meaningful interaction between
text (Scripture) and tradition (Church). Consequently Tracy critiques Frei‟s
understanding of the “plain sense” of Scripture as being too Protestant 260 and too limited
261

to explain how the Scripture is the Church‟s book. Frei, on the other hand, typically

describes the Church as a “socio-linguistic community,” using the work of Wittgenstein
and Geertz.262 The Church can be fruitfully described in terms of its self-description:
those practices, rules, customs, etc. which are internal to its existence. Consequently Frei
accuses Tracy of not developing his model with reference to the self-understanding of the
Church, replacing the unique, self-description of the Church with the general category of
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Tracy (“On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,” 37), claims that his own emphasis on
the plain sense (which he feels includes a broader range of readings than Frei‟s construal) “clarifies the
Catholic sense of how the Scripture is the church‟s book.”
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Tracy (Dialogue with the Other, 108), writes, “Personally I remain persuaded (de Lubac, et
al.) of the value of the patristic and medieval allegorical readings…The contemporary emphasis on „literal‟
readings, although clearly fruitful for the reasons cited in the text (and distinctively emphasized by Aquinas
and Luther), seems both too narrow in focus and too peremptory in their discussions of „allegorical,‟ or
„mystical‟ or even „general hermeneutical‟ readings and concerns.”
262

Lindbeck has been influential in Frei‟s development of ecclesiology. The Church, for
Lindbeck (The Nature of Doctrine, 33), is that community which provides a “comprehensive interpretive
scheme” which “structure[s] human experience and understanding of self and world.” Frei wishes to give a
“thick description” of the Church (a term used by Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New
York: Basic Books, 1973)), in order to understand why the literal sense is so essential (see Frei, “Literal
Reading,” 71).
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human experience. 263 Each theologian accuses the other of failing to address the Church
adequately in reading the Scriptures theologically. Yet both are committed to descriptive
schemas of the Church that focus on the Church more as a social reality rather than as a
distinctively theological reality.
So long as focus remains almost exclusively on the relationship between
Scriptural texts and individual readers, it will be almost impossible to decide whether
Tracy or Frei has more adequately described the reading community. It remains unclear
why describing the Church‟s identity as a socio-linguistic community (as Frei does) is
methodologically advantageous to describing it philosophically as a tradition (as Tracy
does).264 Both approaches illumine certain important aspects of the Church‟s identity.
Yet both fail to provide a thorough enough theological description of the Church to show
how it is unique in its reception of Christ by means of the Scriptures. In this section I
will show that Tracy and Frei‟s lack of theological description of the Church has
prevented them from placing Scriptural interpretation in the broader context of the
economy of redemption, as they do not adequately show the normative purpose of the
Church‟s reading of Scripture. Explicitly placing the text/reader relationship in its larger
context of God‟s self-mediation to the Church, I suggest, will lead to a better description
263

Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 33), writes, “It is interesting that the Church as the
necessary context for the use of Christian concepts and language plays no part at all in Tracy‟s layout of his
method. Experience is its substitute.”
264

Tracy‟s implicit critique in Dialogue with the Other, 109, seems to be that philosophical
descriptions are not inherently worse than literary theories or social-scientific descriptions of the Church.
Tracy (ibid), thus notes, “In Frei‟s reading, therefore, the only hope of recovering Christian identity is to
recover a „plain sense‟ reading of the biblical narratives again. For Frei, this demands abandoning the futile
hope of „correlating‟ this narrative to some more general notions of „narrativity‟ or „religion‟ (or both).
This also demands reading the narratives more like literary critics read them (at least certain kinds of critics
like Cleanth Brooks or Eric Auerbach).” Tracy remains unconvinced that either the abandonment of
correlation or the use of literary critics or social scientists will, in the end, prove decisive to “recovering
Christian identity.”
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of the receptive activity of readers and hence will allow for a more complete explanation
of Scriptural reading.

A. Frei‟s Ecclesiology: The Church as a Socio-linguistic Community
Frei appears to have developed two strands of ecclesiology, one relating to his
early focus on the identity of Jesus Christ and the other relating to his later “culturallinguistic turn.” In Frei‟s early model, the Church is constituted in response to the
identity of Jesus Christ and thus has its own identity in relation to Christ its head and in
relation to the world. Furthermore, Frei suggests that the Church is the indirect presence
of Christ. In Frei‟s later model, an additional step takes place (additional, because it does
not nullify the former model, but largely presupposes it). Since the Church has its own
identity (dependent on and in relation to the identity of Jesus Christ), the identity of the
Church must be allowed its own self-description in order to show how Scripture must be
normatively read. Throughout both ecclesiological strands Frei insists that general
hermeneutical method does not determine the Church‟s reading of Scripture, nor should
ecclesiology be suspended in order to improve Scriptural reading. 265

1. Frei‟s Early Ecclesiology

265

Topping (Revelation, Scripture, and Church, 195), notes that “on Frei‟s depiction of the
hermeneutic field…One does not suspend church doctrine and practice (ecclesiology) in order to submit
Bible reading to a methodologically and institutionally independent analysis; rather, one suspends
historical-critical discussion (of meaning and reference) in order to attend to either the literary features of
the Bible (in his early work) or follow the church‟s ruled use of the Bible (in his later work), particularly
those which govern Gospel reading in relation to the rest of the Bible and, indeed, to the rest of reality.”
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Frei‟s early ecclesiology, developed in The Identity of Jesus Christ, sketches an
identity of the Church that analogously follows the identity of Christ. Using the same
intention-action schema he had applied to the Christ depicted in the Gospels, Frei argues
that the identity of the Church is constituted as a follower of the identity of Christ. 266 In
the same way Jesus‟ identity in the Gospels is rendered in His relation to others, so the
identity of the Church is constituted as it acts in relation to Christ and to the world. 267
Just as “Jesus‟ identity was the intention-action sequence in which he came to be who he
was,” and just as Jesus “was constituted by the interaction of his character and
circumstances…So also is the church. Like Jesus, like the people of Israel, the church is
its history, its passage from event to event…” 268 As a result, Frei can claim that “the
church has a history, indeed it is nothing other than its as yet unfinished history
transpiring from event to event.”269 This identity is understood by paying attention to the
relationships between Christ, the Church, and the world.
The Church is constituted both as follower of Christ and as indirect presence of
Christ. As a witness to the identity of Christ, the Church is faithful to the extent that it
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Mike Higton ("„A Carefully Circumscribed Progressive Politics:' Hans Frei's Political
Theology," Modern Theology 15, no. 1 (1999), 63), notes three traits of Frei‟s early ecclesiology: The
Church “is the place where the accessible identity of Jesus is re-presented,…it has its own identity as an
unsubstitutable corporate follower of an unsubstitutable Lord, and it witnesses to the fact that the one
whom it follows is present beyond the church to the whole of history.”
267

Because the identity of a person is the action of the person in relation to others, the Church
could be said to be constituted in such action as well.
268

Frei, Identity, 160. Frei (ibid 159), proposes, “The identity description that we applied to
Jesus in the Gospels must, to a lesser extent and in merely analogous fashion, be applied to the church as
his people.” The identity must remain “merely analogous,” because “no community or institution is a
„subject‟ in the same way in which the term applies to an individual.”
269

Ibid, 159.
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reflects the Christ depicted in the Gospels. 270 The Church “must be a follower rather than
a complete reiteration of its Lord…The church has no need to play the role of „Christ
figure.‟ Rather, it is called upon to be a collective disciple, to follow at a distance the
pattern of exchange…”271 At the same time, however, the Church is more than simply a
partially obedient follower. The Church is the locus of the indirect presence of the
unsubstitutable person of Jesus Christ. The Church is “both the witness to that presence
and the public and communal form the indirect presence of Christ now takes…” 272
Significantly, Frei states that the Church is constituted by both Word and Sacrament, and
claims that eliminating one or the other of these would make Sacrament into “religious
ritual” and Word into “humane ideology.” 273 However strongly Frei claims the Church is
constituted on the identity of Jesus Christ, the Church is also constituted by sacrament as
well.
Although the identity of the Church is primarily constituted in relation to Christ, it
is only recognizable in relation to the world. Frei claims, “History is public history—the
intention-action pattern formed by the interaction of the church with mankind at large;
270
Ibid, 159. The Church‟s identity is one of witness to the Christ who is at the center of
history. Frei (ibid), claims, “The church is simply the witness to the fact that it is Jesus Christ and none
other who is the ultimate presence in and to the world in its mysterious passage from event to event in
public history.”
271
Frei (Ibid, 160), claims, “First, …In the church‟s case, that neighbor is the human world at
large, to which the church must be open in gratitude without forsaking its own mission and testimony. (It is
surely difficult—seemingly impossible—to claim that the church is even unambiguously true to this
discipleship.).”
272
Ibid, 157. It is, in fact, the indirect presence of Christ in the Church that gives the Church
its identity. Frei (ibid, 159), claims, “The given and instituted, spatial and temporal bases for the indirect
presence of Christ allow the church that relatively permanent institutional structure without which no
community can exist or be self-identical…” This indirect presence of Christ is also mediated to the Church
by the Holy Spirit, yet the Spirit is not the direct presence of Jesus—Jesus‟ identity is that of an
unsubstitutable individual.
273

Ibid, 158.
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and it is this history which forms the mysterious pattern of meaning to be disclosed by the
presence of God in Jesus Christ in the future mode.”274 This means that, in some way,
the identity of both the Church and Christ become apparent as the Church interacts with
the world. God is at work in secular history in a way that the Church may not be able to
recognize, but must trust in faith.275 Frei claims,
[The] providential presence of God in Jesus Christ” [happens in] “history that
takes place in the interaction of the church with humanity at large. In a sense, that
means that the really significant events may well transpire among the „Gentiles‟
from whom the church („Israel‟) receives the enrichment of her own humanity.
Humanity at large is the neighbor given to the church, through whom Christ is
present to the Church.276
While Christ‟s indirect presence has “spatial, temporal bases” in the Church
(through Word, Sacrament and the Holy Spirit), Christ is clearly working beyond the
Church in history.277 Just as the indirect presence of Christ is seen in the Church by the
world, so it is also seen in the world by the Church. The Church learns to recognize
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Ibid, 161.
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Ibid, 161. Thus, for the Christian, Frei (ibid), claims that “history is neither chaotic nor
fated, but providentially ordered in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, who is Lord of the past,
the present, and the future.” Frei (ibid, 163), claims further that, “The parabolic application of Christ‟s
passion and resurrection is limited. It does not light up all history…This is the clue it provides: There will
be a summing up of history, a summing up of the history of the church together with the world…This is the
Christian‟s hope in the future mode of the presence of Jesus Christ, of which the interaction of life in the
church and world is for him a token and a pledge.” This means that “not even the event of Jesus Christ can
be…an absolute clue” to the future. Frei (ibid, 164), claims, “That is why Christians, precisely because
they believe in providence, know far less than certain ideological groups about the shape of the future, e.g.,
the Marxists.”
276

Ibid, 162.
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Ibid, 157-58. Thus Frei (ibid), insightfully notes, “The church is constituted by the one
(his presence, which must be spatially and temporally based—even though these bases are not identical
with his presence) as well as by the other (his presence to the course of human history) and by their unity.”
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Christ in the world, although it cannot ever claim it knows the meaning of history. 278
Clearly Frei wishes to take seriously the identity of the Church in relation to the identity
of Christ and world.
For Frei, understanding the place of the Church in relation to Christ and world is a
product of figural reading. Frei claims that figural reading depends “on the conviction
that the narrative renders temporal reality in such a way that the interpretive thought can
and need only comprehend the meaning that is, or emerges from, the cumulative
sequence and its teleological pattern, because the interpreter himself is part of that real
sequence.”279 Frei‟s project of figural reading attempts to establish the reader between
Christ‟s first and second coming, and hence to show, in de Lubac‟s language, the
allegorical and anagogical dimensions of Christian understanding. 280 Dawson claims that
for Frei, figural reading is “a patient „working through‟ the spiritual dynamics of the
disciple‟s movement from his or her state of figure to one of fulfillment, a working
forward in light of the assurances of Christ‟s first coming but also of the uncertainties of
his not-yet-realized second coming.”281 Finding the Church‟s identity between the poles
of Christ‟s first and final advents establishes a certain agnosticism about the meaning of
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Ibid, 161. Frei is reticent to say too much about the Church‟s understanding of the future
from examining the world. Frei (ibid, 161), claims, “In our endeavor to narrate the as-yet-unfinished
pattern of history, we reach for parables that might serve to set forth a kind of pattern, though not to confine
history and the mysterious providence of God to these symbolic meanings. Sequences of events differ from
each other sufficiently widely and always take place in a sufficiently unexpected manner so that we cannot
claim that any set of images or parables can give us the clue to the pattern of history.”
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Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 37.
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Frei‟s figural reading, Higton (Christ, Providence and History, 166), claims, contains “a
willingness to wait upon the particularity of the world rather than digging beneath the particularity in
search of some stabilizing religious bedrock.”
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history apart from Christ. In a 1986 paper, Frei insists that “to believe that God‟s
kingdom holds the human future [is] not to know how it will supersede the present, in fact
to know very little about the future for sure...”282 Higton claims that “The secular,
skeptical sensibility of which Frei speaks is, we might say, a commitment to an unending
learning of the world which does not know in advance what it will find, and which is not
simply recalling or confirming general truths already known.” 283 The one presupposition
that one must carry, for Frei, in order to do justice to the particularity of Christ, is that no
stable meaning pattern can be found apart from Christ. Hence the systematic theologian
has no need to look for one, and all such looking will result in failure. The Church, then,
forms its identity as it follows what Scripture reveals about Christ and remains patiently
agnostic beyond what is revealed through the narrative structure of the text extended in
figural reading.
At this point, a few tentative suggestions can be made about the import of this
early ecclesiology on Frei‟s hermeneutical project. First, for Frei, priority must be given
to self-description of the Church over any extrinsic philosophical system of meaning.
Because Frei‟s focus is on identity rather than existential experience (as Tracy), Frei will
practically favor a self-referential description of the Church rather than a description
based on a particular philosophical model. Second, because the Church gains its identity
by following the identity of Christ, Frei struggles to show the implications of the
282
Higton, Christ, Providence and History, 170, citing Frei, “Comments” (YD S 18-268, 11173), emphasis his. Frei apparently wrote this draft of this conference paper overnight in reaction to the
optimism toward understanding history that Frei had sensed at the conference the previous day (see Higton,
ibid, 164-65). Frei says later in the paper that Christians should be “uneasy about thinking that the
crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus are the clue to the shape of the political future. The limits of time and
space remain, and yet we have the promise of God” (Frei, “Comments,” cited in Higton, 170).
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presence of the living Christ in the community. Frei will tend to give priority to the
unique identity of Christ to such an extent that he never really explains what the indirect
presence of Christ in the Church means for this reading community. Third, Frei sees the
Church as a “public” (to use Tracy‟s term) because it exists in relation to the world. Frei
does not wish to explain the Church only as a self-referential community, engaged only
in reading its own texts without the possibility of external critique. In fact, such a
communitarian description of the Church would be quite incompatible with Frei‟s
ecclesiology. The Church can only be understood as it interacts with the world. Fourth,
Frei‟s figural reading is heavily balanced toward explaining how identity is shaped rather
than how transformation occurs. Frei is so interested in safeguarding the unique identity
of Christ that he does not say much about the way the Church encounters Christ. We will
see that this is a key difference between Frei‟s figural reading and de Lubac‟s allegorical
reading, and that Frei leaves undeveloped much theological reflection about Christ‟s
mediation to the Church by means of Scripture. In the end, Frei‟s focus on method,
unattended by a complete theological description of the nature of the Church or of God‟s
use of Scripture in mediating Christ to the Church prevents him from developing the full
dimensions of his figural reading.

2. Frei‟s Later Ecclesiology
Much of Frei‟s ecclesiology is developed as a product of his project of ad hoc
correlation. The priority, for Frei, is to subordinate philosophical models to Christian
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self-description while allowing each to influence the other.284 Ad hoc correlation will
always be necessary for adequate self-description of the Christian faith (Christianity
cannot adequately understand itself without it),285 while systematic correlation always
risks imposing an extrinsic structure on the Christian faith, and through that, to reduce the
faith to philosophy. The interpreter must always maintain vigilance against allowing
philosophy to overtake Christian self-description. Frei realizes that ad hoc correlation
will be more ambiguous and more difficult to employ than a system of systematic
correlation.286 Necessarily, Frei states, this new program for theology will “obviously
mean a humbler hermeneutics for rather low-level guidance in interpretation than we
have become accustomed to. It will raise doubts about a theory or the possibility that is
logically prior to the actuality of interpretation, and it will be a theory of descriptive
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In a 1984 letter to Gary Comstock, (unpublished letter, cited in Higton, Christ, History,
and Providence, 84), 1-2, Frei claims, “Christian theologians will have to make use of philosophy…I‟m
saying two things simultaneously: First, Christian theology is quite distinct from philosophy…Second,
despite their mutual distinctness, theology as a second-order discipline cannot dispense with philosophy,
and their relation remains complex and has constantly to be worked out, rather than being of one invariable
shape.”
285
Higton (Christ, History and Providence, 197), points out that Frei has three problems with
systems of theology which claim to be independent of philosophical constructs. First, such a theology
would make repetition the highest theological expression. Second, such a theology is, in fact, determined
by philosophical constructs (see Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 4). This model includes both
“Wittgensteinian fideists” and evangelicals, thus being “a chameleon that can wear either conservative or
liberal theological colors.” Interestingly, Frei notes that this model is just as determined by philosophy as
is types 1 or 2, since “its sharp rejection of the other types is a purely philosophical rather than theological
argument—namely, the rejection of universal, transcendental Wissenschaftstheorie and the appeal instead
to the metaphor grammar” (ibid, 4). Third, as a logical consequence, it limits the Christian faith by
imposing an external structure which will not let the faith speak provide a true self-description.
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Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 86), cites Karl Barth: “We must be clear that every
scheme of thought which we bring with us is different from that of the scriptural word which we have to
interpret, for the object of the latter is God‟s revelation in Jesus Christ, it is the testimony of this revelation
inspired by the Holy Ghost, and it can become luminous for us only through the same Holy Ghost” (Karl
Barth, Church Dogmatics 1.2, trans. G.W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), 730). Frei (ibid,
86), then adds, “To that we might well reply, „That‟s all very well, but now tell us how to apply these
rules.‟ But there‟s the rub, and the rub is the point. If he could tell us how, the rule would no longer be a
rule but a method, a systematic and general theory for how to read. „Subordination‟ of a scheme to the
scriptural text means inescapably taking a real risk…”
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elements that go into but do not constitute a unified description of „understanding.‟” 287
Yet such a program, Frei thinks, will be more faithful to the Christian faith, because “the
language of a Church is always community-specific and can never be dissolved…into a
more general culture or, for that matter, a philosophical-technical vocabulary.”288
Yet despite Frei‟s insistence that the identity of the Church not be forced into a
general schema of meaning, Frei‟s later turn to grounding authority of the plain sense in
the decision of the early Church community actually pushes Frei to describe the Church
less as a theological reality (as in his early ecclesiology) and more as a social reality. In
his later works Frei focuses on the Church in largely social categories:
Christianity is a religion, a social organism. Its self-description marks it typically
as a religion in ways similar to those given by sociologists of religion or cultural
anthropologists. It is a community held together by constantly changing yet
enduring structures, practices, and institutions, the way religious communities are:
e.g. a sacred text; regulated relations between an elite…and a more general body
of adherents; and by a set of rituals—preaching, baptism, the celebration of
communion; common beliefs and attitudes; all of these linked…with a set of
narratives connected with each other in the sacred text and its interpretive
tradition. All of these are, for social scientist and theologian…not the signs or
manifestations of religion; rather they constitute it, in complex and changing
coherence.289
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Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 113.
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Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 37.
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Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 96-97. Note that social scientists can
go wrong here just as phenomenologists do. Frei is quite critical of social scientists who posit an “essence”
of the religion and then study the religion in light of its “essence.” This is just as bad as the
phenomenologists who begin with a structure of meaning and read Christianity in light of that. Here again
Frei attacks the phenomenological tradition in its description of religion. The problem with this group is
that it “mistakes some secondary phenomena of religion for its essence. The essence that social scientists
cannot capture is indelibly bound to its self-expression in adherents‟ experience and description…that
uniqueness is a function of linguistic as well as prelinguistic experience, and understanding them is
conditional upon understanding the circular relationship between the experience and its meaning-referent,
the essence of religion” (99).
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Frei‟s primary appreciation for the arguments of philosophers such as
Wittgenstein and anthropologists such as Geertz seem to be that they clear a space for the
Church to read its own Scripture without being required to conform to an external
meaning system. Frei praises this interpretive tradition for refusing to incorporate
general meaning systems wholesale:
They [followers of Wittgenstein] believe that „understanding‟ a text is more
nearly an ability to use it appropriately in specific contexts (and the appropriate
skill of judgment about whether or not to activate that capacity) than to know the
rules for proper „interpretation.‟ To construe the text properly is part of learning
the requisite conceptual skills. To understand concepts is to have the ability both
to explicate and to apply them, without necessarily resorting to a theory that
would indicate how to couple the two. In the case of the Bible, this finally cannot
be done without learning how to use the Bible, including its narratives, within the
church and as its canon, i.e., as authoritative „in the coincidence of letter and
spirit.‟290
Biblical interpretation must be accountable, first of all, to the Church, and the
chief criteria for determining a good reading of Scripture is its coherence to the
established language of the Church. This language is only able to be understood in its
use, as the Church practices its faith. 291 Because the Church is the location where the
indirect presence of Christ is located, it would be illegitimate to begin with general
theories of human understanding and apply them to the Church‟s reading of Scripture
before describing the rules and practices of the Church. This would, in effect, eclipse the
reality of the Church in the same way that Biblical narrative was eclipsed. Ecclesiology
has, in a sense, become the foundation of Frei‟s hermeneutical work, since the Christian
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tradition establishes the “language” through which the Scriptures can be read and
adequately interpreted.
Frei, then, is making a (necessarily) circular claim: Scripture‟s ability to norm the
tradition is established precisely because Scripture‟s reading is grounded by the tradition.
Frei‟s proposal is not a sola scriptura of the Gospel narratives. Although the Church is
sustained by reading the plain sense of the Gospels, the plain sense is not determined or
understood apart from the self-reflection of the Church. This includes both a constant
attention to the past tradition of the Church, 292 as well as a continual wariness that a
philosophical system may eclipse the Christian language. 293 When Frei speaks of the
Church, he necessarily speaks of Scripture, and in his later work, he rarely speaks of
Scripture without the Church. While Frei recognizes that Scripture is grounded in the
community, he still wishes to give the Scriptures primacy over the Church to critique it.
Frei makes this priority clear by claiming, “In the self-description of the Christian
community, the function „scripture‟ as a concept—it does not contain a „meaning‟ apart
from the interpretation or use in the Church—is to shape and constrain the reader, so that
he or she discovers the very capacity to subordinate himself to it.”294
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Frei, “„Narrative‟ in Christian and Modern Reading.” 160. Hence Frei (ibid), insists that,
“No Christian reflection on the biblical narratives, no matter how technical, is apt to ignore the connections
between those narratives and the focus of Christian identity they helped shape over the centuries.”
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Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 100. Frei (ibid), claims, “No
theologian here speaks for himself without first speaking for the community, and his first task is, therefore,
to give a normative description rather than positioning himself to set forth or argue Christian truth claims.”
Description of the Christian language is top priority, Frei (ibid), claims, because “Christianity, precisely as
a community, is language forming, not purely, of course, but sufficiently so that language as embodied in
its institutions, practices, doctrines, and so on, is a distinctive and irreducible social fact. The language is
religion-specific, and theology is the constant testing of the way it is used in a given era…”
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One indication that Frei has not simply transferred authority from text to Church
is his critique of any narrative theology which places emphasis first on the narrative
rendering of the human being and then looks for coincidences with the narrative of the
text.295 Frei‟s own narrative theology is always “text-bound,” so that the narrative of the
text constitutes the identity of the Church. 296 Consequently, Frei would be critical of any
narrative theology which gives the narrative identity of the reader or community priority
over the narrative identity of the text. No self description of the Church can replace the
plain sense of the text. Frei writes,
The difference between a textually focused inquiry, working with the specificity
of the narratives, and a more generally focused one, for which the biblical
narratives are an illustration or illumination of „narrativity‟ as an elemental aspect
of being human and of human experience, is not absolute. But it is important.
The „hermeneutical‟ (or anti- or non-hermeneutical) instruments we have looked
at have been shaped toward the text, even in the case of phenomenological theory.
Consequently, if they make a contribution toward the definition of the shape(s) of
Christian identity, it will be derivative, i.e., „text-bound.‟297
Frei judges these narrative theologies to be no better than phenomenological
hermeneutics because they also impose an extrinsic meaning system on the text and on
Christian identity. In fact, much of Frei‟s response to Lindbeck‟s book, The Nature of
Doctrine, seeks to curtail those who would use it to promote “Wittgensteinian fideism.”
“The cultural-linguist theory,” Frei notes, “is there solely for the service it can render to
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Frei, ibid, 160-61. This kind of narrative theology, Frei (ibid), claims, is much different
from his own, in that it “proceeds from a conviction and analysis of human nature in general and/or religion
in general…the „recital‟ [of “our personal history or autobiography, or a more general, perhaps archetypal
story”] of it constitutes (a) the condition for the meaningfulness of biblical narrative, and (b) the description
of the coincidence between divine influence (Spirit?) and human/Christian identity.”
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the ongoing description or self-description of the Christian community.” 298 Even
narrative theologies must continually practice vigilance against allowing an external
meaning system to usurp the text, even if it is the self-description of the Church.

3. Relationship between Ecclesiology and Scriptural Interpretation
The consistent weakness of Frei‟s ecclesiology is that it never explicitly develops
how Christ‟s indirect presence in the Church constitutes and sustains the Church through
Word, Sacrament, etc. The texts are a witness to the identity of Christ and render that
identity, yet Frei never explains exactly how the Scriptures are used by the Triune God
for self-communication to the Church. This underdevelopment of theological
explanation has several consequences. First, and most noticeable, is Frei‟s ongoing
problem of grounding authority for a plain sense reading of the text. All of the burden is
placed on the text in his early work, and nearly all of the burden is shifted to the
community in his later work. Explaining how both text and readers are integral parts in a
much larger reality would relieve both from bearing the hermeneutical burden of
authority. 299 Second, studying only the social nature of the Church does, in practice, tend
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toward communitarianism. 300 To describe the Church as only a social reality tends to
make the reason for literal reading a function of community consensus, rather than a
result of the ongoing activity of the universal God who constitutes and sustains the
Church. 301 Tracy is rightly worried that an explanation of the Church as a social reality
would lapse into a kind of relativism that is not consistent with the Triune God named by
the Church.302 Frei may be correct about the priority of Christian self-description over
philosophical correlation, but he must use more theological terminology to develop his
argument. Frei must show why the Church was theologically compelled to read Scripture
realistically in order to show that authority is not grounded in community consensus. For
example, Frei claims that “There is no a priori reason why the „plain‟ reason could not
have been „spiritual‟ in contrast to „literal‟….The identification of the plain with the
literal sense was not a logically necessary development…”303 While Frei is correct that
this move may not have been “logically” necessary, but it is, in Christian description,
theologically necessary, and could be more effectively described if Frei had focused on
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the role of Scripture in the economy of redemption instead of simply the relationship
between texts and readers.304

B. Tracy‟s Ecclesiology: The Church as a Tradition
A driving focus of Tracy‟s work is affirming the public nature of the Church and
theology. Tracy insists that all authentic theology is “discourse available (in principle) to
all persons and explicated by appeals to one‟s experience, intelligence, rationality, and
responsibility, and formulated in arguments where claims are stated with appropriate
warrants, backings, and rebuttal procedures.”305 The Church is a public among two other
publics, the academy and the society, and as such, the Church must establish a system of
correlation (a criterion of intelligibility or credibility) which will allow for dialogue
between the Church and other public realities. For Tracy, the Church must be a public
reality, and theology must be a public discipline primarily because the God referred to by
both is universal. The “God as understood by the Jewish, Christian and Muslim believer
is either universal in actuality or sheer delusion….Any authentic speech on the reality of
God which is really private or particularist is unworthy of that reality.” 306 Christians,
then, have a responsibility to formulate a criterion of intelligibility because of the
universal nature of the God to whom they refer.
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1. Church as a Tradition and a Public Reality
The Church, as the tradition that mediates its classic, provides the possibility for
an intensification of the general human dimension of religious experience which is
disclosed in its religious classic. Tracy‟s description of religious experience in the
Church is again articulated in general categories, focusing on the common religious
dimension found in all human beings through the concept of “limit experiences.” Tracy
writes,
In more secularized human beings, this limit-experience of a religious dimension
to one‟s everyday existence sometimes serves as the sole clue to the character of
religious experience and thereby to all personal appropriation to the languages of
revelation…for those who possess any genuine lived-experience of an
authentically living religious traditio grounded in a revelation, the possibilities for
experiential religion are wider, deeper, and far more intense than the earlier
shared experience of a religious-as-limit dimension to the everyday…for
Christians, revelatory limit-experiences of both manifestation and proclamation
are available in the authentic lived-experience of church. [The] originating
revelatory experience of Jesus Christ…is present more immediately through the
proclamation and the manifestations of an authentic sacramental, ecclesial life,
including the struggle for justice in church and world. 307
Those within a religious tradition will experience disclosure from the religious
dimension in a quantitatively greater way. Because tradition is the bearer of any classic,
it consistent to expect that immersion of an individual into that tradition will allow a
greater disclosure of the classic. It is only natural, then, that the disclosure of the Christ
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event will be greater for the believer than for one outside the Church. One could
rightfully conclude that in the Christian faith,
The church tradition is and remains the major mediator of the Christ-event to the
church community today…The strangeness of the „strange, new world of the
Bible‟ is experienced most concretely within the believing community itself. For
there—when a conversation with the subject-matter event witnessed to by these
texts is genuinely risked—there the disorienting power of these scriptural texts is
felt with fullest force.308
Tracy emphasizes the need for a “heightened consciousness of the tradition‟s
mediating role for the memory of Jesus in interpreting the event of Jesus Christ as
analogous to the role of tradition in the interpretation of every classic.”309 Tracy would
even argue that the individual cannot as deeply understand the Christ event without the
aid of the Christian tradition. Tracy claims, “If we are to know Jesus as he was and is, we
must know him through the mediation of the whole tradition as witness to him and
immediately as we have ourselves experienced him either individually or communally in
our experience of the Christ event as from God and happening now.” 310 Yet within
Tracy‟s model, disclosure is intensified in the tradition, not specifically for theological
reasons, but for philosophical reasons. Immersion of the interpreter into the tradition is
necessary for greater disclosure for several reasons: First, the “preunderstanding” of the
interpreter “must involve at least a horizon open to the religious dimension of existence,”
(i.e. a willingness to ask “religious questions”). 311 This basic step allows for a second, as
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the interpreter must “recognize some claim to serious attention in the event under
interpretation.”312 Third, the interpreter will experience the Christ-event as meaningful
by recognizing the continuity of the original event with the Church today. 313 Christian
tradition, then, has the role of developing within the individual interpreter a horizon of
preunderstanding, an openness to the subject matter of the text, and a recognition of the
continuity of event from past witness to present tradition. So far, these are qualities
present in all traditions.
If Tracy emphasizes that the Christian tradition heightens the disclosure of the
classic, then what is it about Tracy‟s methodology that allows Frei to claim that “the
Church as the necessary context for the use of Christian concepts and language plays no
part at all in Tracy‟s layout of his method?” 314 At first this appears to be a curious claim,
since we have seen that Tracy emphatically supports both a sociological and theological
description of the reality of the Church and argues that greater immersion into the
Christian tradition will allow for greater disclosure of the Christ event. Yet it could be
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Certainly the Church, as a tradition is essential to the understanding of the Christ event
today. Tracy (ibid, 237), claims, “The tradition is the major constitutive mediating reality of the event of
Jesus Christ. For the immediate personal response to the Christ event becomes a communal response as
soon as the Christ event is recognized as the event of Jesus Christ—the Jesus remembered as the Christ by
the tradition and its fidelity to the original apostolic witness.” It is the tradition which safeguards the
apostolic witness to the particular Christ, and through that mediates the present experience of Christ today.
“In so recognizing and naming the Christ event as the event of Jesus Christ, Christians also affirm that the
event itself is mediated to them principally through the tradition, community and church which remembers
this Jesus and keeps alive his dangerous memory. Why that memory is kept alive in the event is a question
primarily for the tradition and community mediating it to answer…The Christ event is represented as the
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asked what the Church does, in Tracy‟s model, beyond what a “tradition” does for
Gadamer and Ricoeur. In fact, for Tracy, the Church does very little that is unique to its
theological description. The manner in which the Christian tradition mediates their
classic is essentially the same as the way in which any tradition mediates their own
classic. Almost completely absent from Tracy‟s work is a discussion of how particular
theological claims might be capable of destabilizing hermeneutical method.315 Frei‟s
legitimate and persistent question to Tracy seems to be, “What is the Church that no other
„tradition‟ can be, and how does that practically affect the process of Scriptural
interpretation?”

2. Church as a Theological Reality
While Tracy insists that the Church must be described as both a theological reality
and a social reality, Tracy claims that adequate theological description is beyond the
scope of his own project, and chooses to focus on the Church only as a social reality. 316
Tracy thinks that at his present time there is an imbalance in ecclesiology favoring
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Tracy, (The Analogical Imagination, 41, n. 75), finds the “theological character of the
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theological description over social description, so that theologians often do not appreciate
the nature of the Church as a social reality. Thus Tracy claims,
As a generalization, it seems fair to observe that in theology the more usual
temptation is to understand society and academy primarily as social realities and
only peripherally as theological…The problem with understanding the third
public, church, is usually the exact opposite. A theological understanding is
almost overwhelmingly operative. A sociological understanding may be implicit
but is rarely explicit…The church is primarily considered, in Christian selfunderstanding, a theological reality…The key concept here is reductionism.
Indeed, so frightened by this reductionist prospect do some ecclesiologists seem
that they are incapable of undertaking, or even appreciating, strictly sociological
understandings of the reality of the church. For this reason, they become trapped
in their own form of reductionism. 317
Tracy proposes that the theologian develop both a mutually critical correlation
between Christian tradition and common human experience, and between the Church as a
theological reality and the Church as a social reality. This will keep the theologian from
falling into a reductionism about the nature of the Church. 318
As a result, Tracy spends far more time describing the interpretive method of the
reader then he does describing the theological nature of the reading community. Other
than a few comments (most of them in footnotes) about the Church as a theological
reality, Tracy is rather silent about a theological description of the Church. 319 Tracy
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Tracy (Ibid, 24), argues that “the theologian should in principle use a correlation model for
relating sociological and theological understandings of the reality of the church in the same way one uses a
correlation model for the more familiar relationship between philosophy and theology.” A correlation
model will allow the theologian “To account theologically for the full spectrum of possible relationships
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with Tracy‟s emphasis on “The always-already reality of a graced world is made present again decisively,
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typically describes the Church as that tradition which keeps alive the memory of the
person/event of Jesus Christ (as the primary Christian classic) and mediates that same
present Christ today. Not surprisingly, Tracy explains this mediation of the Christ event
analogous to the disclosure of all religious classics: “The Christ event, in sum, is representative of the same „that-it-happens-now‟ event from the whole disclosed in every
religious classic.”320 Later Tracy claims, “For here, as in all religious classics, the truth
of one‟s existence may be at stake; here a disclosure and concealment from and by the
power of the whole may be present…”321 This disclosure of the Christian classic is
accorded the same dynamic working as all religious classics, and hence the religious
tradition mediating the Christian classic (the Christ event) has already been determined to
work much like other religious traditions mediate their religious classics.
Tracy does provide elements of a theological description of the Church. Tracy
claims, “In Christian self-understanding, to repeat, the church participates in, as primary
mediator of, the gift of God in Jesus Christ. The church is a theological reality. As such,
the church is an object of faith, of trust in and loyalty to its reality.” 322 Tracy is aware
that the interpretation of the Scriptures by the Church is unique inasmuch as the
disclosure of the Christ event requires faith. Tracy insists that a response of faith is
paradigmatically, classically as event in Jesus Christ. The event, as re-presentative of the reality always
already present to us as human beings, is present again as the decisive that it happens” (ibid, 234). The
Church, then, as sacrament of Christ, mediates the living, present Christ to the present moment.
320

Ibid, 235. And yet, for Tracy (ibid), this is not a general event of human experience, but
one grounded in a particular Person: “The Christ event is also the event of Jesus Christ” and thus the
tradition which mediates that event, “remembers this Jesus and keeps alive his dangerous memory.” Tracy
is insistent here on the particularity of Jesus Christ, even if this event is mediated through general
categories of meaning.
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essential for a true disclosure of the text, and that faith is a gift, and hence a response to,
God‟s prior gracious action. 323 Tracy wishes to make clear that all “disclosure” in
Scripture is a gift, and not simply a product of human construction. Furthermore, Tracy
claims that the Church itself is a gift. 324 Yet this unique characteristic of both disclosure
and Church goes largely underdeveloped because of Tracy‟s formal categories. Speaking
of the unique disclosure of Christ in Scripture, Tracy writes, “Hermeneutically, the
category event (Ereignis) is applicable even to Word-as-Word-event (Sprach-Ereignis)—
as a happening of language itself and, therefore, not under the control of the modern
subject.”325 This statement appears to capture a central ambiguity in Tracy‟s work.

3. Relationship Between Ecclesiology and Scriptural Interpretation
Tracy‟s project lacks developed description of the relationship between Church
and Scripture in the economy of redemption. While God‟s gracious action to the world is
the backdrop for Tracy‟s discussion, it remains largely a formal explanation, and there is
very little explanation of how God‟s acts by and through the texts of Scripture to
communicate to the Church. On the other hand, there is very little theological description
of the Church which would provide it any ability to read Scripture which other
communities do not possess. Tracy‟s insistence on establishing a general correlation
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between text and reader keeps him from explaining how Scripture‟s disclosure is
qualitatively different within the Church than outside it. It remains unclear whether the
disclosure of Christ to the Church is qualitatively different from or simply a
quantitatively heightened expression of what occurs in religious texts elsewhere. For the
Christian, the subject matter of revelation, Jesus Christ, is no doubt distinct (qualitatively
and quantitatively unique) from what is disclosed in the other religious texts, but the
manner of disclosure of this event is in continuity with disclosure as a religious
dimension in the secular person or a person with another religious identity. Both in
Tracy‟s ecclesiology and in his Scriptural interpretation, then, the same difficulty in
moving from general categories to theological description is seen. The insistence on
beginning with general categories both for Scripture and for Church make it difficult to
say anything distinctive about the reading of Scripture within the Church.
Tracy does say that the Scriptures are the Church‟s book, and that the experience
of the Christian community must be in continuity with the realistic rendering of the
identity of Jesus Christ. This insight, I will argue, has tremendous potential to further the
discussion between Tracy and Frei. Yet Tracy‟s own ecclesiology does not provide the
tools to show why and how this intrinsic unity must exist between Scripture and the
Church, and only after the deeper ecclesiological reflection of Henri de Lubac is
incorporated into the discussion will it be possible to use Tracy‟s insight.

IV. Beyond the Impasse: Locating Scripture in the Divine Economy
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The debates between Frei and Tracy have yielded a number of important insights
for developing a theological interpretation of Scripture. Yet the debate has also narrowed
the hermeneutical emphasis to simply the relationship between texts and readers, thus
leading to impasses and preventing certain of their insights from being used. This section
will summarize the most important achievements and impasses and will suggest that
certain achievements could be advanced and certain difficulties could be resolved if
Scripture were examined within the context of the relationship between Christ and the
Church.
Frei‟s insistence that the plain sense reading of Scripture is the normative means
by which the Christian community understands the particular identity of Christ is an
essential insight for all Christian readings of Scripture. Furthermore, Frei‟s retrieval of
the normative practice of figural reading to show that the whole Scriptures must be read
as one story unified in Jesus Christ, has provided a number of resources for developing
hermeneutical method regulated by plain sense reading. It is this plain sense reading
which renders the unique identity of Christ and forms the identity of the Church.
Yet Frei‟s nearly exclusive focus on the relationship between text and reader has
also produced some hermeneutical difficulties which cannot be overcome without
broadening the context to the economy of redemption. On the one hand, Frei‟s reluctance
to explain God‟s use of Scripture makes the location of Scriptural authority nearly
impossible to determine. Frei has insisted that authority be given to plain sense readings,
but without discussing God‟s use of the text it is difficult to show whether that authority
grounded in the consensus of the Church or in the literary qualities of the texts
themselves. In the next chapter, we will investigate how Vanhoozer‟s proposal that God
104

uses Scripture to speak to readers provides a different option which could strengthen
Frei‟s argument. On the other hand, Frei‟s description of the Church as a socio-linguistic
community which responds to the identity of Christ has led to two difficulties, the first
ecclesiological and communal, and the second soteriological and individual. First, Frei‟s
preservation of the identity of Christ makes him wary of showing how Christ is related to
the Church as head to body. Frei suggests that the Church is the locus of the indirect
presence of Christ through the Spirit, yet Frei never really explains how the risen Christ
acts as head of the Church, guiding and transforming the through its realistic reading of
Scripture. Second, Frei never adequately explains how the individual believer is
transformed by the unique identity, and hence presence, of Christ. This seems to be John
Milbank‟s criticism when he asks, “What difference does the mere fact—however
astounding—of God‟s identifying with us through incarnation make to our lives?” 326
Frei‟s attempt to preserve the unique identity of Christ needs to be supplemented with a
theological description of incorporation into that identity through the Church, and hence
how the Church participates in the economy of redemption. In the fourth chapter, we will
investigate how de Lubac‟s proposal of a more complete ecclesiology could show how
Christ uses Scripture to build His Church.
Tracy‟s insistence on the disclosure of the present, risen Christ in Scriptural
reading, as well as his creative use of Ricoeur to show the disclosive potential of all
genres of Scripture have likewise produced essential insights for Christian interpretation
of Scripture. Tracy shows that the consistent witness of the Church has insisted that
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Scriptural reading brings the reader into contact with a subject matter so great and unique
that the reader can experience a reorienting power occasioning a new-mode-of-being-inthe-world. Thus Tracy has rightly insisted that readers approach the text with expectation
to encounter a subject matter whom they name God.
Yet, like Frei, Tracy‟s nearly exclusive focus on the relationship between text and
reader makes it difficult for him to incorporate phenomenological hermeneutics with a
plain reading of the Gospels. At times Tracy appears to say that the existential situation
of modernity sets the agenda for Scripture, so that Christ is the type who best fits the
potential existential disclosure as antitype. 327 Here the world in front of the text creates
the economy by which the world of the text is fit together. Yet at other times Tracy
emphasizes the centrality of the identity of Christ to the Christian story and insists that
the reader‟s own story be reoriented by His particular identity. This remains a genuine
ambiguity in Tracy, and further emphasis on method will not bring resolution. Instead,
what is needed is a thorough theological account of the role of Scripture in mediating the
present Christ to the Church and transforming readers through just these texts. In the
fourth chapter de Lubac‟s insistence on a spiritual sense of Scripture will be examined in
order to show that it is possible to emphasize the particular identity of Christ while also
showing how that Christ transforms and reorients readers in disclosive Scriptural
readings.
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See here John J. and R.R. Reno O'Keefe, Sanctified Vision, 86, who argue that all
contemporary interpretive schemes need an “economy” to relate different parts of the economy of Scripture
to one another. They conclude that “For most modern theological readers the logos of the economy is
something much more abstract” than Christ (87). Yet, “The economy of Christ was as real and as totalizing
form them as various modern economies of historical or spiritual experience are for us” (87). In Tracy‟s
work, the absence of figural interpretation as an extension of the literal story of Jesus is striking. In place
of figural reading is a theory of the disclosure of existential possibility of the One beyond knowing who is
revealed through encounter with the text.
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In the next two chapters, I will examine the hermeneutical projects of Kevin
Vanhoozer and Henri de Lubac, who seek to articulate the unique place of Scripture as
God‟s self-communication to the Church in the economy of redemption. In those
chapters it will become more apparent how the relationship between Christ and Church
provides a broader context for exploring the relationship between texts and readers.
Adding these new voices to the discussion will allow for new insights to emerge which
could help to advance the impasses between Frei and Tracy.
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CHAPTER 2:
KEVIN VANHOOZER: SCRIPTURE AS GOD‟S SPEAKING ACTION
I. Placing Vanhoozer in Discussion with Frei and Tracy
In the last chapter I suggested that much of the impasse between Frei and Tracy
was due to an almost exclusive emphasis on the relationship between text and reader.
This impasse, I suggested, has occurred in part because issues of method have dominated
discussions of Scriptural interpretation to the neglect of theological reflection about the
place of Scripture in the divine economy. In this chapter I will consider the work of
Kevin Vanhoozer, who, throughout his career, has specifically attempted to move beyond
the impasse between Frei and Tracy. 328 Vanhoozer has attempted to advance the
discussion in two distinct ways, the first by proposing a new method which will
safeguard the literal sense, and the second by grounding all methodological discussions in
the theological matrix of the economy of redemption. Vanhoozer‟s overall project is
instructive both in its failure and in its success, as I will argue that his early proposal of
an alternative method fails to advance the discussion, while his later proposal, by locating
Scripture in the economy, has great potential for advancing the interpretation of
Scripture.
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Vanhoozer‟s doctoral dissertation is a study of Paul Ricoeur‟s hermeneutics, and it devotes
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In his early work, Vanhoozer tries to advance the discussion of Tracy and Frei by
proposing a new general method for reading which will establish the authority of
Scriptural meaning. Vanhoozer‟s suggestion to move beyond them is to broaden the
discussion of text and reader to also include a return to authorial intent, thus showing that
the text must be read as a purposeful act of communication by an author to an audience.
If readers agree to seek the intention of the author, Vanhoozer feels, they can reach
relative consensus on the meaning of the text. Yet this early proposal is notable for its
almost complete absence of any discussion about the place of Scripture in the economy of
redemption. While focus on the literal sense may help readers grasp the meaning of the
human authors, it does not articulate how God uses just these texts to speak to readers.
After the publication of his first book, Is There a Meaning in this Text?,
Vanhoozer realizes that this approach does not really do justice to the Christian
Scriptures as a theological reality. In his later work, then, Vanhoozer abandons much his
early proposal and seeks instead to articulate the way God communicates to the Church
by means of Scripture. While not abandoning his quest for authorial intent, Vanhoozer
suggests that Scripture‟s primary author is God rather than the human author. Yet as
Vanhoozer focuses on God‟s authorship of Scripture, he is forced to broaden his
methodology from what is primarily a discussion of literary theory defending the
importance of authorial intent to a discussion of ontology and the economy of
redemption. Vanhoozer‟s two major later works could be described as substantial
responses to postliberal theology (Drama of Doctrine) and revisionist theology
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(Remythologizing Theology).329 In them Vanhoozer suggests that the cure for revisionist
and postliberal ailments alike is to understand the unique and authoritative role of
Scripture in God‟s Trinitarian self-communicative action.
Relationship to Frei: Vanhoozer appreciates Frei‟s insistence on reading
Scripture in such a way that the particularity of Christ is proclaimed without
incorporating some pre-determined criteria of meaningfulness.330 Vanhoozer likewise
appreciates the early Frei‟s category of “realistic narrative,” yet insists that ostensive
reference should not be dismissed as unnecessary to establishing meaning.331
Vanhoozer‟s greatest complaint against Frei concerns Frei‟s later decision to invest
authority in the community rather than in the text itself. Vanhoozer complains that Frei
has “exchanged his hermeneutical birthright for a mess of pottage, or rather Fishstew?...It is the community, ultimately, that enjoys interpretive authority…” 332
Vanhoozer is worried that the later Frei seems to propose a “certain optimism with regard
to the believing community. Interpretive might makes right.”333 Frei‟s later work is, for
Vanhoozer, perhaps the clearest example of the troubling trend of abandoning authority
in the text in order to grant authority to the community.
329

Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical Linguistic Approach to
Christian Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), and Kevin J. Vanhoozer,
Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and Authorship, ed. Daniel W. Hardy, Cambridge
Studies in Christian Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 154. Vanhoozer (ibid
178), appreciates that Frei is not a “pure narrativist...Rather, Frei is an Anselmian theologian who is
seeking to understand the Christian faith, particularly its central narrative expression, on its own terms.”
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 225), argues that the whole reason one should take the realistic narrative
of Scripture seriously is grounded in the assumption that it is, in fact, true. God did enter human history
and act.
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Vanhoozer, “The Spirit of Understanding,” 219.
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As its title implies, Vanhoozer‟s book, The Drama of Doctrine: A CanonicalLinguistic Approach to Christian Theology, offers a critical appropriation of George
Lindbeck‟s The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age for
Evangelical readers.334 In it, Vanhoozer argues that postliberals (the chosen dialogue
partners of this book) have obscured the nature of doctrine by shifting authority from
canon to community. 335 In response to the postliberal project, Vanhoozer suggests, “The
present book sets forth a postconservative, canonical-linguistic theology and a directive
theory of doctrine that roots theology more firmly in Scripture while preserving
Lindbeck‟s emphasis on practice.”336 The answer to the postmodern shift of authority to
the Church is to reinvest authority in Scripture.
In order to show the obligation which the Church has to respect the meaning of
Scripture, Vanhoozer distinguishes between “ecclesial performance interpretation” (in
which “the church‟s habitual use/performance of Scripture is seen to be constitutive of
the literal sense”), and “canonical-linguistic” interpretation (in which “[t]he grammar of
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George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984). As the title of Vanhoozer‟s book suggests, Lindbeck‟s “nature”
of doctrine will be changed to a description of doctrine as “drama,” and the determining factor of “culture”
is replaced by “canon” as the constituting feature of the Church. (See here especially Vanhoozer, The
Drama of Doctrine, 133-41, in the section entitled, “How Scripture Constitutes the Church,” 133-41).
Vanhoozer (ibid, 3), suggests that doctrine is strangely absent in the Church today for several reasons:
“sound doctrine is suffering from confusion about its nature, from disagreement concerning the locus of its
authority, and above all from its captivity to a debilitating dichotomy between theory and practice.” As the
book progresses, it becomes quickly apparent that the first problem (confusion about doctrine‟s nature)
finds its roots in the second (disagreement about doctrine‟s authority). Vanhoozer suggests that the Church
will continue to be confused about the nature of doctrine until it understands that its authority comes from
the Scriptural canon, not the Church.
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 10), notes, “Though Lindbeck‟s postliberal proposal initially appears to
swing the pendulum of authority back to the biblical text, a closer inspection shows that he relocates
authority in the church, that singular „culture‟ within which, and only within which, the Bible is used to
shape Christian identity.”
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Ibid, xiii. Emphasis Vanhoozer‟s. Vanhoozer italicizes many points in his books, and all
italicized quotes in this chapter are his.
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Christian faith is embedded an enacted in the use of language in the canon”). 337 By
distinguishing between these two kinds of interpretation, Vanhoozer establishes two
trajectories: Frei, Lindbeck, Fish, Kelsey and Childs are all said to be located on the
(wrong) trajectory toward ecclesial performance interpretation, while Vanhoozer, Barth,
and Wolterstorff are located on the (right) trajectory of canonical-linguistic interpretation.
Relationship to Tracy: Vanhoozer appreciates Ricoeur and Tracy‟s emphasis on
the importance of the “plurality of biblical genres” (form) to communicate the text‟s
message (content), as well as Ricoeur‟s explanation of how the biblical text, as a text, is
disclosive of transformative truth.338 Yet Vanhoozer complains that Ricoeur and Tracy,
despite their stated appreciation for the various genres of Scripture, are guilty of imposing
a single, phenomenological schema of interpretation which prohibits full appreciation of
certain genres, such as Gospel.339 Furthermore, Vanhoozer believes that Ricoeur and
Tracy‟s method for biblical hermeneutics ultimately collapses into general hermeneutics.
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Ibid, 167. Vanhoozer (ibid, 184), calls the latter “performance” because interpreters must
see “canonical discourse as itself an instance of triune performance” and must see “the canon as a script
that requires not merely information processing but ecclesial response.”
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See Vanhoozer, “The Spirit of Understanding,” 216 and Remythologizing Theology, xv.
Vanhoozer ("The Spirit of Understanding,” 218), sides with Tracy, claiming that “Frei‟s emphasis on a
unified coherent narrative overlooks the plurality and ambiguity within the canon itself. What theology
needs is the full spectrum of forms in the Bible itself, with Jesus Christ as the supreme „form‟ that informs
all Christian understanding of God.”
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Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 150. Vanhoozer (ibid, 158), feels
that this reduction of Scripture to one schema has its most negative consequences in Tracy‟s early work,
where Tracy‟s analogy between religious classics and art, cause “[t]he claims to truth in both art and
religion” to “stand or fall together.”
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Beginning as it does with the reorienting power of all texts, their method cannot articulate
any significant distinction between Scripture and other texts.340
Ricoeur‟s great weakness, as Vanhoozer sees it, is that, “By attributing to the
poetic word the sacramental function of manifesting transcendence, Ricoeur erases the
very distinction between nature and grace that was so important to Barth.…For
Ricoeur…revelation is not so much an „impossible possibility‟ as a natural possibility
shared by sacred and secular narratives alike.” 341 The root of this problem, Vanhoozer
believes, is that Ricoeur and Tracy privilege a manifestation model over a proclamation
model of revelation. Vanhoozer agrees with Tracy that the proclamation/manifestation
distinction is the primary distinction in hermeneutical trajectories, but argues against
Tracy that the manifestation model is an entirely inadequate model for showing the
radical newness of the Gospel.342 For Vanhoozer, the manifestation model is ultimately
inadequate because,
First and foremost is the consequence that the truth disclosed by the Gospels
refers to an always-already state of affairs. The story of Jesus discloses a way of
being in the world that is always-already open to human beings by virtue of the
always-already graced nature of the world…The Gospels manifest universal
truths about humanity. The contrast between manifestation and proclamation, in
which the Gospels say something new, particular and unique, could not be
sharper: do the Gospels disclose a universal truth, or do they announce something
new and unprecedented?343
340

Ibid, 225. Vanhoozer (ibid, 155), claims, “Ricoeur has not shown us that theological
hermeneutics is significantly different from his philosophical hermeneutics, only that his philosophical
hermeneutics receives its most fruitful development when applied to the Biblical texts.”
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Ibid, 180.
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 167), claims, “The goodness of Being which Ricoeur presupposes finds
its decisive manifestation in the event of Jesus Christ. But the point is that without reflection on art or
classic texts, this truth of the trustworthiness of existence could not be had.”
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Ibid, 168.
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Vanhoozer makes a very close connection between revelation and grace.
“Universal truths about humanity” are, for Vanhoozer, something in the realm of nature,
while “something new and unprecedented” is ultimately a disclosure from the realm of
grace. Any system which tends away from the proclamation model, ultimately
misunderstands both the uniqueness of revelation and the relationship between nature and
grace. Beginning with the manifestation model, Vanhoozer believes, will place the
emphasis (and hence authority) on universal experience (nature) instead of the
particularity of Christ and the particularity of the biblical text (grace). 344 Vanhoozer
claims that ultimately, “For Ricoeur [and Tracy], the referent of the Gospels is the
Kingdom of God as it qualifies human experience…For Frei, the referent of the Gospels
is Jesus Christ.”345 For Vanhoozer, as for Frei, one cannot have it both ways. It is the
manifestation model which wrongly understands and “erases” the distinction between
nature and grace, and consequently is unable to safeguard the uniqueness of Christian
revelation.346 As a response to this perceived mistake, Vanhoozer will develop a program
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Vanhoozer ("The Spirit of Understanding,” 220), is disturbed by Tracy‟s claim that he can
give primacy to the literal sense while being a pluralist. Vanhoozer (Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy
of Paul Ricoeur, 168-69), is chiefly worried that all religious traditions can be smoothed over by assuming
a manifestation model—persons of every religious tradition can “experience similar manifestations of the
whole by the power of the whole” through their own particular faiths. This, Vanhoozer believes, destroys
the very notion of particularity.
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Ibid, 171.
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Ibid, 170. Vanhoozer‟s claim that Ricoeur is a manifestation theologian shows just how
strongly Vanhoozer favors the proclamation model. While Tracy has claimed that Ricoeur stands more on
the side of proclamation, Vanhoozer (ibid,, 169), argues that for Ricoeur the moment of “critical
distanciation” is more properly a proclamation moment, but the surrounding moments of “understanding”
and “appropriation” are manifestation moments. Vanhoozer claims that “for Ricoeur, the poetic word
functions sacramentally,” and hence both “Ricoeur and Tracy, though they try to incorporate both
proclamation and manifestation in their theologies, ultimately privilege the manifestation pole…Ricoeur‟s
whole hermeneutical arch is slightly off-balance, tilted slightly but decisively towards the manifestation
model (170).”
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which operates distinctly from the proclamation model, giving clear priority to the
biblical text over experience or the modern sensibility.
Vanhoozer‟s latest book, Remythologizing Theology, seeks to establish a clear
trajectory beginning from a proclamation model and privileging the authority of Scripture
over any other source. Vanhoozer suggests,
The real dividing line [between theologians] is between those who view theology
only as talk about God-talk and those who believe in the possibility of true talk
about God…Among the latter, there is a further distinction between those who
seek to speak of God on the basis of nature (including human nature) and those
who believe that speaking well of God is ultimately possible only on the basis of
God‟s own communication. 347
The first division separates some postliberals (Lindbeck) and revisionists alike,
while the second division further separates off virtually all other correlational approaches
to theology. 348 For Vanhoozer, contemporary revisionist theology provides a wrong
direction for theology because theologians begin from human experience and use
Scripture as a foundational expression of religious consciousness. In some ways,
Vanhoozer‟s project of remythologizing theology is intended to provide as sweeping and
radical a challenge to contemporary systematic theological method as Frei‟s “great
reversal” provided to post-enlightenment Christology.349 Vanhoozer notes that his
primary goal “is to complete Paul Ricoeur‟s „second Copernican Revolution‟ that
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Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 182.
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Vanhoozer names George Lindbeck and Sallie McFague as the chief referents of the first
distinction, while in the second distinction Vanhoozer includes nearly everyone else on the revisionist
trajectory, including Elizabeth Johnson, David Tracy, Jurgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and Robert
Jensen.
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Vanhoozer (Remythologizing Theology, 29, thesis 5), argues that to “remythologize
theology is to reverse what Hans Frei called the „great reversal‟.”
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dethrones the autonomous knowing subject in order to hearken to the one whose creative
word forms, informs, and transforms us.”350 Vanhoozer thinks that Ricoeur could not
accomplish this task because his project has started from a general theory of texts rather
than a Triune First Theology.351 Remythologizing must reverse this direction and
emphasize that the Scriptures are first God‟s action to which doctrine is a response. 352
Reevaluating the action of God in the economy of redemption, Vanhoozer feels, will
reestablish Scripture as the authoritative foundation for the Church‟s life and practice.

II. Scriptural Interpretation: The Literal Sense as God‟s Speaking Action
Vanhoozer‟s primary emphasis throughout his career is to allow establish a
method of Scriptural interpretation wherein readers understand and submit to the plain
meaning of the text. Vanhoozer argues that because meaning is encoded in texts by
authors, the meaning of a text can only be grasped as readers seek to understand the
speech act of the author. Meaning is encoded in the text by the author to be discovered
by the reader. The Scriptures are understood, then, by readers rightly grasping what the
author communicated in the text.
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Ibid, xv.
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Vanhoozer (ibid, xv), feels that “neither Ricoeur nor those who stand on his shoulders have
given much attention to the doctrine of God, either to the question of divine action in general or to the
doctrine of the Trinity in particular.”
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For example, Vanhoozer (ibid, 272), argues, “Whereas Christian doctrines are for
Schleiermacher descriptions of human passions (e.g., the feeling of absolute dependence)—„accounts of the
Chrisitan religious affections set forth in speech‟—the remythologizer conceives doctrine as the conceptual
elaboration of divine action. Better: doctrines are accounts of triune communicative action set forth in
speech.”
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Vanhoozer‟s career, much like Tracy and Frei‟s, can be divided into a class of
early writings and a class of later writings, between which certain key emphases have
changed across a generally continuous project. Vanhoozer‟s early works span from 1989,
with the publication of his dissertation on Ricoeur, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy
of Paul Ricoeur to 1998 with his publication of his first major book on biblical
hermeneutics, Is There a Meaning in This Text: The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality
of Literary Knowledge.353 This stage is marked by an almost exclusive focus on a
theological general hermeneutics in which authorial intent is restored as basis for
understanding the meaning of the text. In his early work, Vanhoozer sought to protect
biblical interpretation from postmodern “undoers” of meaning, such as literary theorists
as diverse as Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish. In response to these
writers, Vanhoozer proposes a theological general hermeneutics, a program for reading
all texts as one must read the Bible. A return to authorial intent is necessary in all texts,
just as it is paradigmatically in Scripture. Vanhoozer‟s later works run from 1998 to the
present, and include the significant works The Drama of Doctrine (2005) and
Remythologizing Theology (2010). This stage is marked by a shift from human authorial
intent to divine authorial intent, so that Scripture is now located within the economy of
redemption as a unique and integral part of God‟s self-communicative action. In
dialogue with postliberal and revisionist theology, Vanhoozer realizes that the reason
Scripture provides a unique authority for the Church is because Scripture is a unique set
of documents which can be identified as God‟s communicative action. Proper reading of
353
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur,and Kevin J.
Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary
Knowledge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998).
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Scripture, then, can only start with a right First Theology, a stance of faith and response
toward God.
Two factors seem to account for Vanhoozer‟s change of focus from defending the
authority of Scripture in terms of secular literary theory to an explanation of the role of
Scripture in the economy of redemption. First, many of the changes in Vanhoozer‟s
writing can be traced to his social context. Vanhoozer‟s early work begins in discussion
with secular literary theorists at the University of Edinburgh, where one of his primary
concerns became the safeguarding of meaning in any text.354 Vanhoozer‟s later work
takes place in dialogue with fellow Evangelicals at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in
Deerfield, Illinois, and subsequently in discussion with the North American
postliberalism and various forms of revisionist theology. Thus while Vanhoozer‟s early
work proposes a challenge to the current secular postmodern tendency to disregard the
authority of any text, Vanhoozer‟s later work proposes a challenge to the Christian
postmodern tendency to grant authority to experience or community over Scripture.
Vanhoozer feels that the secular literary mistake is best challenged by defending the role
of authorial intent, while the Christian doctrinal mistake is best challenged by
reevaluating God‟s use of Scripture in the economy of redemption.
Second, Vanhoozer‟s change of location in 1998 takes place at the same time as
the publication of his first major work, Is There a Meaning in This Text? While the 2009
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Vanhoozer‟s early works were forged in dialogue with secular literary theory at the
University of Edinburgh, where he taught on Paul Ricoeur in the Department of Comparative Literature.
Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 2), admits that he struggled to get students to seriously
consider Ricoeur‟s claim that the text carries a meaning to which the reader must respond. Vanhoozer‟s
research and writing reflected his desire to set forth a response to deconstructionists and reader-response
theorists. Vanhoozer‟s move to Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in 1998 allowed his later work to
develop in dialogue with American Evangelical thought at Trinity Seminary in Chicago.
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“Tenth Anniversary Edition” testifies to the popularity of the book, the primary criticism
of it has been its lack of attention to the uniqueness of Scripture and lack of focus on
God‟s agency in precisely these texts. These criticisms have forced Vanhoozer focus
more on the uniqueness of Scripture as God‟s communicative action and to draw out the
implications of God as triune communicative Being.355 This change of focus presses
Vanhoozer to develop a distinctly Christian approach to understanding the role of God as
author and the place of Scripture in the divine economy.
Despite these significant changes in Vanhoozer‟s approach, much of his project
remains the same. Vanhoozer‟s clearest hermeneutical emphasis throughout his career is
to respect the author of any text as a communicative agent. When applied to human
authors, the reader must respect the meaning encoded in the text.356 When God is viewed
as author of Scripture, the reader will be forced to work out the implications of God‟s
self-communicative action. Consequently, the reader must understand who this God is
(God as Triune self-communicative Act), what this text is (God‟s covenant document to
the Church), and where this text fits in the economy of redemption (Scripture constitutes
the Church). Throughout his work, then, Vanhoozer will seek to articulate the
relationship between God, Scripture, and Church in a way that will establish the priority
of God, through Scripture, to the Church in the economy of redemption. Theological
themes, such as sola scriptura and covenant, and philosophical tools such as speech-act
theory, authorial intent, and the distinction between meaning and significance, all remain
355

Vanhoozer (ibid, 6), notes, “Much of my academic life subsequent to Is There a Meaning?
has been spent doing penance for its sins of omission.”
356
Vanhoozer has not changed his claim that a fixed meaning is encoded in a text for readers
to discover and understand. Vanhoozer (Ibid, 1), claims, “I still think the substance of the argument—a
proposal about textual meaning—is essentially correct.”
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important parts of Vanhoozer‟s project as they promote the authority of Scripture over
Church in the economy of redemption.

A. Vanhoozer‟s early Work: Theological General Hermeneutics
Vanhoozer‟s early works are written primarily to safeguard biblical meaning from
postmodern “undoers” (esp. deconstructionists and reader response theorists), who claim
that the biblical texts, like other all other texts, have no determinate meaning. In
response, Vanhoozer seeks to develop an apologetic for reading which will not dismiss
the author or reduce the content of the text to the reader‟s own interpretive aims.
Vanhoozer‟s first major hermeneutical work, Is There a Meaning in This Text, sets the
agenda for his early career by attempting to develop a “theological general hermeneutic”
in which “the Bible should be read like any other book, and…every other book should be
read like the Bible.”357 Because all human communication is a gift grounded in the
communicative action of God, all reading is a necessarily a moral and theological
activity. Rules for a proper reading of all texts, Vanhoozer argues, should be modeled on
a proper reading of Scripture. As a result, a certain morality of reading exists which
obligates readers to respect the author of any text. I will argue that this approach has
resulted in failure both because it cannot overcome inherent hermeneutical difficulties,
and because it does not accomplish Vanhoozer‟s desired result of establishing the
authority of God‟s communicative action in Scripture.

357

Vanhoozer ("The Spirit of Understanding:”, 208), follows Barth and Ricoeur, who have
made suggestions that reading the Bible has implications for the reading of all texts.
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1. Theological Presuppositions of a Theological General Hermeneutics
In the beginning of his career, Vanhoozer proposes an ontology of reading which
assumes that the triune God is the ground of all communicative action. 358 God somehow
„underwrites‟ all language, and it is the understanding this reality which grounds rules for
reading, both in Scripture and in all texts. 359 Vanhoozer proposes that all reading is
ultimately a theological activity because all reading is a generally moral activity. This
argument includes several key elements, which will be discussed below: all reading must
be open to transcendence, the author of the text must be respected, all language must be
understood to be covenantal, and the reader must assume a stance of critical realism.
Hermeneutical Openness to Transcendence: Vanhoozer‟s general hermeneutic
has a theological center. Vanhoozer claims that since language is a gift given by God to
allow persons to interact morally with one another, “All hermeneutics, not simply the
special hermeneutics of Scripture, is „theological.‟”360 The argument for a theological,
general hermeneutic rests on a “certain methodological analogy between theology and
literary theory, based on their shared concern to speak of transcendence: of that which
transcends the world (God) and of that which transcends language (meaning).” 361 The
grounding assumption is that both author and the content communicated by the author
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 231), specifically claims that he is “advocating a Trinitarian hermeneutic
for all interpretation.”
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Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 456.
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Vanhoozer, “The Spirit of Understanding,” 231. Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This
Text?, 205), claims all use of language has moral implications because, “Language is a God-given capacity
that enables human beings to relate to God, to the world, and to one another.”
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transcend the text, and hence the author can indeed say something to someone by means
of a written text.362 Hence, Vanhoozer writes, “Interpretation is theological if it is based
on the belief that there is something that „transcends‟ the play of language in writing.” 363
The ground of such transcendence is ultimately God, and Vanhoozer thus argues that
hermeneutical decisions are ultimately rooted in theological presuppositions:
All textual understanding is a theological matter—an encounter with something
that transcends us and has the capacity to transform us, provided that we approach
it in the right spirit. Such is the fundamental thesis of my argument. The
interpretive virtues are in reality spiritual virtues: without faith—an openness to
transcendence—we would never find something in the text that is not our own
creation, or our own reflection Hence the struggle with the text is ultimately a
spiritual struggle—with the text and with ourselves.364
Interpretation is moral, Vanhoozer argues, if it is “open to transcendence,” and it
becomes immoral when transcendence is disregarded. Interpreters act morally as they
respect both the communicator and the communicative intent which transcends the text,
and they act immorally when they suggest there is nothing outside the text. 365 In the end,
Vanhoozer argues that only Christian theology provides adequate resources for a general
hermeneutics, because, “Only from the vantage point of Christian faith, perhaps, does
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 395), argues that a communicative act is ultimately “a verbal work
whereby an author says something about something to someone.” Vanhoozer (ibid, 214), claims,
“Discourse has a sense (something said), a reference (about something), and a destination (to someone).”
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Vanhoozer, "The Spirit of Understanding,” 211.
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Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 381.
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Consequently, the methods of Deconstructionism and Structuralism are inherently immoral
ways of reading (See Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 369-74). Vanhoozer ("The Spirit of
Understanding,” 211), suggests that the moral reader of the text is one who is a follower of the text while
those who are “users” and “critics” are immoral readers. As a result, “Barthes and Jacques Derrida are
countertheologians: there is nothing outside the play of writing, nothing that guarantees that our worlds
refer to the world. The loss of a transcendent signifier—Logos—thus follows hard upon the death of the
author.”
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language appear not as a system of differences that reflects political power but as a form
of divinely instituted communicative action that can be performed responsibly or
irresponsibly, to the glory of God or to the undoing of humanity.” 366 Since God has
established communication as the structure within which human morality takes place, the
reader‟s decision about how to interpret a text is always a moral decision.
Vanhoozer‟s project, then, seeks to identify the proper moral virtues that one must
nurture and develop in order to be a moral reader of all texts. The development of certain
interpretive practices place one on a trajectory toward moral reading, while the denial of
those same practices place one on a trajectory toward immoral reading. Vanhoozer
understands his moral grounding of all reading in theological virtues to apply to all texts,
not just Scripture. Vanhoozer writes,
My contribution to the epistemology of meaning is to stress the extent to which
literary criticism is not simply a problem of the morality of knowledge, but a
problem that ultimately demands theological resources—specifically the virtues
of faith, hope, obedience, and love: faith, that there is a real presence in the text
that demands a response; hope, that the community of interpreters can reach, at
least ideally, a reasoned agreement; obedience, that the interpreter will observe
the context of the text itself and follow the literary sense where it leads; love, that
the interpreter will indwell the text and attend to it on its own terms. 367
In the end, for Vanhoozer, it seems that the Holy Spirit turns all general
hermeneutics to theological hermeneutics. By respecting transcendence in the text or
denying it, the interpreter is really participating in or resisting the mission of the Holy
Spirit. Hence Vanhoozer argues that “[t]he interpretive values…are none other than the
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Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 369.
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fruit of the Spirit.”368 Vanhoozer carries this insight through to its logical conclusion.
Vanhoozer claims, “If I am right that genuine interpretation affirms transcendence…that
all hermeneutics is ultimately theological hermeneutics,” then it follows that “the Spirit
plays a role in general hermeneutics as well” as in a hermeneutics of Scripture. 369 Since
right reading is always a moral activity which requires certain distinctly theological
presuppositions, and since all moral action requires the activity of the Holy Spirit,
Vanhoozer logically concludes that responsible reading of all texts requires the work of
the Holy Spirit.
The Spirit, then, has an underlying role in all human understanding by making
communication effective. The Spirit works within all language to move readers from
self-centered interpretations to other-centered interpretation. Vanhoozer claims,
[I]t is the Spirit‟s unique role to bridge distances that impede understanding…The
Spirit enables us to avoid falling prey to self-deception, not by working a miracle
or our rational faculties, but by shedding grace abroad in our hearts…The Holy
Spirit aids understanding in general, not least by cultivating the interpretive
virtues in individuals and in believing community. 370
While Vanhoozer realizes that his claim that the Spirit works in all language may
be difficult to prove, he argues that it is nonetheless reasonable. 371 While the fallen
human tendency is to distort texts rather than to respect them, it is reasonable to think that
368
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Ibid, 407. Vanhoozer (ibid, 414), seems to base this whole pneumatology of general
hermeneutics on Ricoeur‟s claim that a text “both „reveals‟ and „transforms,‟” and on Barth‟s claim that
“those schooled in biblical interpretation are best able to appreciate what it is to do justice to textual
otherness.”
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Ibid, 415. Vanhoozer (ibid), appeals to the “renewing of your minds” (Rom. 12:2), as the
Spirit‟s help to “receiving textual meaning.”
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 428), is quite aware of the strong nature of his claim, “The Spirit enables
understanding” in all texts.
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the Spirit may influence understanding without human knowledge.372 As we will see,
this insistence on the Spirit‟s work in all reading will come at a high price, because it will
stand in tension with Vanhoozer‟s overall pneumatology.
Meaning as Authorial Intent: If moral reading is open to the transcendence of
both author and message, Vanhoozer must rehabilitate the quest for authorial intent as a
legitimate interpretive goal. Vanhoozer‟s argument for authorial intent centers on
answering the question, “What is an author?” rather than the questions, “Who was the
author?” or “What was the psychological intent of the author?” 373 Vanhoozer claims,
“Any theory of interpretation that misunderstands what an author is cannot hope to
understand what a text is and how it conveys…meaning.” 374 Vanhoozer‟s foundational
analogy is that the author is best viewed as a creator. Drawing a parallel from God‟s
creation ex nihilo, Vanhoozer asks, “Why is there something rather than nothing in texts?
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 428), suggests, “Distortion is a real possibility whenever readers are
faced with texts that require behavioral change…Interpretation never takes place in a cognitively and
spiritually clean environment.” Vanhoozer ("The Spirit of Understanding,” 229), argues that the “Spirit of
understanding” enables ethical interpretation as he “progressively convicts us of our biases and conforms
us to reality,” even without the interpreter‟s knowledge. Vanhoozer (ibid), calls this the “bias principle,”
namely that “we never know the world apart from biases that influence our perception of reality.” Just as
interpreters naturally have a distorting bias toward texts, so the Spirit can affect a bias toward morally
respecting the other without the interpreter being aware of it.
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Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 5), is clear that he is not trying to
rehabilitate a notion of authorial intent that depends on “conscious awareness.” Instead, Vanhoozer (ibid),
claims that authorial intent is an “aspect of action. Specifically, authorial intention is a form of agential
intention...By authorial intention, then, I have in mind not what authors wanted to do (too psychological)
but what they did.” Because “to be human is to be always having to interpret what other people are doing”
(no human can avoid such action), interpreters must interpret the speech acts of authors. This means
interpreting what persons are saying by “counting their sentences as promises, questions, commands,
assertions, and the like.” Interpretation for authorial intent means understanding the correct illocutions
inscribed by the locutions. Because this is encoded in the text, the search for authorial intent is not a
speculation about the consciousness of the author.
374

Ibid, 228.

125

Because someone has said something about something to someone.” 375 The author “is
responsible both for the existence of the text (that it is) and for its specific nature (what it
is).”376 The text‟s “what it is,” for Vanhoozer, includes the text‟s determinate meaning,
codified by the configuration in a particular genre. Hence the author “is the one whose
action determines the meaning of the text—its subject matter, its literary form, and its
communicative energy.”377
The author‟s creative work of codifying a determinate meaning (i.e. content) in a
text in a particular manner (i.e. form) allows Vanhoozer to move beyond the analogy of
creation to another theological analogy. Drawing on a Christological analogy,
Vanhoozer suggests that the author‟s meaning in the text is the incarnation of the author‟s
intent. Vanhoozer explains, a “text is an extension of one‟s self into the world, through
communicative action.”378 On this account of authorship, it becomes clear why meaning
must be so closely connected to the author. If all human communicative acts are
analogously modeled after the triune God‟s extension of the divine Word as a
communicative act, there are definite reasons for respecting and attending to the speech
act of the human author. God is the paradigmatic author because of God‟s paradigmatic
communicative act. As Christians respect God by attending to God‟s self-communicative
act, so they respect human authors by attending to the author‟s self-communicative acts.
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Vanhoozer, (Ibid, 229), claims that analogous to the manner in which “[t]he divine author
embodied his message in human flesh,” the “text is…a kind of „body‟ of the author. It is this body, this
medium of authorial agency, that I have sought to resurrect.” Vanhoozer claims to have gotten this analogy
from Anthony C. Thistelton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming
Biblical Reading (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 75.
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Relying heavily on speech-act theory, Vanhoozer does not differentiate greatly
between speech and writing. Vanhoozer follows Ricoeur‟s claim that writing is, at
bottom, a form of discourse, yet he feels he must give more priority to the author than
Ricoeur does.379 Vanhoozer strengthens Ricoeur‟s thesis that a text is “any discourse
fixed by writing” to the stronger thesis that all “language as „discourse,‟” whether
speaking or writing, consists of “something said to someone about something.”380
Vanhoozer believes that much modern literary theory has fundamentally misunderstood
how cultures use texts. While modern literary theory emphasizes the distance between
text and author (and thus the separation between author and meaning), Vanhoozer feels
that cultures have always used texts precisely to preserve meaning. Since both writing
and speaking are discourse, “Texts are able to communicate at a distance because writing
preserves discourse. Writing…does not alienate authors from readers but makes shared
meaning possible. Indeed, it is humanity‟s chief resource for overcoming spatial,
temporal, and cultural distance.”381 Abandoning the connection between author and
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 328), uses Ricoeur‟s phrase, “If all discourse is actualized as an event, all
discourse is understood as meaning,” to ground all writing in discourse. See Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation
Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976),
12). Yet where Ricoeur goes on to discuss the difference between writing and discourse, Vanhoozer (ibid,
328), emphasizes the similarities, noting that, “Communication is the unifying act that orders all the other
acts” both in writing and in speaking.
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See D. Christopher Spinks, The Bible and the Crisis of Meaning: Debates on the
Theological Interpretation of Scripture (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2007), 87 (cf. Vanhoozer, Is
There a Meaning in This Text?, 214.) Vanhoozer claims, “Often overlooked is Ricoeur‟s
acknowledgement that discourse fixes not only the locutionary but the illocutionary act…Ricoeur knows
that one cannot cancel out this main characteristic of discourse—„said by someone‟—without reducing
texts to natural (nonintentional) objects like pebbles in the sand” ("From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts:
The Covenant of Discourse and the Discourse of the Covenant," in First Theology: God, Scripture and
Hermeneutics, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 190). As a result,
Vanhoozer has moved from Ricoeur‟s claim that meaning remains in the text to an insistence that such
meaning remain attached to an author.
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meaning in a text undermines one of the fundamental reasons that societies use writing
for communication.
Since author and meaning remain intrinsically connected in the text, Vanhoozer
understands the failure to respect meaning in the text as a failure to respect the author as a
legitimate „other.‟ In all texts, Vanhoozer writes, “The voice of the communicative agent
confronts us with a moral demand: „Heed me. Hear me. Understand. Do not bear false
witness.‟”382 Vanhoozer calls this the “hermeneutical imperative,” the moral demand on
the reader to “respect the author‟s intended act.”383 This insistence on respecting the
author as „other‟ draws a characteristically postmodern response to a characteristically
postmodern tendency. Francis Watson observes that in much postmodern literary theory
“the text must be dragged before a tribunal and subjected to interrogation about its own
ideological tendencies, its tacit support for an unjust status quo, its stereotyping of
marginalized groups.”384 For Vanhoozer, Watson continues, this “inquisitorial practice”
is “unethical because in dealing with texts we are dealing with persons whose
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Ibid, 401. Vanhoozer (ibid, 368, 375), etc. claims that “in reading we encounter an other
that calls us to respond.” Vanhoozer (ibid, 185), agrees that deconstructionism may be good insofar as it
chastens the reader and brings interpretive humility, yet, (ibid, 187), rejects “the postmodern contention
that suspicion—the critical moment—is all there is to the ethics of interpretation…Fortunately, there is an
alternative between the absolutely knowable and the absolutely undecidable. A proper fear of the other, of
the author, is the real beginning of literary knowledge.”
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 401), makes it clear that this does not mean that interpreters cannot look
for other things in texts as well: “„Seek ye first understanding‟ may be the interpretive norm, but it need not
exhaust the reader‟s interpretive aims. The hermeneutical imperative—to respect the author‟s intended
act—is nevertheless a sieve through which all interpretive aims must pass.” What Vanhoozer is really
doing here is to rank interpretive aims, showing that one stands out as an underlying priority over all the
others. There are many different legitimate interpretive aims, yet the only morally acceptable starting-point
is to respect the intention of the author. To disregard this interpretive aim in principle would be immoral.
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Francis Watson, "Review of Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The
Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge," Journal of the Evangelical Theological
Society 44, no. 4 (2001), 745.
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communicative actions the texts embody.” 385 Since “[a]ll texts…invoke a certain debt
that readers owe authors,”386 Vanhoozer responds to Barthes‟s declaration of the “death
of the author” by suggesting that interpretive “understanding” leads to the “death of the
reader.”387 The chief goal of interpretation is not to decipher the text‟s oppressive
ideology, nor to impose one‟s own meaning on the text, but “to gain literary knowledge,
to discover what an author is doing in tending to words as well as what those words are
about.”388 Since the “undoing of interpretation rests on a theological mistake,” namely
the immoral treatment of the author, Vanhoozer claims that “Christian theology, not
deconstruction, is the better response to the ethical challenge of the „other.‟” 389 The way
to reverse the immoral trend of disconnecting author and textual meaning is to turn to the
distinctly Christian understanding of discipleship as respecting the communicative act of
God. As a result, a respectful interpretation of the Bible provides the foundation for
interpreting all other books. Vanhoozer claims, “I prefer to say, not that we should read
the Bible like any other book, but that we should read every other book as we have
learned to read the Bible, namely, in a spirit of understanding that lets the text be what it
is and do what it intends.”390
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Ibid, 405. Just as the essence of Christian discipleship is to understand the author of the
Biblical text and die to self, so all interpretive understanding seeks to respect the intentions of the author.
To disregard the author (i.e. to make oneself author of the text), is fundamentally immoral.
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All Language as Covenantal: In Vanhoozer‟s early work, human language is the
medium by which readers and authors enter into a kind of “covenant” with one another to
act morally toward one another.391 Vanhoozer claims that all “texts are „covenants‟ of
discourse,”392 since through language authors take a public stance, establishing moral
obligations on themselves and others. Thus Vanhoozer puts forth his thesis that “the
design plan of language is to serve as the medium of covenantal relations with God, with
others, with the world.”393 Vanhoozer calls his claim that all language is covenantal the
“presumption of covenantal relation,” suggesting that “implied in every speech act is a
certain covenantal relation—a tacit plea, or demand, to understand.”394 Language is a gift
given by God with a specific “design plan” to produce understanding. 395 In written
discourse, then, “Covenant faithfulness to what is written is the necessary condition for
receiving the covenant blessing: understanding. Understanding is a covenantal
agreement between competent authors and competent readers about the rulegovernedness of every kind of text.”396 Seeking to understand the meaning
communicated by the author “is a proper response to the text as a communicative act, for
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Vanhoozer, “From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts,” 201. Language is only the medium of
such moral action, and only when transcendence is presupposed humans use language analogously to God‟s
use of language. Vanhoozer (ibid, 201), clarifies, “Language itself cannot make this demand on us”
because language “has no rights.”
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it respects the design plan of language (and literature) and increases my selfunderstanding precisely by giving me knowledge about something other than myself.” 397
This claim that all language is covenantal is grounded in God‟s own covenantal
communication, so that,
From a Christian perspective, God is first and foremost a communicative agent,
one who relates to humankind through words and the Word. Indeed, God‟s very
being is a self-communicative act that both constitutes and enacts the covenant of
discourse: speaker (Father), Word (Son), and reception (Spirit) are all interrelated.
Human communication is a similarly covenantal affair… 398
The Bible operates as the paradigm for all communication as it uniquely testifies
to the paradigmatic communicative action of God and as it is the covenantal document
par excellence. Learning to read Scripture appropriately, then, is the best way to learn
how to enter the covenantal structure of language in general and hence to respect morally
the author, who has also entered this structure of communication.
Vanhoozer emphasizes not only that texts have determinate meaning, but also that
there is ultimately only one right interpretation of a speech act. 399 In opposition to Frei‟s
distinction between “meaning” and “truth,” Vanhoozer proposes an opposite position:
meaning and truth are ultimately united in God, and thus all interpretations are oriented
toward, though will never completely reach, the fullness of meaning/truth. 400 Vanhoozer
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Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 302), suggests that ultimately, “There is one
determinate meaning in light of which the many interpretations must be judged inadequate or incorrect.”
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Vanhoozer ("The Semantics of Biblical Literature: Truth and Scripture's Diverse Literary
Forms," in Hermeneutics, Authority and Canon, ed. D.A. and John Woodbridge Carson (Grand Rapids:
Zonderban, 1986), 85), claims, “Because God is all-knowing and omnipresent…Truth must be
comprehensive and unified (at least for God, if not always for us).”
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assumes that if interpreters abandon the presupposition that there is only one correct
interpretation, they will also abandon the quest to do justice to the author. While
interpreters can never have complete confidence that they have attained the one right
interpretation, Vanhoozer argues that it is a faulty conclusion to abandon the search for
determinate meaning.401 Since the author has entered into the covenant of
communication, the text must have some determinate and intelligible meaning.

2. Use of Speech-Act Theory to Defend the Role of the Author
It is the connection between author and determinate textual meaning allows
Vanhoozer to show that all communication is a moral activity and ultimately grounded in
God. Speech-act theory provides Vanhoozer with the conceptual tools to locate
determinate meaning in a text and connect it to the author. In the case of Scripture,
speech-act theory will allow Vanhoozer to suggest that God is involved in both authoring
and reading.
Meaning and the Parts of a Speech Act: Speech-act theory proposes that all
speech acts have three parts: locutions (the words themselves), illocutions (the stance
taken by the author, i.e. commanding, requesting, etc.) and perlocutions (the effect
produced by the author‟s communication) in a speech act. Following this structure,
Vanhoozer defines a text as a written “complex communicative act with matter
(propositional content), energy (illocutionary force) and purpose (perlocutionary

401
Against the deconstructionists, Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 334),writes,
“The argument, „If no absolutes, then skepticism,‟ is fallacious. Between „all‟ and „nothing‟ stands „some.‟
Hermeneutic rationality yields some literary knowledge.”
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effect).”402 Yet while each component of the speech act is necessary to a text, Vanhoozer
locates the meaning of the text in the locutions and illocutions only. Meaning is
determinate in texts because the author encodes that meaning in the text by means of
locutions and illocutions.
Interpretation, then, is the art of grasping this meaning, not creating meaning in
dialogue with the author. Since meaning is bound to the illocutions and locutions of a
text, perlocutionary effect does not add to the meaning of the text. Vanhoozer articulates
this distinction between meaning and perlocutionary effect in various ways, at times
distinguishing between “meaning” (the product of the illocutions and locutions of the
author) and “significance” (the “effects that the text produces in its community of
readers),” and at other times between the “literal sense” (“what it meant to the author and
the original audience”) and the “ecclesiastical sense” (“what it means to us today in the
community guided by tradition or by the Spirit”). 403 In Scripture, while “perlocutionary
effect,” “significance” and “ecclesial sense” may continually change based on the
response of the Church, the determinate meaning of the text remains unaffected.
To associate perlocutionary effect with meaning would be to make both a
philosophical mistake and a theological mistake. Philosophically, to allow for
“confusion” between illocutionary efficacy and perlocutionary efficacy would be a
“confusion of text and commentary,” and hence would be just “another version of the
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affective fallacy.”404 Meaning must be set (i.e. determinate) before perlocutionary effect
is able to occur.405 Theologically, it is immoral to confuse “textual meaning with its
[perlocutionary] effects,”406 because this would prohibit the interpreter from genuinely
being confronted by the voice of the other in the text. Vanhoozer argues, “The task of an
ethics of interpretation, I submit, is to guard the otherness of the text: to preserve its
ability to say something to and affect the reader, thus creating the possibility of selftranscendence.”407 For Vanhoozer, assuming that determinate meaning exists is a
necessary prerequisite for any communication. To enter the process of communication,
interpreters must trust that the “illocutionary intent is usually recognizable” in all texts. 408
As a result, the isolation of meaning from perlocutionary effect is necessary to preserve
moral reading.
Vanhoozer grounds his distinction between locutions, illocutions and perlocutions
in God‟s self-communicative action. Vanhoozer finds an analogy between the Trinity
and speech-act theory that allows him to relate persons of the Trinity to specific parts of a
communicative act. Vanhoozer suggests,
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Ibid, 386 (cf. 409). For a description of the affective fallacy, see Frei‟s use of the New
Criticism in chapter one.
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 427), clarifies that there exists both an illocutionary efficacy and a
perlocutionary efficacy in Scripture. The “illocutionary efficacy,” intended by the author, (which “is a
matter of meaning”), and perlocutionary efficacy, the effect the text has on the reader, (which does not
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Ibid, 427. Vanhoozer (ibid), argues that the “external clarity” of Scripture is similar to the
“external clarity” of all texts. Notice that all textual meaning is placed on an equal playing field here: “The
suggestion that either the church magisterium or the Spirit‟s illumination is a prerequisite for understanding
would call this presumption into question.”
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Speech act theory serves as handmaiden to a Trinitarian theology of
communication. If the Father is the locutor, the Son is his preeminent illocution.
Christ is God‟s definitive Word, the substantive content of his message. And the
Holy Spirit—the condition and power of receiving the sender‟s message—is God
the perlocutor, the reason that his words do not return to him empty (Isa. 55:11).
The triune God is therefore the epitome of communicative agency: the speech
agent who utters, embodies, and keeps his Word. Human speakers, created in
God‟s image, enjoy the dignity of communicative agency, though as sinners their
speech acts (and interpretations) are subject to…imperfections and distortions. 409
In this schema, the Father and Son are most appropriately related to locutions and
illocutions respectively, and the Spirit is most appropriately related to perlocutionary
effect. If the divine Persons can be analogously associated with the parts of a speech act
in this way, then “the Trinitarian language of „procession‟ is apt: as the Spirit proceeds
from the Father and the Son, so the literary act proceeds from the author, and so too does
the perlocution (persuading, convincing) proceed from the illocution (claiming,
asserting).410
Both the Son and Spirit cannot be responsible for meaning, Vanhoozer suggests,
because attributing meaning to the Spirit would make the Spirit a “rival author” setting
“Spirit against Word.”411 The Spirit does not contribute to illocutionary meaning, but
instead “renders the Word effective.”412 Vanhoozer applies his axiomatic statement: “the
Spirit is tied to the written Word as significance is tied to meaning,” in order to show that
“the role of the Spirit is to serve as the Spirit of significance and thus to apply meaning,
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not to change it.”413 Since Scripture is complete in meaning (locutions and “illocutionary
success”), but indeterminate in bringing about the appropriate response in the reader
(“perlocutionary success”), it is naturally the Holy Spirit who accomplishes the meaning
determined by the Father and Son.414 The Spirit has a specific role in the literary act, just
as the Spirit has a specific role in relation to Father and Son: “The Spirit‟s role in
bringing about understanding is to witness to what is other than himself (meaning
accomplished) and to bring its significance to bear on the reader (meaning applied).”415
Practically, this means that the Spirit “ensures that [the illocutionary acts] are recognized
for what they are,” by means of “conviction,” “illumination,” and “sanctification.” 416
Vanhoozer‟s association of perlocutionary effect with the work of the Spirit
should be seen in light of his pneumatology. Vanhoozer wishes to develop a
pneumatology that will tie Spirit and Scripture closer together than either Tracy or
postliberals are willing to do. On the one hand, Vanhoozer criticizes Tracy and Ricoeur
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413), to say Spirit has the role of “bringing about understanding is to witness to what is other than himself
(meaning accomplished) and to bring its significance to bear on the reader (meaning applied).”
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Vanhoozer‟s argument becomes more refined as he works out his view of the determinate
meaning of Scripture as God‟s Word in contrast to Barth. Vanhoozer feels that Scripture is the Word of
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sufficiently clear without the aid of the Holy Spirit. This argument will be a continual tension in
Vanhoozer‟s work.
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for associating the work of the Spirit more with the universal work of creation than with
Christology, believing that such a model will de-emphasize the particularity of
Christianity. 417 On the other hand, Vanhoozer criticizes postliberals for their tendency to
“confine the Spirit to the church by making the Spirit‟s work a function of community
reading practices,” believing that this will de-emphasize the authority of Scripture.418
Vanhoozer‟s own proposal ties the work of the Spirit to the Scriptures, for it suggests a
model in which the Spirit primarily works in Scripture rather than the practices of the
Church or in the created order at large. This model seeks to call revisionists and
postliberals alike to respect the ways in which the literal sense of Scripture establishes the
bounds for the Christian faith.
Establishing the Literal Sense: The literal sense is the combination of locutions
and illocutions intended by the author within the context of the whole communicative act.
It is the illocutions, however, which are finally decisive for determining the literal
sense. 419 Interpretation takes place when a reader moves from discerning the locutions to
“inferring illocutionary intent from the evidence, which includes both the primary data
(the text) and secondary considerations (context).”420 Vanhoozer‟s paradigmatic example
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Vanhoozer, “The Spirit of Understanding,” 227. The claim is developed fully in Biblical
Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, ch. 9, esp. 248-57.)
418

Vanhoozer, "The Spirit of Understanding,” 226.

419

Vanhoozer ("From Speech Acts to Scripture Acts,” 178), defines the literal sense as “the
sum total of those illocutionary acts performed by the author intentionally and with self-awareness.” Yet
he also insists, “The literal sense, I maintain, is not a matter of locutions alone; every utterance has an
illocutionary force as well (e.g., assertive, directive, expressive, etc.)…To ignore the role of illocutions is to
succumb to „letterism,‟ or to what could also be called „locutionism‟” (Is There a Meaning in This Text?,
310-11).
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here is the interpretation of legal documents (a will, for example) where the thought
process of the author must be reconstructed in order to understand the communicative act
intentionally preserved by writing.421 The reader must use the locutions in order to move
to the illocutions, and hence the meaning, of a text.422
Vanhoozer further shows the importance of illocutions by likening interpretation
to translation. Good translation, Vanhoozer claims, occurs when the illocutions and
perlocutions are preserved as the locutions are changed. This produces “an „equivalent
response‟ in a new context.423 While something is always added and lost in translation,
“Moral interpretation respects and responds to the illocutions of the text in the way
intended by the author.”424 Through this explanation, it is possible to see how closely
tied authorial intent remains to meaning. The very ability to grasp meaning depends on
one‟s ability to grasp the illocutionary efficacy of the text while using different locutions.
In the structure of language, “illocutions „supervene‟ on locutions,” so that, “One can
perform an illocutionary act only on the basis of locutions—words, sentences—though

Vanhoozer, the movement from simply recognizing locutions to understanding the supervening illocutions
of an author is analogous to the movement from semiotics to semantics (182). For example, Vanhoozer
(ibid, 183), claims that the information transmitted by the locution „Wet paint‟ is one thing; the illocution—
„Do not touch‟—is quite another.”
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Christology provides a pivotal analogy for Vanhoozer‟s understanding of the literal sense.
Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 357, n. 143), claims, “One cannot read divine revelation off
of the body of Jesus. It is only in other contexts, on higher descriptive levels, that we can see Jesus as the
Christ and as the Son of God. „Christ‟ supervenes on „Jesus.‟ His divinity cannot be reduced to his
humanity, but it cannot be discussed apart from it either.” In the same way, one must move from locutions
to supervening illocutions to understand the literal sense.
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 387), claims, “In order to preserve the nature and content (proposition
and illocution) of the message, however, it is often necessary to change the form (locution).”
424
Vanhoozer (ibid, 335), claims, “What we are after as readers is not an interpretation that
perfectly corresponds to the text (whatever that might mean), but rather an interpretation that adequately
responds to it. In responding to the text we allow the text to complete the purpose for which it was sent.”
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illocutions cannot be reduced to locutions.” 425 The literal sense is understood by moving
from the words of the text to the authorial intent which created those words and
supervened on them in an illocutionary stance.
Up to this point, Vanhoozer has only given a general description of the literal
sense which would apply to all texts. As he transitions to an explanation of the literal
sense of Scripture, some sharp tensions arise. In the next section, I will show that
attempting to employ general hermeneutical rules to Scripture, even if those rules are
grounded in the notion of God‟s communicative acts, fails to provide an adequate
framework for understanding dual authorship, the unity of the canon, progressive
revelation, and reading all Scripture in light of Christ. 426

C. Persistent Tensions in Vanhoozer‟s Early Work
While Vanhoozer‟s early work articulates a philosophically interesting,
theologically grounded argument for reading Scripture and consequently all other texts
with respect for their authors and messages, this early work suffers from a number of
difficulties in establishing rules for reading Scripture. Specifically, Vanhoozer‟s early
project lacks adequate articulation of the uniqueness of Scripture and the activity of God
in communicating the Scriptural texts. Too often, Scripture appears to be governed by all
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 178), claims that the Bible is unique because of its “pedagogical nature
and function”—its status is “canon” and its “nature” is as a “guidebook for the believing community.”
Vanhoozer, (ibid, 103), further demonstrates the uniqueness of Scripture in that the literal sense of
Scripture means “taking it as testimony to Jesus Christ,” and thus the literal sense must regard Christ as the
center of Scripture.
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the same rules that govern the reading of other texts, and God appears to be little more
than a necessary presupposition for moral reading.
In this regard, Vanhoozer‟s early work may be more instructive in its failure than
it is in its success. Vanhoozer criticizes both Tracy and Frei for focusing on general
hermeneutics to the exclusion of special hermeneutics, yet Vanhoozer‟s own early
approach exhibits many of the same problems. These difficulties in Vanhoozer‟s work
show the importance of developing rules for reading within the context of the whole
economy of redemption rather than trying to move beyond the impasse by simply
imposing a different literary method. This section will highlight several key difficulties
in Vanhoozer‟s early work in order to show that the discussion must be broadened further
to include a discussion of the divine Author as well as the place of Scripture in the
economy of redemption.
The Movement From Human Authorship to Divine Authorship: While most of
Vanhoozer‟s early works focuses on the speech acts of the human author, Vanhoozer
knows that ultimately he must move from a theological general hermeneutics to a special
hermeneutics of Scripture as he deals with dual authorship. Vanhoozer‟s move to special
hermeneutics is made by claiming that God brings canonical meaning to completion by
supervening God‟s own divine illocutions on human speech acts. Since God acts upon
the biblical texts in this way, the whole canon can be considered a unified speech act, of
which God is the primary author. Vanhoozer calls this supervening action, which
becomes apparent at the level of the whole canon, either the canonical sense or the sensus
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plenior.427 Ultimately, Vanhoozer suggests, the literal sense is the canonical sense as the
canon provides the full context for understanding God‟s communicative act.
For Vanhoozer, determining textual meaning is a function of understanding both
the locutions and the illocutionary stance of the author. Understanding the full meaning
of the author can best occur as one examines the speech act in its whole context; e.g., an
author‟s whole text in the context of its genre, with the cultural situation of the author,
etc. Vanhoozer applies this same logic to Scripture as he moves from human authorship
to divine authorship to determine Scripture‟s divine canonical sense. While individual
authors wrote the individual texts of Scripture as speech acts, the fullest meaning of
Scripture emerges only at the level of the canon where the whole of Scripture can best be
understood as God‟s unified speech act. Thus the “canon as a whole becomes the unified
act for which the divine intention serves as the unifying principle.”428 Vanhoozer
explains that the whole completed canon is the context within which God‟s speech act
can be determined:
A text must be read in light of its intentional context, that is, against the
background that best allows us to answer the question of what the author is doing.

427

The term sensus plenior is associated with Raymond Brown, who defines the term as
“additional meaning…in the words of a biblical text (or group of texts, or even a whole book) when they
are studied in the light of further revelation or development” (Raymond Brown, The Sensus Plenior of
Sacred Scripture (Baltimore: St. Mary‟s University, 1955), 92, cited in David M. Williams, Receiving the
Bible in Faith: Historical and Theological Exegesis (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America
Press, 2004)). Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in this Text, 313), suggests that the “„fuller sense‟ is in fact
the literal sense, taken at the level of its thickest description.” Thus the sensus plenior, for Vanhoozer,
ends with the closure of the canon. Vanhoozer‟s chief aim is to protect the codified meaning of the Biblical
text from human detractors at all costs; hence his articulation of Scripture as God‟s speech act is only a
secondary emphasis.
428

Ibid, 265. This position does not deny that God was influential (providentially,
communicatively, etc.) in the production of the individual texts of Scripture; rather, it only claims that
God‟s speech act is best understood within the whole canonical context and should be discerned by using
that whole context—i.e. that all Scripture testifies to Christ.
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For it is in relation to its intentional context that a text yields its maximal sense,
its fullest meaning. If we are reading the Bible as the Word of God, therefore, I
suggest that the context that yields this maximal sense is the canon taken as a
unified communicative act. The books of Scripture, taken individually, may
anticipate the whole, but the canon alone is its instantiation.429
Since this “fuller meaning…emerges only at the level of the whole canon,”
Vanhoozer argues that the „fuller sense,‟ the „literal sense‟ and the „canonical sense‟ are
all ways of referring to the same unified, divine speech act of God.430
This movement from human authors to divine authorship proves an extreme
challenge for Vanhoozer‟s theological general hermeneutics. Up to this point
Vanhoozer‟s whole argument has rested on the „hermeneutical imperative,‟ the claim that
readers have a moral obligation to respect the speech acts of human authors. Now,
Vanhoozer must show how God can supervene God‟s own speech act on human speech
acts in such a way that God does not do interpretive violence to the human authors. In
order to show that “[t]he divine intention does not contravene the intention of the human
author but rather supervenes on it,” Vanhoozer suggests that textual meaning in
Scripture was indeterminate until the closure of the canon, at which time it became
determinate.431 Using Brevard Childs‟s canonical approach, Vanhoozer claims that “a
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Ibid.
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Ibid, 264, 313. The “fuller sense,” for Vanhoozer (ibid, 313), is “the literal sense, taken at
the level of its thickest description.” Using this argument, Vanhoozer will argue that the literal sense is the
canonical sense. Carrying this argument through in his later work, Vanhoozer writes, “If one takes divine
authorship of Scripture seriously, then literal interpretation must have recourse to the canonical context, for
the meaning of the parts is related to the whole of Scripture. The literal sense of Scripture as intended by
God is the sense of the canonical act (the communicative act when seen in the context of the canon)”
(Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "Body Piercing, the Natural Sense and the Task of Theological Interpretation," in
First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Downers Grove: InterVarsity
Press, 2001)., in First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Downers
Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 292).
431

Ibid, 265.
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work‟s potential is its capacity to function in future circumstances, a capacity that for
Childs is precisely the canonical function.” 432 On this account, the individual texts which
were originally indeterminate in meaning opened beyond themselves so that future
generations could “provide the descriptive framework within which to understand new
events.”433 Yet, with the closure of the canon, the indeterminacy of just these texts ended
as God‟s speech act supervened on them and established the meaning. Vanhoozer
explains,
What this means is that the literal sense—the sense of the literary act—may, at
times, be indeterminate or open-ended. However—and this is crucial—the
indeterminacy we are considering is intended; moreover, it is a definite feature of
the meaning of the text…If there is a sensus plenior, then, it is on the level of
God‟s gathering together the various partial and progressive communicative acts
and purposes of the human authors into one „great canonical Design.‟ 434
The argument seems to be that God providentially caused the indeterminacy of
the human speech acts of the texts so that God could establish determinate meaning in
them with the completion of the canon.435 As the canon was closed, those providentially
indeterminate texts could be recognized as a unified speech act of God, closed with
regard to meaning.436

432

Ibid, 313. Vanhoozer is using Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays.
Tr. Vern W. McGee. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 4.
433

Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 313.
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Ibid, 314.
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Here a distinction again appears between reading Scripture and reading other texts.
Unfortunately, Vanhoozer provides no distinguishing criteria for reading the Bible differently, except that
all the books must be read as a canonical whole.
436

Ibid, 313. Vanhoozer (ibid), has just used Bakhtin to show that the interpreter must not
“„enclose‟ the work „within the epoch,‟” yet he appears to do precisely that once the canon itself is closed.
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This argument seems incompatible with Vanhoozer‟s project for two reasons.
First, if God was involved providentially in the text in this unique way, then the biblical
texts simply cannot be read with the same rules as other texts. Readers must read for
divine authorial intent often instead of human authorial intent. In Scripture, God is
uniquely responsible both for the indeterminacy and the final determinacy of textual
meaning, and the individual texts must be read in that light. The previous decision about
whether one reads to understand God‟s speech acts or the human speech acts in Scripture
will affect the subsequent method of reading more than Vanhoozer‟s method can account
for, especially when explaining the use of the Old Testament in the New. 437 For example,
Vanhoozer claims that “New Testament testimony does not „spiritualize‟ but „specifies‟”
the Old Testament reference, so that “Jesus Christ…is the literal referent of biblical
testimony.” Vanhoozer argues that the “meaning” of the Old Testament is not changed in
the New, but that God has “rather rendered its referent—God‟s gracious provision for
Israel and the world—more specific.”438 It seems Vanhoozer can make this claim only
by understanding “meaning” and “referent” in a very general sense. 439 It is quite difficult
to preserve the radical newness of Christ while saying that the New Testament is simply a

437
Spinks (The Bible and the Crisis of Meaning, 92), notes that Vanhoozer‟s safeguarding of
the term “meaning” becomes very difficult to defend as it is extended “from sentence to text to canon while
all the while maintaining authorial intention, both human and divine. In other words, Vanhoozer‟s term
„meaning‟ seems to have to bear a good deal of weight as it moves to incorporate the whole of Scripture.”
438

Ibid, 423.
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And Vanhoozer does exactly that. Vanhoozer (ibid, 423), claims, “What is of continuing
relevance across the two Testaments is God‟s promise to create a people for himself and the divine action
that fulfills that promise.” It is the covenantal structure, it seems, that is constant, and the final covenant
specifies the previous. Of course this is true, but surely the matter is not that simple. It is doubtful that
Vanhoozer will be satisfied with this general a concept of meaning when attending carefully to the
particular genres of Scripture as parts of a speech act.
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specifying of the textual indeterminacy of the Old Testament. 440 As we will see in the
next chapter, de Lubac argues that this is not really a Christian reading of Scripture at all.
Second, this description of the movement from human to divine authorship causes
Vanhoozer to land remarkably close to Tracy and Frei in precisely his disregard for the
significance of the human author. For Tracy, investigating authorial intent would simply
be a part of excavating the world behind the text in order to move on to the meaning in
front of the text. For Frei, investigating authorial intent is unnecessary because the text is
sufficiently plain. By claiming that Scripture is ultimately God‟s speech act, constituted
as such by God‟s supervening illocutions on the human speech acts, it appears that
Vanhoozer must say that the speech act of the human author is a means to God‟s speech
act. God, the primary author, is able to supervene additional illocutions on the locutions
of the human author, thus making the text mean something different than the original
intention of the human author. It is unclear, then, why interpreters must maintain a quest
for human authorial intent at all. 441

440

Drawing the now familiar distinction between meaning and significance, Vanhoozer (ibid,
423), claims, “Significance just is „recontextualized meaning.‟ Just as Jesus Christ recontextualizes the
meaning of the Old Testament, so the church is called to recontextualize the meaning of Jesus Christ.” I
am not sure how this can possibly escape blurring the distinction between progressive revelation and
interpretation of encoded meaning that Vanhoozer has set up his argument precisely to preserve.
441
Interestingly, Adonis Vidu notes precisely this difficulty even without adding a quest for
the divine author. Vidu argues that if authorial intent means the speech act of the author which is
sufficiently plain in the text, it is unclear why we must call it authorial intent? Vidu (Adonis Vidu, "Is
There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge," Trinity
Journal 21, no. 2 (2000). 211), writes, “The question which remains to be asked, by way of criticism, is
whether Vanhoozer doesn‟t too easily collapse the author back into the text…But if the act (the text) tells
us all we need to know, why bother with the author? While Vanhoozer succeeds in avoiding to describe
authorial intention in terms of the psychology of the author, it is not clear whether the author is not merely
a postulate, perhaps a useless one.” I would suggest that the tension is greatly heightened when interpreters
concede that meaning is not located in the human speech acts at all, but in the supervening divine speech
acts.
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A Distinctly General Hermeneutic: After arguing that general hermeneutics
overshadowed and effectively nullified Ricoeur‟s special hermeneutics, it is somewhat
surprising that Vanhoozer starts his own Scriptural hermeneutics from a general morality
of reading. Besides Vanhoozer‟s occasional emphasis on the uniqueness of Scripture‟s
subject matter, there appears to be very little difference between Scripture and other
books. This ambiguity about the place of special hermeneutics can be illustrated at the
end of Vanhoozer‟s book, where he summarily claims,
On the one hand, we should read the Bible like any other text, though due
consideration must be given to those factors that set it apart (e.g., its divinehuman authorship, its canonical shape, its function as Scripture). On the other
hand, we should read every other text with the same theological presuppositions
that we bring to, and discover through, our study of the Bible. 442
While the first sentence of this statement highlights some key differences between
Scripture and other books (namely, uniqueness of authorship, canon, and use in the
Church), it is Vanhoozer‟s lack of attention to these issues which is most striking
throughout his early work.443 The second sentence of this quote provides a manifesto for
Vanhoozer‟s theological general hermeneutics, yet it must be asked whether the very
thesis may be flawed. Do not Christians turn to Scripture precisely because they bring
different theological presuppositions to this text?444 Overall, the very argument for a
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Ibid, 455-56.
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In fact, Vanhoozer (ibid, 4), claims in his 10 year anniversary edition, “To be sure, biblical
interpretation is a special case (hence the term „special hermeneutics‟), not least because God is uniquely
involved in the process of composition, canonization, and interpretation.” These are precisely the issues
that Vanhoozer has noted but left undeveloped in his early career. In his later career, Vanhoozer will start
from these issues and develop them thoroughly.
444

At the very least, these presuppositions would include a conviction that the illocutions of
the Author deserve to be heard and responded to in a qualitatively greater way, that the locutions of this
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theological general hermeneutic appears to be both philosophically and theologically
problematic. The attempt is philosophically problematic because writing does not
summon the ethical response of a reader in quite the way speaking does. The
distanciation between author and reader does allow the reader to first decide if she wishes
to enter the covenant of communication at all. The covenant of communication operates,
then, in most written texts, on a previous decision by the reader to enter into that
covenant.445 Further, the attempt is theologically problematic because its attempt to
establish authority in all texts based on a general moral obligation toward human authors
actually detracts from the special importance of reading Scripture because it is God‟s
word. While it is true that language establishes a structure in which human beings are
able to interact morally or immorally with one another, Vanhoozer seems to realize that it
does not necessarily follow that readers are morally obligated to investigate the meaning
proposals of all authors equally. In his later work, Vanhoozer will soften his claim to a

text were somehow uniquely attended to by the Holy Spirit, and that the perlocutionary efficacy of this text
is capable of producing different results than other texts.
445
In this sense, writing does appear to be a different kind of communicative act than
speaking. In writing, the author is distanced from the reader so that no direct summons by a speaker to a
hearer occurs (with the exception of legal documents, which provide the basis for Vanhoozer‟s argument—
see Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 332). This difficulty may be seen more clearly by putting Vanhoozer
and Tracy in discussion about other potentially disclosive religious texts, say, the Koran. Tracy would say
that the Koran is disclosive in the same way as is the Bible, because each, as a religious text, makes a
„claim to the whole.‟ Vanhoozer would agree with Tracy that treating the author/text as an „other‟ would
force readers to genuinely seek understanding (in Vanhoozer‟s case, the locutions and illocutions of the
author). Yet Vanhoozer would likely not yield to the claim to the whole in the Koran in the same way he
yields to the Bible. Would Vanhoozer, then, be an immoral reader on his own account? The answer seems
clear: Vanhoozer does not think the author of the Koran deserves to be understood or responded to in quite
the same manner as does the primary author of the Christian Scriptures. This example clarifies
Vanhoozer‟s difficulty. The hermeneutical imperative only works if one first decides that it is important to
read the author. Human authors do deserve the respect of readers to adequately identify their locutions and
illocutions if readers decide to enter that covenant (i.e. if readers choose to say, “The author meant…”, they
are obligated to correctly identify what the author, in fact, meant). However, it seems clear that readers
read for understanding to the level that they believe such understanding matters. Such a decision of worth
is not an inherently immoral action toward the author. Rather, it is the necessarily prior decision to any act
of interpretation.
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covenant of communication and propose that language is only “quasi-covenantal,” and
that what is needed in reading Scripture is a “first theology” which will establish the
moral demands on readers to read for understanding.
Pneumatology of all Reading: One of the most apparent tensions in Vanhoozer‟s
early work is his insistence that moral reading of all texts is grounded in the activity of
the Spirit. This insistence appears incompatible with Vanhoozer‟s project in several
ways. First, it works against Vanhoozer‟s overall pneumatology, which seeks to
associate the work of the Spirit more closely to the biblical text. Vanhoozer‟s intent has
been to show how the Spirit‟s activity is tied distinctly to Scripture. Yet now it appears
that Vanhoozer must associate the Spirit‟s work with the reading of all texts in
qualitatively the same way as the Spirit works in Scripture.446 It is quite unclear how
Vanhoozer can simultaneously maintain both the uniqueness of the Spirit‟s work in
Scripture and the presupposition of the Spirit‟s work in all texts.
Second, Vanhoozer‟s claim that pneumatology is a grounding presupposition for
all reading may blur the very distinction between nature and grace that Vanhoozer so
strongly wishes to maintain. On this general argument, it remains unclear whether
Vanhoozer intends the moral reading of any text to be ultimately a matter of nature or of
grace. At some points Vanhoozer appears to simply be claiming that Christians have
better resources for reading general texts which will allow them to read morally (namely,
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One telling sign of Vanhoozer‟s struggle here is to observe how quickly Vanhoozer retreats
from a general theory of the Spirit‟s work in all texts back to a discussion of the Spirit‟s perlocutionary
efficacy in Scripture, leaving his explanation of the Spirit‟s work in all other texts undeveloped. For
example, Vanhoozer (ibid, 415), appeals to the “renewing of your minds” (Rom. 12:2), as the Spirit‟s help
to “receiving textual meaning.” Vanhoozer cannot (morally!) appeal to the authorial intent of Paul to apply
this transformation to all textual interpretation. And, in fact, Vanhoozer does not, for his argument simply
switches back to the transformation brought about by the Spirit‟s perlocutionary effect in Scripture alone.
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the grounding presupposition that God stands behind all communication). On this
account, moral reading is in the realm of nature, although Christians are better prepared
for moral reading because they presuppose a framework of transcendence. At other
points, however, by suggesting that the Spirit grounds all reading, Vanhoozer appears to
be claiming that all moral reading ultimately participates in the realm of grace. When the
reader develops interpretive virtues for reading Homer, he or she is participating in the
fruit of the Spirit. It is one thing to say that all texts should be read with the same general
rules of interpretation as the biblical text. But it is quite another to say that the Spirit‟s
effective action operates in all texts as it does in the perlocutionary efficacy of the
biblical texts. The latter dismisses the very uniqueness Vanhoozer is attempting to
establish.
Third, Vanhoozer‟s early work fails to associate the work of the Spirit with the
Church in any qualitatively different way than in other institutions. Vanhoozer claims,
[T]he Bible is best read in the context of community of disciplined readers…not
because there is no meaning in the Bible apart from its reception of the Spirit-led
community, but because the Church is the place where the Spirit cultivates
righteousness and the willingness to hear the one who leads the community into
the single correct interpretation: the literal sense 447.
The Church provides the best context for reading Scripture primarily because it is
the best context for developing the proper response to Scripture. This conclusion appears
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Ibid, 415. Vanhoozer (ibid, 430), does give several reasons in favor of interpreting
Scripture in the Church: 1. “What reading Scripture in the church does is to provide a context for
cultivating the interpretive virtues and a conducive environment in which to discern and to do the Word.”
2. “The church is the community dedicated to discovering the Bible‟s meaning and to attesting its
continuing significance.” 3. “It is, above all, the significance of Scripture that cannot be discerned apart
from the receiving, believing community.” Vanhoozer‟s insistence that the plain sense of all texts can be
determined sufficiently outside the Church and that all reading is grounded in the influence of the Holy
Spirit, makes it quite difficult for him to locate the Spirit‟s activity in the Church in any distinct way.
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to give Vanhoozer the same difficulty that Tracy has faced in explaining the difference
between reading Scripture within the Church and outside it. The encounter with the text
does not appear to be qualitatively different inside and outside the Church—it only
provides the community of a group of persons who are like-minded and able to formulate
the correct virtues for reading. This awkward result appears an inescapable conclusion to
the claim that meaning is determinate in all texts and that the Spirit underlies the moral
reading of all texts.
God‟s Activity in Scripture: Perhaps the greatest difficulty in Vanhoozer‟s early
work is in articulating God‟s action in Scripture. Vanhoozer proposes that the Triune
God is the backdrop to all human communication, as human communication analogously
models the action of the Triune God.448 Vanhoozer claims, “The thesis underlying the
present work takes God‟s trinitarian communicative action as the paradigm, not merely
the illustration, of all genuine message-sending and receiving…The triune God is
therefore the epitome of communicative agency.” 449 It is clear that Vanhoozer wants
readers to understand that the Triune God is the ground of all communicative action, and
that the reality of the Trinity establishes the very rules for reading. Vanhoozer insists,
therefore, that he is building a truly “theological general hermeneutics” which starts from

448
Vanhoozer (“The Spirit of Understanding,” 231), specifically claims, “I am advocating a
Trinitarian hermeneutic for all interpretation.” Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 161),
explains that self-communicative action is an attribute both of the immanent Trinity (God is “essentially the
one who communicates himself to others in trinitarian fashion…In the beginning was the communicative
act…”) and of the economic Trinity (“The incarnation…grounds the possibility of human communication
by demonstrating that it is indeed possible to enter into the life of another so as to achieve understanding”).
449

Ibid, 457.
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a theology of God and moves to hermeneutical theory, rather than a “general
hermeneutics” which presupposes God as a ground.450
Despite this persistence, however, it is far from clear that Vanhoozer has actually
accomplished such a project. When Vanhoozer explains the role of the Trinity in
interpretation, he suggests that “The Trinity thus serves the role of what Kant calls a
„transcendental condition‟: a necessary condition for the possibility of something humans
experience but cannot otherwise explain, namely, the experience of meaningful
communication.”451 While God is a “transcendental condition” of communication, it is
not apparent what the Triune God actually does apart from establishing a (covenantal)
ground of morality and influencing all readers to read morally. Vanhoozer‟s early work
has focused one-sidedly on the necessity of Trinity as a backdrop to human
communication, neglecting the ongoing economic action of the Trinity in Scripture. 452
While God may have providentially brought together the different books of Scripture and
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For example, Vanhoozer (ibid, 456), argues, “I have been at pains not to use the Trinity
merely as an illustration of a point obtained elsewhere…God somehow „underwrites‟ language and [I] have
attempted to clarify it from an explicitly Christian point of view.” Vanhoozer (ibid), argues even more
insistently that “[t]he Trinity is not merely an illustration of a general intellectual process. I am not
beginning with a philosophical framework and saying, „The Trinity is like that.‟ Nor am I using the Trinity
to justify a particular interpretive approach…”
451

Ibid, 456, (emphasis his).
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Indeed, the thesis of Bowald‟s book may be justified in this statement by Vanhoozer.
Bowald (Rendering the Word in Theological Hermeneutics, 1-23), has argued that the post-Enlightenment
tendency in biblical hermeneutics is to understand God‟s action in Scripture in much the same way Kant
has defined a “notional judgment”: a piece of knowledge we need to conduct investigations, but which
does not affect the process of investigation. Hence while terms like “inspiration,” “infallibility,”
“inerrancy” may be necessary backdrops for Biblical studies, they do not affect the process of “operational
judgments”—those which influence the process of reasoning. Vanhoozer appears here to use the
communicative action of “Trinity” in the same way—it is a necessary backdrop for human communication,
but does not affect the process of humans communicating.
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supervened illocutions on them at the level of the canon, it is still unclear what special
consequence God‟s authorship of Scripture may have on the process of reading today.453
Conclusion: The early Vanhoozer‟s contribution to the debate between Tracy and
Frei appears to be one of instructive failure rather than providing a helpful alternative.
The tensions mentioned above appear to be the inevitable result of attempting to ground a
reading of all texts and a reading of Scripture on the same theological presuppositions.
Simply changing the philosophical tools from theories such as the New Criticism (as
Frei) or phenomenology (as Tracy) to speech-act theory (as Vanhoozer) does not ease the
tensions in Scriptural hermeneutics when only the relationship between text and reader is
developed. Instead, the whole discussion of Scriptural interpretation must be placed in a
broader context which includes God‟s use of Scripture to the Church, as well as the role
of the Church in receiving Scripture. Fortunately for Vanhoozer, the difficulties inherent
in his early approach will cause him to develop this broader context during his later work.

B. Vanhoozer‟s Later Work: Starting from God as Self-Communicative Act
In his later work, Vanhoozer specifically claims that his first work failed to
adequately appreciate the uniqueness of Scripture since he did not adequately show that
“God is involved in the production and reception of the Bible in a way that is so
qualitatively different that it makes of biblical interpretation a special case.” 454
Vanhoozer‟s 2001 book, First Theology, marks a distinctly new trajectory in his
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Bowald (ibid, 65), claims that with regard to Scripture, “There is still no clear indication
for how the actual influence or participation of God‟s speech action occurs with human speech action.”
454

Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 4.
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hermeneutical approach.455 Vanhoozer has taken the idea of First Theology from David
Kelsey, and summarizes it in this way:
[T]he way Scripture functions authoritatively in theology is inseparable from a
view of God, an inseparability that I call „first theology‟; [and] one‟s first
theology invariably involves an „imaginative construal,‟ a decision to take the
Bible as something or other based on our discernment of how God relates to the
community of readers via Scripture.456
Vanhoozer argues that an “imaginary construal” about what Scripture is will
determine how Scripture is to be read. This “first theology” now forms a starting point
for all Vanhoozer‟s hermeneutics, and allows Vanhoozer to locate Scripture more
precisely in the economy of redemption. Rather than focusing almost exclusively on
epistemological concerns like meaning and literary theory, Vanhoozer now focuses on
the way in which the triune God has graciously used Scripture to call and sanctify a
people in covenant relationship. Whereas Vanhoozer previously explained interpretation
as a morally responsible quest for the (human) author‟s meaning, he now claims that “the
interpretation of Scripture is the means by which human discourse participates in the
„strange new world of the Bible‟—the divine discourse of the blessed Trinity.” 457
Interpretation, then, is a response to and participation in the triune God.

455
Vanhoozer, First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2002). This book is composed mostly of articles which range throughout the 1990‟s,
and hence are of little use in illustrating Vanhoozer‟s new focus. Vanhoozer‟s introduction to the book, pp.
15-44 is the most helpful in showing his new trajectory in thought.
456
Vanhoozer, "The Apostolic Discourse and Its Development," 192. See David H. Kelsey
(The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), 159), who claims that prior
to the theologian‟s use of Scripture stands “a decision a theologian must make about the point of engaging
in the activity of doing theology, a decision about what is the subject matter of theology. And that is
determined…by the way in which he tries to catch up what Christianity is basically all about in a single,
synoptic, imaginative judgment.”
457

Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 80.
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This First Theology helps press Vanhoozer to broaden the discussion of
hermeneutics to include an articulation of the relationship between God, Scripture, and
the Church. Vanhoozer‟s most recent book, Remythologizing Theology, sets forth an
ontology of the economy of redemption. There Vanhoozer writes,
[Remythologizing theology] is a way of viewing God, Scripture, and
hermeneutics in terms of their mutual implications, all coordinated by the notion
of communicative action: the triune God is the ultimate communicative agent of
Scripture; Scripture is an element in the triune God‟s communicative action;
interpretation is the way the church demonstrates her understanding of what God
is saying and doing in and through Scripture by right theodramatic
participation.458
This refocusing of the discussion specifically on the economy of redemption
allows Vanhoozer to make a substantive contribution to Scriptural hermeneutics which
will move beyond the debate between Frei and Tracy. God will now be understood not
simply as the necessary ground for all human communicative acts, but as Pure, Triune
self-communicative Act who extends communication to human beings uniquely through
Christ and Scripture. It is now specifically the doctrine of God which establishes the
roles that Scripture and the interpretive community have in the divine economy.
As a doctrine of God now uniquely grounds his hermeneutics of Scripture,
Vanhoozer simultaneously softens his use of speech-act theory so that it is clear he is
beginning with the Trinitarian theology rather than speech-act theory to build an
argument that God, both in essence and in Personal relations, is communicative.
Vanhoozer‟s later claim is that,
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God is the communicator, communication, and communicatedness. The triune
God is the agent, act, and effect of his own self-communication. As Voice, the
Father is the speaking subject who initiates the process of communication. As
Word, the Son is what the Father speaks, the content of the communicative act.
As the Breath that accompanies and conveys the Father‟s Word, the Spirit is the
channel or medium of the communicative act as well as its efficacy. 459
Vanhoozer now begins his hermeneutical project specifically from an
understanding of the Trinity and attempts to work out the implications of the doctrine of
God for hermeneutics, rather than starting with rules for reading and grounding them in
the doctrine of the Trinity. Speech-act theory is still the philosophical tool of choice, but
the priority of Trinitarian doctrine over philosophical concepts has been established.
Vanhoozer‟s later project is characterized by two moves: the attempt to develop an
ontology of God as Pure Communicative Action, and an attempt to demonstrate that God
should be considered Author of Scripture. Both steps will require a discussion of God‟s
use of the Scriptural texts and the role of these texts in the Church.

1. Developing an Ontology of Communicative Action
In Remythologizing Theology, Vanhoozer moves beyond hermeneutics to a
theological explanation of God which will advance theology proper. 460 Observing that
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Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 261. Bowald, 67, nt. 79, suggests that Vanhoozer
gradually moves from a strict dependence on speech act theory to an ancillary use of this philosophical
method in describing God.
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Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology. (The basis for this book appears in a 2001 article
by Vanhoozer, entitled, "The Love of God: Its Place, Meaning and Function in Systematic Theology," in
First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 71-95.)
Vanhoozer realizes that theological hermeneutics will never be an extremely helpful movement for
Christian theology until it can enhance articulation of the nature of God as well as God‟s relation to
Scripture. Vanhoozer, (Remythologizing Theology, xiv), claims, “The recent interest in theological
hermeneutics, together with the church‟s recovery of the practice of interpreting the Bible in the context of
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recent theologians have said much about God‟s self-communication, Vanhoozer finds it
surprising that very few have actually explained what self-communication means.461 To
fill this theological void, Vanhoozer attempts to set forth a “communicative ontology
(i.e., a set of concepts with which to speak of God-in-communicative-action).”462 This
program of communicative ontology has several emphases: First, while Vanhoozer
argues that Christian theology cannot abandon a holistic system for understanding reality,
he is insistent that such a holistic quest must start from God‟s self-revelation in Christ
and Scripture rather than from some predetermined system of truth.463 Second,
Vanhoozer insists that metaphysics should not begin with a system of causality but by
understanding God as Pure communicative action. 464 Vanhoozer‟s unique contribution is
to unite these insights into a constructive proposal.
Post-Barthian Thomism: Describing himself as a “post-Barthian Thomist,”
Vanhoozer suggests that Aquinas‟s metaphysical system can best be employed today

God‟s triune activity, welcome though these be, must be matched by an equal attention to the nature of the
God of whose communicative activity the Bible is an ingredient.”
461

Vanhoozer (ibid, xiii), claims, “Western theologians as diverse as Thomas Aquinas, John
Owen, Karl Rahner, and Karl Barth freely employ the notions of communication and self-communication
in the contexts of divine revelation and/or redemption, yet usually without explicit analysis. Finally, few
theologians have made use of the available linguistic, philosophical, literary, and rhetorical resources
conceptually to elaborate the nature of God‟s communicative action.”
462

Ibid, xv.

463

Vanhoozer (Remythologizing Theology, 199), believes Barth was correct in his emphasis
that any ontology of God must be based (a posteriori) on God‟s own self-revelation in Jesus Christ, and
only from there move to philosophy. Yet Vanhoozer (ibid, 217), suggests that “faith that stops its search
for understanding short of ontology risks falling back into mere mythologizing. By contrast,
remythologizing renews and revitalizes…by letting Scripture serve as our primary interpretative
framework.”
464

Vanhoozer (ibid, 217), believes Aquinas was correct in his emphasis that “being is not a
static substance but a dynamic, existential act,” and that this revised ontology will call for a more modest
metaphysics of God as Being-as-self-communicative-action which starts from God‟s self-revelation rather
than God as First Cause which starts from a system of philosophical logic.
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after it has been chastened by Barth‟s priority of revelation over reason. 465 The most
important “Barthian anxiety” is Barth‟s insistence on Christology as the starting point for
God‟s self-communication.466 Vanhoozer will develop his program using Aquinas‟s
conception of God as Pure Act, and Barth‟s focus on God‟s self-communication.
Vanhoozer agrees with Aquinas‟s description of God‟s Being as Pure Act.
However, Vanhoozer wishes to emphasize that communication instead of causality is the
proper starting point for metaphysics. In shifting emphasis from communication to
causality, Vanhoozer intends to “bring out a communicative sense to which the church
has not sufficiently attended.”467 Vanhoozer begins by agreeing with Aquinas‟s claim
that to be is to act, as well as W. Norris Clarke‟s claim that “Action is the self-revelation
of being; every being, insofar as it is in act, is self-communicative.”468 This brings Barth
and Aquinas very close, since Barth attempted to overcome an idea of God as perfect
being by beginning with God as act. This initial correlation of God‟s being with God‟s
action allows Vanhoozer to move from God‟s action to God‟s self-communication. To
be is to act and to act is to communicate. Following Clarke, Vanhoozer claims that “it is
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 222), claims that remythologizing “has Thomistic ambitions yet is
tempered by Barthian anxieties: we begin with faith in revealed truth and proceed to reason, sometimes
with the aid of philosophical concepts.” Vanhoozer will follow a form of Aquinas‟s metaphysics and
Barth‟s Christology. Vanhoozer‟s claim to be a “post-Barthian Thomist” has taken its cue from Ricoeur‟s
claim to be a “post-Hegelian Kantian” (See Ricoeur, “Biblical Hermeneutics,” Semeia 4 1975).
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As Vanhoozer sees it (Remythologizing Theology, 222), the key difference between
Aquinas and Barth is that “Aquinas asks what God the creator must be given the existence of creation while
Barth asks what God must be given the history of Jesus Christ.” The other noted difference is that
“Aquinas employs a single conceptual scheme, that of Aristotle, while Barth is more eclectic” (222).
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Ibid, 28 (see thesis 4 and n. 109, respectively). Vanhoozer stresses that he does not wish to
entirely dismiss the notion of God as cause; rather, he wants to personalize the notion.
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See Ibid, 24-25, citing William Norris Clarke, Explorations in Metaphysics: Being, God,
Person (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 37.
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the very nature of real being…to pour over into action that is self-revealing and selfcommunicative.”469 Vanhoozer further follows Clarke‟s suggestion that “All action is
communication, and all communication is action.”470 In other words, Being-in-action
always is Being-in-communication.471 As a result, for Vanhoozer, „Being-as-Pure-Act‟ is
„Being-as-Pure-Communicative-Act.‟
Vanhoozer sees his own project as an advancement of “Barth‟s unfinished task of
rethinking God‟s being on the basis of his revelation in „word‟ and „act.‟” 472 The way to
finish Barth‟s project, Vanhoozer feels, is to “includ[e] other instances of divine speaking
and acting alongside the Incarnation.”473 Practically, this means Scripture must be
included in the economy of God‟s speaking and acting. The contents of the biblical texts,
as well as the diverse forms in which they are recorded, ought to be seen as “part of a
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Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 224, citing William Norris Clarke, The One and
the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (South Bend: University of Notre Dame, 2001), 32.
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Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 224, citing Clarke, Explorations in Metaphysics, 9.
Vanhoozer (Remythologizing Theology, 225), cites Clarke (Explorations in Metaphysics, 215) who claims
that being as “intrinsically self-communicative” is “one of the few great fundamental insights in the history
of metaphysics.”
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Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 225. Human persons are the best example of this,
because persons are most authentically „being‟ as they are self-communicative. Humans only analogously
reflect the personhood of God. Thus Vanhoozer (ibid, 207), claims, “God is God in large part because his
communicative capacity far outstrips that of humans. In particular, God has the ability to „communicate‟
his own life to others, through Word and Spirit, thereby establishing communion and fulfilling his word…”
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Ibid, 207. Vanhoozer (ibid, 207), feels that “Barth unnecessarily delimits the set of divine
communicative acts by making divine ontology a function of the incarnate life of Jesus alone.” On Barth‟s
account, since God is God‟s self-revelation, Scripture cannot be considered God‟s self-communication, lest
God be identified with Scripture (Bibliolatry). Vanhoozer (ibid, 211), responds that Barth, in equating
revelation only with the event of Jesus Christ, may “overlook other things that speakers do with their
words…It is not clear on Barth‟s account how God can do the things the Bible depicts him as doing (i.e.,
commanding, warning, promising) if he is not the agent of properly verbal communicative acts as well as of
the revelatory act of incarnation.” Speech act theory, then, provides Vanhoozer with resources to describe
God as a properly speaking agent, and one who is able to speak in Scripture.
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prior economy of divine self-projection.”474 As a result, to remythologize theology is “to
put our discourse of what is under the discipline of the biblical accounts of God‟s
speaking and acting.”475 Remythologizing means “rendering explicit the implicit
„metaphysics‟ of the biblical mythos. Its aim is to let the biblical texts govern one‟s
understanding of being, not to deploy an independently derived concept of being to
govern one‟s reading of the biblical texts.”476 Thus Vanhoozer‟s goal in remythologizing
is to “deploy metaphysical categories…for the sake of a project that is ultimately
governed by the biblical accounts of God‟s self-presentation in speech and act.”477
Remythologizing from Scripture: The project of remythologizing theology can be
best understood in contrast to the post-Enlightenment tendency to demythologize God‟s
communicative acts.478 Demythologizing is generally defined by Vanhoozer as “a
strategy for translating biblical statements about God into existential statements about
human being.”479 This action does not respect the covenant of communication, but looks
behind the particular genre to find the kernel of truth.480 It is this quality of projection
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Ibid, 223. Vanhoozer (ibid, 220), describes the choice before theologians in his familiar
either/or construal: “Should theologians derive their understanding of actus from God‟s communicative
action or should they understand God‟s communicative action against the background of an independently
derived general conception of being-in-act? Put differently: is theology merely a regional instance of a
general metaphysic?”
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 30), claims that “remythologizing is best defined in contrast to
demythologizing as a type of first theology.”
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Ibid, 15.
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 16-20), uses Bultmann and Feuerbach as interlocutors in order to contrast
his own project of remythologizing with their project of demythologizing. Bultmann is described as a
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(allowing existential concerns to dictate language about God), which remythologizing
seeks to challenge.481
Remythologizing Scripture means articulating an ontology that proceeds from
God‟s self-communicative action in Scripture rather than first configuring a metaphysics
into which God and Scripture are placed. Vanhoozer suggests that the goal of his project
is “not ontotheology but theo-ontology, not general but special (remythologized,
biblically governed) metaphysics.”482 Ontotheology (a “unified system of thought that
employs concepts such as Supreme Being or Unmoved Mover as conceptual stopgaps to
prevent infinite metaphysical regress”) 483 must be expelled and replaced by “theoontology” (“A „theodramatic‟ metaphysics [which] provides a systematic account of the
categories needed to describe what God has said and done to renew all things in Jesus

“soft” demythologizer because he insists that God still “encounters” the believer, in his/her “inner life,”
while Feuerbach is a “hard” demythologizer, in that everything said about God is merely the projection of
the ideal self. Hence, “On [Feuerbach‟s] view, the secret of reading is authoring: what appears to be the
creation of an author—meaning—is actually the invention (projection) of the reader.”
481

Interpreters should not read Vanhoozer‟s project in Remythologizing Theology as a
referendum on most of contemporary theology any more than Drama of Doctrine was designed to be a
referendum on all aspects of postliberal theology, or Is There a Meaning in this Text? was designed to be a
referendum on the whole of postmodern interpretive method. In all three books, Vanhoozer is simply
pointing out a feature of contemporary method that he feels is leading theology in a harmful direction.
Vanhoozer‟s use of Feuerbach as paradigmatic demythologizer is not to associate contemporary revisionist
theologians with Feuerbach as much as it is to apply a lesson learned from Feuerbach to contemporary
theology: any speech about God that starts from our own experience rather than God‟s self-communication
has the potential to lead us away from what God has, in fact, communicated about Godself. Vanhoozer is,
then, highlighting the difference between two trajectories, the trajectory of demythologizing (represented
by Feuerbach and Bultmann), and the trajectory of remythologizing (uncompleted by Barth, approached by
Ricoeur, and advanced by Vanhoozer).
482

Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 222.
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Ibid, 8. Ontotheology is also defined by Vanhoozer (ibid, 8), as a “unified system”
developed “from below” which projects God as the greatest Being in our conceptual schema.
Ontotheology arises from “totalizing” metaphysics, the “underlying assumption that there is one set of
categories, accessible to unaided human reason, which applies both to the world and to God, created and
uncreated reality.”
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Christ through the Holy Spirit.”)484 Ontotheology is “bad” metaphysics because it
“imposes a system of categories on God without attending to God‟s own selfcommunication,” and must be replaced by a “good” metaphysics of theo-ontology, which
is a “descriptive metaphysics,” which “derives its system of categories from the train of
God‟s own communicative action (i.e., theodrama).”485 The goal, then, is to allow
Scripture to form the foundation for understanding all reality by understanding Scripture
as God‟s “communicative agency.” 486
Because Scripture is the self-communication of God, all literary forms are used by
God for self-communication. Vanhoozer claims,
If God‟s activity is best construed in terms of triune communicative agency, then
it behooves us to attend to the concrete manner in which God „projects‟ his own
story. Hence my thesis: the mythos of the Bible—the Christological content and
canonical form—is the written means of God‟s triune self-presentation. In a
word, the mythos is the medium (and the message).487
Remythologizing means respecting the communicative act as it appears in a
particular genre, because in doing so one is respecting the God who exists as Pure
Communicative Act. From God‟s own “rainbow of divine communicative acts” given in
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Ibid, 11. Vanhoozer‟s use of mythos is central to the argument of the book. Mythos,
originally Aristotle‟s term for dramatic plot, is defined by Vanhoozer (ibid, 5-6), as a “unified course of
action that includes a beginning, middle, and end,” a “mode of discourse that configures human action so as
to create a form of wholeness (i.e., a unified action) out of a multiplicity of incidents.” Mythos is the
narrative figuring of events into a whole system of meaning. By beginning with mythos, Vanhoozer places
himself in the narrative tradition and claims he is in continuity with both Frei‟s “realistic narrative” and
Ricoeur‟s “configuring mimesis.” Yet Vanhoozer (ibid, 7), extends mythos beyond Ricoeur‟s use (and
Frei‟s narrative) by using it to “refer to all the ways in which diverse forms of biblical literature represent,
and render, the divine drama.” As a result, all of Scripture will be God‟s self-revealing mimesis.
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the various genres of Scripture,488 Vanhoozer proposes that readers should read Scripture
with the presupposition of God as pure self-communicative Act. As a result, Vanhoozer
believes that God‟s revelation in Scripture can itself be the basis for a holistic system of
understanding the Christian life in such a way that critical correlation is not needed.

2. Establishing Divine Authorship of Scripture
The foundation for Vanhoozer‟s understanding of Scripture is what he calls the
“Scripture Principle,” the Christian preunderstanding that the Bible is, in fact, the Word
of God.489 This Scripture Principle seems grounded in the phenomenological and
traditional observation that the Church does, in fact, recognize Scripture as the Word of
God.490 As we have seen, in Vanhoozer‟s early writings, he struggled to move from
human authorship of Scripture to divine authorship. In his later work, Vanhoozer builds
an argument for divine authorship as he seeks to clarify just how God is the primary
speaker/author in these unique texts. Vanhoozer‟s argument for divine authorship can be
systematized into several steps.
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Vanhoozer, "First Theology: Meditations in a Postmodern Toolshed," in First Theology:
God, Scripture and Hermeneutics (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 35.
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Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 63-68), claims, “Theology‟s first principle is God in
communicative action,” and the “Scripture principle maintains that the Bible itself is ultimately a species of
divine discourse.” This is said to be held by the early Church, and is grounded theologically in the concept
of God‟s covenant communication.
490

Vanhoozer (ibid, 205), claims, “The church has traditionally acknowledged the Bible‟s
self-attestation as the word of God. It follows that the various biblical texts are forms of divine discourse
and should thus be counted as figuring among the divine repertoire of communicative action.” Vanhoozer
("The Apostolic Discourse and Its Development," 197), argues that the practice of the Church is the
primary reason Scripture should be understood as God‟s word. There he claims, “Suffice it to say that the
church has taken the apostolic discourse as authoritative precisely because it communicates the word of
God.”
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God Can and Did Speak in Scripture: The first step in articulating how God is
author of Scripture is to emphasize that God can and does communicate with human
beings. For Vanhoozer, affirming that God can speak is part of the essence of the
Christian faith. 491 God‟s communicative acts, of course, are analogous to human speech
acts, although for communication to take place God must use symbols which are able to
truly communicate.492 In contrast to those who think that symbols about God are merely
human symbols, Vanhoozer feels that the Christian faith depends on God‟s actually
taking up human symbols and using them for communicative purposes. For God to act in
the public sphere (i.e. in the economy of redemption), God must be able to perform
speech acts, i.e. to communicate himself and take up illocutionary stances in the public
realm. 493 Hence Vanhoozer suggests that, “A great deal of God‟s communicative work,
perhaps more than has hitherto been appreciated, involves language, the most
sophisticated medium of discourse.”494 If God truly desired to communicate to human
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Vanhoozer (Ibid, 206), claims, “From the fact that God dialogues with human beings we
may infer at the very least that he has the capacity to communicate. From the incarnation of the Word we
may further conclude that God has the capacity to communicate himself. God‟s presence is thus in the first
instance personal, agential, and communicative rather than merely spatial, substantive, or metaphysical.”
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 212), defines communication as “interaction by means of mutually
recognized signals,” and “manipulation of symbols by one person to stimulate meaning in another person,”
or “social interaction through messages.” Vanhoozer (ibid, 210), specifies, “It is not self-evident that
„employing vocal cords‟ is an essential element in acting… it is entirely possible that God could achieve
fundamentally the same result by other means.” Vanhoozer introduces the distinction between “mode of
action” and the “action done” to show that God can perform the same action, although in a different way.
Vanhoozer (ibid, 210-11), notes, “It is therefore legitimate to say „God (literally) speaks‟ (because he
performs communicative acts via words, which is what „speaking‟ ordinarily means) even though „speaks‟
is not being used univocally with regard to God and human beings (because the mode of God‟s speaking
may be extraordinary).”
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Vanhoozer (Remythologizing Theology, 210), heightens the intensity of this claim by
arguing, “The stakes could not be higher: to the extent that one refuses to ascribe specific (communicative)
acts to God‟s personal agency, one revises what the Bible and Christian faith are primarily about.”
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Ibid, 277.
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beings, and yet failed to perform the most fundamental of all communicative acts, i.e.
speaking, humans could hardly assume that God had desired to communicate.
Yet even if God is able to communicate through human symbols, Vanhoozer must
go further to show why the Church should think that God did, in fact, speak in Scripture.
Vanhoozer‟s next argument is that God‟s revelatory action in the world must be backed
up by explanatory communication or else it would remain too ambiguous to be useful.
Vanhoozer argues that, “Without an event of divine speaking, we are unable to say either
who is acting or what this person is up to: „behavior unaccompanied by speech remains
inherently ambiguous.‟”495 Apparently, for Vanhoozer, all “revelatory” acts performed
by God require God‟s speech acts to accompany them. When God acts in a decisive
(revelatory) way, God will also provide a speech act (Scripture) to explain the action.
The Church, in turn, has recognized the Scriptures as just this adequate and authoritative
explanation of God‟s interaction in the human sphere.
God as Author of Scripture: At this point, having moved from a defense that God
can speak to an argument that God must have spoken in Scripture, Vanhoozer can move
to his crucial argument that God should be considered author of Scripture. For
Vanhoozer, the claim that God is author of Scripture and the claim that Scripture is
authoritative over the Church stand or fall together.496 Vanhoozer defines authorship as
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Ibid, 209. Here Vanhoozer is citing Basil Mitchell, „Revelation Revisited,‟ in Sarah
Coakley and David A. Palin (eds.), The Making and Remaking of Christian Doctrine: Essays in Honour of
Maurice Wiles (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 182. See also Vanhoozer‟s claim,
(Remythologizing Theology, 213), “Only speech disambiguates behavior. Only God‟s word disambiguates
God‟s deed.”
496
Vanhoozer, (The Drama of Doctrine, 64), writes that “the Bible is Scripture—the
authoritative Word of God—precisely because it is a word for which God assumes the rights and
responsibilities of authorship. The church‟s script is ultimately a matter of divine discourse.” (See also
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“a convenient shorthand for the notion of verbal communicative action” in general, 497
although the term “verbal” is much broader than simply human words. When applied to
God, “„Authoring‟ covers what God does as creator, reconciler, redeemer, and perfecter,
and so serves as a metaphor for the economic Trinity as well: the Father „authors‟ in
Christ through the Spirit.”498 God is even the “author” of God‟s own Being. 499 At this
point, the role which the concept of authorship plays in Vanhoozer‟s system becomes
clear: authorship is a broad description for God‟s self-communicating action. The
advantage of attributing authorship to God is that it provides a way of explaining “God‟s
relation to the world, and to Scripture, in terms of an „economy of communication,‟”
which, in turn, “enables us to better conceive…the absolute distinction between Creator
and creation.”500 The economy of redemption is best called an economy of
communication, as Vanhoozer feels many theologians have implicitly suggested. 501
Since “redemption entails revelation,” and hence self-communication, “The canon is a
rule and criterion… precisely because of its place in the divine economy of

Vanhoozer, (ibid, 179): “In sum: it is the divine illocutions—God‟s use—that constitute biblical authority”
and Vanhoozer, (ibid, 63): “It is not enough to begin simply with the sensus literalis (the Bible read like
any other book), nor with a sensus divinitatis, nor with a sensus fidelium. No; the first principle we require
is a sensus scripturalis; the sense that the Bible is „of God‟ and hence authoritative for the Church.”)
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Vanhoozer (ibid, xiii), refers especially to Aquinas, Rahner, and Barth.
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redemption.”502 Here it becomes clear that Vanhoozer‟s argument about authorship is
really an explanation of God‟s action and the role of Scripture in the divine economy.
Scripture as Covenant Document: In the end, though, it is the theological concept
of covenant which does most of the heavy lifting in establishing an argument that God is
author of Scripture.503 Vanhoozer‟s basic claim is that “the Bible is a divine
communicative act that exists for the sake of covenantal relations.”504 When establishing
covenant, God always “takes the communicative initiative to enter into covenantal
relation,” and “this covenant-making involves both oral and written communicative acts
on God‟s part.”505 This is the final step in showing that God is author of Scripture,
because Vanhoozer can now show what kind of speech act Scripture ultimately is. Now
Vanhoozer can summarily say, “Scripture is triune discourse: something (covenantal)
someone (Father, Son and Spirit) says to someone (the church) about something (life with
God).”506
As covenant document, the text, as a canonical whole, must be understood to be a
unified speech act of God. The Christian must enter the interpretive process
understanding that “inspired Scripture” is “the discourse therefore of one single
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Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 147.
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While Vanhoozer uses speech act theory to show how God can be considered a speaker,
and hence an author, Vanhoozer realizes that he needs a theological argument, not simply a philosophical
construct, to show that the Scriptures should be granted authority as God‟s speech act. Vanhoozer unites
the theological concept of covenant with speech act theory to show that covenant is a kind of speech act.
Vanhoozer (ibid, 64), appeals to J.L. Austin, who “listed „making a covenant‟ as one of the things we do
with words: „Our word is our bond.‟” (See J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 10.)
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speaker…a single body of discourse, which serves the consistent purpose of a single
authoritative agent.”507 If Scripture is a document of covenant, God must be the primary
speaker, and the words must be considered to be God‟s own communication.
Vanhoozer, in opposition to Barth, argues that because God enters into real
obligation to humanity through Scripture, Scripture must be equated with revelation. 508
The real obligation between God and human beings occurs because “[t]o covenant is to
enter into a personal relationship structured by divine promises to behave in certain ways
and to do certain things.”509 In every covenant recorded in Scripture, Vanhoozer claims,
“The words…were the communicative medium by which the people approached God and
vice versa, so much so that to engage the words of Scripture is to engage God in
communicative action.”510 Understanding Scripture God‟s covenantal stance in the
public sphere is qualitatively different from understanding Scripture as a witness to God‟s

507

Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 231.
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Vanhoozer‟s discussion of the canon as God‟s communicative covenant document takes
place in dialogue with Barth, who had argued that Scripture cannot be God‟s word because God‟s freedom
cannot be tied to human language. Vanhoozer responds that if Barth had started from the assumption that
the Bible is the document preserving God‟s covenant with human beings, Barth would likely not have
difficulty accepting that God could, in freedom, enter into obligation with human beings by extending
God‟s self-communication to the Bible. Vanhoozer‟s argument (ibid, 136-40) against Barth runs like this:
First, God can enter a covenant only by communicative action (136). Second, the canon is the
documentation of these covenantal initiatives, it “„documents‟ our covenantal privileges and
responsibilities” (137). Third, the canon was completed because the new covenant needed a written,
binding witness (138). Fourth, God still ministers the covenant today through the Scriptures (139). Fifth,
the canon constitutes the community with whom God has committed Godself to covenant relationship
(140). These five points together build a strong case that God indeed could bind his freedom to human
communicative acts in Scripture.
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Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 263. Vanhoozer ("Triune Discourse: Theological
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actions in history. Scripture, then, cannot be considered simply a witness to revelation,
but must, in fact, be revelation.
Vanhoozer‟s use of covenant in his later work is significantly different from his
earlier construction. In his early work, Vanhoozer argued that precisely because all
language is covenantal, Scripture imposes a demand on its readers to read to understand
the intentions of its human authors. Now, Vanhoozer significantly softens this argument,
claiming, “While discourse in general creates a quasi-covenantal situation inasmuch as
speakers and hearers assume certain obligations in the process of communicating, this is
particularly the case when the discourse is explicitly covenantal.”511 While language does
create a structure of rights and obligations, it is precisely because God has authored
Scripture for use as the covenant document in the economy of redemption that Scripture
has authority in the Church. This change from all language as covenantal to God‟s
unique use of Scripture as a covenant document, in turn, establishes the authority of text
over the Church. 512 Since Scripture is a document of covenant, Scripture can even be
said to constitute the Church, just as in all covenants God called and constituted a people
for relationship.513
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Thus Vanhoozer (ibid, 133), claims, “The most important reason for doing theology in
accord with the canon, then, is that Scripture is a divine covenant document before it is an ecclesial
constitution.” The concept of covenant provides, for Vanhoozer, the single greatest reason why divine
authorial intent in Scripture must not be dismissed. Vanhoozer (ibid, 139), claims, “The origin (and hence
the authority) of the canonical Scriptures is thus far removed from that of human constitutions.
Constitutions can be amended; not so the canonical covenant.”
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Vanhoozer, (ibid, 135), claims, “It is the divine drama—the communicative action of the
triune God creating and covenanting with what is other than God—that gives rise to the church, and not
vice versa…”
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Scripture as God‟s Unified Speech-Act: Genres are, for Vanhoozer, the key to
proposing determinate meaning in the text, as they provide the form in which the
„covenant of communication‟ takes place. 514 Genres are the common literary structure by
which communication is possible, and God enters into precisely this human structure to
extend covenant to human beings. Literary forms, for Vanhoozer, “are the indispensable
means of conforming our minds to the „divine genius‟ of Scripture. For the way God
communicates, and the point of view that gets communicated, „is as much part of the
story as the events it tells.‟” 515 Both form and content are essential “elements in the
divine drama of revelation and redemption,” as God has used just these forms (genres) to
communicate just this message (Christ) to just this covenant people (the Church). 516
Ultimately, God‟s communicative action in Scripture is that of “offering a theologically
thick description of Jesus Christ” and bringing believers to be covenantally incorporated
into him. 517 Yet this “thick description” requires God‟s use of many genres, as each
genre provides an aspect of God‟s testimony about Christ.518 The theological concept of
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covenant, for Vanhoozer, includes “not only promise but other aspects of the covenant—
stories, stipulations, sanctions—that together constitute the relationship between God and
his people.”519 As a result, the content of the covenant could not be adequately
communicated without precisely the many genres represented in the canon.
Speech acts operate, for Vanhoozer, at the level of genre, since authors choose a
particular genre in order to establish a particular illocutionary stance. Vanhoozer argues
that illocutionary stances can be offered within a particular genre at the level of the whole
text. For example, “In choosing to write in the narrative genre, authors choose to take up
a stance…an ideology, a „worldview.‟” 520 The same would be true for any genre.
Vanhoozer uses the phrase “generic illocution” to describe “what an author is doing at the
level of the whole text,” and claims that “every genre in Scripture…performs its distinct
illocutionary act (or acts).”521 Vanhoozer suggests, then, that “genre…describes the
illocutionary act at the level of the whole, placing the parts within an overall unity that
serves a meaningful purpose. It follows that genre is the key to interpreting
communicative action.”522
Since the Bible has many different genres, many different illocutionary stances
(generic illocutions) are taken in Scripture. Yet these are not where God‟s supervening

through diverse forms.” Yet it is important to remember that this communicative act is not simply a
description about Jesus, but it is Christ‟s active work toward the Church: “In the context of the divine
drama, the canon is the external means by which Christ exercises his authority over the Church” (The
Drama of Doctrine, 114).
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speech-act comes to light. Rather, the whole canon should be understood as its own
unique genre, with its own divine illocutionary stance. Vanhoozer suggests in his later
work that the whole canon operates something like a “super-genre.”523 The “various
literary forms” may be “taken together” at the level of canon where they yield a larger
illocutionary stance.524 Vanhoozer proposes the phrase “canonical illocution” to show
“what God is doing by means of the human discourse in the biblical texts at the level of
the canon.”525 This overarching stance, as a canonical illocution, is “something that
comes to light only on the canonical level, when the divine playwright speaks in and
through the various human authorial voices.”526 Identifying this supervening
illocutionary stance provides the key to articulating what the Bible finally is, and thus
allows the theologian to formulate a theology of Scripture. Vanhoozer identifies this
unique “macrogenre” as “divine address” or “theodrama,” descriptions which allow for
the existence of other genres within them.
The meaning of the human authors, then, is unified by the supervening illocution
of God at the canonical whole. Brevard Childs has objected that the possibility of
supervening illocutions would mean that, “By performing an illocutionary act with the
noematic content of the human discourse, God can say something entirely different” than
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what the human authors wrote.527 Vanhoozer can escape Childs‟s critique because
Vanhoozer‟s own model proposes that God‟s supervening illocutions ceased with the
closure of the canon. Since recognizing God‟s supervening illocutions in Scripture is a
matter of deciding which full context rightly encompasses the whole communicative act,
Vanhoozer feels God‟s intention becomes clear at the level of the whole canon.
Vanhoozer, then, refers to the “plain canonical sense” as the literal sense, the whole in
which God‟s speech acts come to light.528
Vanhoozer knows that his own proposal for identifying the essence of Scripture is
a single, philosophical formulation placed upon Scripture. Yet while Vanhoozer
responds that while this articulation of God‟s supervening action through the use of
speech-act theory is indeed new, it simply provides a new way to illumine the lasting
claim that God speaks in Scripture.529 Furthermore, Vanhoozer knows that the
construction of a single, overarching construct for Scripture often reduces Scripture one
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kind of literary text.530 Yet Vanhoozer feels that his own proposal does not succumb to
such reductionistic tendencies because his own construal works requires respect for all
the genres of Scripture as indispensable elements of the single, supervening illocutionary
stance which unites all the other individual illocutionary stances.

C. Scripture‟s Role in the Economy
Vanhoozer‟s later work is a sustained attempt to locate Scripture in the economy
of redemption which opens a number of interpretive options beyond those suggested by
Tracy and Frei. Vanhoozer‟s theological project advances the hermeneutical discussion,
not by providing a superior method for reading through the employment of more useful
philosophical resources, but by showing that Christian interpretation of Scripture can
never be confined to the relationship of text and reader. As Scripture is a species of
God‟s communicative action to the Church, Scriptural reading must always attend to
theological presuppositions which will influence interpretive outcomes.

1. God‟s Use of Scripture
Vanhoozer‟s most significant contribution to a theological interpretation of
Scripture is his insistence that the Scriptures are an extension of the Triune missions of
God and are God‟s communicative action by which salvation history is mediated to
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proposal that Scripture is one genre, discourse, avoids imposing a reductionistic structure on Scripture, and
instead opens it to a greater appreciation of its literary forms.
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readers. Vanhoozer‟s early work is unsuccessful insofar as it attempts to locate the
authority of Scripture in the literal sense without showing how the literal sense is God‟s
communicative action. Vanhoozer‟s later work advances the discussion between Frei and
Tracy as it suggests that the authority of Scripture is grounded not in experience or in
community consensus, but in the communicative action of God who extends salvation to
the Church. Vanhoozer‟s later model, consequently, advances Tracy‟s appeal to
appreciate all the genres of Scripture, as Vanhoozer shows that God uses the various
literary styles to communicate to readers. At the same time, Vanhoozer‟s model
appreciates Frei‟s insistence on the plain reading of Scriptural narrative by showing that
the whole Scriptures is a unified story of salvation history communicated to the Church.
Vanhoozer‟s ontology of communicative action places Scriptural hermeneutics within the
broader context of the divine economy and hence prevents readers from handing
authority over to either the exegete or the community consensus, but to show that correct
Scriptural reading can only take place when believers understand that these texts are a
species of God‟s speaking action.

2. The Movement from Text to Spiritual Reality
Vanhoozer puts forward two proposals for moving from text to divine reality, one
based in figural reading and one based in speech-act theory. These two proposals,
although quite different, are complementary. In the first proposal, Vanhoozer adopts
Frei‟s understanding of figural reading and emphasizes the participatory aspect of such
interpretive practice. Figural reading is “the rule for present-day Christians to make
sense of their stories as Jesus did of his, precisely by reading their own lives in light of
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the life of Jesus.”531 Vanhoozer concludes that through figural reading, “The canon thus
teaches us to see, trains us in crucial epistemic practices that, in conjunction with the
Spirit‟s work, are necessary for the renewing of our minds and for perceiving „the whole
in Christ.‟”532 Vanhoozer‟s whole subsequent project of theodrama is intended to show
how the reader is formed by Scripture to a new understanding of the world. Vanhoozer,
like Frei, understands that figural reading is not necessitated by a literal reading of texts,
but is based on prior theological presuppositions. Vanhoozer‟s primary concern, like
Frei‟s, is showing why this kind of reading is authoritative for the Church. Because
Vanhoozer places figural reading within the larger context of the economy of redemption,
he is able to provide resources to advance the discussion. While Frei‟s nearly exclusive
focus on the text/reader relationship causes him to struggle to decide whether authority
resides in the text itself or community practice, Vanhoozer‟s articulation of the divine
economy allows him to show that authority resides in God‟s sending of Scripture to the
community of faith. Here overtly theological concerns ground issues of method, so that
once the theological presupposition of God‟s authoring work is established behind the
text, Vanhoozer proposes a fairly intratextual approach to Scriptural reading.
Vanhoozer‟s second proposal for explaining the movement from text to divine
reality relies on speech-act theory. Vanhoozer explains both the unity of Scripture and
the incorporation of the present reader at the level of the canonical whole, as God‟s
illocutionary stance supervenes upon the many locutions and illocutions of the human
writers, making the Scriptures God‟s speaking action. The authority of Scripture, then, is
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based on the unique movement from human communication to divine communication,
and this is completed with the final form of the Christian canon. In this sense, the
movement from text to divine reality takes place more in the theological prerequisites for
reading Scripture uniquely than in an encounter with the text itself. Whereas both Frei
and Tracy emphasized the reader‟s encounter with the text, Vanhoozer focuses on the
preunderstanding of the reader who encounters the text. If employed in isolation, this
proposal for a particular conception of authorship may draw attention away from the
transforming event of Christ. If only a theory of divine authorship were emphasized, the
revelation of Jesus Christ as the transforming event in light of which the Old Testament
should be read could be neglected. Stress on Scripture as a covenant document which
renders a relatively determinate meaning might neglect the unique narrative structure of
Scripture which testifies to God‟s ongoing action in history. Only if Vanhoozer‟s two
proposals of figural reading and divine authorship are held as complementary can the
uniqueness and authority of Scripture be simultaneously demonstrated.

3. Conclusion and Remaining Challenges
Vanhoozer‟s later work is devoted to the development of a First Theology which
understands God‟s Being as Pure, self-communicative Act, therefore understands all
reality in light of God‟s economic self-communication in Christ and Scripture. This
model allows Vanhoozer to establish rules for reading Scripture which grant it authority
over the reading community and provide a philosophically interesting, theologically
significant proposal for developing an account of God as communicative act in light of
Scripture‟s many speech acts. Yet Vanhoozer‟s later model also brings out a number of
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significant difficulties which must be resolved if his project is to be completed. This
section will identify four persistent difficulties in Vanhoozer‟s later work which will be
discussed later in the dissertation.
Theological Presuppositions, or Disclosive Encounter? For Vanhoozer, the ability
to read Scripture correctly is largely a matter of being able to employ the correct
theological presuppositions to a literal reading of the Scriptural texts. Whereas Frei
focuses on the realistic rendering of the text as disclosive to the reader in a straightforward way and Tracy focuses on the encounter between reader and text which pushes
the reader to a new existential possibility, Vanhoozer focuses on the theological
presuppositions of the reader, so that only those readers who have the right
presuppositions concerning Scripture will be able to read. Reading the Scriptures rightly
requires several presuppositions: God can communicate to human beings; God did so
definitively in Christ; the canon is taken up into God‟s self-communicative action;
consequently, only these texts should be considered divine discourse. After this First
Theology is presupposed, the interpreter may go on to employ general hermeneutical
rules to Scripture in order to understand the diverse communicative acts that take place
by means of the different genres. For Vanhoozer, doctrinal categories replace literary
theory as the determinate element in Scriptural interpretation. With this new proposal,
Vanhoozer‟s earlier tension between reading within the Church and outside the Church
simply disappears. If the interpreter reads correctly (i.e. with the right First Theology),
she is in the Church. Only believers can read Scripture rightly, because only they are
able to accept, by faith, the proper stance toward Scripture.
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This First Theology shifts Vanhoozer‟s hermeneutics of Scripture explicitly from
the realm of “nature” to the realm of “grace.”533 When Vanhoozer speaks of “theological
interpretation” in his later work, he always associates it with “divine action.” While it is
right, Vanhoozer believes, to explore meaning behind, in, and in front of the text, secular
hermeneutics “stops short of a properly theological criticism to the extent that it brackets
out a consideration of divine action.”534 To attend seriously to the subject matter of
Scripture means establishing a First Theology which necessarily breaks general
hermeneutical rules.535 Theological interpretation, then, begins with a preunderstanding
of God and God‟s action that causes the interpreter to read the texts along a certain
trajectory—remythologizing instead of demythologizing and participatory response
instead of subjecting text to community norms. As we will see in the next chapter, De
Lubac will add an additional dimension to this discussion, as he emphasizes that even the
right theological presuppositions cannot, by themselves, lead to right reading without the
process of conversion on the part of the reader. For de Lubac, theological
presuppositions must lead to participation in the Mystery. Hence de Lubac will go
further in grounding Scriptural reading in theology rather than literary theory.
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followed the same hermeneutical rules because God grounds all communication. In his later work,
Scripture is unique because it is God‟s speaking action. In fact, Vanhoozer (ibid, 22), claims that reading
to understand God can be considered the only legitimate primary purpose of Scripture: “the principal
interests of the Bible‟s authors, of the text itself, and of the original community of readers was theological:
reading the Scriptures therefore meant coming to hear God‟s word and to know God better.”
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Does God Still Speak? While Vanhoozer provides a strong argument for
understanding God as able to speak and having spoken, Vanhoozer is often unclear about
how God continues to speak. A rather strong tension exists throughout Vanhoozer‟s later
work between a very broad understanding of authorship in which authoring refers to the
entire economy of redemption, and a very narrow view of authorship in which only
revelatory events in history and Scripture are considered God‟s speech acts. Overall, it
appears that Vanhoozer is pressed to the narrow view of authorship, in which God‟s
speaking in Scripture is an entire past action, for three reasons. First, Vanhoozer spends a
great deal of his work in dialogue with Barth, attempting to expand Barth‟s understanding
of God‟s speaking action in Christ to include both Christ and Scripture as acts of speech.
The underlying assumption for Vanhoozer is that God‟s speaking action has taken place
in the past and is both complete and determinate in meaning (both in Christ and in
Scripture). In this sense, speech acts and revelation are virtually synonymous for
Vanhoozer. Second, Vanhoozer‟s whole argument about the supervening of divine
illocutions on human illocutions to create a canon with determinate meaning is only
intelligible if God‟s speaking action ceased with the closure of the canon. God‟s ongoing
communication to human beings today must be distinguished from God‟s speech acts,
because the latter can be understood determinately in the context of the canon alone.
Both revelation and speech acts, then, ceased with the closure of the canon. Third, the
limitation of speaking to God‟s actions in history and the canonical texts is also necessary
to safeguard Vanhoozer‟s claim that Scriptural meaning is determinate. It appears that
God‟s speech acts count as speech acts precisely because they are determinate in
meaning, and hence complete as acts. Vanhoozer is committed to showing that because
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meaning resides in the text itself, God‟s speaking to human beings has a determinate
meaning. 536 The meaning of the text, then, must be closely associated with God‟s speech
acts, and must be distinguished from God‟s ongoing communication. 537 Consequently,
God does not speak today, as that speaking action was completed with the closure of the
canon.
Placing God‟s speaking action entirely in the past, however, does not sit well with
Vanhoozer‟s later project. Vanhoozer‟s purpose in developing a metaphysics of God as
communicative Being is not simply to construct yet another doctrine of inspiration in the
past, but to show that God continues to communicate to believers through Scripture
today. Here a distinction, never really drawn out by Vanhoozer, between „speaking‟ and
„communicating‟ becomes clearer. The ongoing action of the Holy Spirit is
communicative, but cannot be considered speaking. Vanhoozer insists,
The Spirit‟s role is not to go beyond Scripture, adding new words, but to enable
the church to perceive and respond to the words that are already there. The Spirit
is the advocate of the word written, the executor of the will of the Father and the
Son. The Spirit is the efficacy of divine canonical discourse, the indispensable
means through which the triune communicative action achieves its goal in the
lives of believers. 538
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The Spirit does not add new words, but “enables,” “advocates,” “executes,”
“effects,” and is the “means through which” God‟s speech is conveyed to human beings.
Vanhoozer admits that the Spirit communicates through a number of channels, including
sacraments, the leadership of the Church, lives of the saints, etc., yet God‟s speaking
action as illocutionary supervening on human speech acts, is unique to Scripture. 539
Ongoing communication is the work of the Holy Spirit and is mediated in many ways, yet
it is not determinate in meaning in the same way that revelation (God‟s acts in history and
Scripture) are determinate in meaning. This ongoing communication between God and
reader must be developed further to account for the whole action of God in using
Scripture.540
Does sola Scriptura Work? Vanhoozer continually insists that authority ought to
be granted to the Scripture over the Church. Vanhoozer‟s concern with postliberals is
what he perceives to be a willingness to grant authority to the Church over Scripture. In
fact, the very equating of Scripture with revelation is very closely tied to the question of
authority. For Vanhoozer, it is God‟s speaking action that establishes Scripture‟s
authority. As a result, Vanhoozer does not feel comfortable extending that speaking
action beyond Scripture, even though his whole project seeks to portray a God who
communicates with believers on an ongoing basis. Vanhoozer attempts to expose,
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through the use of speech-act theory, a neglect on the part of postliberals to adequately
show the relationship between Scripture and Church in the economy of redemption. Yet
at the same time, Vanhoozer‟s whole discussion of authorship rests on the assumption
that the Church has acknowledged God as author of Scripture. Vanhoozer must, then,
discuss the place of both Scripture and the Church within the context of the divine
economy. I will show in the next chapter that the relationship between Scripture and
revelation can only be addressed within the context of the whole economy of redemption.
What Unifies Scripture—The Event of Christ or Divine Illocutions? Vanhoozer‟s
construction of a divine supervening illocution seeks to establish a unity of the canon at
the level of the text more than at the level of events of salvation history. Focus is on
God‟s speaking which unifies the canon into one speech-act, rather than the revelation of
Jesus Christ which unifies the events of both Old and New Testament. Vanhoozer does
at the level of illocutionary stances almost exactly what de Lubac does at the level of
events. Vanhoozer claims that God‟s supervening speech-action unifies the meaning of
all other speech-acts to God‟s own speech at the level of the whole canon (hence the
canon becomes the principle of meaning by which to understand the individual parts).
De Lubac will claim that the revelation of Jesus Christ unifies all Scriptural events and
allows the whole of Scripture to be read in light of this principle of meaning. The focus
for Vanhoozer is on text rather than event, and literary theory rather than history. We
will see in the next chapter that this decision between text and event has significant
consequences for the project of both Vanhoozer and de Lubac. De Lubac‟s focus on
history leaves his literary treatment of the text underdeveloped, and Vanhoozer‟s focus
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on the text leaves his understanding of the radical newness of Christ in history
underdeveloped.

III. Ecclesiology: The Church as a Response to Scripture
Vanhoozer‟s whole project of establishing Scripture as God‟s speech act,
articulating all Scripture as covenant, rehabilitating sola scriptura, distinguishing
between Scripture‟s mission and tradition‟s commission, and appealing to a fixed
meaning of the biblical texts, emphasizes his clear priority of Scriptural authority over the
authority of Church and tradition. Vanhoozer summarizes that, “As a work of the Spirit,
tradition plays the role of moon to Scripture‟s sun: what light, and authority, tradition
bears, it does so by virtue of reflecting the light of the Son that shines forth from the
canon.”541 Though both Scripture as mission and Church as commissioned response are
necessary parts in the economy of redemption, Scripture is always given authority over
the Church. In Vanhoozer‟s structuring of the economy, the Church derives its authority
only from its faithful response to Scripture.
Like Frei, Vanhoozer‟s project is driven by his persistent concern about the
location of Scriptural authority. Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on the authority of Scripture over
the Church is really intended to be a manifesto for articulating the authority of God over
the Church, and thereby for chastening readers to attend submissively to God‟s
authoritative speech. Yet Vanhoozer‟s either/or schema comes at a high price, as his
denial of the authority of the Church prevents him from adequately describing the Church
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as a theological reality. This underdeveloped ecclesiology, in turn, opens a number of
hermeneutical difficulties as Vanhoozer seeks to describe the relationship between
Scripture and Church in the economy.

A. The Identity of the Church: An Evangelical Ecclesiology
Vanhoozer‟s claim that Scripture is constitutive of the Church has its roots in
Vanhoozer‟s Evangelical ecclesiology which posits a strong distinction between the
visible, present Church and the invisible, eschatological Church. Vanhoozer bases his
argument that God does not normatively speak in tradition on the present incompleteness
of the Church.542 Scripture is authoritative because it is complete, while the visible
Church, because it is still being led toward its eschatological fullness, cannot be
authoritative in the same way. Vanhoozer claims that, “Ecclesiology cannot be first
theology because the church enjoys only the first fruits of its salvation. As an
eschatological reality, it is indeed already in union with Christ, but not yet completely
so.”543 Since the canonical Scriptures are already complete in content, Vanhoozer feels
that they naturally should be given priority over a presently incomplete, sinful Church.
The only authority the Church can claim for itself is its responsive participation in the
economy of redemption, and this must continually be checked by some criterion which is
authoritative over the Church. 544 This strong distinction between visible and invisible
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Church makes it quite difficult to show how the visible Church has a productive role in
the economy of redemption.
Following Gerhard Ebeling, Vanhoozer equates tradition with the history of
biblical interpretation, so that “church tradition” is defined as “the embodied social
practice of biblical interpretation” and hence always “stands under the canon viewed as a
dominical and spiritual practice of administering the covenant.”545 The Church, then, is
constituted by Scripture, and the Church becomes the Church to the extent that it
participates rightly in response to the mission of Scripture. The Church, for Vanhoozer,
is “a „creature of the word‟—brought into being and shaped by the Spirit‟s ministry of the
word.”546 The Church, then, appears to be a group of individuals who are individually
and only then corporately called to respond to the Scriptures. It is the association of
individuals responding to God who make up the Church. This focus on the Church as an
association of individuals makes it difficult for Vanhoozer to describe the visible Church
as a theological reality.
Yet Vanhoozer does try to give an account of the Church as a theological reality.
Vanhoozer rejects the theological formulation of Church as sacrament, instead suggesting

fiction… Cultures…are as susceptible to deconstruction as are texts.” Only Scripture, because of its unique
role in the divine economy, can avoid deconstruction and stand as a check to corporate pride.
545

Ibid, 114. Vanhoozer (“The Spirit of Understanding,” 222), is very clear that Ebeling‟s
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scriptura is needed to preserve just this distinction. Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 235, 418), quotes
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that the Church “imitates” and “signifies” grace. 547 In fact, Vanhoozer rejects both a
description of the Church as “mediation” of grace and a description of the Church as a
“memorial” of Christ, instead opting for a description of the Church as a “mimesis” of the
Gospel.548 Vanhoozer rejects mediation because it gives the Church too much
sacramental value. Vanhoozer specifically rejects any ecclesiology in which the church
is considered a “sign/presence of the triune God,” where “ecclesial words and actions
mediate the grace of God.”549 This, he thinks, would give the Church an initiatory
mission analogous to the mission of Scripture. Yet Vanhoozer also rejects a description
of the Church as a memorial because it seems to deny the active role of the Spirit in the
Church. Vanhoozer consequently seeks a middle ground in mimesis: “The form of the
church‟s fitting participation in the drama of redemption is precisely that of mimesis: an
imitation of Paul, of God, of Christ.”550 Imitating is distinctly a mission of response, and
consequently has less authority than mediation in the economy of redemption. For
Vanhoozer, the Church‟s task is that of “performing the word in the power of the Spirit,”
and “present[ing] the body of Christ.”551 Once again, Vanhoozer feels more comfortable
with the terms performing and presenting, as they indicate a responsive role only,
whereas mediating suggests a mission closer to that granted to Scripture. Proposing the
model of imitation (mimesis), Vanhoozer feels, will provide the Church a participatory
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role in redemption, yet will keep that action from being confused with God‟s prior
initiatory action.552 Drama, then, provides a helpful paradigm for showing that the
Church is responsive to the divine and Scriptural missions yet actively participatory in
them.553

B. The Relationship between Scripture and Church in the Economy
Vanhoozer‟s Evangelical ecclesiology emphasizes a one-directional authority
from Scripture to Church. Vanhoozer‟s later work does not place authority in the literary
construction of the text itself, but in God‟s supervening speech acts which establish the
biblical texts as Scripture. As Vanhoozer describes both Scripture and Church as
extensions of the economic missions of the Triune God, Vanhoozer proposes a
structuring of the economy in which Scripture is given an active mission and the Church
is given a responsive mission.

1. The Active Mission of Scripture in the Economy

552

Vanhoozer sees “imitation” as a middle ground between claiming the Church is a simple
(almost passive) remembrance of Christ, and a channel of mediation of Christ. In fact, Vanhoozer‟s model
of drama attempts to incorporate “imitating” as an alternative to the traditional divide between memorial
and sacrament in sacramental theology. Hence Vanhoozer (ibid, 409), claims, “As celebration, the church
is not a literal repetition of the body of Christ, nor a sacrament, nor an empty memorial, but an active
mimesis.” Vanhoozer‟s treatment of sacraments covers only three pages, and unfortunately the focus is on
defining them rather than showing how they are an essential and unique part of God‟s self-communicative
action. Sacramental theology would seem to be a very productive area for developing a theology of
communicative action, and a greater development of this branch of theology would likely enhance
Vanhoozer‟s project.
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Whereas Kelsey described First Theology as the theologian‟s prior decision about
how to use Scripture, Vanhoozer wishes to establish the authority of Scripture based on
God‟s use of these texts.554 Vanhoozer argues, “What becomes paramount is God‟s use
of the biblical texts…God, in and through the human authors, has an ongoing speaking
part.”555 The Church, says Vanhoozer, can take responsibility neither for the
establishment of the canon nor for establishing the literal sense as authoritative. This is
because “it is not the church‟s use but the triune God‟s use of Scripture that makes it
canon. That the church recognizes the canon authenticates the church rather than the
canon, which needs no ecclesial approval to be what it is: the Word of God.”556
Ultimately, Scripture must be understood as God‟s communication rather than human
communication about God. Vanhoozer explains,
The crucial point is that Scripture is holy (set apart) and authoritative because it is
ingredient in the economy of communication, that is, in the way in which the
triune God ministers the Word of God in the power of the Spirit…Scripture is a
creaturely medium taken up as an „extension of Christ‟s active, communicative
presence in the Spirit‟s power through the commissioned apostolic testimony.‟
As such, Scripture is a means of ongoing triune communication by which the
church follows her master‟s voice… 557
While Scripture is a “creaturely medium,” it is ultimately more a species of the
economic triune communicative action than a product of human discourse. While the
focal point of the economy of redemption “consists in what God has done and is doing in
Christ, the Scriptures, as testimony to this act, are themselves caught up in it and become
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a means for God for building up his church in Christ through the power of the Spirit.” 558
Realizing that Scripture is finally an act of God in the economy of communication
requires a re-estimation of the human language of Scripture. For Vanhoozer, “The
human statements about God‟s action and passion are not accommodations of a rich
reality to poor words, but rather an elevation of human words to divine discourse: these
human texts have been set apart as sanctified servants of divine revelation.” 559 As a
result, “In attending closely to Scripture we not only read about God but confront God in
one mode of his self-presentation.”560 The unique mode of self-presentation here seems
to be dependent on Vanhoozer‟s claim that Scripture uniquely contains God‟s complete,
determinate speech acts. The Scriptures are unique precisely because God uses them in a
unique way.
Vanhoozer develops an argument for the place of Scripture in the economy of
redemption by comparing the mission of Scripture to the mission of Son and Spirit. God
exists as self-communicative Act, eternally communicating among the Persons of the
immanent Trinity. Yet, Vanhoozer claims, “When directed ad extra, the communicative
action of God is perhaps better termed mission. Hence the economy of communication is
ultimately missional: divine communicative action involves the „sendings‟ (missio) of
Son and Spirit.”561 Vanhoozer proposes that Scripture is given a mission for redemption
analogous to the missions of the triune Persons, and that “Scripture‟s mission is tied up
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with the Trinitarian missions of the Son and Spirit.”562 Scripture is sent to the Church so
that the Church may respond, just as Son and Spirit were sent for the purpose of
redemption. As a result, “Scripture does not simply recount action; it is part of the
action…it contributes to the realization of God‟s purposes for the world…Scripture is
thus a collection of statements—and promises, commands, warnings, and so on—all on
their respective missions.” 563 This claim locates Scripture in the economy of redemption,
and it establishes the priority of Scripture over the Church as Scripture is ultimately an
action of God (not of the Church).
For Vanhoozer, everything included in the economy of redemption has a
particular mission.564 Since both Church and Scripture participate in the economy of
redemption, each has its own respective mission which is essential to that economy. 565
Yet two distinct kinds of mission must be distinguished. Vanhoozer calls these “mission”
and “commission.” Mission is initiative, while commission is responsive. Since the
Triune Persons extend themselves in economic mission, and because Scripture is caught
up in that action and likewise sent, the mission of Scripture is an initiative kind of
mission. At the same time, those to whom the missions of the Son, Spirit and Scripture
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are sent are themselves called to participate in mission, but this is a “commissioned”
mission, a mission of response. 566 Vanhoozer concludes, “The Bible is thus the locus of
God‟s ongoing communicative action in the church and in the world…The mission of the
church, and therefore of theology, is to participate in and continue the joint mission of
Word and Spirit.”567 Yet, while each of these kinds of mission is essential, each does not
have equal authority. 568 Initiating mission (God‟s initial act) always has authority over
commissioned responsive mission (the effect that God‟s initial act produces). The
essential thing to notice here is that the mission of Scripture is located on the side of
God‟s self-communicative act rather than on the side of participated human response.
Scripture has priority over the Church because Scripture is mission sent by God to the
Church, and hence the Church‟s mission is constituted in response to that mission.
Failure to locate the place Scripture‟s mission among the various missions of the
divine economy, Vanhoozer feels, is a mistake of most modern theology. Vanhoozer
suggests that both “Chicago” and “Yale” go wrong precisely by seeing Scripture more as
a response to revelation than as God‟s communicative act. Vanhoozer suggests that
Ricoeur was correct to propose a “Copernican revolution” in biblical interpretation which
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would render the reader a submissive learner of the unique subject matter of Scripture.
However, Vanhoozer feels that Ricoeur was unable to accomplish this project because
Ricoeur could not precisely articulate how the biblical text is „of God.‟ Vanhoozer
claims,
Ricoeur…fails to consider the possibility that the Bible as a unified canonical
whole may itself ultimately count as a divine communicative work, in which case
the self-naming of God would not be limited merely to one or two instances, such
as the burning bush of Exodus 3, but would comprise the entire length and
breadth of the canon. God would therefore be not only the subject of the biblical
mythos, but also in some sense its author.569
To complete Ricoeur‟s Copernican revolution and articulate the correct relation
between Scripture and Church, the theologian must go beyond a claim about the
uniqueness of the subject matter (i.e. these texts name God, and hence may invert general
hermeneutical rules) to a claim that God has used this text in a unique way (these texts
are caught up in God‟s self-communication).570 Scriptural language is not a human
projection about God, but is rather God‟s true and real self-revelation.
It is this location of Scripture as active mission in the economy that reestablishes
the principle of sola scriptura in Vanhoozer‟s later work. Vanhoozer suggests that only
by returning to the traditional Protestant doctrine of sola scriptura will resolve the crisis
of authority in the Church, because only this doctrine will allow God to use Scripture
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against the Church. 571 Sola scriptura, then, operates both as a principle of authority
which, when recognized by the Church, in conjunction with a First Theology, will
conform the Church‟s concrete practices toward Scripture.572

2. The Passive Mission of the Church in the Economy
In Vanhoozer‟s articulation of the relationship between Scripture and Church,
then, the Church has an actively responsive role in the economy of redemption.
Vanhoozer clarifies this relationship between Scripture and Church by claiming,
The human readers of Scripture are indeed active, but in a peculiarly passive way.
The Spirit catches readers up into the theo-dramatic action not by inspiring but
illumining them, enabling them to read the Bible in order to hear and do the
Word…The church is ultimately not the author but the passive recipient of the
canonical Scriptures…573
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Vanhoozer (ibid, 17), claims, “The supreme norm for church practice is Scripture itself:
not Scripture as used by the church but Scripture as used by God, even, or perhaps especially, when such
use is over against the church.” Notice that this Protestant doctrine is simply used by Vanhoozer, ibid, as
a theoretical construct to locate authority. It does not mean Scripture alone, but is “a responsive,
directional practice of the Church… namely, the practice of corresponding in one‟s speech and action to the
word of God.”
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Vanhoozer (“Scripture and Tradition,” Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ed., The Cambridge
Companion to Postmodern Theology, Cambridge Companions to Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 166), claims that sola scriptura means that “Scripture is a polyphonic testimony to
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What is important to notice here is that there are only two options; the Church is
either “passive recipient” or “author.” Since the Church is not author of Scripture, the
Church must only have a mission of response to Scripture‟s author. This structuring of
the Scripture/Church relationship sets the stage for Vanhoozer‟s discussion of drama and
performance. While Scripture alone is authoritative for the Church, Vanhoozer will
suggest that the Scripture is incomplete without the responsive mission of the Church.
Since the very mission of Scripture is to “form a new people,” this mission cannot be
fulfilled without the incorporation of the Church into a commissioned mission. 574 At this
point Vanhoozer agrees with Gadamer that “only the performance brings out everything
that is in the play….To be occasional is essential to it: the occasion of the performance
makes it speak and brings out what is in it.” 575 Yet far from generating meaning in
conversation with Scripture, Vanhoozer emphasizes that performance is a response to
Scripture, and cannot be authoritative over Scripture nor affect the meaning of Scripture.
Vanhoozer suggests that “„performing texts‟ may be the best means for reframing
traditional discussions concerning the Scripture/tradition relationship,” so that the
necessity of the Church can be acknowledged in a way that safeguards the authority of
Scripture.576 The Church, then, is called the “theater of the gospel,” the location where
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the Gospel drama is played out, while those incorporated into the Church are “the
company of performers” who can “function as a „hermeneutic of the gospel.‟” 577
Vanhoozer further clarifies his distinction between importance and authority, suggesting
that “script and performance are equally necessary, though not equally authoritative.
Biblical script without ecclesial performance is empty; ecclesial performance without
biblical script is blind.”578 While both have essential missions in the fulfillment of the
economy of redemption, Scripture always has the authoritative role and the Church the
responsive role.
Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on the plurality of literary genres unified as a divine
speech act provides a further argument for the passive mission of the Church in response
to the active mission of Scripture. In dialogue with postliberals, Vanhoozer agrees that
literary genres are social constructions built in response to community needs. Genres are
“communicative practices, rule-governed literary forms that authors employ to engage
reality and interact intelligibly with others.”579 Genres provide the agreed-upon structure
for communication to occur in social situations, and new genres must arise in response to
new social realities. Vanhoozer writes,
In short: genres are bound up with the aims and purposes of beings who act and
react within social situations in certain rule-governed ways to accomplish certain
text. Quite the opposite. Vanhoozer‟s whole project of theo-drama seeks to overcome the “ugly ditch”
between theory and practice in order to show how contemporary doctrine can flow from Scripture itself.
Because Vanhoozer (Ibid, 16), feels “the main purpose of doctrine is to equip Christians to understand and
participate in the action of the principal players (namely, Father, Son, and Spirit),” the model of drama
“overcomes the theory/praxis dichotomy…when it insists on audience participation.” The Church‟s
responsive role is indeed quite active, even if it lacks authority.
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kinds of communicative objectives. Literature falls into generic types precisely
because the situations humans find themselves in often recur…each [literary
genre] makes a distinct social contribution. 580
In Scripture, literary genres are the product of a “covenant form of life,” literary
forms which establish possibilities and boundaries for communication in a new social
reality. The best example of this is the production of the literary genre, Gospel, which
was an attempt to respond to the new event of Christ.581 Ultimately, because “Covenant
is the social situation to which the various language games of Scripture broadly
correspond…the many canonical practices represent and render the real in Christ, the
shape, and hope, of glory.”582 God, then, can communicate the many aspects of the
covenant to the Church by means of the many genres.
Yet whereas postliberals propose that the Church establishes the “language
games” by which Scriptural interpretation can take place, Vanhoozer argues that
canonical Scripture, not Church practice, has already established those rules. On
Vanhoozer‟s account, there is simply no need to start from community practice, because
Christians already have, in the canon, the authoritative means to develop a Christian form
of life.583 Thus “the uses to which Christians should attend to learn the meaning and
correct grammar of „God‟ are the patterns of usages (practices) in the canon itself.
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Christian theology is, or should be, ruled by a properly canonical grammar.”584 The very
genres of Scripture, as the social forms of Christian identity, are able to form community
practice. Scripture takes the active mission in establishing the form of the Church, which
responds in passive mission.
In Vanhoozer‟s later work, the Spirit is the one who links both the authoritative
mission of the Scriptures and the responsive mission of the Church by bringing about the
perlocutionary effect of the fixed meaning of Scripture. It is the particular role of the
Spirit to communicate the determinate, fixed covenant message of Scripture to the
Church, and to bring about the intended response. 585 As a result, the Church can only
claim relative authority to the extent that it can demonstrate interpretive competence.
Clearly, this argument for associating the Spirit with the perlocutionary effect of the text
has not changed from Vanhoozer‟s early work. What has developed, however, is the
emphasis on God‟s communication to the Church instead of the human author‟s
communication to individual readers. Vanhoozer argues that the missions of Word and
Spirit must be closely connected, because “Word without Spirit is powerless; Spirit
without Word is directionless…The canon is the Spirit‟s chosen means to mediate the
covenant and foster the communion that obtains between Christ and the church.”586 By
locating the places of God, Scripture, and Church in the economy of redemption, then,
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Vanhoozer is able to show the necessity of the Church for completing Scripture, even as
he shows the necessity of the Scriptures in constituting the Church.

IV. Vanhoozer‟s Contributions to the Scripture in the Economy
Vanhoozer‟s later work provides a substantial theological proposal for
understanding Scripture which moves beyond the impasse between Frei and Tracy.
Vanhoozer moves beyond the impasse both by articulating an argument for God‟s use of
the Scriptures in the economy of redemption, and by placing both Scriptures and the
Church in the broader context of the divine economy. Discussions about methods for
reading are set within a structure of the economy of redemption in which theological
presuppositions form a foundation for reading. The Scriptural texts are unique as they
are uniquely used by God and as they relate uniquely to the Church. Vanhoozer‟s later
work advances the discussion between Tracy and Frei by easing the persistent difficulties
of locating authority (Frei) and explaining disclosure in multiplicity of genres (Tracy).
Authority, Vanhoozer argues, is located in the literal reading of these texts because God
has used the plain sense to communicate plainly to readers. At the same time, Vanhoozer
shows, the various genres of Scripture do have unique disclosive potential precisely
because God has chosen just these forms of communication for self-mediation to readers.
Vanhoozer‟s construction of the divine economy as a series of missions is a
particularly fruitful development in the discussion. Vanhoozer shows that in the
economy of redemption, God exists as self-communicative Act, Scripture exists as
communicative act sent on economic mission through which the Word and Spirit carry
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out their respective missions today, and the Church exists as Christ and Spirit-led
responder to the mission of Scripture through the work of the Spirit who makes the
Scriptures effective in the Church. Whether or not one is convinced by Vanhoozer‟s
series of arguments to establish the authority of Scripture (that God is Author of
Scripture, that only sola scriptura will solve the crisis of authority in the Church, that the
Church‟s mission is always responsive), Vanhoozer‟s analysis of the various elements of
the divine economy provides valuable resources for discussing the interpretation of
Scripture. From beginning to end Vanhoozer‟s project has been more about establishing
the proper theological presuppositions necessary for reading Scripture than it has been
about the development of a particular method of reading. What Scripture is and what
Scripture does has inevitable consequences for how Scripture is read, and this
understanding of Scripture can only take place within the context of the divine economy.
Hence Vanhoozer has shown that the relationship between Scripture and Church is
essential to hermeneutical method.
At the same time, it is not at all clear that Vanhoozer has rightly articulated the
relationship between Scripture and Church. Vanhoozer‟s strong “either/or” language
creates significant deficiencies which weaken the strength of the overall argument.
Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on the completeness of Scripture and the incompleteness of the
visible Church causes Vanhoozer to take a stance of continual suspicion toward the
Church and trust toward Scripture. While Vanhoozer discusses the relationship between
various parts of the economy of redemption, an apologetic for sola scriptura often
overwhelms substantial ecclesiological reflection. Here I will highlight several such
tensions.
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The first difficulty concerns Vanhoozer‟s articulation of the relationship between
Scripture and Church as each is “sent” on an economic mission. It remains somewhat
unclear in Vanhoozer‟s account why the mission of Scripture must be placed on the side
of God‟s initiation (and hence authoritative) while the Church must be only placed on the
side of commissioned response (and hence submissive). From a historical standpoint,
those who wrote the biblical texts and those who assembled the canon appear to have
thought themselves to be responding to revelation as they wrote.587 God guided the
process of this human response and then incorporated Scripture into a mission in the
economy of redemption. It is difficult to see why the Church should not likewise be
considered as also being incorporated into the active, mediating mission of God.
Although one may grant that “[n]either tradition nor practice can be the supreme norm
for Christian theology, because each is susceptible to error,”588 this also does not
necessarily prohibit the Church from also being caught up into the divine economy and
also used to mediate truth. If God could use human words of human authors (susceptible
to error), and incorporate them into an active economic mission in Scripture, it appears at
least possible that the Church could also be so used.589 One of the most serious
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Vanhoozer posits. Some of this ground has already been claimed by Wolterstorff, Lindbeck, and Childs,
all of whom have said they could accept some claim to divine discourse in Scripture, and yet are also
willing to grant a greater amount of interpretative authority to the Church than Vanhoozer is willing to do.
All three agree that some claim to divine discourse is a helpful articulation of Scripture‟s authority, yet
Vanhoozer thinks all three give too much authority to the Church. Their granting of interpretive authority
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oversights here is Vanhoozer‟s lack of attention to the process of canonization.
Vanhoozer‟s claim for divine authorship has been that the biblical texts become God‟s
speech acts as God‟s illocutionary stance supervenes over the whole collection of texts.
Individual genres, illocutionary stances and texts, on this account, cannot be considered
God‟s authorship, no matter how indispensable to the illumination of God‟s speech act
they have become. Yet it was the Church which was used by God to collect just the right
set of texts so that God‟s supervening illocution could become known. As a result, the
Church must have a more active role in the economy; to some extent it has the role of
constituting the Scriptures. The difficulty with Vanhoozer‟s construction is not his
promotion of sola scriptura as a criterion of authority over the Church, but that
Vanhoozer simply does not sufficiently explore the nature of the Church as a theological
reality. Vanhoozer simply follows his Evangelical tradition in emphasizing the
distinction between the visible Church and the invisible Church, and then concludes that
the visible Church, being incomplete, can only be a mission of response.
A second, closely related difficulty regards the scope of Vanhoozer‟s
ecclesiology. Nearly all of Vanhoozer‟s ecclesiology is worked out in dialogue with
postliberal theologians, especially Lindbeck. In this sense, Vanhoozer‟s ecclesiology
may be best appropriated as an apologetic against misbalancing the economy of
redemption in favor of Church practice. As such, Vanhoozer‟s project articulates a
helpful argument for interpretive humility and the continual chastening of readers. 590 Yet

to the Church is expressed variously through a doctrine of providence (Childs), a cultural-linguistic
understanding of doctrine (Lindbeck), or a second hermeneutic (Wolterstorff).
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Interestingly, Vanhoozer (Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, 22),
claims, “A theological interpretation of the Bible is more likely to be critical of readers than of biblical
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one theological reduction must not be countered by another. The reduction of Scripture
to the Church cannot be corrected by a reduction of ecclesiology to elevate Scripture.
Thus when Vanhoozer writes, “This emphasis on the community‟s use of the biblical text
tends to obscure the question of God‟s use of the text,” he may be quite correct in the
contemporary climate; yet, to dismiss community use in favor of authorial discourse may
be to accept one aspect of the economy of redemption to the exclusion of another. 591
Both Frei and Tracy are also critical of what they believe is Lindbeck‟s wholesale
appropriation of authority to tradition, and they all pursue ways of establishing Scripture
as a normative authority for the Church. If the only two ways to express the relationship
between Scripture and Church were Lindbeck‟s linguistic postliberal method and
Vanhoozer‟s theo-dramatic sola scriptura method, there may be compelling reasons to
side with Vanhoozer. Indeed, the Scriptures must be allowed some critical authority over
the Church. Yet Vanhoozer does not enter into serious dialogue with any Catholic
theologian on the topic of authoritative interpretation, and his overall arguments seem to
suggest that the Church simply cannot ever make an authoritative interpretation of
Scripture. It is one thing to say that, “Church authorities do not have the mandate either
to define doctrine that runs counter to Scripture or to invent new truth,” and quite another
to say that the Church lacks authority to “preserve doctrine…and to pronounce doctrinal
definitions of the faith” because Scripture stands as an authority over the Church. 592

authors or biblical texts…A properly theological criticism will therefore seek to do justice to the priority of
God. One way to do so is to guard against idols: images of God manufactured by the interpretative
communities.”
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202

Vanhoozer does not adequately distinguish between these two. Since Vanhoozer does
very little to examine the options beyond a standard account of Evangelical and
postliberal ecclesiology, it will be difficult to find in Vanhoozer the resources to establish
a far-reaching, constructive proposal for the Church‟s use of Scripture in its responsive
mission in the economy.
The next chapter will consider the work of Henri de Lubac, who shares
Vanhoozer‟s desire to locate Scriptural interpretation in the economy of redemption.
Though their hermeneutical projects vary greatly, the chief difference between
Vanhoozer and de Lubac will not be found in their method, but in the different way in
which each understands the Church to relate to Scripture in the economy of redemption.
As de Lubac provides a more thorough description of the theological nature of the
Church, it will be possible to identify helpful theological resources by which to advance a
more complete theological interpretation of Scripture.
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CHAPTER 3:
HENRI DE LUBAC: SCRIPTURE AS MEDIATION OF MYSTERY
I. Introduction: Placing de Lubac in Discussion with Tracy, Frei and Vanhoozer
In the first chapter I suggested that impasses in the discussion between Tracy and
Frei are largely a consequence of their nearly exclusive focus on the relationship between
text and reader. The chapter concluded that Frei‟s central difficulty of deciding whether
to locate Scripture‟s authority in the text or in the Church, and Tracy‟s central difficulty
of showing that the identity of Jesus Christ is the singular subject matter of Scripture,
cannot be resolved without placing hermeneutical discussions in the broader context of
the economy of redemption. The second chapter examined the work of Kevin Vanhoozer
to show how his explicit articulation of Scripture‟s role in the economy of redemption
provides theological resources which have potential to advance the discussion on method.
The chapter concluded that while Vanhoozer has rightly attempted to shift hermeneutical
discussions beyond the relationship between text and reader, Vanhoozer‟s one-sided
insistence on the authority of Scripture over the Church has prevented him from
completing his hermeneutical project. This chapter will examine the project of Henri de
Lubac in order to show how a different way of structuring the relationship between
Scripture and Church in the economy of redemption may advance hermeneutical
discussions between Frei and Tracy. This chapter will suggest that de Lubac provides
two theological insights which can help interpreters move beyond certain impasses. First,
de Lubac has explicitly identified the central hermeneutical issue in a Christian reading of
Scripture as the movement from text to spiritual reality in such a way that the relationship
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between Christ, Scripture and Church become visible. This concern, I have shown, is
central to Tracy and Frei, although the philosophical tools they employ prevent them
from not explicitly identifying this hermeneutical movement. Second, de Lubac has
shown the intrinsic relationship between Scripture and Church in the economy of
redemption in such a way that eases the tension of locating authority in either Scripture or
Church. De Lubac‟s structuring of the relationship of the Church to Scripture provides a
way to move beyond Vanhoozer‟s investment of authority in sola Scriptura and Frei‟s
investment of authority in the community consensus of the Church. These two insights
will be explored within the context of de Lubac‟s overall project.
Ressourcement Theology: De Lubac‟s own theological project is best located in
the Ressourcement movement of French theology.593 Although labeled “La nouvelle
théologie” by its opponents, the movement intended to return Christian theology to riches
of Christian tradition which had been lost by a separation of biblical studies, historical
theology and systematic theology. 594 D‟Ambrosio describes the movement as a “creative
hermeneutical exercise in which the „sources‟ of Christian faith were „reinterrogated‟
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Other theologians commonly classified in this movement are Jean Danielou, Yves Congar,
and Marie-Cominique Chenu, Gaston Fessard, Henri Bouillard, and Pierre Tielhard de Chardin (see Wood,
Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 6).
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It appears to be Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (“La nouvelle théologie ou va-t-elle?”
Anglicum 23 (1946), 126-45), who first applied this term to de Lubac, and associated the movement with
the philosophy of Maurice Blondel (see Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 6, and Marcellino G.
D'Ambrosio, Henri De Lubac and the Recovery of the Traditional Hermeneutic (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI
Dissertation Services, 1991), 2-3; 20-21). De Lubac rejected the term because he saw his project as
providing answers to contemporary questions precisely through a return to the patristic and medieval
sources. De Lubac was viewed as something of a ring-leader for this movement toward a critical retrieval
of the sources of Christian theology, and his work was viewed with suspicion during his career. After the
publication of the encyclical Humani Generis in 1950, several of de Lubac‟s books, Surnaturel, Corpus
Mysticum, and Connaissance de Dieu, were banned. Yet in 1960 de Lubac was invited by Pope John
XXIII to be a consultant for the preparatory Theological Commission at the Vatican II Council, where de
Lubac consulted in the drafting of Dei Verbum. In 1983 de Lubac was named by Pope John Paul II as a
cardinal (see Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 3-5).
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with new questions,” rooted in the needs of the modern Church. 595 The very name
“ressourcement” implies a “going back” to the sources of Christian faith to bring out
theological insights and resources forgotten or overlooked in the Church at present. As
D‟Ambrosio emphasizes, the “sources” mined by these theologians were viewed as much
more than ancient texts; they were “wellsprings of dynamic spiritual life.” 596
D‟Ambrosio claims, “The events and words of Scripture, the doctrine of the Fathers, the
Creeds and decrees of the councils, the rites of the liturgy—all of these are, for them,
vehicles and, in an analogous sense, sacraments of the dynamic and living Mystery of
Christ.”597 De Lubac‟s early work, Catholicism, became programmatic for the
Ressourcement movement, as it stressed the “social character of the church as the true
universal community in embryo, rather than as a mere external machinery for the saving
of individual souls.”598 The Church, as the social reality established by God which
participates integrally in the mystery of Christian faith, mediates that singular mystery
through its sources, and these must continually be re-approached for the revitalization of
the Church.
The Ressourcement movement was at once a rejection of contemporary neoScholastic Thomism and the modern Protestant liberal tradition. The latter, thought de
Lubac, denied the transcendence of Christian faith, while the former denied the intrinsic
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relationship between history and the Christian mystery. Neo-Scholasticism, as
D‟Ambrosio describes it, “has virtually no historical sense. In an existentialist world, it
remains resolutely essentialist and objectivist, oblivious to human
subjectivity….Hardened by its Scholastic categories, neo-Thomism remains basically
incomprehensible to most people and is thus incapable of offering them spiritual and
doctrinal nourishment.”599 Rationalist and liberal theology, on the other hand, tended to
focus on “closed, clear systems” which has “impoverished theology and has almost done
away with the mystery.” 600 The return to the sources of the Christian faith, then, will
seek to recover both the transcendence of the Christian mystery, and the intrinsic
relationship of that mystery to the human being.
The Influence of Maurice Blondel: De Lubac‟s hermeneutical system is heavily
influenced by the philosophy of Maurice Blondel, who has provided a description of the
Christian “Mystery” which will be used by de Lubac in several important ways. 601 First,
for Blondel, Mystery is always granted as revelation, and is consequently a gift.602 No
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Maurice Blondel was the most influential philosophical influence on de Lubac, as
Blondel‟s proposal for a distinctly Christian philosophy sets forth many of the distinctive features which de
Lubac finds central to his own hermeneutical project. De Lubac also influenced by many other
philosophers and theologians, although they will not be discussed in this dissertation (D‟Ambrosio,
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Blondel (La philosophie et l‟esprit chrétien I , 14, cited in Adam C. English, The
Possibility of Chrisian Philosophy: Maurice Blondel at the Intersection of Theology and Philosophy, ed.
John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, Routledge Radical Orthodoxy Series (London &
New York: Routledge, 2007), 65), claims, “We will use this word „mystery‟ in order to signify a revealed
truth that the human spirit, left to its own resources, would not have been able to discover and identify with
certainty. [It is] a secret that, even once revealed, remains impenetrable in its depth. Yet, it is not without
useful significance, illuminating and profitable for us. [It is] a speculative and practical teaching which, in
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amount of intellectual striving will grasp the Mystery, since Mystery is revealed and not
intellectually mastered.603 Blondel distinguishes between “enigma,” an “impasse, a
moment of confusion, a stumbling block to thought” which ought to be but has not yet
been solved, and a “mystery” which “by contrast, is not something that eludes but
something to be found and entered into; it does not describe the state of knowledge at the
end of data but rather the state of being confronted by Truth.” 604 A mystery, then, is
intelligible but never comprehensible. 605 Since scientific disciplines are structured to
solve enigmas, they do not possess the right tools for approaching Mystery.
Second, Since Mystery is an opening to a dimension greater than can be comprehended
or intellectually mastered, Mystery is approached primarily through sacramental signs
and is always understood through paradox.606 According to de Lubac, all Christian

this clair-obscur moment where faith and reason have to cooperate, allows us to know and achieve our true
and entire destiny.”
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De Lubac (ibid, 13-14), claims that mystery “is not, therefore, something irrational or
absurd or merely non-contradictory; but, even so, the intellectual approach will always be
fruitless…Neither is it a truth which would remain provisionally out of reach but as human reason attained
„adulthood‟ would become progressively more accessible.” For Blondel, philosophy could take a person to
the point of encounter with the very Mystery of existence, yet it could not answer that question. For
example, Blondel ends his doctoral thesis, (Action, 1893: Essay on a Critique of Life and a Science of
Practice, trans. Olivia Blanchette (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 466), by claiming,
“There is no middle ground or neutrality: not to do as if it were true, is to do as if it were false. It is for
philosophy to show the necessity of posing the alternative: „Is it or is it not?‟…But philosophy can go no
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realities (including Scripture and Church) have a fundamentally sacramental structure,
where an intrinsic relationship exists between the visible sign and disclosure of the
Mystery. This Mystery can only be approached intellectually through a series of
paradoxical relationships. Theology (and philosophy) will always be fundamentally
paradoxical, as they highlight the tension between seen reality and the spiritual realm to
which it points, but which stands in tension with it. 607
Third, for Blondel, appropriation of the Mystery is never passive, but always
requires participation. 608 The truth of Christian faith is one which must be lived to be
understood. As a result, faith grows as it is practiced, since “perfection is in the act.”609
Hence Blondel claims, “It is through action that the divine takes hold in man, hides its
presence there, insinuates into him a new thought and a new life…” 610 Blondel argues
that the “thought that follows the act is richer by an infinite degree than that which

Lubac (ibid), claims, “In Latin mysterium serves as the double for sacramentum…The two words are often
simply synonyms.” Following Augustine, de Lubac calls the sacramentum the “exterior component, the
„envelope‟” (21).
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For de Lubac (The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 62), paradox refers to the very structure
of reality, so that “Paradoxes: the word specifies, above all, then, things themselves, not the way of saying
them.” D‟Ambrosio (Traditional Hermeneutic, 63), claims, “The great methodological sin for de Lubac is
one-sidedness” which would eliminate one side of tensions between nature and the supernatural, and hence
creation and redemption, etc. Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man, trans.
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precedes it.”611 As approaching the Mystery is more than an intellectual assent to a
particular set of truths, Mystery must be lived in order to be known.
Fourth, because the Mystery is manifest through the sacramental structure of
Scripture and Church alike, and because it is manifest in participation, an intrinsic unity
must exist between Scripture and Church. Tradition, Blondel shows, is the medium of
participation in the Mystery, and it provides a “living synthesis” between the historical
narrative of Scripture and the lived experience of Christian faith today, what Blondel
calls “real history.”612
This understanding of Mystery has significant implications for de Lubac‟s
theological interpretation of Scripture. First, since the scientific disciplines are structured
to solve enigmas but are not able to apprehend Mystery, de Lubac insists that the various
scientific disciplines which inform the interpretation of Scripture can never finally
determine the meaning of the text, nor will they bring encounter with the Mystery. A
„spiritual sense‟ of Scripture, the spiritual reality to which the text points, always
transcends that which is accessible to any scientific investigation. Second, since both
Scripture and Church have the same sacramental structure and mediate the same Mystery,
de Lubac insists that the Church possesses an implicit and unique understanding of the
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Blondel speaks of “real history” in contrast to the history developed by the historical
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meaning of history and has a unique ability to interpret Scripture according to its own
self-understanding. 613 A reciprocal causality exists between Scripture and Church so that
each constitutes and vitalizes the other, while both mediate the singular Mystery. Third,
for de Lubac, the basis for all Scriptural interpretation is the “transcendence” of the spirit
over the letter which “forms the central event of Christianity that remains continuously
present at every moment.”614 It is Christ who gives meaning to history, unifies the
Testaments, and establishes both Scripture and the Church to mediate this mystery. This
mediation of revelation is essentially sacramental, and Scripture and Church have each
been given a particular role in the divine economy lead toward the eschatological reality
of the totus Christus. Consequently, all de Lubac‟s discussion of the interpretation of
Scripture in the Church will take place in the larger context of God‟s use of Scripture,
Church and sacrament to mediate the mystery of the supernatural in the economy of
redemption.
Through this understanding of Mystery and tradition, de Lubac develops an
understanding of the relationship between Scripture and the Church in the divine
economy which provide further resources for the hermeneutical projects of Tracy, Frei
and Vanhoozer. Like Frei, de Lubac stresses the centrality of Christ for all Christian
reading of Scripture, as well as the importance of the Church‟s self-description as a
starting-point for hermeneutical reflection. Like Tracy, de Lubac emphasizes the public
character of Christian faith and a symbolic understanding of Scriptural reading, in which
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the text discloses encounter with the divine. Yet de Lubac goes beyond Tracy and Frei
by grounding his hermeneutical reflections in a theological description of the place of
Scripture and Church in the economy of redemption. By situating Scriptural reading in
this broader context, de Lubac is largely able to bypass both Tracy‟s difficulty with
Christological reference and Frei‟s difficulty of authority. De Lubac, like Vanhoozer,
will alleviate certain hermeneutical difficulties by placing Scripture in the economy of
redemption. Yet de Lubac‟s placement of Scripture in the divine economy will produce
very different rules for reading than Vanhoozer‟s placement of Scripture in the economy,
since each will understand the relationship of Scripture and Church in very different
ways. While Vanhoozer emphasizes the authority of Scripture over the Church, de Lubac
emphasizes the reciprocal constitution of each by the other, and the direction of both
toward the singular Christian Mystery.

II. Scriptural Interpretation: Emphasizing Spiritual Reality within the Letter
Although de Lubac (1896-1991) writes a generation before Frei, Tracy and
Vanhoozer, de Lubac shows a similar concern about the tendency of historical critical
method to reduce the content of Scripture to historical reference. De Lubac‟s
hermeneutical focus is always on God‟s use of the Scriptural texts to mediate the singular
mystery of the Christian faith revealed in Jesus Christ. For de Lubac, Christianity is
unique among religions in its historical grounding, as God has entered into human history
for self-revelation. This revelation is divided into a covenant of promise (Old Testament)
and a covenant of fulfillment (New Testament). This twofold structure of letter and spirit
212

characterizes de Lubac‟s understanding of the relationship between nature and the
supernatural, and hence his understanding of all reality from a Christian perspective. 615
The transcendent mystery of the supernatural, though always beyond the grasp of the
human intellect, is nonetheless sacramentally disclosed in certain natural realities through
which God has chosen to make Godself known. Hence Scripture is unified in Christ,
who mediates Himself to the Church by means of this witness to Himself. This section
will explore de Lubac‟s insistence on the unity of the Scriptures in Christ and the
sacramental structure of Scripture by which Christ mediates Himself to readers.

A. Unity of the Testaments in Christ
The center of de Lubac‟s Scriptural hermeneutics is the premise that Christ is at
the same time both singular Object and Subject of Scripture. As Object, “Jesus Christ
brings about the unity of Scripture, because he is the endpoint and fullness of Scripture.
Everything in it is related to him. In the end he is its sole object.” 616 As Subject,
“Inasmuch as he is the exegesis of Scripture, Jesus Christ is also the exegete. He is truly
Scripture‟s Logos, in an active as well as a passive sense.”617 The goal of Scriptural
exegesis, then, is not to search for some thematic relationship between Old Testament
and New Testament; it is to look to the reality of Christ and read all Scripture in light of
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Him as Object. Yet to exegete Christ in Scripture is not to read Scripture in light of some
new doctrinal principle or teaching; to exegete Christ is to participate in Christ‟s
presence. De Lubac claims that “Christ‟s exegesis, insofar as it is essential and decisive,
does not consist of words first and foremost. It is actual. It is Action….The mysteries of
Scripture are „revealed in action…‟” 618 This action is both the action of God and the
action of the interpreter. On the side of the interpreter, Christ, as Object, cannot be
understood without participation in Him. On the side of the referent, Christ, as Subject,
continually offers to the reader incorporation into the singular Mystery.
The unification of all Scripture in Christ is what makes the Christian Scriptures
unique among religious books. For de Lubac, the relationship between the Testaments
can be described neither simply by a doctrine of progressive revelation nor by the
assumption that there is a spiritual dimension which transcends the letter. Other religions
bring both of these presuppositions to their religious books, yet the Christian unity of the
Testaments goes beyond both. The Event of Christ goes far beyond progressive
revelation, as the “history of revelation…offers the spectacle of a discontinuity that has
no equal, which makes the traditional idea of allegory, understood in its most profound
essence, irreplaceable.”619 Christ reorients all of Scripture toward Himself. The Event of
Christ goes far beyond the assumption that Old Testament letter points to a deeper
spiritual reality. All religions of the Book claim that the reality to which their text points
is greater than the words themselves, and every religion “fancies that there is some
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hidden meaning” in their religious texts.620 Yet the Christian faith, for de Lubac, is not a
religion of the book, but a religion of the Word. The movement from letter to spirit in the
Christian Scriptures is unique because it is grounded in the “definitive” and “eternal” act
of Christ which unifies the Testaments. Hence, “In fulfilling” the Old Testament, the act
of Christ “gives it new life and renews it. It transfigures it. It subsumes it into itself. In a
word, it changes its letter into spirit.”621 De Lubac‟s implication here is that one cannot,
like Tracy and Ricoeur, employ a general strategy of reading which leads the reader to
discover in the subject matter a content which transcends the letter and hence presses the
reader to limit experiences. All religions suggest this dimension in their texts. The
Christian Scriptures are unique because Christ, as Object of Scripture, gave meaning to
both Testaments by entering into history and unifying them within Himself. They are
unique because Christ, as Subject of Scripture, continually mediates Himself through
them in a unique manner. Thus the Event of Christ which unifies Scripture establishes
the unique character of Christian reading.
It is the movement from the literal sense to the spiritual sense (often called
allegory) in interpretation which insures that all Scripture is read as a unified whole. De
Lubac claims,
Thus, using „allegory‟ as a means of going beyond the literal significance of Old
Testament texts and finding in them the mysteries then being revealed in the flesh
by the New was a way of showing the indissoluble unity of the two Testaments.
Hence, the relationship of history to allegory, of fact to doctrine or of the figure to
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the truth was the link between the two parts of Scripture and the witness to its
profound unity. 622
Christ, the great Allegory, is the ground upon which all subsequent allegorical
interpretation of a particular passage can be legitimated. The more resolutely the reader
approaches the text presupposing the unity of the Testaments in Christ, the more
Christian will be the disclosure yielded by the interpretation.

B. Unity of the Senses of Scripture in Christ
For de Lubac, the spiritual senses are the threefold means of approaching the
singular Mystery. 623 De Lubac writes, “Each sense leads to the other as its end…A unity
of source, and a unity of convergence.” 624 The literal sense discloses the Mystery, which
must be illumined in three intrinsically related ways. There is an integral movement from
one sense of Scripture to the other, which de Lubac calls a “living evolution,” so that the
senses of Scripture, while distinguished from one another, cannot be separated from one

622

Henri de Lubac, “On an Old Distch,” Theological Fragments, trans. Rebecca Howell
Balinski (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 123-24.
623

One way de Lubac highlights the intrinsic unity of the spiritual senses is to relate them to
the three advents of Christ. Christ‟s advent in history radically transformed the meaning of the OT history
and creating the spiritual reality of the Church (allegory); Christ is born daily in the soul of the individual
believer, causing an interiorization of the Mystery (tropology), and Christ will return in glory at the end of
time (anagogy). (see, for example, Medieval Exegesis, II, 138-40). Another way de Lubac often highlights
their unity is by showing their correspondence to the threefold Pauline theological virtues, faith, hope and
love. Allegory is the Christian faith, tropology corresponds to the love which is the interiorization of the
Christian faith, and anagogy corresponds to the hope of the final consummation of the Christian faith (see
The Sources of Revelation, 221).
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De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 203. See also de Lubac (ibid, 26), who claims, “But in
Scripture itself, one professes that there is no dissociation of the two senses. The spirit does not exist
without the letter, nor is the letter devoid of the spirit. Each of the two senses is in the other—like the
„wheel within the wheel.‟ Each needs the other. With those two they constitute „the perfect science.‟”
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another.625 The whole structure of Christian reality is the movement from sign to the
unified Christian Mystery viewed in three aspects: as the radical transposition of the OT
in the advent of Christ (allegory), as the transformative participation of the individual in
the body of Christ (tropology), and as the eschatological union of the totus Christus,
Christ and Church (anagogy). The fourfold nature of Scriptural interpretation is really
the fourfold understanding of all of Christian reality. Only the Christian Scriptures can
be interpreted in a fourfold manner, because they are the privileged witness to the
revelation of the whole Mystery of Christ who, coming in history, transformed the
meaning of history, and invites individuals to share in this salvation history and await the
fulfillment of history. 626 The purpose of this section is to show the intrinsic relationship
between each of the senses, as well as the way in which movement occurs from letter to
spirit.

1. Literal Sense
Indispensability of the Letter: The letter of Scripture is the indispensable starting
point for all Christian reading for two essential reasons.627 First, Christian faith is a
uniquely historical faith, and the literal sense narrates the historical events of salvation
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De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 221. This de Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 203),
also described as a “living development” or an “organic unfolding.”
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See de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 8.
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Besides these two characteristics of the letter which make it indispensable for Christian
faith, de Lubac notes several other less essential characteristics about the literal sense for premodern
interpreters. First, the literal sense is the way for beginners to enter the Scriptures, as it does not require
conversion to be understood. Second, the literal sense provides moral lessons for readers (see de Lubac,
Medieval Exegesis, II, 44-45 and 70, respectively). The distinction of this understanding of morality from
tropology will be seen later.
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history.628 De Lubac insists: “is it not essential for Scripture to recount a history, the
history of redemptive events? Is that not, even for the unbelieving observer, the
characteristic that most markedly differentiates the Bible from so many other sacred
scriptures?”629 In his classic work, Catholicism, de Lubac emphasizes the historical, and
hence social nature of the Christian faith, showing that “if the salvation offered by God is
in fact the salvation of the human race…any account of this salvation will naturally take a
historical form—it will be the history of the penetration of humanity by Christ.”630 For
premodern interpreters, according to de Lubac, the “literal sense” meant essentially a
narration of God‟s action in human history, so that stress was on the events behind the
text rather than the text itself. Due to Christianity‟s uniquely historical character,
Scripture must first be a record which “delivers us facts,” and to participate in Christian
faith we are “obliged to believe in a whole series of facts that have really come about.”631
It is essential to Christian faith to realize that “redemption has not been accomplished in
the imagination, but in time and in factual reality,” so that “our whole salvation in fact is
worked out in…history.”632 Hence de Lubac states strongly, “Christianity is not one of
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D‟Ambrosio (Traditional Hermeneutic, 173), notes that the “letter” and “history” were
basically “synonyms in the patristic and medieval exegetical tradition,” and de Lubac emphasizes that the
“letter” refers to “objective facts or events in history.”
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De Lubac, “On an Old Distich,” 122-23.
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De Lubac, Catholicism, 141.
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De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 44. De Lubac (“On an Old Distich,” 114), adds that
Christian “religion is first of all a historical fact. God has intervened in human history: the first thing to do
is to learn the history of his interventions from the Book where they have been recorded by the Holy
Spirit.”
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De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 46-47.
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the great things of history: it is history which is one of the great things of Christianity.” 633
There is an intrinsic relationship between Christianity and history so that one cannot
explain either without the other.
Second, the letter is the indispensable means of rendering present the Spirit.
Summarily, de Lubac claims, “The spirit is not separate from the letter but is contained
and, at least initially, hidden within it. The letter is both good and necessary, for it leads
to the spirit: it is the instrument and the servant of the spirit.” 634 This necessary
movement from history to spirit could be described as a sacramental relationship, in
which “the letter is „the sacrament of the spirit.‟” 635 Without the letter, then, the singular
Mystery of Christian faith would never be known. This role of the letter as means to the
Spirit will be developed further in the section on allegory.
Uses of the Letter: These two roles of the letter make the study of Scripture in its
literal sense the indispensable foundation for spiritual understanding. Yet a great deal of
ambiguity exists in de Lubac‟s work about the exact meaning of the “letter” which has
resulted in difficulty for readers in explaining the relationship between letter and spirit.
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De Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith, 145, cited in D‟Ambrosio, Henri De Lubac and the
Recovery of the Traditional Hermeneutic, 176, n. 123. De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 75), realizes that
many practiced a tendency “to pass rapidly over this „letter,‟ so as to have more time to give to the
exploration of the „mystery,‟” yet he recognizes this as a problem in practice, and not in principle.
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De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 87.
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De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 14. De Lubac often likens the letter of Scripture to
wax which holds honey (the spiritual sense) (see, for example, de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 162-5 and
The Sources of Revelation, 87). A number of theological and anthropological analogies are also given to
show the indispensability of the letter in leading to the divine reality. De Lubac uses the analogy of the
relationship of the Son to the Father in the Trinity (the Son is the indispensable means to know the Father),
the soul to the body in a human being, and the human nature to the divine nature in Christ (See The Sources
of Revelation, 14, Medieval Exegesis, II, 45, and II, 60-61, respectively). These are, of course, just
analogies, but they show the intrinsic nature of the relationship of the literal sense of Scripture to the
spiritual senses of Scripture.
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While some of this ambiguity can be attributed to the flexibility of the patristic usage of
the term, part of the ambiguity lies in de Lubac‟s relishing of paradoxes in the
relationship between letter and spirit. De Lubac at times suggests quite varied
understandings of the letter, often leaving the reader to discern from the context exactly
what he meant by the term. Overall, de Lubac appears to be more interested in
emphasizing the relationship of letter to spirit than he is in providing a precise definition
of the literal sense. De Lubac describes the letter in a variety of ways that he feels are
advantageous in illuminating the manner in which the letter hides, contains, and discloses
the spirit. Here I will identify four distinct ways in which de Lubac uses the literal sense.
First, the literal sense often means the Old Testament Scriptures before the advent
of Christ. De Lubac claims, for example, that “Scripture has two meanings. The most
general name for these two meanings is the literal meaning and the spiritual
(„pneumatic‟) meaning, and these two meanings have the same kind of relationship to
each other as do the Old and New Testaments to each other.”636 In this usage, the letter
corresponds to the Old Testament, while the Spirit corresponds to the New Testament.
Here the letter was preparation for the Spirit and contains the Spirit, so that the economy
of Old Testament history was transposed by the economy of New Testament grace.
Second, the literal sense often means the Old Testament read without Christian
faith. This usage, however, provides a significant ambiguity which further complicates
the understanding of the literal sense. On the one hand, the “letter” could refer to the
reading of the Old Testament by a Jewish person who refused to read it in light of the
New. De Lubac‟s classic text to illustrate this kind of reading is Paul‟s distinction
636

De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 225.
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between the veiled letter and the Spirit. 637 The Jewish exegete, by refusing to read in
light of Christ, would only read the “mere letter.”638 On the other hand, the “letter” could
refer to the reading of a secular historian who insisted on reading the Old Testament text
only as a secular history. Using only his secular methodology, the secular exegete could
only access the “mere letter,” since this is all that can be discerned using the tools of
secular historical research. 639
De Lubac often equates these two uses of the “letter,” since the outcome of such
reading for the unbelieving Jew and secular historian is basically the same. As the letter
was not allowed to operate as a sign which points to the spiritual reality, for both Jew and
secular historian it becomes a “mere letter.”640 Failing to see Christ as its inner reality,
the “living spirit of prophecy is no longer within it; it is a body…after the soul has been
taken from it.”641 Equating these two uses creates a serious difficulty, however, since the
way the Jewish person views Scripture is quite different from the way the secular
historian views these texts. As Susan Wood notes, the Old Testament, read in a Jewish
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See 2 Cor. 3:15-17: “Whenever Moses is read, a veil lies over their minds; but when one
turns to the Lord the veil is removed. Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there
is freedom.”
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De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 81. This is the picture of the modern commentators who,
de Lubac (ibid), says, “consider the Bible „as a book that interests them, but which does not concern
them.‟”
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D‟Ambrosio (Traditional Hermeneutic, 182), claims that the letter that kills is “that
attachment to the literal sense that blinds the interpreter to the spirit hidden within it…the obstinate refusal
to go beyond the littera sola.” David M. Williams (Receiving the Bible in Faith: Historical and
Theological Exegesis (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 154), notes that the
central problem by those who create a “mere letter” was that the letter “was restricted in scope. It failed to
acknowledge the inner potential that would find its actuality in the Gospel and, explicitly or implicitly,
denied the affirmation that would be later integrated into the Creed: that these things happened in
fulfillment of the Scriptures.”
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De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 174.
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way, “is itself an interpretation of positivistic phenomena from a perspective of faith,”
and hence differs greatly from the interpretation of the secular historian who first
excludes such presuppositions. 642 As we will see, this ambiguity has a significant impact
on de Lubac‟s understanding of the relationship between text and event, and his doctrine
of inspiration.643
Third, the literal sense often designates the historical events of salvation history.
As de Lubac follows the Medieval formula, the letter “delivers us facts” of history. 644
Things signify things. Here the focus is on God‟s revelatory action in history as event, to
which the text bears witness. In the New Testament, because of Christ, the Great
Allegory of the Old, the literal sense is also the spiritual sense, 645 as the New Testament
bears adequate and authoritative witness to the “fact” of Christ in history. The letter is
used to show the indispensability of history to Christian faith. Here all history could only
be understood rightly through the very historical event of Christ. As we will see,
ambiguity also exists in this third sense between the Old Testament as letter anticipating
Christ and the New Testament as letter and allegory, showing the realized historical event
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Susan K. Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 34.
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One key difference is the issue of inspiration. The Jewish interpreter would accept the
inspiration of the author, and hence would understand the events of history as rendered in a particular way
that is beneficial for salvation. The secular historian, on the other hand, could not begin with the
presupposition that the biblical text was inspired. As such, the secular historian would not appreciate the
work of God in the preservation of just this text. This creates an extremely significant difference between a
Jewish reading of Scripture and a secular reading of Scripture, for the Jew would understand the text as
rendering the events of salvation history, while the secular historian would see merely a set of conjoined
historical happenings.
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De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 44.

645
Wood (Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 33), claims that “the allegorical meaning is also
historical insofar as history is the interpreted event and the principle of this interpretation is the Christ
event…”
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of Christ. The concluded canon as unified in the historical event of Christ is a very
different kind of letter than the Old Testament history anticipating the spirit. This
ambiguity will cause some confusion about the ongoing nature of allegory today.
Fourth, the literal sense often means the plain sense of the text. D‟Ambrosio
defines the literal sense as “the sense directly conveyed by the words, irrespective of the
intention of the human author.”646 God, as divine Author had overseen the pattern of
words in such a way that the meaning that they render is reliable. It is in regard to this
usage that de Lubac insists on basing theological arguments on the literal sense only. 647
As this understanding of the letter deals with the text itself, the literary genre is essential
for understanding the meaning of the letter.648 Figurative texts such as Song of Songs,
despite not being a record of history, had a literal sense determined by the plain meaning
of the words.649 Appreciating the importance of the plain sense of the text, de Lubac
shows that the tradition had made a distinction had been made between the “ad litteram”
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D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 174. D‟Ambrosio may exaggerate de Lubac‟s
disinterest in human authors (de Lubac and the early Christian tradition were not entirely uninterested in
the intended meaning of the author). Notice, for example, that de Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 79), claims
that even the “letter” itself, “as letter, had in fact a sort of „inside,‟ since, before passing to the spiritual
interpretation, one inquired about the „intention of the letter.‟” This at least shows some concern for
authorial intent at this point, as this would have been an object of inquiry for all books, not just the
Scriptures. Yet the focus is certainly on most common sense meaning of the words to the contemporary
listener.
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In fact, de Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, IV, 382), claims that all “theological
argumentation…can only proceed from the literal meaning, and theological proofs cannot be based on the
allegorical sense” (cited in Susan Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 32).
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Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 32. Here she cites Genesis 1-3 as a place where
the literal sense is a figurative sense. Wood claims that in this particular situation, the allegorical sense is
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De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 41-44), claims that non-historical genres such as
proverbs, parables, etc. on the one hand “have no literal sense” because they do not recount history, but on
the other hand they are history insofar as they are a historical response to God‟s action in history which
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(the “linguistic order”), the “ad sensum” (the “signification of the words”), and the “ad
sententiam” (the “ideological content of the passage”). 650 As we will see, the ambiguity
between the literal sense as historical event and the literal sense as the plain sense of the
text will result in difficulty for articulating a truly hermeneutical project of theological
interpretation.
Conclusion: Overall, de Lubac‟s use of the “letter” is usually the one he believes
is most appropriate in highlighting the relationship of letter and spirit. Only the specific
context will help the reader discern whether the letter refers to the text itself or to the
historical event behind it, to the Old Testament as anticipation of or in rejection of New
Testament reality, and if the latter, to the Jewish reading or secular reading of the Old
Testament texts. Yet what must be stressed here is that the literal sense is always that
which grounds Christian faith in history and that which intrinsically contains and
discloses the spirit. All four above mentioned uses of the historical sense are structured
emphasize both of these aspects. Thus the literal sense really cannot be understood
without describing the spiritual sense of Scripture which is intrinsically contained within
it and disclosed by it.

2. Allegorical Sense
Allegory as the Meaning of History: If history discloses the Mystery, allegory is
the Mystery disclosed in its various aspects. Allegory is thus the intended completion of
history. All historical events, if they are to be understood, need a principle of reference,
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without which they remain merely random events. Allegory is the meaning of history,
for it shows that all history is unified in Christ. De Lubac claims, “At the summit of
history, the Fact of Christ supposed history, and its radiance transfigured history.” 651 It is
in this sense that allegory is, as the Old Distich says, first of all “what you must
believe…doctrine, the very object of faith.” 652 This “theological sense of history,” de
Lubac claims, is the only kind which really has resources to understand the whole of
history, since it has “recourse to the final causes” which can allow the interpreter to
understand the individual parts.653 As a result, far from undermining the historical
importance of Scripture, the spiritual sense was actually “providing the foundation for the
objective sense of history and by that very fact giving history its proper value.”654 Thus,
de Lubac claims, “If it is…a dive into the „mystery,‟ it in no way follows that it is, as it
has been accused of, a „flight from history.‟” 655
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Ibid, 105. Hence allegory, de Lubac (ibid, 107), claims, was a very useful and necessary
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De Lubac, “On an Old Distich,” 114. De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 109), explains that
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Ibid, 100. To show the great difference between Christian allegory and pagan allegory, de
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De Lubac never tires of stressing the unique historical character of Christian
allegory as opposed to the allegory used by classical writers, claiming that, “Biblical
allegory is…essentially allegoria facti,” not allegory based on the words alone, like other
instances of ancient allegory.656 A fundamental difference existed between Christian
allegory and pagan allegory, as Christian allegory was always a unification of history in
an actual historical event, as opposed to pagan allegory which sought to reconcile
fictitious stories and myths with “timeless philosophical truths.” 657 The Christian use of
allegory was developed from the apostle Paul, who saw his own allegory grounded in real
historical events.658 While the allegorical sense is the doctrinal sense, it can never
operate apart from the foundation of the historical (literal) sense. Wherever there is
spirit, there is also history. For de Lubac, Christian allegory was based in history and
saw history as essential, while pagan allegory was often an attempt to escape something
embarrassing in history. The spiritual reality cannot be disclosed in Scripture without
attention to the literal sense.
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De Lubac (ibid, 88), is here citing John Scotus Erigena (In Jo., fr. 3 (PL, CXXII, 344-45),
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Allegory as Movement from Nature to Supernatural: The realm of allegory brings
the reader into a qualitatively new dimension. The transition from letter to spirit is the
movement from nature to the supernatural. De Lubac insists that in this movement exists
an “infinite qualitative difference” exists, which, if diminished, would “make out of the
allegorical sense, which is a spiritual sense, a new literal sense; and this would practically
negate the interiority of the Christian mystery.” 659 The rule of thumb seems to be that if a
secular historian could notice the historical correspondence based on his or her own
secular tools, observation could not yield an allegorical reading. Boersma suggests that
the movement from letter to spirit can best be described as a sacramental relationship.
This means that for de Lubac, “The sacramental character of history implied that it
pointed beyond itself not just in a horizontal, historical, but also in a vertical sense. The
natural-supernatural relationship should provide the pattern for the relationship between
history and spirit.”660 No method, then, can move the exegete from history to spirit. This
movement is made by God, as the reader places herself in the place of submission to
receive the mediation of God‟s revelation by Scripture.
De Lubac‟s emphasis on the entrance into a new dimension of reality with the
spiritual sense can be illustrated by showing his dissatisfaction for typology and sensus
plenior. Typology could be defined as an instance recorded in Scripture where an earlier
historical event in salvation history is recognized to prefigure a later historical event of
salvation history. Typology, de Lubac feels, falls short of the radical newness of allegory
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Medieval Exegesis, II, 98-99. Thus de Lubac (ibid, 108), claims, “Faith is the light „that
makes one see the light of the spirit in the law of the letter‟…we are therefore „to be imbued in the faith
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 183.
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because typology is grounded only in historical correspondence and not in the definitive
revelation of God in Jesus Christ.661 The very uniqueness of Christian allegory is
grounded in the radical newness of the Event of Christ giving meaning to all historical
events. As a result, typology “does not have a foundation of its own, typology by itself
says nothing about the dialectical opposition of the two Testaments nor about the
conditions for their union. It does not explain the unique passage from prophecy to
Gospel.”662 Typology, then, taken on its own, could only diminish understanding of the
radical newness of Christ, because typology “lacks the ability to show that the New
Testament is something other than a second Old Testament which…would leave us
completely within the thread of history.” 663 Typology without allegory, then, would
leave the reader in the realm of nature and consequently without apprehension of the
Mystery or personal incorporation into it.664
The movement to a supernatural dimension in the biblical texts forces the reader
to relinquish control over the meaning of the text. This insistence is perhaps best seen in
de Lubac‟s criticism of the sensus plenior. De Lubac resists any attempt use a conception
of sensus plenior to “constitute a „scientific demonstration of the harmonies of the two

661
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Testaments,‟” as this approach will always attempt to capture knowledge at a natural
level and will never advance to the level of faith. 665 De Lubac insists that when reading
Scripture, “In order to receive it, it is not enough…to „press hard,‟ to „seek‟; it is also
necessary to „pray,‟ to „implore.‟” 666 This is because the only adequate movement to the
spiritual sense is one which takes place “on the level of faith,” which “cannot be
something purely technical or purely intellectual,” but is “a gift of this Spirit.”667
Allegory as Conversion to Mystery: Since the passage to allegory brings passage
to a qualitatively new dimension, de Lubac insists that spiritual meaning “„stems totally
from the Spirit‟ inasmuch as it presupposes an entire grasp of the history of salvation as
directed toward Jesus.”668 Yet this qualitatively new dimension is not simply an
intellectually apprehended theological presupposition. The reader must not think that the
event of Christ in history provided the singular historical clue which would allow the
secular historian to now decipher all history without personal faith. De Lubac claims that
in Scripture, “To stop at the objective datum of the mystery would be to mutilate it, to
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betray it.”669 Since the Christian Mystery cannot be understood without participation,
allegory is essentially the process of conversion. 670 De Lubac shows this desire to read
first for conversion rather than mastery of the text as he claims that for the premoderns,
“It was an undefined understanding, precisely because it was an approach to the depths of
God. It was not a matter merely of a text being explicated, but of mysteries being
explored.”671 As a result, de Lubac emphasizes that it is not guaranteed that those most
knowledgeable, even in Christian theology as an academic discipline, will understand
allegory. He claims, “But it is not ordained by God that the most learned will inevitably
be the most believing, nor the most spiritual; nor that the century which sees the greatest
progress realized in scientific exegesis will, by that fact alone, be the century with the
best understanding of Holy Scripture.”672 Allegory, then, is more than reading the
Scriptures as a unified whole: It is participating personally in the Mystery.
Allegory as the totus Christus: The Christian Mystery which is disclosed in
allegory is not, properly speaking, the Triune God as divine Persons in themselves.
Neither is the Christian Mystery Jesus Christ considered as an individual Person. Rather,
the Christian Mystery is the union of the Triune God with human beings. In the
movement from letter to spirit, Scripture “always shows forth the Mystery of Christ,
indivisible. The same unique mystery is also the mystery of ourselves and our
669
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eternity.”673 Thus the Mystery encompasses Christ, Church, and all salvation history.
The one Mystery was anticipated in salvation history and revealed in Jesus Christ (past),
mediated to the Church by Scripture and sacrament alike (present), and anticipated as the
totus Christus (future).
As the meaning of history, then, allegory is the disclosure of the Mystery of Christ
and the Church. De Lubac emphasizes that Christ‟s Incarnation has as its goal the union
with Church as body. Consequently, the “whole content of the Bible” is the mystery of
Christ and the Church. 674 In the scope of salvation history, then, “This ecclesial
body…must thus be said…to be „truer‟ than the [incarnate body], because it constitutes a
more perfect, fuller realization of the divine design.”675 Emphasizing the totus Christus
does not in any way depreciate the value of the Incarnation, but instead shows this unique
and transformative event in light of its completion. De Lubac shows that at times
premodern exegetes understood the object of allegory to be Christ, yet at other times they
speak of the object as the Church, and at times they do not distinguish between them. De
Lubac likens this difference in approach to the distinction drawn in contemporary
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Ibid, 222. Because the Mystery is precisely that union between God and human beings, de
Lubac also, in a secondary way, describes the human person as mystery as well. The human being is the
one created for, enabled, and called into this relationship as partaker of the Mystery. In this way, de Lubac
can, at times, speak of the human being as mystery.
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De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 90. One of de Lubac‟s most frequent uses of Mystery is
the usage taken from Paul about the relationship of Christ and the Church in Ephesians 5. De Lubac (ibid,
92), claims, “[A]s Saint Paul said, Christ and the Church are just one great mystery: this is the mystery of
their union. Now the whole mystery of Scripture, the whole object of allegoria, resides in this. This
enables one to discover everywhere the „deeper mysteries about Christ and his body.‟”
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De Lubac (History and Spirit, 412), claims, “The assumption of individual flesh has a
unique importance, of course, because it constitutes the point where God inserts himself into our humanity.
But it is not an end in itself. Its goal is to allow the assumption of the Church.”
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Christology between “Christology from above” and “Christology from below.” 676 For
the premoderns, one could consider the totus Christus from the perspective of Christ as
head, or from the perspective of Church as body, but both must be considered in relation
to each other. De Lubac explains that, “The matter of holy Scripture is the whole Christ,
head and members,”677 and because “Christ and the Church are just one great mystery,”
one cannot really consider one reality without the other, without risking abstraction. 678
As head of the body, one cannot look to Christ abstractly without also including the
Church.
Since the Mystery revealed is the totus Christus, the Church is included in the
allegorical meaning of Scripture. De Lubac explains that, “For a long time, allegory was
taken by theology to mean, and often in the broadest sense, the mysteries of Christ and of
the Church as they appeared in Scripture.”679 As D‟Ambrosio claims, “The fact that
biblical allegory has the mystery of the Church as part of its very object means that the
Church and its tradition must necessarily be a principle of interpretation.” 680 God has
both ordained the events recorded in Scripture to disclose the Church as Mystery and has
ordained that the Church, by participating in the Mystery, is the only institution that can
understand the disclosed Mystery.
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Allegory Regulated by the Church: Since the allegorical sense includes the
Church and can only be understood by the Church, it follows that allegory can only be
regulated within the Church. All allegorical interpretations must be in accord with the
understanding of the Church, since the Spirit operates both in the text and in the Church.
Hence, “The „true‟ meaning of the Scriptures, their complete and definitive meaning, can
really be nothing other than the meaning „which the Spirit gives to the Church.‟” 681 The
Church, as that institution which participates in the Mystery, is the only one which has an
intuition of the Mystery, and this intuition toward which the Church yearns allows the
Church to sense which interpretations are legitimately part of its Faith.
For de Lubac, the Church ought to focus more on the illumination of the Mystery
through allegory than on the regulation of careless allegorical interpretation. 682 While de
Lubac admits that many allegorical interpretations have been inadequate and should be
quickly dismissed,683 he also insists that interpreters “not confuse them with what they
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De Lubac believes that the Spirit always resides in the Scriptures to disclose the Mystery to
the Church. De Lubac‟s whole project of recovering the wealth of traditional insights illustrates his
emphasis on doctrinal maximalism (D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 59, for example, claims that de
Lubac‟s ultimate goal is “to help Christians enter into sanctifying communion with the divine principle of
tradition which is the Holy Spirit.”)
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De Lubac agrees that there was need for some control on allegory. Wood (Spiritual
Exegesis and the Church, 49-50), notes several of de Lubac‟s criteria for limiting allegory, although none
of these appears to have been unanimously followed either by the tradition nor by de Lubac‟s own
judgment. First, “divine revelation” both in the sense that the New Testament explicitly authorizes a
particular allegory and in the sense that there is “unanimous agreement” among the Fathers about such an
interpretation (49). Second, the analogy of faith is helpful, because it points to the one, unified meaning of
Scripture (50). Third, allegory should, properly speaking, flow only from allegoria facti (allegory of the
events of history) and not allegoria verbi (allegory based on a correlation of terminology). This kept the
allegory always based in and dependent upon history, rather than being based in the imagination of the
commentator (50).
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are intended to signify”—the great Allegory of Christ.684 So long as the interpretation fit
within the analogy of faith, it should be appreciated as being a “Christian” reading. The
most important thing to remember was that, as D‟Ambrosio says, “All successive
allegorical interpretations performed by Christian commentators through the centuries are
no more than incomplete attempts to trace the lines of this great Allegory of the Scripture
performed once and for all by Christ.”685 No individual allegorical interpretation adds to
the Mystery revealed in Christ, but simply seeks to illumine this Event by all of
history.686
This fundamental stress on illumination over regulation is seen in de Lubac‟s tacit
acceptance of allegoria dicti. De Lubac has argued that allegoria facti is distinctly
Christian while allegoria dicti is not, as the Christian understanding of allegory is
established on real historical events rather than from relationships drawn between figures
in the text.687 However, in practice de Lubac does not see allegoria dicti as
inappropriate, provided that it is grounded on allegoria facti, the Great Transposition of
Christ.688 As D‟Ambrosio claims, “So long as allegoria facti is given first place, and the
theological principles that establish its validity granted, [de Lubac] regards the use of
684
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D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic 186. As D‟Ambrosio (ibid, 193), claims, “Thus, in
the ancient exegetical tradition, the various allegoriae dicti are ordinarily pressed into the service of the one
great Allegoria facti by means of the analogy of faith.”
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verbal allegory as a matter of indifference.” 689 Allegoria dicti may be fanciful,
imaginative, and in fact mistaken interpretation, but it is not harmful to Christian faith so
long as it directs the imagination toward the great Act of Christ. As long as the Mystery
is being contemplated, the maximum range of interpretations should be allowed.
Allegory Continued in Preaching: De Lubac sees the role of the apostles and their
successors as that of expositing the Scriptures, the Old Testament in light of the New. 690
The chief duty of preaching does not concern “some „oratorical genre‟ or some sort of
„moral teaching,‟” but to “proclaim the whole Christian faith as revealed in Scripture.691
This means that all “Christian preaching is an exegesis, and indeed an „allegorical‟
exegesis.”692 What is important to note is that all successive Christian expositors, even
up to the present time, are called to this task.693 De Lubac emphasizes that, “This was
true of the first Christian preaching, that of the apostles; this is equally true of the
preaching of those who succeed them in the Church: the Fathers, the Doctors, and our

689

Williams, Receiving the Bible in Faith, 171.

690
It is somewhat unclear why de Lubac locates the discussion of “apostolic preaching” under
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placed under the section on allegory. The emphasis here seems to be that the apostles and their successors
were entrusted with the task of proclaiming, for each age and context, the whole mystery of the faith, and
this included the fourfold meaning of Scripture.
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Hence de Lubac (ibid, 219), claims that the apostles and their successors “draw the fire,
that is to say, the light of the faith, from the pits where the patriarchs and the prophets had hidden it, that is,
from the deep obscurity of the Scriptures,” which, “thanks to the „inspiration of the Holy Spirit,‟ [makes
known] its content in their „expositions.‟” The emphasis here is on the succession of the task of exposition
as the apostles initiated it. De Lubac claims that the “great miracle of Pentecost” in which “the disciples
there were filled with the Spirit; they themselves became like a book written within and decorated without,”
and hence “the miracle is being perpetuated from generation to generation” as those entrusted with
preaching continues “always in unfolding the Scripture, as Jesus did, by relating it all to Jesus” (ibid).
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present-day pastors.”694 Successors to the Apostles, though they have not witnessed the
historical event of Christ (and hence could not write Scripture), are still entrusted with the
same task of allegory. De Lubac feels that the first successors of the Apostles must have
understood themselves to have been entrusted with the role of carrying on the allegory of
the apostles because,
Up until the end of the second century, the writings later referred to as the New
Testament were considered not as „Scripture,‟ but as the spiritual or allegorical
interpretation of Scripture. The apostles and evangelists were then considered
exegetes. Hence, the apostolic writings, in their literal sense, are already
allegoria.695
Thus de Lubac suggests a fundamental continuity in interpretive method between
the apostles and their successors, for interpretation is the reading of the whole Scriptures
as a unity in light of Christ. Significantly, for de Lubac, the closure of the canon does not
mean that the allegorical method of the New Testament authors was unique to their age.
Rather, the New Testament provides the foundation for continuing allegorical
interpretation of Scripture. It is the role of successors to go beyond the Apostles in
tracing lines of allegory between Old and New, as successors reproduce the same
spiritual movement of the first Apostles. Since de Lubac‟s focus is not on the text itself
but on the event behind the text, de Lubac argues that all generations of successors have
qualitatively the same access to Christ as the first apostles. Yet it must be asked whether
the access of the first Apostles to the historical Christ and the access of their immediate
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D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 194. De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, 216-23),
shows this awareness on the part of the successors to the apostles, who typically write literal expositions on
the works of the apostles, not allegorical commentaries on the apostolic writings.
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successors to the oral tradition witnessing to that Christ is the same as the access of later
successors to canonical, textual witness to Christ. If the mediation of Christ is
significantly different between these three modes, we will have reason to ask whether
allegory can really be performed today exactly like it did for the first Apostles. Here the
relationship of text and event will be quite significant.
Conclusion: Allegory is the Mystery of Christ contained in the letter of history.
While allegory is the meaning of history and the completion of the letter, it belongs to the
realm of faith and therefore cannot be discerned through history alone. The only reality
able to discern this Mystery is the Church, which is constituted by the Mystery and
participates in the Mystery. The fourfold structure of apprehending the Christian
Mystery stresses that because the unified Mystery can never be fully comprehended,
there will always be “an incurable character of non-fulfillment which marks all spiritual
understanding…there will always be new aspects of doctrine to bring to light and new
applications of it to be adduced” as the Scriptures are studied.696 It is the role of the
successors of the Apostles to continue allegory in the Church by continually tracing the
lines of Old Testament history to the Event of Christ.
De Lubac‟s understanding of allegory yields several significant insights for this
study. First, de Lubac‟s understanding of the infinite qualitative difference between letter
and spirit goes beyond the relationship between text and spiritual reality portrayed by
Tracy, Frei, and Vanhoozer. While all see allegory as the meaning of history, and all
have some sense of the movement from letter to spirit, only de Lubac stresses the
qualitative difference from the realm of nature to that of the supernatural. De Lubac‟s
696
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articulation of allegory will go beyond Frei‟s emphasis on figural readings which extend
the literal sense to the whole Scriptures. It will go beyond Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on a
canonical sense in which the right theological presuppositions will allow God to be heard
in the literal sense. And it will go beyond Tracy‟s emphasis that the subject matter of the
text presses the reader to a limit-experience. None of these articulations of the
relationship between text and spiritual reality, de Lubac feels, really gets at the radical
newness of Christian allegory.
Second, de Lubac‟s position that the successors of the apostles ought to carry out
the same interpretive strategy as did the original apostles will place him in a unique
position among these four theologians, for it causes him to de-emphasize the significance
of the completed canon for ongoing interpretation. It must be asked whether subsequent
allegorists really have the same role in extending allegory in the same way after the New
Testament canon is formed as those who practiced allegory before it. The key question
will be, „What difference, if any, does the existence of a closed New Testament canon
impose on subsequent allegorical interpretation?‟ It would seem that while the first
apostles interpreted in light of their experience, subsequent apostles interpret in light of
the closed canon. Here the closure of the New Testament writings may have a more
significant impact than de Lubac has stressed.
Third, while Tracy, Frei, and Vanhoozer understand the literal sense more in
terms of the plain meaning of the text, de Lubac‟s treatment of the literal sense is almost
functional, as it focuses mainly on the way events render spiritual realities. As a result,
de Lubac spends very little time explaining how the New Testament text, as literal sense,
renders the event of Christ. Here de Lubac largely ignores the question that concerned
238

Frei so greatly: „How is it that just this text provides disclosure and regulation of
individual interpretation of the Event of Christ?‟ This relationship between text and
event which is given so much attention by Frei, Tracy, and Vanhoozer receives very little
focus by de Lubac.

3. Tropological Sense
Relationship between Church and Individual: As has been shown above,
tropology is not so much an additional sense of Scripture as it is one intrinsic aspect of
the unified spiritual sense. Hence tropology does not move beyond allegory, but gives
allegory specification in the individual. Tropology refers to the “daily” advent of Christ
into the soul of the individual believer as the Mystery is continually being interiorized,
and hence illumines the intrinsic relationship between the Church and the individual
believer.697 Just as believers could not come to faith without the Church, so the Church
could not exist without individuals. 698 On the one hand, “if the soul can effectively be
united to the Word of God, this is because the Church is united to Christ.” Yet on the
other hand, the individual soul is the “microcosm of the perfect Church.” 699 The meaning
of Scripture, then, must be accomplished in both the Church and in the individual soul.
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De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 138. De Lubac (ibid), insists that “in this Christian soul, it
is each day, it is today, that the mystery, by being interiorized, is accomplished…Moraliter, intrinsecus and
quotidie are three adverbs that go together.”
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De Lubac (ibid, citing Ambrose, De myst., c. vii, n. 39 (SC, 25, 120)), claims, “The
tropological sense presupposes, or rather, expresses the mystery: for if the souls are Christian only within
the Church, the reverse holds: „it is within the souls that the Church is beautiful.‟”
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Hence, says de Lubac, “everything in Scripture that is susceptible of being allegorized
also can and ought to be moralized.” 700
Just as history intrinsically points to the Mystery in the Church, so history
intrinsically points to the Mystery interiorized in the individual. De Lubac explains the
same relationship between tropology and history as he has shown to exist between
allegory and history. Hence he writes, “All that Scripture recounts has indeed happened
in history, but the account that is given does not contain the whole purpose of Scripture in
itself. This purpose still needs to be accomplished and is actually accomplished in us
each day, by the mystery of this spiritual understanding. Only then…will Scripture bear
us its fruit in its fullness.” 701 The very plan of God in salvation history which is seen in
the unity of the Testaments takes place for the purpose of the transformation of the
individual soul.702
Tropology and Morality: While tropology is often referred to as the moral sense
of Scripture, this does not mean that it refers to Scripture‟s moral instructions. In fact,
passages of moral instruction do not have a privileged place in tropology at all. As we
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have seen, de Lubac has already classified these under the literal sense and has shown
that the Holy Spirit has ordered history in such a way that the responsive reader can
understand and incorporate moral lessons from the text.703 Tropology is qualitatively
different from moral instruction, as it refers to the interiorization of the Christian
Mystery.704 It is this essential distinction between moral instruction as part of the literal
sense and the interiorization of the Mystery as the tropological sense which occasions de
Lubac‟s preference of the fourfold sense of Scripture over the often used threefold sense
in the history of interpretation. Really, it is not the number of senses which are important
to de Lubac, but the order in which they are developed. In the threefold schema, the
order of the senses is history, tropology, allegory, while in the “classic” fourfold schema,
the order of the senses is history, allegory, tropology, anagogy. It is the place of
tropology in the order which determines how the whole schema is to be understood. As
de Lubac puts it, “Depending on its position, it yields either a natural anatomy and
physiology of the soul and its virtues (the first formula) or a Christological spirituality

703
De Lubac has claimed that the letter, as history, was a source of moral edification. This
kind of moral edification must be distinguished from tropology (as we will see), because it does not require
conversion to understand. De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 70), claims that all “[h]istory was...a moral
science, which was studied with a view to improving morals…Indeed, whether it were a question of good
acts or bad, the history that reports them always draws a salutary lesson from them, teaching people to
imitate the good acts and to avoid the rest…What is true of every history is still more true of sacred
history.” Scripture, having been shaped by the Holy Spirit, was useful in teaching moral lessons because it
provided such lessons, not just from the perspective of a human historian, but from the perspective of the
God who grounded all morality. While de Lubac (ibid), claims that “the very report that [the Bible] makes
concerning the worst crimes there results for our use a „warning to turn to a better life,‟” it does so in a
qualitatively and quantitatively greater way than other texts, because the Holy Spirit stands uniquely behind
those examples which have become part of Scripture.
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Ibid, 141. As interiorization, de Lubac (ibid), can claim that “whatever page I meditate
upon, I find in it a means that God offers me, right now, to restore the divine image within me.” It is the
Mystery interiorized which transforms the reader, not the moral instruction of the text.
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and asceticism (the „classic‟ formula).”705 If tropology is placed before allegory, the
result is that the text in its literal (and hence natural) sense supplies the moral sense as
general natural lessons for morality. If tropology is placed after allegory, tropology is
understood as an interiorization of the Mystery which allegory discloses. Since Christ is
the real basis for Christian morality, not nature, de Lubac claims that “only the second of
the two orders, the one that puts allegory right after history, expresses authentic doctrine
in both its fullness and its purity. It alone gives an adequate rendition of the Christian
mystery.”706 Ultimately, in de Lubac‟s understanding, tropology would simply be natural
moral instruction without allegory, and allegory has not been grasped without the
interiorization of the Mystery in tropology. Christian moral action, then, is not developed
by simply following the example of Christ, but rather is an interiorization of the Mystery
of Christ.707
De Lubac believes it has always been a temptation for both preachers and
theologians to lose the intrinsic relationship between allegory and tropology, since the
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Lubac recognizes that both threefold and fourfold schemas are represented in Christian
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tasks of both preaching and dogmatic theology are simplified when one is not required to
trace the intrinsic connection between Mystery and action. 708 De Lubac chronicles the
reduction of tropology in the Middle Ages, a reduction which he feels was inevitable as
soon as allegory and tropology were split. The split began when the disciplines of
dogmatic theology and preaching became separated, with allegory becoming more
associated with the academy and tropology becoming more associated with preaching.
Consequently, allegory “became more theoretical, more impersonal, in a certain way
drier,” and ultimately became the “object of theological speculation,” while tropology
became “more practical, looking more to regulate external activity than to nourish the
interior life,” and ultimately became the primary subject matter for preaching. 709 Yet
however natural such a separation was, de Lubac insists it had a tragic effect on
Scriptural interpretation for several reasons. First, as moral instruction lost its intrinsic
relationship to allegory, it became a product of nature rather than the supernatural. Hence
to emphasize morals to a congregation of believers without showing its intrinsic
relationship to doctrine inevitably depreciates the reality of the Christian life. Second,
the intrinsic connection of individual to Church was likewise lost, with the result that
moral action lost contact with the anagogical hope of the union of individuals in the
Church with Christ as head. Third, preaching lost touch with its fundamental task, the
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explanation of the whole Mystery of Christ in the unified Scriptures. Hence the
disassociation between allegory and tropology was devastating for both senses.
The Process of Interiorization: It is specifically through the tropological sense of
Scripture that Christ reveals the reader to him/herself. Lewis Ayres has shown that
tropology depends on a doctrine of the soul as a spiritual meeting place between God and
human beings, where the Mystery may take effect and elicit the return response. 710 The
human being, for de Lubac, has already been created with the imprint of the Logos
within, a place that could theologically be called the soul. Thus when the Mystery is
interiorized in the soul, the Logos reveals the human being to him/herself. Consequently,
de Lubac claims that, “By taking possession of man, by seizing hold of him and by
penetrating to the very depths of his being Christ makes man go down deep within
himself, there to discover in a flash regions hitherto unsuspected. It is through Christ that
the person…becomes conscious of his own being.”711
This anthropology which affirms the inscription of the Logos on the soul has
immediate implications for the tropological reading of Scripture. De Lubac sees,
following Origen, a reciprocal effect between Logos inscribed in the soul and Logos
inscribed in Scripture. De Lubac writes,
What I draw from myself with respect to the Bible, provided that it is really, in
fact, from the depths of myself, I draw from the Bible also; since Scripture and
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the soul have the same structure, or rather the same „inspiration‟; since one and
the same divine breath gives birth to them and never ceases to animate them…it is
thus the sign that normally reveals my soul to me; but the converse also has its
truth.712
This insight shows the importance, for de Lubac, of reading the Bible‟s salvation
history as one‟s own interior history. The narrative construction of the individual is one
which yearns toward the Logos. Consequently, when Scripture is read, there is a certain
awareness of identity between the narrative of salvation history and the individual‟s own
narrative identity. The narrative structure of the Bible reflects the narrative structure of
the individual. Consequently, de Lubac speaks of Scripture as a mirror, in which the
individual reader reads his/her own history in the narration of history in Scripture. De
Lubac claims,
In this mirror we learn to know our nature and our destiny; in it we also see the
different stages through which we have passed since creation, the beautiful and
the ugly features of our internal face. It shows us the truth of our being by
pointing it out in its relation to the Creator. It is a living mirror, a living and
efficacious Word, a sword penetrating at the juncture of soul and spirit, which
makes our secret thoughts appear and reveals to us our heart. It teaches us to read
in the book of experience, and makes us, so to speak, our own exegesis. 713
Scripture can be described as a mirror because the Logos is already inscribed in
the interior realm of the human being. The claim that the Logos is written on the soul of
every person legitimates the interiorization of the Logos in Scripture. De Lubac suggests
that interiorization takes effect through a double movement of, on the one hand, sustained
contemplative reflection on the relationship between history and allegory, and on the
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other hand, repentance and conversion. 714 As this takes place, “Interior experience and
meditation on Scripture accordingly tend to merge in a unique „experience of the Word,‟”
in which each deepens and furthers the other.715
Conclusion: Tropology is an inevitable aspect of the spiritual meaning of
Scripture as it is the personal interiorization of the Mystery. What is useful about de
Lubac‟s model is his recovery of an integrated life of discipleship through which the
Scriptures (history and meaning) are interiorized or assimilated to the reader as the reader
is converted to the Mystery they reveal. The Christian moral life, for de Lubac, is not
based primarily in a set of biblical or traditional rules, or in a following of the moral
example of Christ. Instead, spiritual reorientation takes place as Christ is present to the
reader as the reader reads his/her own history in light of God‟s action in history
culminating in Christ.716 It would be interesting to speculate about de Lubac‟s response
to the debate between the narrative theologies of Tracy and Frei. De Lubac would likely
agree with the narrative construction of the individual, yet would add an important
addendum: the human being is so structured as the Logos is inscribed on the individual
soul. This would provide a theological description which is much more akin to Tracy‟s
understanding of human beings than Frei‟s and would provide a valuable ontology to
supplement the postliberal descriptions of the role of narrative. Yet, on the other hand, de
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Lubac would almost certainly side with Frei in his insistence to read one‟s own
experience in light of Scripture rather than to read Scripture with correlation to one‟s own
experience. The incorporation of the Logos in Scripture stands logically and
ontologically prior to the inscription of the Logos on the individual soul, and it is the soul
which is incorporated into the Mystery through Scripture. Furthermore, the means by
which the Logos incorporated in Scripture meets with the Logos-inscripted soul is the
ongoing inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Here it will be de Lubac‟s account of God‟s use
of Scripture which gives his understanding of tropology theological density.

4. Anagogical Sense
The Union of the Senses: The sense of anagogy anticipates the union of the four
senses of Scripture in the eschatological return of Christ. De Lubac claims, “The doctrine
of the four meanings of Scripture (history, allegory, tropology, anagoge) is fulfilled and
finds its unity in traditional eschatology. For Christianity it is a fulfillment, yet it is, in
this very fulfillment, also an expectation…real anagogy is, therefore, always
eschatological. It stirs up in us the desire for eternity.” 717 The movement from allegory
to anagogy is not a further passage to a greater reality, since the Church and individual
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already participate in the Mystery.718 Yet the fourfold Christian apprehension of reality
can only be seen as unified as it is directed toward anagogy.
Anagogy unifies the spiritual senses of Scripture by “achieving a synthesis”
between allegory and tropology which “is neither „objective‟ like the first nor „subjective‟
like the second.”719 Consequently, both allegory and tropology are “contained within
anagogy, as the first and the second coming of Christ are included within the last.” 720
Anagogy contains the eschatological hope of the “objective” content of allegory, the
union of the totus Christus. Although “the whole mystery of salvation had undoubtedly
been revealed,” it will “not fully be grasped” until the end of time. 721 God‟s revelation is
presently accessible only to faith, whereas at the end of time it will be accessible to
“another sort of knowledge” (the “face to face” of 1 Cor. 13 rather than the “mirror”).
Thus allegory, although it is the full revelation of the Mystery, can only be described as
an “image” and a “promise” of what is to come. 722 Further, anagogy contains the more
specified hope of the “subjective” sense of tropology as the individual is fully
incorporated into the totus Christus. Tropology is inherently ordered toward anagogy,
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since “it is in each of the members of his mystical body that Christ, at the end of time,
completes the work of the Father.”723 Furthermore, anagogy unifies the literal sense with
the spiritual senses, as Christ returns in glory within history to unify all history within
Himself.
The Scriptural sense of anagogy must be distinguished from what de Lubac calls
total anagogy. Scriptural anagogy is the hope for the final union in Christ, while total
anagogy is its actual arrival in history. Total anagogy will occur when faith becomes
sight, the moment of union of doctrinal and interior anagogy when the totus Christus is
complete. This “fully concrete anagogy,” or “total anagogy” is “reserved for the
„fatherland,‟” because “Mystical contemplation is not yet vision.”724 Thus while anagogy
as an exegetical practice is the sense which yearns for completed anagogy, the time when
Scripture is “merged with the great Book of Life,” and hence will reveal “its final
secrets,” total anagogy is the moment this takes place.725 At this final realization of
anagogy, sacramental signs from the current divine economy will no longer be needed for
mediation of the Mystery, and hence at the final union of the senses the whole of
Scripture will give way to the unmediated presence of the Mystery. 726
Immanentism and the Breakdown of Anagogy: Throughout his career, de Lubac
was continually concerned about the encroachment of immanentism, the loss of the
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dimension of eschatological hope as Christian faith is reduced to historical progress. De
Lubac suggests that this tendency arose during the Middle Ages, as theology became a
product of the monastery. De Lubac highlights a correspondence between the rise of
monasticism and the decrease in eschatology, as a misbalance emerged which tilted
attention toward the “interior life” and away from “the end of history.” 727 Hence, “As
spiritual individualism gained ground, the great dogmatic vision became blurred,” as
“morality and spirituality, though still referred to as tropology and anagogy, split in two,
and this was at the expense of eschatology.” 728 De Lubac agrees with Congar that “lack
of the eschatological sense…represents the most crucial defect arising from
scholasticism.”729 Without a firm sense of Christ‟s eschatological Advent in history,
anagogy “tends to become, on the one hand, a process of natural mysticism, and, on the
other, a chapter of natural theology.” 730 This reduction of Christian faith, de Lubac
argues, is the chief danger of the Church today, as it tends to eliminate the Mystery in the
Christian vision of reality and reduce Christian faith to an expression of human progress.
In the section on ecclesiology I will show how de Lubac‟s insistence on the anagogical
sense of Scripture matched his insistence on the Church‟s eschatological dimension. The
integral unity of the Christian vision of reality constitutes the fourfold understanding of
both Scripture and Church.
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Conclusion: Since anagogy is, for de Lubac, the dimension in which all the
senses of Scripture are united, analysis of anagogy shows the relationship of all the
spiritual senses. This examination of the different senses of Scripture highlights certain
key points for de Lubac‟s understanding of Scripture and all of Christian reality. First,
there is an intrinsic relationship between letter and spirit, so that Christian faith cannot be
adequately expressed without both. The believer cannot access the Mystery without the
letter, and the letter is incomplete without the spiritual senses. Second, the three spiritual
senses of Scripture are not so much different ways to read the text as they are mutually
complementary aspects of being brought into contact with the one unified Mystery of
Scripture: the union between God and human beings in Christ. None of these senses of
Scripture could be removed from the Christian understanding of reality without the
collapse of the integral Christian vision. It is impossible to practice one of the spiritual
senses in isolation from the others, just as it is impossible to practice faith, hope or love
in isolation from the others or to understand the Mystery of Christ without one of His
three advents. There will, then, be a reciprocal deepening in all the spiritual senses when
any one of them is rightly engaged. Third, the senses of Scripture are dimensions of an
integral understanding of Christian reality, which cannot be understood in isolation from
the divine economy. It is only as readers understand the place of Scripture in the
economy that they will understand the way in which the spiritual senses are related to one
another.

C. Scripture‟s Role in the Economy
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Since the letter of Scripture discloses the spiritual sense, and since the spiritual
sense is inaccessible without the work of the Spirit, the very distinction between letter
and spirit shows that God must use the Scriptures in a unique way for communication.
While Tracy and Frei use literary theory and philosophical reflection to articulate the
causal relationship between text and content rendered, de Lubac wishes to place the
discussion of how the letter discloses the spirit within the broader discussion of God‟s
ongoing use of Scripture in the divine economy. In this section, I will show how de
Lubac understands the spiritual sense of Scripture to be, in many ways, equivalent to
God‟s communicative action. I will suggest that while de Lubac‟s articulation of the
relationship helpfully shows the way in which Scriptural reading discloses spiritual
reality, his project also presents a fundamental ambiguity about the way in which the
literal sense of Scripture participates in God‟s communicative action. The ambiguity will
be illumined in this section so that in the final chapter I will be able to suggest that the
projects of Tracy, Frei and Vanhoozer provide just the resources to advance de Lubac‟s
project.

1. God‟s Use of Scripture
For de Lubac, the text possesses a quasi-sacramental character and a
communicative character as it is used by God to mediate the Mystery. Theological
categories of presence, inspiration, authorship, and speaking all take priority over literary
theory in describing God‟s use of the Scriptural text. This section will describe the
communicative character of the texts of Scripture under the central category of
inspiration. De Lubac continually emphasizes God‟s presence in and communication
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through the texts as being the spiritual sense of Scripture. Since the spiritual sense of
Scripture is God‟s communication through the texts, the category of ongoing inspiration
dominates de Lubac‟s work. At the same time, de Lubac is somewhat ambiguous about
the way in which the literal sense of the text participates in God‟s communicative action.
This section will explore the way in which de Lubac articulates God‟s communication to
readers through both the spiritual sense and the literal sense.
Inspiration in the Spiritual Sense: To speak of inspiration in the spiritual senses,
of course, is to speak tautologically, since de Lubac insists that the spiritual sense is
inaccessible without the action of the Spirit in the reader. The whole recovery of spiritual
exegesis has as one of its goals the explanation of the Spirit‟s role in the entire process of
Scriptural mediation, from the inspiration of original authors to the inspiration of texts to
the inspiration of readers. Yet when de Lubac speaks of inspiration, his focus is usually
on the ongoing aspect of inspiration, in which the Spirit continues to mediate the Mystery
to the believer by means of the spiritual sense of Scripture. This spiritual mediation is
perhaps the defining characteristic of de Lubac‟s whole hermeneutical project, as the very
distinction of “letter” and “spirit” emphasizes the Spirit‟s involvement in the text beyond
the letter. In a summary statement, de Lubac emphasizes,
It is not only the sacred writers who were inspired one fine day. The sacred books
themselves are and remain inspired. It can and must be said of them, with
especially good reason, what Saint Augustine said of all the beings of creation:
„God did not create them and then depart from the scene. They come from him
and exist in him.‟731
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While not denying inspiration of the original texts, de Lubac‟s emphasis here is
clearly on the Spirit‟s continual action within the texts rather than the providential
ordering of the original documents. De Lubac is concerned that theories of inspiration
are often developed for apologetic reasons to safeguard God‟s past action in the text. 732
Furthermore, de Lubac continually worries that believers will see the inspired Scriptures
simply as a warehouse of dogmatic propositions which need only to be mined and applied
in the Church. 733 Both tendencies, De Lubac thinks, ignore the intrinsic unity between
letter and spirit and tend toward extrinsicism. To avoid this error, de Lubac emphasizes
the passage to the spiritual sense as the moment when the communicative action of God
takes place. This communication is best described as spiritual communion, and hence is
grounded in, but does not take place in, the literal sense.
This kind of ongoing inspiration is better described as presence than as
providential action. De Lubac does not really distinguish between the continued
inspiration of the Holy Spirit and Scripture as an incorporation of the Logos. In fact,
there is such a close connection between the two that ongoing inspiration can only be
understood in light of de Lubac‟s understanding of the incorporation of the Logos in

signifies moreover and above all, as we have seen, that this Spirit dwells in it.” De Lubac, then, shifts
emphasis away from Origin‟s focus on inspiration of the text and onto the ongoing aspect of inspiration.
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Scripture.734 In History and Spirit, de Lubac claims, “In his Scripture as in his earthly
life, Origen thought, the Logos needs a body; the historical meaning and the spiritual
meaning are, between them, like the flesh and the divinity of the Logos.”735 Just as the
Spirit prepared a physical body for the Logos so that God‟s revelation could take place,
so the Spirit prepares a literary body for the Logos so that God‟s revelation could become
effective in the Church. The Spirit is the active agent in both, and the Spirit uses the
physical and literary bodies to manifest the Mystery which transcends them both.
Scripture, then, is characterized by the continual presence of God, just as was the
humanity of Christ. De Lubac emphatically claims,
Within the Scripture, God resides; by the Scripture, God makes himself known;
the mystery of the Scripture is the very mystery of the Kingdom of God…Thus
Scripture is not merely divinely guaranteed. It is divinely true. The Spirit did not
merely dictate it. The Spirit immured himself in it, as it were. He lives in it. His
breath has always animated it. Scripture is „fertilized by a miracle of the Holy
Spirit.‟736
Since Christ and the Spirit of Christ are continually present in Scripture, communication
to the believer is always available through the movement from letter to the spirit of
Scripture.
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It is within this discussion of the ongoing inspiration of the Spirit that de Lubac‟s
comments about God‟s speaking action in the text ought to be located. De Lubac insists
that “the Word of God…speaks to us still” in Scripture, “reaching the depth of our souls
as the limits of the universe.”737 A primary purpose of Scripture is to mediate God‟s
communication to human beings, yet de Lubac does not emphasize the role of God‟s
speaking in the literal sense. On the contrary, De Lubac claims that Scripture “is not a
document handed over to the historian or thinker, even to the believing historian or
thinker. It is a word, which is to say, the start of a dialogue. It is addressed to someone
from whom it awaits a response…a return movement.”738 Speaking here is attributed to
the spiritual sense of Scripture, as de Lubac emphasizes that while the historian may see a
document, the purpose of Scripture is only fulfilled as the believer hears God‟s voice. 739
This speaking is inaccessible at the level of the letter. Primarily in de Lubac‟s work, the
literal sense points to events, which, when contemplated in light of Christ, open the
reader to the speaking action of God.
Normally, then, God‟s speaking action in the text is identified with the Spirit‟s
ongoing inspiration of the text and reader. The speaking that takes place in Scripture is a
twofold action: It is a disclosure of the Mystery to the reader and a transformation of the
reader which enables understanding. Notice the twofold action by God in this extended
quote:
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It is the same God who gives us scripture and makes it understood; what appear to
be two successive acts on his part are in reality but one. The Spirit communicates
to the sacred text a limitless potentiality, which therefore entails degrees of
profundity which can go on and on. No more than this world was Scripture, that
other world, created once for all: the Spirit „creates‟ it still, as if every day, to the
extent that he „opens‟ it. Through a wondrous and precise correlationship, he
„expands‟ it to the extent that he expands the understanding of him who receives
it…The volatus of the contemplative soul, no matter how far into the heavens of
Scripture it might carry the soul, will never cause it to collide at any frontier, for
both space and flight are provided, proportionately. This is a bold view indeed,
but, properly understood, the boldness is precisely the boldness of faith. 740
God gives Scripture, opens it for understanding, and uses it to move the individual
soul toward union with God. On the one hand, Scripture “expands” to the reader, and on
the other hand, the reader is “expanded” to Scripture.741 Speaking, then, is the drawing of
the individual into the unified Mystery, and takes place as one enters into the spiritual
sense.
Inspiration in the Letter: While de Lubac‟s emphasis is on the ongoing aspect of
inspiration in the spiritual sense, his insistence on the uniqueness of God‟s action in
history leads him to articulate God‟s providential preservation of those events in the letter
of Scripture as well. On account of the intrinsic unity of the literal and spiritual senses in
Scripture, inspiration must be attributed to both. 742 De Lubac insists that because “God
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has intervened in human history…the first thing to do is to learn the history of his
interventions from the Book where they have been recorded by the Holy Spirit.” 743 De
Lubac makes it clear that the Holy Spirit is involved in the letter and has providentially
ordained that just these events are preserved. Here the primary role of the Spirit in the
inspiration of the letter seems to be the providential action of insuring that the account
inscribed by the human authors was adequate for salvation history. The focus, as usual,
is on the events rather than the text itself, and what is required of the text is that it is a
reliable mediator of events.
Yet at times de Lubac goes further and describes the Spirit as having an integral
role in the authorship of the text in such a way that the texts themselves have a certain
role in salvation history beyond merely leading readers to events. This is seen in several
ways: First, the Spirit seems to have been responsible for the recording of events which
were not pertinent to salvation history but which would provide moral lessons for readers.
Here we are referring to those moral lessons contained in the literal sense, not tropology.
For example, de Lubac claims that the Spirit saw fit to record certain ignoble instances in
history, events not part of God‟s intervention in history, in order to provide moral lessons
for readers. Noting that God‟s providence moves ahead of the biblical authors, de Lubac
speaks of “the whole Old Testament” as having “value as prophecy,” so that even “a
disgraceful act,” when providentially recorded in Scripture, “becomes a prophecy.”744
Even the “less worthy” parts of Scripture, “made of rather gross material,” are part of
God‟s prophetic plan, because “the Holy Spirit has turned a precious content within them
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to our intention.”745 Whatever the intent of the human authors, the Spirit orchestrated the
content in such a way that it is useful today. De Lubac suggests that “if the Holy Spirit
had perceived no shame in mentioning such histories, we have still less reason to disguise
them.”746 Hence the Spirit actively inscribed moral lessons in the texts during their
composition.
Second, because the early Church assumed that the Spirit authored the whole
Scriptures, they consequently assumed that even the difficult passages of Scripture must
have meaning, even if an interpreter could not immediately discern them. In fact, it was
assumed that the Holy Spirit placed difficulties into the literal sense so that readers would
be humbled and would be required to think more deeply into the truths of Scripture. 747
The early readers “took the opportunity to admire the „magnificent and salutary‟ art of the
Holy Spirit, who knows how to pacify our hunger with the clear passages and to prevent
satiety by means of the obscure ones…The clarity of the first illuminates us; the difficulty
of the second keeps us breathless. Thus, made for all, helpful to all, Scripture is always
adapted to all.”748 Hence one primary purpose of unclear passages was develop the
character of the reader. Since the Church believed that the Spirit authored the text, one of
the goals of premodern exegesis was to show that the Spirit was in agreement with
Himself throughout the text. Since all of Scripture “has the same God as author,” the
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exegete “works on it until one can finally say: „All the divine writings stand together at
peace with each other.‟”749 Exegesis of the literal sense necessarily included the
reconciliation of difficult passages, since interpreters must assume that the divine Author
inscribed them purposefully.
Although de Lubac stresses ongoing inspiration in the spiritual senses, he also
accepts the providential and even authoring action of the Spirit in the composition of the
literal sense of the Scriptures, which insures in just these texts their unity, their reliability,
and their intrinsic connection between the literal and spiritual senses. The distinction
between providence and authoring is important here, because it highlights the distinction
between the literal sense as history and the literal sense as the plain reading of the words.
The Spirit providentially insured the literal sense to be a reliable rendering of God‟s
action in history, and the Spirit authored the literal sense to communicate just those
moral lessons and plain meaning of the words which will draw the reader into the
Mystery. I will show in the next section that this distinction between text and event is
quite significant for our discussion, as Vanhoozer, Tracy and Frei are all focused on the
literal sense of the text, while this aspect remains the least developed for de Lubac.

2. The Movement from Text to Spiritual Reality
De Lubac has argued for the necessity of spiritual understanding in reading
Scripture, seeking to demonstrate that fourfold Christian exegesis flows inevitably from a
holistic Christian vision of reality. Both letter and spirit form an indissoluble unity in
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Scripture. Yet to move from theological vision to hermeneutical explanation, it will be
necessary to explore exactly how the letter discloses the Mystery. It is in this movement
from letter to spirit that the importance of de Lubac‟s hermeneutical program will begin
to emerge. In this section I will evaluate the relationship between the text of Scripture
and the event it signifies in order to show a significant tension in the relationship between
letter and spirit.750 I will suggest that de Lubac‟s work does not adequately articulate the
movement from text and signified historical event, and consequently that it does not enter
into adequate hermeneutical discussion about the relationship between letter and spirit.
Yet I will suggest that these difficulties are significantly eased by de Lubac‟s insistence
that the understanding the way Scripture as text mediates the spiritual reality is only be
possible in light of how God uses the biblical text in the divine economy. So long as the
place of Scripture in the economy is clearly articulated, hermeneutical method will not be
the decisive factor in gleaning theological meaning in Scripture.
A fundamental ambiguity exists throughout de Lubac‟s writings about the
relationship of the Scriptural texts to the historical events they signify. As we have seen,
when de Lubac speaks of the letter, he sometimes means the plain sense of the text, and
at other times he means the historical events to which Scripture points. For de Lubac,
historical reference (objective history—the events themselves) is typically given priority
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Articulating de Lubac‟s understanding of the transition from letter to spirit is complicated
by several factors. First, de Lubac relishes a number of paradoxes to describe the relationship which are
difficult to systematize. Spirit is at times in the same discussion opposed to the letter and the fulfillment of
the letter. Second, de Lubac desires to represent the breadth of the whole Christian tradition, and therefore
provides a wealth of quotes which are difficult to reconcile systematically. Third, a genuine ambiguity
exists in de Lubac‟s own thought between the relationship of the letter of the text to the events of history
which make it unclear which letter de Lubac is referring to. Fourth, the relationship between letter and
spirit must be seen in light of de Lubac‟s whole understanding of Christian reality in all its various forms:
the relationship of nature/supernatural, Church as divine and human, sacramental presence, etc.

261

over textual sense (subjective history—Scriptural witness to those events). 751 De Lubac
makes a key distinction between “history in the objective sense as a past event and
history in the subjective sense as a report of that past event by witnesses” 752 When de
Lubac claims that “the letter is „the sacrament of the spirit,‟” he insists that this refers to
the letter “not Scripture as text, but sacred history as contained in Scripture…since
spiritual meaning is not the meaning of words but the meaning of things.” 753
Furthermore, de Lubac insists that “to discover…allegory, one will not find it properly
speaking in the text, but in the realities of which the text speaks; not in history as
recitation, but in history as event…allegory is indeed in the recitation, but one that relates
a real event.”754 It is the emphasis on things signifying things that forms the basis of all
allegorical interpretation. The text leads the reader into the events, and the events
prefigure and signify other events. Theologically, it seems clear that the historical events
themselves are more important than Scripture‟s witness to them, for events are the
foundation of Christian faith.
Yet, granting the Christian priority of events over texts, the way in which the
Scriptures mediate historical events must still be articulated. It is here that ambiguity can
be seen. On the one hand, de Lubac speaks of the text as merely pointing to historical
events, which, in turn point to spiritual realities. De Lubac claims, for example, that “the
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words signify things, but the things themselves signify other things.”
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text acts only as spokesman to lead to the historical realities; the latter are themselves the
figures, they themselves contain the mysteries that the exercise of allegory is supposed to
extract from them.”755 This would suggest a providential relationship between text and
event only, as God has preserved an adequate and reliable witness about historical events
so that the events may render spiritual realities. The literal sense, then, as text, would
simply be a providentially ordered witness to history.
Yet on the other hand, de Lubac at times has a quite robust understanding of the
spiritual reality intrinsically contained in the text of Scripture itself. De Lubac calls
Scripture an “incorporation” of the Logos, claiming, “The Logos is already truly
incorporated there; he himself dwells there, not just some idea of him, and this is what
authorizes us to speak already of his coming, of his hidden presence,” a “presence that
[is] actualized anew each time this Scripture illumines us…” 756 While defending
Origen‟s understanding of Eucharistic presence, De Lubac claims that while the Eucharist
“truly contains the Body and Blood of Christ…in a subsequent, more elevated and
profound and, therefore, „truer‟ sense, Scripture is the Body and Blood of the Logos.” 757
The Logos dwells in Scripture as mystery, analogous to the way the Logos dwells in the
flesh of Christ.758 At times, de Lubac speaks of two Incarnations of the Word. Just as the
Word was clothed flesh, so also the Word descends to the Scriptures. Significantly, de
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Ibid, 86. Thus de Lubac (ibid, 87), follows Augustine in claiming that, “The facts of the
Bible…in their very reality, „were words, destined to signify something to us…‟”
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De Lubac, History and Spirit, 389 (citing John Scotus, In Jo., fr. 1). De Lubac (ibid), notes
the difference with the Logos‟s presence in the Incarnation, as he shows that “the Logos is…not, properly
speaking, incarnated as he is in the humanity of Jesus.”
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Ibid, 415.
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Ibid, 393. De Lubac (ibid), is comfortable with a double meaning for Hebrews 4:11,
allowing the “living and active” referent to be both Jesus Christ and Scripture, for the Logos dwells in both.

263

Lubac records Origen‟s claim that this dual “incarnation” (using Origen‟s term) “is here
something more than a comparison; „letter‟ and „flesh‟ are not only alike in that they are
both likened to a „veil‟; for, according to Scripture itself, one can say that „the Word of
God has been incarnated in two ways,‟ since at bottom it is one and the same unique
Word of God who descends into the letter of Scripture and into the flesh of our
humanity.”759 Here Scripture as text seems to have something of a sacramental value.
De Lubac strengthens this sacramental allusion by claiming, “Already in its literal sense,
or in its „body,‟ Scripture expresses something of the Logos, just as something of him is
glimpsed through the flesh of Christ.”760 Furthermore, de Lubac records Origen‟s claim
that even before the Incarnation, the Word was present in Scripture and “the function of
Scripture is to reveal this Logos.”761 Here the text of Scripture itself, as the dwelling
place of the Logos, intrinsically discloses the Mystery. While de Lubac never himself
claims that the Word was present in Scripture before the Incarnation, de Lubac does seem
to agree that texts, unified by Christ, provide access to the Logos as Mystery because
they are words which render the Word. Thus Scripture has the same role in disclosing
the second Person of the Trinity as does the humanity of Christ. When the Mystery is
viewed in terms of its historical revelation, the great Act of Christ, the event has priority
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De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 60-61. Quoting Augustine, de Lubac (ibid 61), speaks of
both the humility of the letter and the humility of the Son of Man, emphasizing that the divine is present in
both the letter and the humanity.
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over the text. Yet when the Mystery is viewed in terms of the reality revealed, the Logos,
both text and incarnation are seen as efficacious signs. 762
Furthermore, yet another position can be discerned, which is Distinct from both of
these two contrasting understandings of the literal sense of the text as mere witness to
historical event, and as sacramental embodiment of the Logos. Often it seems that
something of a double movement takes place from words to events to spiritual reality.
Words really signify and make present the events of history, and the events, in turn, really
signify and make present the Mystery. For example, De Lubac suggests that for Origen,
history takes a “new mode” when written down in Scripture, so that the past events
“survive today…as signs and mysteries….for the purpose of our „edification‟.” 763 This
“new mode” is not simply the record of events, but the providentially ordained record of
salvation history. The letter preserves the event, and hence participates in the flow of
history from past to present. The purpose of this recorded history is to “pass on,” and
hence, “„In following the trail of truth in the letter of Scripture‟, we „will thus be served
by history as by a ladder‟.”764 The “ladder” which de Lubac refers to allows the reader to
climb from text to event to spirit. De Lubac‟s understanding seems to be of the human
authors themselves being caught up into the events of salvation history as they recorded
sacred history, so that the Mystery is disclosed through “both” the events themselves and
the written record of the events. Hence de Lubac claims that although “the human
762

It is important here to again note that for de Lubac, the Mystery is singular. There is no
incompatibility between disclosure of the Logos and disclosure of Christ, as both ultimately are aspects of
the same Mystery. Christ is the definitive revelation of God in history, yet the Logos is always working in
history to incorporate believers into the Mystery.
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authors of the holy Books have died,” and “the events that they have reported have
passed away,” yet still “the Word of God was expressed through both.”765 In some way,
texts, authors and events are all drawn as integral and indispensable parts into salvation
history, so that the texts themselves are used as mediation of the Logos, and not just the
events to which they point.
It would be tempting to describe this as a double sacramental movement, where
text sacramentally discloses event and event sacramentally discloses spirit. Yet the text
cannot be said to have a sacramental relationship to the event, because in this movement
the text only renders history, not spiritual reality. Those who wish to grant a sacramental
status to the text itself must clarify that the text is not sacramental insofar as it leads to
events.766 On the other hand, as we have seen, some sacramental value must be accorded
to the letter of the text as text, as it, and not the event to which it points, is said to be an
incorporation of the Logos. This seems to be an unresolvable lacuna in de Lubac‟s work,
and it has consequences on the appropriation of de Lubac‟s work today. While Frei
focuses on meaning in the text situates his project in the movement from text to event,
Tracy‟s focus on meaning in front of the text situates his project completely on the ability
of the literal sense of the text to disclose new human possibilities. To both, de Lubac‟s
inattention to this relationship would make it nearly impossible to appropriate de Lubac‟s
work.
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Boersma (Nouvelle Theologie, pp. 154-60), consistently emphasizes that the letter as
history which is sacramental. Yet in discussing Origen‟s understanding of Scripture as the “incorporation”
of the Logos, Boersma changes his focus from history to text as sacramental (see esp. 163-64). The fault
here is perhaps not Boersma‟s, but Origen‟s lack of distinction between text and event as sacramentally
making present the spirit.
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Overall, it seems that de Lubac would like to shift the discussion from the way
texts render events to the way in which God uses both text and history to mediate the
Mystery. In discussing the way the text renders its spiritual content, de Lubac is less
concerned with hermeneutical theory and more interested in articulating the place of
Scripture in the divine economy. Thus the manner in which the text of Scripture
discloses the Mystery can only be discerned in relation to the way Sacrament and Church
disclose the Mystery. In this shift of emphasis, explanation of the relationship between
text and event is left unfinished.

3. Conclusion and Remaining Challenges
De Lubac insists that allegory is grounded in events of history, not texts.767
Current exegetical and hermeneutical discussions center almost completely on the textual
rendering of the event, leaving historians to investigate the events themselves. Hence
many contemporary exegetes write off allegory as fanciful interpretation before even
investigating it, since they do not feel that it technically falls under their domain. Texts
are judged by literary criteria, and historical events are judged by the criteria of secular
history. This is exactly the division that de Lubac desired to overcome. Yet De Lubac‟s
explanation of the relationship between letter and spirit reveal several ambiguities in the
relationship of text and event which have significant consequences for exegesis. Some of
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The Christian Scriptures are different from other ancient texts which were subjected to
allegory, in that Christian allegorists clearly distinguished between allegoria facti and allegoria verbi (see
especially Henri de Lubac, "Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory," in Theological Fragments, 16596).
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these difficulties can be traced to de Lubac‟s ambiguity about the literal sense, while
others can be traced to inattention to the relationship between text and letter.
One of de Lubac‟s difficulties in describing the relationship between text and
event arises from not adequately distinguishing between secular history and biblical
history. De Lubac locates history in the realm of nature, not the supernatural, claiming
that “by themselves, historical events bring us no increase in supernatural revelation.
They remain always „ambiguous‟ and in a kind of state of „expectation,‟ and it is they
that must be enlightened for us by the light that comes from the Gospel.” 768 De Lubac‟s
focus is, as always, on the infinite qualitative difference in the movement from letter to
spirit. Yet in describing the “letter” itself, a further distinction still needs to be made
between a secular understanding of history and an understanding of history as guided by
the Holy Spirit. 769 While both are described as the “letter,” the text of Scripture is not the
mere letter. Not just any interpretation of the events of salvation history will do, for
interpretations without the providential ordering of God fail to configure the events in
such a way that the Mystery can be intrinsically disclosed. When the Great Act of Christ
transformed history, it transformed a certain history—that which was recorded through
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See Voderholzer, “Dogma and History,” 664, citing De Lubac, La révélation divine,
Troisième édition. Revue et augmentée. (Paris, 1983), 101.
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The latter here is often described as the “relgious sense” in which the Bible is read to
understand the religious experience of Israel (see D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 232-33). In the
“religious sense,” de Lubac (Sources of Revelation, 26), claims, the Christian historian attempts to
understand the history of Israel and, “Since we are dealing with a unique history, it is important that the
historian who recounts that history do so as a believer.” Still, de Lubac insists on a qualitative difference
between the “religious sense” and the “spiritual sense” to such an extent that the religious sense is simply a
species of the literal sense. While de Lubac is correct that Christian interpretation must insist that the
reader approach Scripture as “his own history, from which he cannot remove himself” (Sources of
Revelation, 27), the sharp distinction that de Lubac draws between these two seems unnecessary if the
literal sense of Scripture can be shown to itself participate in salvation history. Frei‟s project of figural
reading will be shown to have potential to expand de Lubac‟s proposal here.
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the inspiration of the Holy Spirit in Scripture and discloses the presence of the Logos.
Scripture as a text is both the providentially ordained theological interpretation of
revelation and an incorporation of the Logos.
As soon as it is emphasized that what is “in the text” is the only adequate Godordained guide to understanding what is “behind the text,” some theory of dual
authorship must be articulated. Consequently, the inspiration of the human author must
also be considered. As we have seen, de Lubac‟s emphasis is on the ongoing aspect of
inspiration rather than on the inspiration of the original authors, leaving the inspiration of
the letter quite underdeveloped. Yet the relationship between human authors and divine
Author must be addressed. De Lubac has already suggested God has a meaning in the
spiritual senses that may not only expand, but may be viewed in opposition from the
intention of the human author. He also suggests a certain divine authorship of Scripture
that seems to go beyond the providential recording of events. Hence divine authorship
applies even to the literal sense. Yet no real discussion of the role of the human authors
is discussed. David Williams highlights this problem as he critiques de Lubac‟s
understanding of the original authors:
As one magnifies the importance of the overall biblical gestalt as the object of
God‟s intention and a primary medium of the Spirit, so the significance of what
the human authors of individual books intended to convey diminishes. Their
intention, as with any human effort, is part of the particular historical context that
is now gone; it must pale to some degree when contrasted with an opportunity to
discern the movement of the divine plan borne by the Spirit… 770
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Williams, Receiving the Bible in Faith, 171.

269

Williams is suggesting that de Lubac‟s emphasis on ongoing inspiration of the
Spirit in the spiritual sense forces him to neglect God‟s guiding action on the part of the
original writers. Indeed, if the literal sense simply tells us facts, and if the text is the
incorporation of the Logos, we would expect the ongoing inspiration of the Spirit to
dominate. But the text does more than tell us facts: it tells us what human authors
reliably recorded about the facts, how they thought their audiences ought to respond to
the facts, etc. The problem becomes quite practical in exegesis. For example, in a
difficult passage, should the exegete assume both that the Spirit has placed this difficulty
in the text to humble the exegete and that the text must be able to be harmonized with
other texts because it is authored by the Spirit, or should the exegete assume a human
mistake? The assumption of divine authorship requires a mutual discussion of human
authorship. In order to attend to this, more attention needs to be given to the role of
human authors in encoding meaning in the text.
A second difficulty in describing the relationship between text and event arises
from an ambiguity in the definition of the literal sense. As we have seen, the letter is
sometimes described as “history” and sometimes as the “plain sense” of the text. When
de Lubac describes the letter as the plain sense, however, the text‟s relationship to both
history and spiritual reality becomes unclear. At times, de Lubac emphasizes that the text
is only a “spokesman” to lead the reader to history, while at other times he claims that the
plain sense of the text is the “incorporation of the Logos.” Often a double movement
from text to event to spiritual reality seems to emerge throughout de Lubac‟s work, in
which both text and event are caught up in salvation history and lead to the spiritual
sense. I would suggest, here, that in this double movement from text to event to spiritual
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reality, there is a great deal of room for literary theory and philosophical reflection to
explain the first movement from text to event. De Lubac should feel uncomfortable
describing the text as a sacrament, since the text points to a historical event, and in a
sacramental relationship one natural thing cannot disclose another natural thing. 771
Hence explanation of the rendering of event by text belongs to the realm of literary
theory rather than sacramentality. As most of the discussion between Frei, Tracy and
Vanhoozer focuses on the relationship between text and referent, their work could be
quite instructive to this part of de Lubac‟s hermeneutical project. Frei‟s entire project, for
example, may be classified as an attempt to describe this first movement from text to
event. De Lubac is so focused on showing the necessity of historical events as the
foundation of Christian faith that he does not give enough attention to the relationship
between God‟s action in history and God‟s assurance that just this rendition of history
will be preserved in Scripture.772 In keeping with de Lubac‟s project, to appreciate the
historical character of Christian faith without allowing the secular historian to have the
final word and thereby reduce the Mystery to historicism and immanentism will require
more than simply an insistence upon an anagogical reading. It will require a thorough
explanation of just how these texts mediate the events of salvation history to the reader.
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Given his sacramental understanding of the whole economy of redemption (Incarnation,
Scripture, Church, Eucharist, Nature/Supernatural), it seems significant that de Lubac never speaks of a
double sacramental movement from text to event to reality. He does call the “letter” a sacrament, but in
that context is clear that the letter refers to history (See de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 34, 60-61, 162-5
and The Sources of Revelation, 14).
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The problem is heightened when the exegete attempts to assess the importance of those
parts of Scripture which are not historical, but are themselves responses to revelation. It is not enough to
say that the letter leads us to historical events, when certain non-narrative responses to events are preserved
and others are not. It seems clear that written responses to revelation themselves have a privileged place in
mediating spiritual realities that have not been sufficiently described.
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Hence de Lubac‟s project would not be compromised by placing greater attention on the
relationship between text and event. Rather, de Lubac‟s project would be furthered by
this attention, as discussion of the relationship between text and event would provide the
theologian with resources to describe how just this text can render just these events in just
the way that will be effective for salvation.
A third difficulty in describing the movement from letter to spirit arises
specifically from a lack of clarity about the nature of the New Testament as a text. While
at times de Lubac speaks of the literal sense as the reading of God‟s action in the Old
Testament which anticipate the New, at other times de Lubac speaks of the literal sense
as the whole witness to God‟s action in history. 773 In the New Testament, the literal
sense is the allegorical sense. This explanation needs further clarification, since, while it
is true that the Act of Christ transfigures history, the record of Christ‟s transformation of
history became the literal sense after it was recorded as Scripture. Hence even the secular
historian can read the whole of Scripture in its plain sense and understand with relative
clarity what the apostles, the first allegorists, believed about the event of Christ. The
relationship between a literal reading of the New Testament and a spiritual reading of the
New Testament must be more carefully developed.
Here the relationship between text and events once again becomes important.
When the emphasis remains on events, we see that no matter how energetically the
secular historian studies the New Testament texts, he or she could not grasp the Event of
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It is in this sense that a secular New Testament historian might read only the “mere letter”
of Scripture. For example, de Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 154), is clear that spiritual understanding
is a meaning that the secular historian can never grasp, for human effort by itself “can never furnish
anything other than a better historical knowledge.” The historical knowledge, here, is knowledge of the
event of Christ, yet it does not move to the spiritual sense.
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the New Testament (the Incarnate Christ unifying history and anticipating the totus
Christus), and hence could never see the intrinsic relationship between Old Testament
history and New Testament meaning. However, if the emphasis is on the whole text of
Scripture as a canonical unity, it seems that the secular historian could intellectually
recognize the Christian Faith without subsequently participating in it. In this sense, the
New Testament is the adequate and authoritative witness to the meaning of history in
Christ, and this testimony is located in the plain sense of the text, accessible to all
readers. The plain sense of the Old Testament is very different from the plain sense of
the unified canon, for the unified canon does provide the rules and theological
presuppositions necessary to discern, intellectually, the distinctly Christian faith. The
upshot of this distinction is that the presence of a New Testament canon really may
change the subsequent use of allegory. While the first Christians were first required to
access the meaning of history by interpreting the Old Testament in light of the Event of
Christ which they had experienced, Christians today are required to access the meaning
of history by first reading the plain sense of the text and accepting it in faith. 774 Here the
concern by Tracy, Frei, and Vanhoozer about the continued use of allegory may have
some merit. While de Lubac suggests that the continuation of allegory is a primary task
of apostolic succession as it continues the work of the New Testament writers, Frei and
Vanhoozer‟s insistence that the priority of interpretation should be on Scripture as a
canonical whole may restrict allegory in a way that would be consistent even to de
Lubac‟s project.
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Williams (Receiving the Bible in Faith, 208-10), makes suggestions in this direction. We
will return to his assessment in the next chapter.
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These three ambiguities must be addressed if de Lubac‟s work is to provide a
consistent hermeneutical reflection which will advance the theological interpretation of
Scripture. In the final chapter I will suggest that Vanhoozer‟s emphasis that the literal
sense is the canonical sense, as well as Frei‟s method of figural reading, provide
resources which could develop de Lubac clarify the way in which the very literal sense is
used by God to mediate Christ to readers. The strength of de Lubac‟s project lies not in
his development of literary theory or philosophical description about the process of
reading, but in his insistence that when the interpretation of Scripture is understood
within the wider context of the divine economy, a movement to the threefold spiritual
sense is inevitable. The fourfold interpretation, for de Lubac, is a part of a fourfold
understanding of all Christian reality in which God uses Scripture, Church and Sacrament
to mediate the unified Mystery. As Scripture is understood in this broader context,
hermeneutical issues relating to literary theory and the rendering of meaning by texts are
subjected to theological descriptions of the economy. Thus de Lubac‟s project, more
clearly than the others, shifts discussions of textual interpretation from literary theory to
the mediation of the unified Mystery through these texts.

III. Ecclesiology: The Church as a Sacramental Reality
De Lubac‟s ecclesiology can only be understood in light of the way he
understands Scripture, Eucharist, and the Church to play essential roles in mediating the
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Mystery in the divine economy. 775 All three, for de Lubac, have a sacramental structure,
in which the visible discloses the Mystery. Furthermore, all three operate with the same
fourfold understanding of Christian reality. As the Church points toward and makes
present Christ, it does so with an understanding of the fourfold reality of the economy,
which is also the fourfold sense of Scripture. The visible Church discloses the Church as
divine reality, which in turn effects transformation in individuals and yearns toward its
eschatological fulfillment in the totus Christus. Of the four theologians, only de Lubac
provides a description of the Church which seeks to show the integral identity between
Church and Scripture in the economy of redemption. This section will first describe the
identity of the Church, then will show the relationship of the Church to Scripture and
Eucharist in the economy.

A. Identity of the Church: Mystery and Sacrament
De Lubac‟s development of an ecclesiology in which the Church is both Mystery
and Sacrament sets his work apart from that of Frei, Tracy and Vanhoozer. These
descriptions of the Church flow naturally from de Lubac‟s understanding of God‟s use of
the Church to mediate Christ. The Church already is the Mystery of the totus Christus,
yet it always acts as sacramental sign which leads to Christ. Here the Church exhibits the
fourfold structure of Christian reality in its own self-identity as the visible Church is the
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Wood (Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 62), concludes that for de Lubac “the spiritual
interpretation of Scripture is in fact a sacramental theology, but one which situates sacraments within the
entire historical economy of salvation.” Wood‟s argument is that de Lubac is able to draw his parallel
between Eucharistic theology, ecclesiology, and spiritual interpretation by correlating the Eucharist with
the allegorical sense of Scripture. In his Eucharistic ecclesiology, the Eucharist makes the Church as it
unites Christ as head with the Church as body. This action, though, presses toward the anagogical sense for
its final conclusion, where the totus Christus will be complete.
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indispensable means to the fullness of the totus Christus as it incorporates individuals and
yearns for its eschatological fullness.
The Church as Mystery: As we have seen in the section on allegory, de Lubac
insists that the Church, in an incomplete way, is the Mystery. De Lubac claims, “The
Church is a mysterious extension in time of the Trinity, not only preparing us for the life
of unity but bringing about even now our participation in it. She comes from and is full
of the Trinity…She is „the Incarnation continued,‟” the “presence of Christ on earth.”776
The Church really is Mystery because it is the reality of the totus Christus. De Lubac
insists, “The Church on earth is not merely the vestibule of the Church in heaven…for
she stands to our heavenly home in a relation of mystical analogy in which we should
perceive the reflection of a profound identity. It is indeed the same city which is built on
earth and yet has its foundations in heaven…” 777 Anagogy thus unites the Church as it
exists today with the fulfillment of the totus Christus. The Church is not the cause of the
Mystery, nor can it claim any role in mediating the Mystery other than what it has
received as a gift. Rather, “The Church is a mystery because, coming from God and
entirely at the service of his plan, she is an organism of salvation, precisely because she
relates wholly to Christ and apart from him has no existence, value or efficacity.” 778 The
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De Lubac, Catholicism, 72. De Lubac (The Splendor of the Church, 119), suggests that the
difficulty in seeing the eternal nature of the Church is “because we don‟t yet see her from a viewpoint
wide-embracing enough. We are thinking of the Church only as the Church Militant, not as the perfect and
glorious Bride…” A theological understanding of the Church must include the Church Militant, purgatory,
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De Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 15. De Lubac (The Splendor of the Church,
106) notes that the Church is both “holy” and “the Church of the holy,” not because there are no sinners in
the Church, but because it is the Church which sanctifies and the Church that is purified by the Holy Spirit.
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Church is Mystery because the Church is the organization ordained by God and united
with Christ in which salvation history receives its meaning and yearns for its ultimate
completion.
De Lubac insists on accepting the implications of the Church as Mystery. While
the Church is sinful and its visible structures are not eternal, these present features of the
Church are not its primary identity. De Lubac claims that the Church should not
understand “herself…so much from her structures or her history as from her
predestination in Jesus Christ and her orientation towards the parousia.‟” 779 Even in the
present state of the Church, “there is between her and Him a certain relation of mystical
identity,” so that, “Practically speaking, for each one of us Christ is thus His Church.” 780
So intrinsic is this relationship between the Church in its “transitory, imperfect state” and
its “complete, spiritual, definitive state” that a certain “exchange of idioms” should be
allowed between Christ and the Church, because “between the means and the end there is
not merely an extrinsic relationship.” 781 Refocusing attention on the divine reality of the
Church and its anagogical completion as Mystery is, of course, an act of faith. Hence de
Lubac claims that “no one can believe in the Church, except in the Holy Spirit.” 782 To
grasp the intrinsic relationship between visible Church and divine reality is to enter the
very Mystery which is intelligible but not comprehensible.
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De Lubac, Catholicism, 68. De Lubac (ibid, 72-73), claims that because “The Church,
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arise a kind of exchange of idioms: Corpus Christi quod est ecclesia.”
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Though de Lubac insists on understanding the Church in terms of its divine
reality, he nonetheless demonstrates a very realistic picture of the sinfulness of the
Church, admitting that the visible Church will often hide rather than disclose this divine
reality. De Lubac claims that “this very same Church, is often unfaithful and
unsubmissive. In her members she is a sinner…the Church is also a symbol of perpetual
decline and mortality.”783 On account of the communication of idioms between the
Church and Christ, the visible Church is often the same kind of stumbling block that the
humanity of Christ posed to understanding his divinity. Yet the ability of the body of
Christ to hide Christ is much greater in the Church than in Christ‟s human body, because
the behavior of the Church is often sinful. 784 De Lubac realizes that the Church has a
responsibility to continually be a fitting sign. The actions of the Church serve to either
hide or disclose the divine reality of the Church. The behavior of those within the
Church has a real effect on whether the sign hides or discloses the reality. 785 Yet de
Lubac claims that the ability to see the divine reality of the Church is part of the gift of
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De Lubac (The Splendor of the Church, 48-49), claims, “[T]here is something yet more
„scandalous‟ and „foolish‟ about belief in a Church where the divine is not only united with the human, but
presents itself to us by way of the all-too-human, and that without any alternative…Truth to tell, the Church
is even more compact of contrast and paradox than Christ. We can say of the Church, as of Christ, „a great
mystery and wonderful sacrament,‟ but we are driven to say of her even more than of Christ…„A stone of
stumbling and a rock of offence‟…If a purification and transformation of vision is necessary to look on
Christ without being scandalized, how much more is it necessary when we are looking at the Church!”
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In The Splendor of the Church, after his chapter on the Church as sacrament (pp. 203-35),
de Lubac spends the rest of the chapter exhorting the Church to realize its sacramental position and not
mute the sacramental value of the sign (see esp. 228-35). The behavior of the Church has a real effect on
its value as sacramental sign.
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faith itself and stands despite the witness of its members. 786 In fact, faith that the Church
will truly be eschatologically transformed is one of the tests of Christian faith. 787
The Church as Sacrament: De Lubac has been a leading figure in emphasizing
the sacramental nature of the Church, resulting in the incorporation of this theological
description in the Second Vatican council. 788 In The Splendor of the Church, de Lubac
describes the Church as “the great sacrament which contains and vitalizes all the
others.”789 The Church is the great sacrament precisely as it operates in a sacramental
chain from Eucharist to Church to Christ to Triune God. De Lubac writes in Catholicism,
If Christ is the sacrament of God, the Church is for us the sacrament of Christ; she
represents him…she really makes him present…she is his very
continuation…the… exterior organization…is but an expression…of the interior
unity of a living entity, so that the Catholic is not only subject to a power but is a
member of a body as well, and his legal dependence on this power is to the end
that he might have part in the life of that body. 790
This description of the Church as sacrament will form the background for all de
Lubac‟s discussion of the Church. On account of its sacramental nature, de Lubac feels
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De Lubac (ibid, 46), claims, “But the dark side of the mystery is there too, and just as
surely…For the unbeliever whom the Father has not begun to draw to Him, the Church remains a
stumbling-block. And she can be a testing-round for the believer too, which is a good thing; perhaps the
test is all the more strenuous in proportion as his faith is purer and more vital.”
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De Lubac (ibid, 49), claims, “Let us within the Church, who speak of ourselves as being
„of the Church‟, manage to grasp the fact as sharply as it is sensed by those who are afraid of her and those
who run away from her.” However, this sense of faith will result in an optimism for the Church rooted in
faith. De Lubac (ibid, 78), claims, “We should…be on our guard against cramping within concepts that are
inadequate to it God‟s power to transfigure His Bride. Far from struggling against belief in something
which our imagination cannot picture, we ought to let the daring of faith sweep us off our feet.”
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The Vatican II Council‟s Lumen gentium (I, 1; II, 9; VII, 48) is the first time the Church is
called a sacrament in an ecumenical council.
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De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 203. De Lubac‟s chapter, “The Sacrament of
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that the Church can only be understood in terms of a series of paradoxes. The visible is
the indispensable means to the invisible, as is the human to the divine and the temporal to
the eternal. 791 Since de Lubac‟s ecclesiology has the same fundamental fourfold structure
as his understanding of Scripture, it can be assumed that the sacramental relationships
which exist in the Church can illumine de Lubac‟s understanding of the movement from
letter to spirit in his theology of Scripture.
Intrinsic Relationship Between Visible and Invisible: De Lubac‟s understanding
of the Church as sacrament suggests that at the fulfillment of the totus Christus, the sign
will pass away into reality. Given the pairs of paradoxes used to describe the Church, it
would be easy to associate the visible with the temporal and the human, and the invisible
with the eternal and the divine. Yet this would destroy the Christian Mystery. Much of
what is visible and human is also eternal, since the totus Christus will be the union of the
Church in history with Christ as head. Thus it does not follow that the sign will pass
away in all these relationships. Rather, just as in the sacramental nature of the
Incarnation, the sign is an integral and continual part of the Mystery.
Due to the intrinsic relationship between the human and divine aspects of the
Church, De Lubac emphatically rejects any division between the invisible Church and the
visible Church which would reduce the visible to merely a human institution. 792 On the
one hand, because the visible Church is “the sign of something else, it must be passed
through, and this not in part but wholly…it is not something intermediate, but something
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See especially de Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 23-29.
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De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 85-87.
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mediatory.”793 On the other hand, however, a sacramental sign cannot simply “be
changed at will” because it is “essentially related to our present condition.” Hence, de
Lubac claims, “We never come to the end of passing through this translucent medium,
which we must, nevertheless, always pass through and that completely. It is always
through it that we reach what it signifies; it can never be superceded, and its bounds
cannot be broken.”794 If viewed from the perspective of the sacramental structure of the
Church, the visible Church is inferior to the spiritual reality it signifies. And yet it is
impossible to discover that spiritual reality without the historical, institutional, visible
Church. 795 The individual believer will never be able to discover Christianity without the
Church nor go beyond the Church to a purely spiritual faith. 796
Since much of the function of the visible Church is to mediate sacramentally the
Mystery, however, those aspects which exist for this purpose (e.g. hierarchical
organization, sacramental system, etc.) will disappear with the return of Christ. De
Lubac claims, “The sacramental element in the Church, being adapted to our temporal
condition, is destined to disappear in the face of the definitive reality which it effectively
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De Lubac (ibid, 147), claims, “Recognition of authority in the Church is the first and
indispensable condition without which we cannot have any part in her vitalizing work...” De Lubac (The
Motherhood of the Church: Followed by Particular Churches in the Universal Church and an Interview
Conducted by Gwendoline Jarczyk, trans. Sergia Englund (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 68,
emphasizes that the three functions of “Word, worship, and government” cannot be “dissociated,” and thus
the visible structure could never be considered optional.
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De Lubac (The Splendor of the Church, 205-09), recounts the many enthusiastic proposals
by Enlightenment philosophers and theologians to move to a purely spiritual faith, a “Church of the Holy
Spirit” (the new era prophesied by Joachim of Fiore). De Lubac emphasizes that the age of the Spirit has
already occurred simultaneously with the age of Christ, and that the Spirit is the Spirit of Christ. As a
result, it is impossible to move beyond the Church which Christ formed to a less institutional faith.

281

signifies; but this should not be thought of as one thing‟s effacing of another. It will be
the manifestation of sacramentality‟s own proper truth; a glorious epiphany and a
consummation.”797 Thus de Lubac emphasizes, “We ought, indeed, to love that very
element in the Church which is transitory—but we ought to love it as the one and only
means, the indispensable organ, the providential instrument, and at the same time as „the
pledge, the passing image, the promise of the communion to come.‟” 798 Certain
sacramental aspects of the Church are destined to pass away when anagogy becomes
reality, yet this does not mean that the visible Church will give way to the invisible
Church.
De Lubac is careful not to say that the true Church is identical to the Roman
Catholic Church, but he does insist that the visible dimension of the Roman Catholic
Church is the true structure of the Church. De Lubac claims, “We shall not reduce the
mystical body of Christ to equivalence with the forms of the Roman Church, nor will we
water down the Church until it becomes a „body‟ conceived in an entirely „mystical‟
fashion. What we shall affirm is that the Church mysteriously transcends the limits of her
visibility, that by her very essence she carries herself, as it were, above herself.” 799 The
visible aspect is intrinsically related to the divine reality, yet the visible dimension is not
identical to the whole reality.
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Protestant theology, de Lubac feels, has lost the intrinsic relationship between
visible and invisible by focusing only on the invisible Church. 800 De Lubac feels that this
disregard for the visible Church causes Protestantism to implicitly deny the structure of
the Christian Mystery.801 By denying the sacramental necessity of the visible, they also
disregard the radical newness of the invisible. De Lubac argues that such Protestant
theologies could not possibly call the Church a sacrament, because their understanding of
the Church is “more inspired by the Old than the New Testament or, in other words, does
not fully enter into the logic of the Mystery of the Incarnation.” 802 In their stress on the
invisible Church, they have lost the uniqueness of the entry of God into human history
and the formation of the Church as a visible reality.
The Immediate Danger of Immanentism: De Lubac‟s ecclesiology, just as his
scriptural interpretation, seeks to avoid what he perceives to be the current errors of the
extrinsicism of the Neo-Thomists and the immanentism of contemporary secularism and
theological liberalism. Throughout his career, de Lubac resists the extrinsicist a tendency
on the one hand to see the Church primarily in terms of its divinely ordained
ecclesiastical structure (thus giving priority to the temporary aspect of the Church), and
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De Lubac (Catholicism, 75-76), claims that “the experience of Protestantism should serve
us as sufficient warning. Having stripped it of all its mystical attributes, it acknowledged in the visible
Church a mere secular institution; as a matter of course it abandoned it to the patronage of the state and
sought a refuge for the spiritual life in an invisible Church, its concept of which had evaporated into an
abstract ideal.” One could suspect that de Lubac is primarily lamenting the current state of German
Lutheranism.
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De Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 25.
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is really the reality that the OT people of God pointed toward as a sign.
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the historicist tendency on the other hand of viewing the Church simply as a social
institution of this world (thus forgetting the eschatological reality of the Church). Both
errors, de Lubac feels, are resisted by stressing the intrinsic sacramental structure of the
Church. Boersma claims, “For de Lubac, the neo-scholastic overemphasis on
hierarchical authority and the liberal critique of authority stemmed from one and the
same source: a sharp disjunction between nature and the supernatural resulting in a
„separated theology‟ that failed to see how authoritative, supernatural means of grace
played a divinely ordained role within the Eucharistic life of the Church.” 803 An intrinsic
relationship between sign and reality must be maintained so that the believer may be
incorporated into the Mystery through the movement from sign to reality.
During his later career, especially after the Second Vatican Council, de Lubac
sees immanentism as the primary danger confronting the Church, as he perceives a
tendency to dismiss the eschatological dimension in order to focus on the world at
present.804 The very structure of Christian reality presses de Lubac to emphasize the
divine, eschatological character of the Church as a counterbalance to what he perceives as
one-sided emphasis on the visible, this-worldly Church. Much of de Lubac‟s later
writing centers on the danger of immanentism in the Church.
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Boersma, Nouvelle Theologie, 258.
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The extent to which a need to stand against the immanentism of the Church is seen in The
Church: Paradox and Mystery, 122-23, where de Lubac provides a list of qualities which will characterize
the person of holiness will possess in the future. Most of these center on a resistance to immanentism:
“They will not…be ideologists…If they bring something truly new to the world….it will not be by means
of worldly generalities on the necessity to create and invent…tradition will be a source of strength, not a
millstone round their necks…They will not confuse the openness of life with the dissolution and
disintegration of death, nor the idolatry of man with brotherly charity…” This list indicates de Lubac‟s
continual concern about the encroachment of immanentism.
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De Lubac‟s concern about immanentism is seen in his rejection of
Schillebeeckx‟s claim that the Church is “the sacrament of the world.” 805 De Lubac,
having emphasized that the Church is the sacrament of Christ, worries that Schillebeeckx
will “confuse the „progress of the world‟ with the „new creation.‟” 806 De Lubac claims,
“Does the „eschatological kingdom‟ not appear, in all this, as the culmination of our
„earthly expectations‟, as their supreme fulfillment and consummation?”807
Consequently, de Lubac believes, making the Church the sacrament of the world would
eliminate the “difference between the Old and the New Testament.” 808 The Church
would no longer be the sacramental embodiment of the Mystery, but would fall victim to
immanentism. 809
De Lubac‟s concern about immanentism is also seen in de Lubac‟s
disappointment that Lumen Gentium chose the description “people of God” for the
Church over other New Testament images such as bride or body of Christ. 810 De Lubac
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“to emphasize the human traits of the Church,” he laments that the image of Church as bride of Christ is
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disapproves of the phrase for two reasons. First, this phrase stresses “continuity” over
“transformation,” thus straining the sacramental nature of the Church. 811 Instead, de
Lubac emphasizes, as always, the radical transformation brought about by the event of
Christ, in which “the infusion of the Holy Spirit placed the people of God in an
essentially new position…the Spirit of Christ has renewed, transfigured, and
„spiritualized‟ everything.”812 Second, de Lubac feels that the phrase „people of God,‟
undervalues the eschatological reality which the Church already participates. 813 For de
Lubac, the eschaton has already broken in to the natural order, and because of its union
with Christ, the Church is the eschatological reality, the kingdom, already, even if it still
awaits its full union.814 The radical newness to which the spiritual senses of Scripture
point is a present, if uncompleted reality in the Church.
For de Lubac, the key to retaining the sacramental nature of both Church and
Scripture is the preservation of anagogy. 815 For de Lubac, where the eschatological focus
is abandoned, the relationship between the historical sense and the allegorical sense will
“subordinated to that of the people of God,” since it is well-represented in both Scripture and in the Fathers.
Thus, says de Lubac, “readers must be careful not to take this expression in isolation” (23).
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De Lubac, ibid, 39-44.
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Ibid, 43.
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Ibid, 49-50. See Lumen Gentium II, 9-17. De Lubac (The Church: Paradox and Mystery,
50), sees the problem mostly as a matter of emphasis, claiming that the council did not “suppress the
consideration of collective eschatology, showing the people of God being guided, generation after
generation, towards, and already mystically united to, the heavenly Jerusalem” (50). The problem of
immanentism, then, is largely a problem of the subsequent application of the council.
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De Lubac (ibid, 51), criticizes the council for “a certain narrowing of the patristic
horizons,” which neglects the „already‟ aspect of the eschatological understanding of the Church. De
Lubac (ibid, 52), claims, “In one way, for the people of God envisaged as still on pilgrimage through the
obscurity of this world, it is altogether a matter of the „not-yet‟. But in another way—and one that cannot
be disassociated from the first—for which the Church considered as a gift from above and the habitation of
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no longer be understood in a sacramental manner. The abandonment of the anagogical
sense will almost inevitably result in a focus on nature without the supernatural. 816 If
allegory is not finally realized in the totus Christus, the “different order” made present by
allegory becomes simply a higher dimension of the natural order.817

B. Relationship between Scripture and Church in the Economy
As we have seen, the strength of de Lubac‟s hermeneutical proposal is found in
his attempt to shift the discussion away from simply the relationship between text and
reader and onto the place of Scripture in mediating the Mystery in the divine economy.
In this section I will examine how Scripture, Eucharist and Church relate to one another
as fellow mediators of the totus Christus. As the singular Mystery is approached in
various ways, de Lubac insists that an intrinsic unity must exist between these different
realities in the economy.
In his emphasis on the singular Mystery of Christian faith and the various ways in
which God mediates this Mystery, de Lubac once again develops his thought from the
philosophy of Maurice Blondel. In his important essay, History and Dogma, published in
1903, Blondel sought to avoid what he saw as the dual errors of “extrinsicism” and
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Dismissal of anagogy would be dismissal of “the presence of the eternal.” De Lubac
(Catholicism, 357-58), emphasizes that “it is the role of the Christian…to raise his voice and remind those
who forget it of their own nobility; man is only himself, he only exists for himself here and now if he can
discover within himself” the “presence of the eternal.” De Lubac (ibid, 354-55), emphasizes that,
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“historicism” through “tradition.”818 Extrinsicism is defined by Blondel as the use of the
historical evidence of Scripture primarily as an instrument of apologetics to prove a
spiritual reality, rather than seeking to understand the revelation brought about by, or
contained in, the historical event. In extrinsicism, historical events are regarded as
merely extrinsic signs which point toward, but are not intrinsically related to, the spiritual
reality that is assumed.819 The opposite error, historicism, is defined by Blondel as the
reduction of the content of the Christian faith to only what is in principle observable to
the secular historian. In historicism, Christian faith is viewed as merely a historical or
social reality, without any intrinsic relationship to a transcendent reality.
Blondel suggests that both extrinsicism and immanentism, though completely
opposed to each other, are really two sides of the same coin. Both reduce the revelatory
action of God in history; extrinsicism by limiting God‟s action to the „proof‟ that can be
adduced from it, and historicism by limiting God‟s action to what the secular historian
can ascertain. Neither approach is useful for apprehending the reality of Christian Faith,
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Blondel (Blondel, History and Dogma, 224-41), seeks a middle way between two
“incomplete and incompatible solutions,” on the one hand the extrinsicism of the neo-thomists who use
history as apologetic data to support the legitimacy of the Christian faith, and on the other hand the
historicism of theological liberals who reduced the spiritual realm to what can be explained by means of
some universal human spirit or demonstrable historical data. Blondel‟s solution is to re-identify the role of
tradition as the “living synthesis” which unifies God‟s past action in history with the present Christian faith.
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Blondel (ibid, 227), claims that in extrinsicism “historical facts are merely a vehicle, the
interest of which is limited to the apologetic use which can be made of them; for, whether this or that
miracle is involved, provided that it is a miracle, the argument remains the same” (emphasis his). The
result, Blondel, (ibid, 228), claims, is that “the relation of the sign to the thing signified is extrinsic, the
relation of the facts to the theology superimposed upon them is extrinsic, and extrinsic too is the link
between our thought and our life and the truths proposed to us from outside.”
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as both have disconnected spiritual reality from historical event. 820 To confront these
errors, Blondel makes a key distinction between secular history, the historian‟s
construction of the past by whatever tools are available, and “real history” which is the
whole reality of life and hence always transcends what could be reconstructed by the
secular historian.821 Blondel realizes that philosophical description must be given to the
element which maintains the intrinsic relationship between both historical event and lived
reality, history and dogma.822
For Blondel, tradition is that living link which connects history as a lived reality
with events as they are observed by the secular historian. Blondel suggests that because
“the Church does not rest entirely on the Scriptures, and that the History in which
Catholicism obliges us to believe is not only the history which the historian can
establish,”823 it is necessary to say that “only a principle distinct from texts and formulae
can relate, harmonize and organize them.” 824 This principle, for Blondel, is tradition,
which provides a “living synthesis” as it links history and spiritual reality through
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Ibid, 244-64. Blondel‟s distinction between the “historic Christ” and the “real Christ” is
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truncating of Christian faith.
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Ibid, 264. Hence Blondel (ibid), claims that there is “need for an intermediary between
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the Church legitimately supports and interprets the Bible?‟”
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experience and reason in submission to Christ, its Head. 825 Since the singular Mystery
cannot be comprehensively manifested in a particular historical event, the Church is
required to continually manifest its reality. 826 On Blondel‟s account, tradition “extends
further than Scripture. Even in regard to what Scripture tells us, it possesses a special
virtue and a distinct competence; and it does not rely only on oral transmission to lead us
deeper and deeper into the reality revealed, and to the Revealer himself who constitutes it
in its entirety.”827 As a result, a reciprocal relationship can be said to exist between
Scripture and Tradition, so that each deepens the understanding of the other.
De Lubac furthers the work of Blondel by providing a more complete theological
description of the intrinsic relationship between tradition and Scripture. In the case of the
Christian faith, the „spirit‟ which transcends what is observable to the sciences is
precisely the Holy Spirit, and consequently must be understood to be qualitatively and
quantitatively different from the „spirit‟ of any lived reality which transcends what is
observable in that reality. 828 Just as the secular historian cannot expect to understand the
fuller dimension of lived history, so much the more the historian cannot expect to
understand the full spiritual reality of the Christian faith through the discipline of history
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alone. Both Scripture and Church are fellow mediators of the Mystery of Christ, and the
intrinsic relationship between them is grounded in the Incarnate Christ. In History and
Spirit, de Lubac follows Origen in calling Eucharist, Scripture and Church three
“incorporations” of the Logos and seeks to distinguish the sacramental role of each in
mediating the one Mystery in the divine economy. 829 All three incorporations are distinct
from revelation, yet are employed by God in mediating revelation. While each
incorporation has a unique role in the economy, all three mediate the same Mystery.

1. Incarnation of the Logos: The Singular Revelation of Christ
For de Lubac, revelation is God‟s action in history, culminating in the event of
Christ. De Lubac emphasizes the priority of the Event of Christ over Scriptural witness
to that event when he claims, “Christianity is not at all, properly speaking, a „religion of
the Book‟: it is the „religion of the Word‟—but not merely nor principally of the Word in
its written (or oral) form.”830 Since the Word is incarnated in the humanity of Christ but
only incorporated in Scripture, only the former is to be considered revelation. 831 De
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In a section of History and Spirit entitled “The Incorporations of the Logos” (pp. 385-426),
de Lubac speaks directly to the relationship between four sacramental realities in the divine economy in
which dwells the eternal Logos: the hypostatically united Christ, Scripture, Eucharist, and Church. Each is
an aspect of the same Mystery, yet each operates causally on the others in this mediation. The first of these
is an “Incarnation” of the Logos, while the last three are “Incorporations” of the Logos. The distinctions
between these two words are decisive, since it was the historical event of the Incarnation which grounds the
Christian faith. Incorporations are ways of making the Mystery made present in the historical event present
today.
De Lubac, La révélation divine (3rd ed) in OEuvrew completes IV, Eric de MoulinsBeaufort and Georges Chantraine (eds) (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 2006), 161, cited by Eric MoulinsBeaufort, "Henri De Lubac: Reader of Dei Verbum," Communio 28 (2001)., 679.
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Voderholzer, “Dogma and History,” 658, claims, “Revelation is achieved in the incarnate
Word, which unifies and fulfills the many words of the Old Covenant, and which is then unfolded in the
New Testament‟s witness to revelation as the word of God in the word of men.” Voderholzer, (ibid, 664),
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Lubac claims that Scripture “contains all of revelation” although revelation and Scripture
are not identical. 832
De Lubac maintains the priority of event over text in the literal sense of Scripture
because revelation was, strictly speaking, event. It is this priority of Christ over textual
witness which necessitates the fourfold exegesis of Scripture. De Lubac emphasizes,
To say that the Scriptures are the Word of God is not, therefore, simply to
designate a succession of books. It is to aim at its internal organization, its
structuring around the center that is Christ. The reading of the holy Scriptures
grants us communion with the faith of these concrete men who were seized by
God and opened to the mystery of Christ by the Holy Spirit; Christ unites us with
them.833
For de Lubac, to interpret Scripture in light of Christ is to give the event of Christ, as
revelation, logical priority over the mediation of that event by Scripture. This, in turn,
necessarily imposes a fourfold hermeneutic to keep all of Scripture unified on this event.
It is also the priority of Christ over Scripture which necessitates reading in the
Church. The distinction between Scripture and revelation allows de Lubac, in continuity
with Vatican II, to subject both Scripture and Church to the event of Christ and
emphasize that both Scripture and tradition are used by God to mediate the Mystery. 834

notes that Dei Verbum emphasizes that by naming Christ Himself as Revelation, the council “defuse[d] a
long-standing dispute about the sources of revelation; neither Scripture nor Tradition may be regarded as
sources of revelation in the strict, properly dogmatic sense of the word. Rather, Christ himself is the one
source of revelation.”
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Reader of Dei Verbum," 680. Christ, “The revealed object „is transmitted to us whole and entire by
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The Church, currently participating in the Mystery and existing as Mystery, is the only
organization which has a sense of this Mystery. 835 De Lubac claims, “Now it is in the
Spirit that the Church…receives her heritage and understands this heritage in truth. The
„true‟ meaning of Scripture, its full and definitive meaning, cannot be other than the one
„that the Spirit gives to the Church.‟” 836 It is only in the Church that the unity of the
Testaments can be maintained, since only the Church has the “instinct” to read Scripture
in this way. 837
The Catholic insistence on interpreting Scripture within the Church has long been
viewed suspiciously by Protestants, who are concerned that human beings will place
themselves above of the word of God. This fear has caused them to summarily dismiss
serious investigation of other senses of Scripture beyond the literal sense. Yet de Lubac
argues that the role of the Church is to ensure that Scripture is always used for the
illumination of the Mystery. Hence, de Lubac claims,
The Magisterium merely guarantees that the development of the mysteries of the
faith in the minds of believers remains within the complete and definitive „figure‟
of this mystery. It guarantees that the communion of these believers remains open
to an Object that is „incomprehensible‟ in the etymological sense of the word,
because it is he who „embraces me beyond my capacity to embrace him‟—and
this embrace is that of a living Person.‟838
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651118_deiverbum_en.html. Accessed July 12, 2011).
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De Lubac, The Sources of Revelation, 114, claims that the Church always knows by
instinct the relationship between the two Testaments: “In subtle balance, ordered by an extremely sure
instinct, the Church affirms from the time of her birth and will maintain during the whole course of her
history „the precise and indissoluble interdependence of the Old and New Testaments.‟”
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De Lubac, La révélation divine, 158-59, cited by Moulins-Beaufort, "Henri De Lubac:
Reader of Dei Verbum," 692. Henri de Lubac ("Preface," in La Parole Vivante Au Concile: Texte Et
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The role of the Magisterium is to keep the interpretation of the text oriented
toward the singular Mystery, and to proscribe those interpretations which prohibit such
Christian readings. Here de Lubac‟s focus, much like Frei‟s work, is on the chastening of
readers rather than the muting of the text. The reading of Scripture within the Church is
meant to eliminate those readings of Scripture that are incompatible with the identity of
the Church and to illumine the Mystery to which only the Church can sense. This
understanding of the Magisterium is possible only when it is assumed that the event of
Christ grounds both Scripture and Church as mediators of that Event. As I will now
show, a certain reciprocal causality exists between Eucharist, Scripture and Church as
unique but intrinsically and ultimately unified mediators of the Mystery.

2. Incorporations of the Logos: Scripture and Church
De Lubac refers to Scripture, Church and Eucharist as mutual incorporations of
the Logos.839 This terminology qualitatively distinguishes Christ as the Incarnation of the
Logos from these theological realities which mediate Christ as Incorporations of the
Logos. Incorporations are the various ways by which God mediates the Mystery in the
economy of redemption. De Lubac, then, subjects both Scripture and Church to the event

Commentaire De La Constitution Sur La Revelation, ed. R. and M. Thurian Schultz (Taize: Presses de
Taize, 1966), 4, cited by Moulins-Beaufort, 691), claims, using a citation from Saint Francis de Sales,
“According to us, it is not Scripture that needs rule or light, but our glosses; we do not place a judgment
between God and ourselves, but rather between „a man like Calvin and another man like Morus.‟”
839

See de Lubac, History and Spirit, “The Incorporations of the Logos” (pp. 385-426).
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of Christ and shows that their authority and their intrinsic relationship are grounded in
Christ.840
Eucharist Makes the Church: De Lubac‟s, Corpus Mysticum, written in 1944,
focused on the causal relationship between the Eucharist and the Church. There de
Lubac claims that “the Eucharist corresponds to the Church as cause to effect, as means
to end, as sign to reality.”841 De Lubac argues in the book that throughout the early
Church and up to the 12th century, the Church had been able to hold together Eucharist,
Church, and Christ by understanding that the Eucharist was the corpus mysticum which
had as its goal the unity of the Church with Christ its head. During the Middle Ages, de
Lubac feels, an “inversion” took place in the terminology between “corpus mysticum”
which had been applied to the Eucharist and now was applied to the Church, and “verum
corpus” which had been applied to the Church but was now applied to the Eucharist to
emphasize Real Presence. 842 This inversion resulted in the loss of focus on the causal
relationship between Eucharist and Church, placing apologetic emphasis only on the real
presence of Christ in the Eucharist. De Lubac argues that the “final result was that the
first two of the „three‟ bodies, that is, the historical and sacramental bodies, were
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De Lubac (La révélation divine, 164-65, cited by Moulins-Beaufort, "Henri De Lubac:
Reader of Dei Verbum," 680), claims that Christ, “The revealed object „is transmitted to us whole and
entire by Scripture, and whole and entire by Tradition, both of which are intimately connected.‟”
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De Lubac, Henri de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle
Ages: A Historical Survey, trans. Gemma Simmonds, Richard Price and Christopher Stephens; ed.
Laurence Paul Hemming and Susan Frank Parsons (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007).
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De Lubac (Catholicism, 100, n. 68), claims, “At first and for quite a long time, „Corpus
mysticum‟ meant the Eucharistic body, as opposed to the „corpus Christi quod est Ecclesia‟, which was the
„verum corpus‟ par excellence. Was it not in fact quite natural to designate as „mystical‟ that body whose
hidden presence was due to „mystical prayer‟ and which was received in a „mystical banquet‟? that body
offered in forms which „mystically‟ signified the Church? It is possible to trace the slow inversion of the
two expressions.”
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identified with each other while the third, the ecclesial body, was detached from the
historical and the sacramental.”843 The importance here is that when the Church
understood her existence in terms of the fourfold Christian understanding, it understood
that the visible sacrament of the Eucharist constitutes the Church and moves it toward its
eschatological reality as the totus Christus. Hence an intrinsic relationship exists
between sacrament and Church, wherein the sacrament has a causal effect on the Corpus
Mysticum, the body of Christ, anticipating its anagogical union as totus Christus.
Scripture Makes the Church: In History and Spirit, the efficacy of the Eucharist
is equated with the efficacy of Scripture.844 Like the Eucharist, Scripture constitutes the
Church as Scripture makes present the Mystery of Christ. 845 De Lubac claims, “Scripture
is…already like the coming of the Son of Man, for it has within itself the radiance of
truth. Now the Church, in accepting it, takes in this radiance…Scripture is thus like the
voice of Christ speaking to the Church and in the Church; it is his efficacious sign; it thus
assures the luminous presence of Christ to the Church.” 846 Thus Scripture, by being
incorporated by the Logos, has a causal role in the divine economy in forming the
Church‟s members into the one body of Christ. Boersma claims that de Lubac
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Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 65, noting de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, 184.

844
Boersma, (Nouvelle Theologie, 163), claims, “In de Lubac‟s portrayal, Origen had
regarded Scripture as one element in a „triology‟ of „incorporations‟ of the Word. Scripture and Eucharist
had both functioned as „body of Christ‟ sacramentally pointing to the Church and, through the Church, to
the completed body of Christ, the eternal Logos.”
845
De Lubac (History and Spirit, 418), claims, “The life of the Church has its source in
Scripture. It has it no less in the Eucharist.” De Lubac (ibid), notes that Origen gives Scripture a certain
causal priority over the Eucharist because “the „Word‟ is, in its pure essence, that very reality: for the Son
of God, God himself, is „Word‟.” This does not mean that Scripture is above the Eucharist, but that while
both “express and reveal the Logos… Scripture does so, in the final analysis, with a superiority that allows
one to consider it…as the „truth‟ of which the Eucharist would be the symbol” (419).
846

Ibid, 418.
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“emphasized the „efficacious sign‟ character of Scripture and Eucharist, both of them
transforming the recipients into Christ himself: „Scripture and Eucharist are thereby
joined once again. Both never ceased to “build up” the Church.‟” 847 Both Scripture and
Eucharist render Christ present to the Church, and thus both constitute the Church and
impel the Church toward its eschatological reality. 848
The Church Makes the Scripture and Eucharist: Though both Scripture and
Eucharist make the Church, mediation of the Mystery is not one-directional, since both
Scripture and Eucharist depend on the Church for their existence and efficacy. With
regard to Scripture, de Lubac emphasizes that “it is only in the Church, through the effect
of the Church‟s preaching, that this Scripture ceases to be a simple mass of letters in
order to become a living language.”849 The Church has produced the Scriptures and has
the ability to interpret Scripture, and without such interpretation, the individual could
never understand the Logos within it.850 With regard to the Eucharist, de Lubac
emphasizes that the hierarchy makes the Eucharist as part of its sacramental structure.
Balthasar notes this reciprocal relationship claiming, “There lies at the heart of the
Church an ineradicable complementarity: the Church (through her hierarchical office)
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Boersma, Nouvelle Theologie,163, citing de Lubac, History and Spirit, 418.

848
De Lubac (History and Spirit, 422-23), emphasizes the anagogical sense of Scripture as he
focuses on the causal effect of Eucharist and Scripture on the Church, as both Scripture and sacrament will
be “only still symbolic in relation to what it will become in the other life, or rather, what the other life will
be…” Susan Wood notes the necessity of anagogy for both the Eucharist/Church relationship with the
literal/spiritual senses of Scripture. Wood (Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 55-56), notes that in both
Eucharistic ecclesiology and spiritual exegesis, sign and reality can only be held together by looking
forward to a full future union between the two (an anagogical sense) in the totus Christus.
849

De Lubac, History and Spirit, 422.

850
De Lubac (ibid, 420), claims that the Church “dispenses” the Word, because the “Church is
for each of us the place of the Logos. In the Church…we hear the Word, and it is the hearing of the Word
that builds up the Church for all eternity.”
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„makes the Eucharist‟, and the „Eucharist makes the Church‟ as incorporation into
Christ‟s body.”851 De Lubac concludes that “we must be careful not to make the smallest
break between the Mystical Body and the Eucharist…The two mysteries must be
understood by one another and their point of unity grasped at depth.”852 Hence there
exists a reciprocal causality between Eucharist, Scripture and Church, so that all become
constitutive signs which lead to the others yet which are ultimately unified in the divine
economy.

IV. De Lubac‟s Contributions to Scripture in the Economy
In this chapter I have suggested that de Lubac‟s project seeks to explain two
essential hermeneutical issues which have potential to advance the discussion between
Tracy and Frei. First, de Lubac has explicitly shown that a Christian reading of Scripture
will inevitably make a move from text to spiritual reality. This movement is essential to
Christian reading, de Lubac suggests, because the Triune God uses just these texts for
self-communication to the Church in the economy of redemption. Readers are drawn into
the singular Christian Mystery as they interpret Scripture according to the fourfold
structure of the economy of redemption. All Christian reality can be approached in this
fourfold manner, seen most clearly in the traditional fourfold interpretation of
Scripture.853 Here Scripture is understood as both letter and spirit, with the spiritual
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Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Henri De Lubac, 108.
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De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church, 156-57.
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In fact, Blondel‟s discussion of tradition anticipates the fourfold dimensions of
apprehension of the Mystery that de Lubac‟s fourfold sense of Scripture will develop in detail. While the
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reality emphasizing both the „already‟ and the „not yet‟ aspects of the Mystery (allegory
and anagogy), as well as the intrinsic relationship between the individual and the Church
(tropology and allegory). In order to read Scripture in the economy of redemption, some
movement from text to spiritual reality must be clearly articulated.
Second, De Lubac has shown that an intrinsic relationship exists between
Scripture and Church, since both are ordained by God to mediate the singular Mystery
revealed in Christ, both are structured toward the fourfold understanding of Christian
reality, and each exercises a causal relationship on the other. De Lubac emphasizes that
the premodern Church interpreted Scripture in accord with its own nature. MoulinsBeaufort summarizes the relationship between scriptural interpretation and ecclesiology
for de Lubac by claiming that “the ultimate criterion of the interpretation of Scripture is
not some hermeneutical principle, but the unity of persons for whom the Church
exercises her maternity.” 854 As the Church realized that it is the new reality formed in
relationship to Christ the head (allegory), which was anticipated by the sign (history), it
realized also its movement toward eschatological fulfillment (anagogy) in the totus
Christus through the transformation of individuals incorporated into the whole
(tropology). De Lubac‟s insistence that the Church be understood primarily as it will be
in its eschatological form allows him to show that the fourfold interpretation of Scripture
distinction between letter and spirit is central to Blondel‟s project, Blondel (ibid, 277), also suggests the
necessity of the anagogical nature of tradition (“Tradition is less concerned to conserve than to discover: it
will only attain the ά at the ω”), as well as the presence of both allegory and tropology in the relation of the
corporate to the individual (“Without the Church, the faithful would not detect the true hand of God in the
Bible and in souls; but, unless each believer brought his little contribution to the common life, the organism
would not be fully alive and spiritual”). Thus in articulating the philosophical relationship between history,
dogma and tradition, Blondel articulates the same fourfold relationship to the Christian reality that de
Lubac argues is essential to premodern exegesis.
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Moulins-Beaufort, “Henri de Lubac: Reader of Dei Verbum,” 692, summarizing de Lubac,
The Motherhood of the Church, 39-168.
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flows naturally from the fourfold structure of the Church, and hence the fourfold structure
of all Christian understanding.
These two conclusions the role of Scripture in the economy and the intrinsic
relationship between Scripture and Church provide several insights by which to advance
the discussion between Frei, Tracy and Vanhoozer. First, de Lubac‟s description of the
Church as a theological reality moves beyond Frei‟s description of the Church as a sociolinguistic community, and will better show how the Church participates in the Mystery of
Christ. De Lubac would likely be quite suspicious that Frei‟s description of the Church
comes close to lapsing into immanentism, and would insist that only as the Church is
described as a theological reality can the Church work out a consistent hermeneutic of
Scripture. Second, de Lubac‟s ecclesiology provides a possible solution to the
disagreement about authority between Frei and Vanhoozer. Where Vanhoozer places
authority in Scripture as God‟s communication, and Frei places authority in the selfdescription of the community as constitutive of the normative role of the literal sense, de
Lubac advances the discussion by grounding both Scripture and Church in the reality of
Christ and giving Church and Scripture essential mediating roles in communicating that
reality. De Lubac would agree with Vanhoozer that Scripture is a species of God‟s
communication to guide and direct the Church, and de Lubac would agree with Frei that
the self-description of the Church is fundamental for establishing rules of Scriptural
reading. Yet in both Vanhoozer and Frei, de Lubac would find a deficient theological
description of the Church at the root of inadequate interpretive strategy. Where
Vanhoozer describes the Church as only a response to Scripture, de Lubac would
seemingly say that the Church is also constitutive of Scripture, and that both mediate and
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are impelled toward the same Mystery. Where Frei describes the Church as establishing
the literal sense as normative by a community consensus, de Lubac would argue that the
Church is compelled to read the Gospels literally as a recognition of God‟s action in
history is the indispensable means to the disclosure of the Christian Mystery in which the
Church participates.
Yet while de Lubac‟s project provides theological resources for moving beyond
certain impasses in the debate between Frei and Tracy, several hermeneutical difficulties
remain in his own project which could be helped by the projects of Frei, Tracy and
Vanhoozer. First, de Lubac‟s equation of the “letter” with history simply bypasses much
of the contemporary hermeneutical debate, which centers on the way in which the text
renders its referent. De Lubac‟s work remains underdeveloped in treating the literal
sense of Scripture, and this confuses the movement from text to historical referent. Lack
of specification between the literal sense as history or as plain sense, as Old Covenant
anticipation of the New Covenant or as the whole canon viewed by the secular historian
limits de Lubac‟s exegetical influence. Much is at stake in this movement from text to
history, for what the text uniquely renders will help to show the place of Scripture in the
economy. It is here that Tracy, Frei and Vanhoozer will be instructive to de Lubac, as
their projects will insist on the importance of the literal sense.
Second, de Lubac‟s project depends on a particular “sacramental ontology” of the
movement between nature and the supernatural. 855 Yet while it may be true that
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This presses for a return to a symbolic method of theology. See here Boersma (Nouvelle
Theologie, 252), who claims, “In short, de Lubac did not just present a plea for a return to a more
Eucharistic understanding of the Church; his concern was also for the restoration of a symbolic approach to
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Christian self-description depends on a fourfold understanding of Christian reality, both
Vanhoozer and Frei suggest that it is possible to preserve the dimensions of
transcendence and anagogy indispensable to Christian faith while interpreting only the
literal sense of the text. While de Lubac has thoroughly shown the foundation of the
fourfold interpretation of Scripture in the Christian tradition, his goal of re-establishing
spiritual exegesis as a practice of the Church has remained largely unrealized. Frei and
Vanhoozer especially would remain critical that such a hermeneutical practice would
reduce to eisegesis, as it would allow the Church to avoid the plain sense of the text. In
the next chapter, I will suggest some possible convergence between these four
theologians which gives adequate attention to the role of Scripture in the broader context
of the divine economy.

theology, one that he felt had suffered greatly through the twelfth-century introduction of dialectical
theology.”
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CHAPTER 4:
LOCATING SCRIPTURE‟S ROLE IN THE ECONOMY OF REDEMPTION
I. Introduction: Advancing the Discussion
In the first chapter of this dissertation I suggested that many of the impasses
between Hans Frei and David Tracy have been caused by a narrowing of hermeneutical
discussions to the relationship between text and readers. I suggested that by locating the
place of Scripture in the broader context of the economy of redemption, it would be
possible to ease many of the difficulties between them, as the hermeneutical discussion
would be expanded to include God‟s use of Scripture to communicate to the Church.
Kevin Vanhoozer provided one attempt to locate Scripture in the economy of redemption,
as he builds an ontology of God as author who communicates to the Church through the
literal, canonical sense of the Scriptural texts. Henri de Lubac provided a very different
approach to locating Scripture in the economy of redemption, as de Lubac explains the
economy as the singular Mystery revealed in Jesus Christ and mediated sacramentally in
Scripture and Church alike. In this chapter, I will place all four authors in dialogue to
show how each of these very different hermeneutical projects, when examined in the
context of the economy of redemption, are able to contribute to a more complete
theological interpretation of Scripture. Here I will examine how God uniquely uses
Scripture for Triune self-mediation to readers so that they may be uniquely incorporated
into the Church as the eschatological totus Christus. This structure is based on the classic
understanding of the divine economy as exitus and reditus, God‟s action toward creation,

303

the transformation of creation by God, and the return of creation to God.856 Thus
situating Scripture in the divine economy will place the text/reader relationship between
two other essential relationships: The relationship between Christ and Scripture and the
relationship between Scripture and the Church.
In this introduction I first suggest that different categories are needed to describe
the differences between Tracy and Frei than those which have typically been used. I will
suggest that locating Scripture in the economy will provide just those categories which
will advance the discussion. Then, I will show that the projects of both Tracy and Frei
require them to articulate this broader theological context in which reading takes place. I
will suggest that because both Frei and Tracy see Scriptural reading as a unique activity
in which the Triune God is disclosed to the reader, they must explain both the way in
which God uses Scripture and the capacity of the Church to encounter God in Scriptural
reading. After showing that articulation of the relationship between Christ and Church is
a requirement of their own hermeneutical aims, I will show how articulating this broader
context will advance the debate.

A. The Inadequacy of the Usual Categorizations
A number of theological and philosophical distinctions have been suggested in an
attempt to categorize the divergent trajectories of revisionists and postliberals. While
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This typical way of structuring the economy of redemption is seen, for example, in
Aquinas‟s structure of the Summa (See Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His
Work, trans. Robert Royal, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996),
150-52). Telford Work (Living and Active, vii-xi) similarly structures the divine economy as, “The
beginning of Scripture: the Word of God,” “the mission of Scripture: a school for all the world,” and “the
end of Scripture: God‟s word in faithful practice.”
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some are quite helpful in illuminating certain key similarities and differences between the
two schools, I will argue here that the discussion has led to impasse because no proposal
has thus far been successful in getting to the heart of the difficulty. The real issue has not
proven to be the choice between a system of “proclamation” or “manifestation” as Tracy
typically describes it, nor has the real issue been captured in the relationship between
philosophical description and the Church‟s self-description, as Frei‟s Types of Christian
Theology so helpfully categorizes it, nor has the real issue fully surfaced the distinction
between “foundationalists” and “nonfoundationalists,” as many postliberals have
suggested.857 While each of these categorizations has illumined significant options for
theological method, none of them has really probed to the center of the disagreement
between Tracy and Frei. The real difference between Tracy and Frei, I will suggest in
this chapter, is that each uses a different hermeneutical method to show the movement
from the plain sense of the text to the spiritual reality which it discloses to readers. These
methods appear to be incompatible when they are compared only in the context of the
text/reader relationship. Yet, when examined in the broader context of the economy of
redemption, they may be seen as compatible and even mutually complementary. Here I
provide a short description of the most common categorizations of the disagreement and
show why each falls short of really getting to the heart of the issue.
Proclamation and Manifestation: Tracy has suggested that the primary difference
is the distinction between “manifestation” and “proclamation” theologians. 858 Tracy
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See here John E. Thiel, Nonfoundationalism (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994).
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See especially Tracy, The Analogical Imagination 371-89, as well as the previous
discussion about proclamation and manifestation in this dissertation in chapter 2, “Relationship to David
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wants to show that theologies of proclamation can ultimately be located as critical
moments within the larger schema of manifestation, and therefore that the trajectory of
manifestation better captures the essence of the Christian tradition. Tracy‟s attempt to
incorporate “proclamation” theology as a necessary moment in his own system of
“manifestation” was intended to show that encounters of radical transcendence and
confrontation are a common and necessary prerequisite for encounters of
“manifestation,” in which readers recognize “some pervasive yes at the heart of the
universe, some radical mystery sensed as power, as an abiding love that undoes all our
more usual senses of the futility and absurdity of existence.”859 Vanhoozer, in his early
writings, agreed that Tracy‟s distinction adequately captured the nature of the debate. In
those writings Vanhoozer strongly resisted the entire trajectory of manifestation because
he felt it necessarily compromised the Gospel message. Vanhoozer argued that both
Ricoeur and Tracy were manifestation theologians who were consequently unable to
articulate the nature of revelation in an adequate way. 860 As a result, Vanhoozer
vigorously defended a system of meaning which would safeguard Christian proclamation

Tracy” above. Tracy (The Analogical Imagination, 379), characterizes “manifestation” as that
“power…now disclosed…reflecting upon the original experience of wonder in existence…to a mediated
sense of a fundamental trust in the ultimate reality of God as well as an attendant trust in all reality as
graced. Reflection upon that uncanny sense of wonder discloses the uncanny giftedness of all creation. It
transforms the stuttering self into a creature alive to and with a fundamental trust in the ultimate reality
manifesting itself/himself/herself as none other than the incomprehensible, a pure, unbounded, powerful
love decisively re-presented as my God in the event of Jesus Christ.” Tracy (ibid, 386-87), characterizes
“proclamation” as emphasizing “the radical transcendence of God and the eschatological coming of God‟s
word into this world in the triumph of grace in Jesus Christ” so that “only if God comes to disclose our true
godforsakenness and our possible liberation can we be healed.”
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Ibid, 386.
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Vanhoozer (Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 180), claims, “By
attributing to the poetic word the sacramental function of manifesting transcendence, Ricoeur erases the
very distinction between nature and grace that was so important to Barth.…For Ricoeur…revelation is not
so much an „impossible possibility‟ as a natural possibility shared by sacred and secular narratives alike.”
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from what he considered to be the destructive advances of the manifestation
theologians. 861 Even in his later work, Vanhoozer remains a decidedly “proclamation”
theologian, although his recent ontology of communication would force him to somewhat
temper his early harshness.
Yet when Vanhoozer is compared to de Lubac, it appears that Tracy‟s dichotomy
between proclamation and manifestation is not so helpful after all. Vanhoozer and de
Lubac share many theological commitments, and both emphasize the uniqueness of
encounter in Scripture, God‟s supervening use of Scripture to communicate to the
Church, and the need to develop a participatory hermeneutics which incorporates the
reader into the meaning of the text. Yet while Vanhoozer develops his career on the
proclamation trajectory, de Lubac would be better located in Tracy‟s manifestation
model. De Lubac proclaims with vigor the disruptive, transformative Word of God
mediated through Scripture, yet de Lubac‟s sacramental ontology is much more at home
with a system of manifestation than proclamation. In de Lubac, Vanhoozer would find a
manifestation theologian whose theological convictions are very close to his own. When
Vanhoozer and de Lubac are compared, we see that the real disagreement is the location
of the Church in relation to Scripture in the economy of redemption, a disagreement that
has little to do with manifestation and proclamation. 862 Hence proclamation and
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See Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 150-180 and
Vanhoozer "The Spirit of Understanding,” 220.
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To be sure, the trajectories of proclamation and manifestation do lead to different
emphases by each theologian. While Vanhoozer, in terms typical of proclamation theologians, emphasizes
the authoring character of God in relation to Scripture, de Lubac, more akin to manifestation theologians,
emphasizes the ongoing communication of the Spirit of Christ through the text in terms of sacramental
mediation. Yet for neither theologian would these differences create a deep conflict in the resulting
program. The real remaining difference between them is the understanding of the place of the Church in
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manifestation appear to be only a small part of a larger disagreement about the structure
of the economy of redemption.
Critical Correlation: Frei and Tracy have both suggested that a central
disagreement between them is the relationship between Christian self-description and
secular philosophical systems of meaning. The debate, as Frei articulates it, is whether
the interpreter ought to employ an “ad hoc” or “systematic” correlation in order to render
the content of Christian faith intelligible. 863 Frei affirms the need to make the Christian
faith intelligible using general philosophical concepts. But he does not look for any
particular criteria to ground this correlation, as he feels that the criteria itself would have
priority over Christian self-description. Tracy, on the other hand, is committed to finding
both criteria of “appropriateness” to the Christian tradition and criteria of “intelligibility,”
a systematic correlation between the Christian tradition and common human experience
based on secular criteria. 864
Yet while Frei‟s posthumous book, Types of Christian Theology, is a remarkable
achievement in presenting options for articulating the relationship between theological
discourse and secular reason, Frei‟s Types does not really get to the heart of the impasse
between revisionists and postliberals. Three examples will show that Frei‟s Types leave
certain key issues unresolved. First, in his later career, Tracy appears to have moved
from type 2 (a system in which “external description and self-description [of the Church]
relation to Scripture, not manifestation and proclamation (see the comparison of de Lubac and Vanhoozer
below, ppg. 74ff).
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See Tracy, “On Reading the Scriptures Theologically” 55, and Frei, Types, 86.
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Tracy ("On Reading the Scriptures Theologically," 26), claims, “In any theological method
which remains distinctively Christian, there logically must be criteria to assess the appropriateness of any
particular theological proposal as Christian. For some theologians (including myself) there must also be
criteria of intelligibility or credibility for a full theological method.”
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merge into one, and the joint product is justified by a foundational philosophical
scheme”) to type 3 (a system in which philosophy and “Christian self-description” are
“correlated as two autonomous yet reciprocally related factors,” and Christian selfdescription is not subjected to philosophical description) on Frei‟s continuum. 865 If this is
so, all four theologians represented in this dissertation would be located in type 3 or 4 (a
system in which “theology is not philosophically founded” and “Christian selfdescription is quite independent of every external endeavor to describe Christianity as a
specific religion”).866 Yet, just as divergence remains between Schleiermacher and Barth,
so these four theologians continue to disagree greatly on important points of interpretive
method. Second, Vanhoozer himself could be described as moving from type 2 to type 4
between his early work and his later work, yet his theological commitments remain
largely unchanged.867 Third, while Vanhoozer, Frei and de Lubac would all probably fit
in type 4, each would remain quite wary of the others‟ employment of hermeneutical
method. Vanhoozer, for example, rejects Frei‟s “turn to the Church” and, against Frei,
constructs his own proposal to grant authority to God rather than to the Church. Frei is
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For Frei‟s definitions of Types 2 and 3, see Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 30 and 3435, respectively. This move from type 2 to type 3 is most explicit for David Tracy in "Writing," 383, where
he admits that his articulation of the classic, while perhaps helpful for fundamental theology, is not
adequate for Christian self-description. Furthermore, Tracy ("On Reading the Scriptures Theologically,"
36-43), has admitted the importance of Frei‟s work in emphasizing the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus
Christ, and hence admits that Christ is the proper referent of the text. Hunsinger and Placher suggest that
Tracy‟s later work might be better appropriated in type 3 (Frei, Types of Christian Theology, x).
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For Frei‟s definition of type 4, see Types of Christian Theology, 39.
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Vanhoozer‟s early work could best fit in type 2 of Frei‟s typology (see Frei, Types of
Christian Theology, 30-34), insofar as Vanhoozer does attempt to ground Scripture in a particular theory of
meaning that comes from literary theory grounded in theological presuppositions. Vanhoozer‟s early work
attempts to move to type 3, yet it appears to remain grounded in type 2, since the general hermeneutical
project proved inflexible enough to not be able to incorporate Vanhoozer‟s suggested theological
underpinnings. Vanhoozer‟s later work could be classified almost certainly in type 4, as it begins with
Scripture‟s place the economy of redemption, and then moves to methods for reading.
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wary of de Lubac‟s turn to the spiritual sense as he feels this will draw attention away
from the unsubstitutable identity of Christ rendered realistically in the literal sense. De
Lubac would see the projects of both Frei and Vanhoozer as failing to capture the
distinctiveness of the Christian hermeneutic as they restrict meaning to the literal sense
alone. Thus while Frei‟s typology may be useful for articulating the relationship between
Christian self-description and secular reason, it says little about options for Christian
hermeneutics. Together, these three observations indicate that some hermeneutical
element exists which Frei‟s typology does not identify. This element can be analyzed
explicitly only when Scripture is located within the economy of redemption, as the
relationship between Christ, Scripture and Church are specifically articulated.
Narrative Theology and Foundationalism: Nor is the issue really the problem of
“narrative theology” vs. “foundationalism,” as has occasionally been the charge of
postliberals. Often postliberals have accused revisionists of being “foundationalists,” or
those who claim some common human experience which forms a philosophical
foundation for truth claims. 868 Postliberals, in turn, have claimed to form their identity on
“nonfoundationalist” narrative readings of reality. 869 Yet while the postliberal allergy to
foundationalism has helped to bring some precision to the relationship between the
Church‟s self-description and philosophical categories (for example, it has helped to
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See, for example, Nancy Murphy (Stanley Hauerwas, Nancey Murphy and Mark Nation,
Theology without Foundations: Religious Practice and the Future of Theological Truth (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1994, 9-16) who calls foundationalism a claim that all knowledge can be traced back to a
bedrock of knowledge which cannot be questioned, an idea which she believes began in Descartes. The
implicit claim is that an epistemological foundation which cannot exist apart from the philosophical
tradition of Descartes lacks usefulness in the contemporary situation.
869

See here Stanley Hauerwas, Nancey Murphy and Mark Nation, Theology Without
Foundations, Hauerwas, Murphy and Nation and John Thiel, Nonfoundationalism.
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clarify why Frei‟s Types 1 and 2 are unhelpful for Christian reading), it has yielded few
insights which will help advance the debate between Frei and Tracy. 870 With perhaps the
exception of the early work of Tracy and Vanhoozer (which both authors admit to have
failed), all theologians in this dissertation desire to give priority to the self-description of
the Church through a literal reading of the Gospel narratives, yet all insist that the
unsubstitutable identity of Christ must be articulated for a secular sensibility. Vanhoozer,
de Lubac, and Frei, all make extensive use of various philosophical tools to illumine
Christian truth while still reading intratextually. For each, philosophical models must be
put in the service of articulating the claims of revelation. 871 Frei is particularly wary of
“type 5” theology in which Christian self-description (language games) has no
relationship to criteria for truth outside the Church. 872 Tracy likewise insists on creating
space for Christian self-description and admits that where he has been unsuccessful at
giving revelation priority over philosophy, his project needs to be corrected. 873
Furthermore, Tracy thinks that his incorporation of recent insights from hermeneutical

870

For Frei‟s definition of type 1, see Types of Christian Theology, 28, where Frei claims that
in this system, theology as a “philosophical discipline…takes complete priority over Christian selfdescription within the…Church.”
871

Each in his own way attempts something of a reversal from “onto-theology” to “theoontology” (The phrase is Vanhoozer‟s (See Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 8, 222, etc.).
872

For Frei‟s definition of type 5, see, Types of Christian Theology, 46, where Frei claims that
in this system “Christian self-description” leaves no place for philosophy, “neither in adducing criteria for
coherence, adequacy, or appropriateness, nor…of any metaphysical scheme by the theologian.”
Significantly, Frei‟s critique of type 5 representative D.Z. Phillips is much like Tracy‟s critique of
Lindbeck: “To ask a question about the reality of God is to ask a question about a kind of reality…asking
that kind of question is asking for criteria. How do you judge whether or not you‟ve got the right
grammar?” (Types, 47). See Tracy (“Lindbeck‟s New Program,” 468), who similarly claims that Lindbeck
“has [not] resolved the issues he has set for himself (viz. relativism and fideism)” with his insistence on a
“linguistic-cultural” theology.
873

See Tracy, “Lindbeck‟s New Program,” 468, and Tracy, “On Reading the Scriptures
Theologically,” 39-40.
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philosophers has fully cleared him of the charge of foundationalism. 874 Both theologians,
then, are committed to assigning a relative priority to the Church‟s self-description, as
well as to insisting that correlation be made between Scripture and secular reason. It
seems, then, that the fundamental disagreement between Tracy and Frei is theological,
not philosophical, as it does not so much concern discussions about modernist and
postmodern philosophical method, but about the way in which Christ is mediated to the
Church through occasioned by a theological reading of Scripture.
Conclusion: All of the above distinctions help to illumine important interpretive
issues in the debate, yet none of them really moves the discussion beyond its present
impasse. Instead, quite different issues will begin to emerge as Tracy and Frei are
brought into discussion with Vanhoozer and de Lubac. I will show that what is
ultimately important to Tracy and Frei alike is the development of a hermeneutical
project in which Scriptural reading is ultimately about encounter between Triune God and
responsive reader. Through Vanhoozer and de Lubac we can see that all methods for
Scriptural reading should be ordered to that end. As we will see, this changes the
parameters of the discussion, as a description of this movement requires an understanding
of Scripture‟s role in God‟s ordering of the economy of redemption.

B. Scripture‟s Spiritual Sense and the Economy of Redemption
The very hermeneutical method of Tracy and Frei requires that each locate
Scripture in the economy of redemption. Central to the method of each is the
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Tracy, “Lindbeck‟s New Program,” 463-65.
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presupposition that, uniquely in the reading of Scripture, a movement takes place from
simply understanding the content of the text to encountering God. As much as Tracy and
Frei try to focus only on the relationship between text and reader, their very goal of
showing that Scriptural reading is about encounter with the Triune God requires that they
provide deeper description of theological realities which attend Scriptural reading. In this
section I propose that the very methods of Tracy and Frei require them to adopt what de
Lubac calls a spiritual sense of Scripture, and that this will, in turn, obligate them to
locate the text/reader relationship in the broader context of the economy of redemption.
Through the lens of de Lubac‟s project of spiritual interpretation, it can be shown that
Tracy and Frei must attend more specifically to theological realities in the context of the
divine economy in order to complete their hermeneutical projects.

1. The Enduring Value of the Spiritual Sense of Scripture
De Lubac has argued that in traditional Christian readings of Scripture, an
essential movement takes place from the text itself to the spiritual reality to which the
text points. De Lubac describes this as the movement from the literal sense to the
spiritual sense, and his whole work on Christian hermeneutics of Scripture could be
described as an attempt to recover this essential movement which he calls spiritual
interpretation. Yet despite de Lubac‟s insistence on the importance of such a move from
text to spiritual reality, contemporary theologians have found it notoriously difficult to
articulate exactly what the spiritual sense of Scripture is, and consequently how it ought
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to be pursued in reading Scripture today. 875 Among the authors represented in this
dissertation, there is little appreciation for de Lubac‟s insight. Tracy is willing to accept
the usefulness of spiritual interpretation, provided that some other criteria be employed to
judge it.876 Vanhoozer and Frei, who see the text as rendering spiritual reality to readers
in some way, nonetheless deny that spiritual interpretation is a discipline in its own
right.877 Even de Lubac refuses to develop a method for what he calls “spiritual
interpretation.”878 At first glance, de Lubac‟s project seems antiquated and unuseful.
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This seems to be the complaint of Joseph Fitzmeyer (The Interpretation of Scripture, 91),
who claims, “The problems that the spiritual sense of Scripture raises today are different and multiple, but
they are almost all derived from the fact that the term „spiritual,‟ when used of the meaning of a biblical
passage, has become a weasel word. Its connotation always depends on who is using it, and one has to try
to sort out its intended nuances.” Fitzmeyer (ibid, 92), himself finds “the christological sense of OT
passages,” to be the only legitimate and unproblematic use of the spiritual sense today. Even many
theologians who hold a deep appreciation for de Lubac‟s work finally conclude that what de Lubac‟s
“spiritual interpretation,” is no longer necessary for the Church. Notice this extended quote by Susan
Wood (Spiritual Exegesis and the Church in the Theology of Henri de Lubac, 141): “One can
conclude…that even though spiritual exegesis is now foreign to scientific biblical study, its categories
continue to shape the Christian worldview. De Lubac does not call for a return to this method of exegesis:
its time is truly past as a method of biblical study, the emphasis now being on a scientific and historical
study of the literal sense of Scripture, a literary analysis of the biblical narrative, or various other exegetical
methodologies. However, the fruits of this exegesis endure and serve as the foundation of a Christian
vision of reality.” Wood herself does not fully appreciate the intrinsic unity between the spiritual sense and
“scientific biblical study,” and a better articulation of the inevitable movement from text to spiritual reality
may show greater ongoing legitimacy in de Lubac‟s ongoing work.
876

See On Naming the Present, 120. The chastening of spiritual interpretation by an outside
criteria, of course, is exactly what de Lubac argues cannot be done, and consequently it shows how little
Tracy understands what de Lubac was arguing for. This makes it all the more interesting to see Tracy
embrace something of a spiritual sense that has a distinct resemblance to de Lubac‟s spiritual sense.
877

It seems fair to conclude that Vanhoozer‟s canonical sense and Frei‟s literal sense (which
includes figural reading) do, in fact, constitute a spiritual sense of Scripture. While both Vanhoozer and
Frei would insist that they are not advancing a spiritual sense, both assume the same set of presuppositions
that de Lubac‟s spiritual sense requires: the unity of the testaments in Christ, an understanding of Christ as
the meaning of history, and the unique spiritual meeting between God and reader that Scripture occasions.
See here Denis Farkasfalvy, "A Heritage in Search of Heirs: The Future of Ancient Christian Exegesis,"
Communio 25 (1998), 505-19, who suggests a movement to the spiritual sense depends on three
presuppositions: First, reading with a focus on the “context of salvation history” (this includes the unity of
the Testaments in Christ as well as the ongoing action of Christ through the Spirit)(344). Second, reading
with a “parallelism between the community and the individual” (This means that each individual finds
his/her own salvation history mirrored in God‟s relationship with Israel and the Church)(346). Third,
reading in light of the principle of “interiorization” (This means that the Bible “ultimately addressed to
man‟s spiritual faculties in order to elicit from them the response of faith and love”)(347). It seems that
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Ironically, however, Tracy, Frei, and de Lubac all provide different strategies for
appropriating just the kind of move from text to spiritual reality that de Lubac saw as
essential to Christian reading.879 While showing little appreciation for e Lubac‟s
hermeneutical project, each performs the same hermeneutical move. Here an analogy
between de Lubac‟s “spiritual interpretation” and Frei‟s The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative
illustrates the issue. In The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, Frei claimed that there is a
quality in the Gospels called realistic reading, that all interpreters saw it, and yet they
“eclipsed” it because they had no method to deal with it.880 I suspect that something very
similar is taking place among these authors in the move from text to spiritual reality.
Vanhoozer would emphatically agree with all three presuppositions, and would see the „canonical sense‟ as
the way in which the interpreter aligns him/herself with them.
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De Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 228-29), claims, for example, “The more religiously
beautiful and powerful a text is, the more it is stripped of its beauty and power by too ready or rigid an
attempt to find a „spiritual meaning‟ in it….We must, therefore, reject too all-embracing or too automatic
practice of spiritual interpretation, so as to preserve the religious value of the Old Testament, considered
both literally and in its historical situations.”
879
Following on the research of the earlier chapters, the implicit move in each could be shown
as including at least the following: Frei sees the move from text to spiritual reality in terms somewhat
analogous to Anselm‟s ontological argument: when the plain sense of the Gospel narratives are read, the
reader cannot but understand the referent of those stories to be the living and present Christ today. Frei
then furthers his argument by showing that the formative Christian practice was to read the whole of
Scripture with Christ at its center. Tracy claims that when it is understood that the very subject matter of
Scripture is God, the reader is placed in a position where he or she risks a claim to the whole and thereby
moves from text to encounter with God. Tracy sees the greatest intensification of this revelatory potential
in Jesus Christ, the Christian classic, but also in other genres of Scripture and, by extension, in other
religious texts. Vanhoozer believes the move from literal sense to spiritual sense occurs in the
presupposition that God is the author of Scripture, supervening divine illocutions on the human speech acts
so that the whole canon ultimately comes to be understood as the communication of God. Vanhoozer‟s key
phrase, “the literal sense is the canonical sense,” shows a distinct move from text to spiritual reality as it
highlights God‟s authorship over the authorship of the human writers. De Lubac understands the move as
occurring in the shift from understanding the events of history to understanding the meaning of history as it
was transformed in the event of Christ.
880

Frei (The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 10), describes his thesis about the „eclipsing‟ of
realistic reading with his central thesis: Realistic reading is “a feature, as obvious as it is important, of
many of the biblical narratives that went into the making of Christian belief…It can be highlighted by the
appropriate analytical procedure…[it] was actually acknowledged and agreed upon by…commentators.
But since the…procedure for isolating it had irretrievably broken down…[it] came to be ignored,
or…denied for lack of a „method‟ to isolate it.” This, I suggest, is a very close description to what has also
happened to the spiritual sense of Scripture.
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Each sees such a move as essential to Christian reading, yet after recognizing its
necessity, each fails to describe it since he has no method for it. As a result, the
movement from text to spiritual reality, central to Christian interpretation of Scripture,
remains unexplored, and is sometimes denied even while it is being used. I suggest that
each of these contemporary theologians is quite interested in demonstrating some
movement from text to spiritual reality, yet that movement will not be identified as such
until the broader theological reality of Christ‟s relationship to the Church is shown to
determine interpretive method. Below, I suggest why this confusion has taken place and
how it can be fixed.

2. Clarifying the Spiritual Sense of Scripture
While it seems that de Lubac‟s central problematic is perhaps the central one for
developing a contemporary theological interpretation of Scripture, de Lubac‟s own lack
of lack of clarity has left his insight underappreciated. To clarify the movement from text
to spiritual reality, it will be necessary to differentiated four distinct aspects of spiritual
interpretation in de Lubac‟s work which de Lubac himself does not often distinguish.
First, spiritual interpretation provides the theological presuppositions necessary for
Church and individual reader to participate in the meaning of Scripture. These include
the presuppositions which make Scripture unique, such as Scripture‟s participation in the
Logos, God‟s use of Scripture for self-disclosure to readers, the unique location of the
Church as a theological reality, although the two most important seem to be the necessity
to reading all Scriptures in light of Christ and to recognize the fourfold structure of
Christian reality. Second, spiritual exegesis describes the unique capacity of the Church
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to encounter Christ in the Scriptures. For de Lubac, spiritual interpretation always
includes a theological description of the Church as reading community which allows
disclosure to take place in a unique way. De Lubac shows that believers have a unique
capacity to encounter the Triune God in Scripture, based on an imprint of the Logos on
the soul of every human being. This capacity can be identified at the level of the
individual (the tropological sense) or at the level of the Church (the allegorical sense), yet
the two are united in anagogy.881 Third, spiritual interpretation describes the
transformative result of reading the Scriptures in light of Christ. This result remains
mysterious as it is an encounter with God which draws the reader into Mystery.
Ultimately, the result is the building of the eschatological totus Christus consequently the
believer in this way is incorporated more deeply into the Church, the body of Christ
which participates in its eschatological reality already even if such eschatological
(although not yet fully realized) reality.
Finally, spiritual interpretation may or may not involve a particular method of
reading. De Lubac shows that the whole process of spiritual reading is the process of
conversion and thus cannot be contained in a particular method, although certain
hermeneutical methods may be more useful than others at leading readers to this
881

For the experience of the tropological capacity, see William F. Murphy (“Henri de Lubac‟s
Mystical Tropology”, 187-90), who identifies three experiences of the believer who participates in spiritual
interpretation. First, the reader experiences “consolations” which provide “nourishment” for the spirit in
which “mystery and morality are united in a single vision full of sweetness” (see de Lubac, Medieval
Exegesis, II, 174, where de Lubac explains this experience of sweetness: “the mystery interiorizes itself
within the heart, where it becomes experience—though always passing over in itself „the limits of
experience‟ as well as those of reason.”). Second, the reader experiences the “Divine Fire” which makes
him “„burn with love‟: it produces in him „an extraordinary expansion of the mind” so that “his
understanding is flooded with the clarity that comes forth from „the eye of the Bridegroom,‟” and
“scrutinizes the mysteries of the Scriptures” (Medieval Exegesis, II, 161; see Murphy, 188). Third, the
reader becomes “aware of…daily participation in the Mystery of Christ” through Scripture (Murphy, 188).
The experience of the whole Church, on the other hand, appears to be best located in the sensus fidelium, in
the guiding role of tradition, and in the teaching Magisterium.
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encounter with God. The Christian hermeneutic may include a wide variety of reading
methods, provided that it respects the plain sense of the text and employs unique
theological presuppositions about God‟s use of the text and the spiritual nature of the
community responding to God‟s communication. In other words, the method in spiritual
interpretation is unique precisely because of the uniqueness of the theological
presuppositions employed, the capacity of those who read, and the transformative result
of Scriptural reading. Consequently, to discuss hermeneutical method in Scripture
interpretation, one must describe theological realities beyond the text/reader
relationship. 882 One cannot arrive at a sufficient method simply by describing the
interaction of the text and reader.
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Much of the confusion about de Lubac‟s account of spiritual interpretation can be
attributed to a lack of consistent distinction between the various parts of the movement from text to
spiritual reality. De Lubac is notoriously unsystematic about the various aspects of spiritual interpretation.
Even in describing the project, de Lubac at times uses the phrases “spiritual sense,” “spiritual
understanding,” “spiritual interpretation,” and “spiritual exegesis” interchangeably, as if there were some
hidden Christian method, unavailable to scientific exegesis, which would lead to disclosure of spiritual
reality. This conflation often makes it unclear whether de Lubac is speaking of approaching the text with
Christian theological presuppositions, or whether he is speaking of the disclosive gift of God received as
gracious result of Christian reading. If spiritual interpretation is to be recovered, theologians must be clear
about their interpretive aims. For example, de Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 114), claims, “The „true‟
meaning of the Scriptures, their complete and definitive meaning, can really be nothing other than the
meaning „which the Spirit gives to the Church,‟” he supposes a theological description of the Church which
strongly distinguishes between insiders and outsiders. Frei and Vanhoozer naturally bristle at this claim,
feeling that the relative clarity of the plain sense is being quickly dismissed in favor of some method
accessible only to “insiders.” Yet the disagreement exists primarily because Frei and Vanhoozer are
focusing on a different aspect of spiritual interpretation than that which de Lubac emphasizes. De Lubac‟s
claim acknowledges that the meaning of Scripture is accessible only to the Church because the Church
brings a unique set of theological presuppositions to Scripture, that the Church has a unique capacity to
understand the spiritual meaning as it uniquely participates in Scripture‟s Logos, and that those in the
Church can participate in a transformative result not open to all readers. When Frei and Vanhoozer
emphasize the external clarity of Scripture, they are referring to the method by which the Scriptures can be
read. De Lubac has persistently demonstrated his commitment to scientific exegesis of the literal sense
grounded in Christian theological commitments. In this sense, de Lubac is in full agreement with Frei and
Vanhoozer, and there is no reason to fear that de Lubac has lapsed into an arbitrary hermeneutic. When de
Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 29), warns that, “We must…reject too all-embracing or too automatic a
practice of spiritual interpretation,” so as not to circumscribe God‟s transformative communication to the
reader, he is here speaking of the result of spiritual reading, encounter with the Triune God and
incorporation into the world of the text. This movement from text to spiritual reality is, for de Lubac, a
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The very methodological goals of Tracy and Frei require that they attend to
theological realities beyond the text/reader relationship. Essential to the method of each
theologian is the assumption that a movement takes place from text to spiritual reality
which, we have now seen, can only be explained when certain theological categories are
developed. Consequently, it can be shown that only when these theologians begin to deal
explicitly with the broader theological issues attending this movement such as the
theological presuppositions about God‟s use of Scripture, the capacity of the Church to
receive the disclosure of God, and the result that occurs when the movement takes place,
can they develop insights about the text/reader relationship which are appropriate to the
Scriptural texts. In order to advance the discussion between Tracy and Frei, then, it is
necessary to locate Scripture‟s role in the economy of redemption. This will mean
articulating the relationship between Christ and Scripture, and the relationship between
Scripture and the Church.

3. Advancing the Discussion in the Divine Economy
Having shown that Frei and Tracy are obligated, by their own hermeneutical aims,
to locate Scripture‟s role in the broader context of the economy of redemption, the rest of
this chapter will seek to show the specific hermeneutical implications of articulating the
relationship between Christ and Scripture and Scripture and the Church. As I examine
the relationship between Christ and Scripture in the next section, I will suggest that the
most helpful model by which to show how Christ is related to Scripture is de Lubac‟s

result of reading rather than a specific method for reading. Keeping these aspects separate will help clarify
both how this move from text to spiritual reality occurs.
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claim that Christ stands as both Subject and Object of Scripture. This lens will show the
intrinsic unity between the literal sense of Scripture and the inevitable movement from
text to spiritual reality in Christian reading. This will advance the debate between Frei
and Tracy by showing that Frei‟s insistence on the plain sense reading of Scripture is
quite compatible with Tracy‟s insistence on disclosure in reading, so long as Christ is
understood as the one who is both sole subject matter of Scripture and the one who is
mediated to the Church through Scripture.
As I examine the relationship between Scripture and Church in the following
section, I will suggest that the most helpful lens by which to show how Scripture is
related to the Church is de Lubac‟s distinction between the “Imprint,” “Incorporations,”
and “Incarnation” of the Logos. This lens will show the intrinsic unity between Scripture
and Church and will show how the Church possesses a unique capacity for understanding
Scripture which is grounded in the authority of Christ. This will advance the debate by
showing that Frei‟s insistence on the identity of Christ rendered in the realistic reading of
the Gospels is intrinsically connected with Tracy‟s insistence on the self-description of
the identity of the Church which reads its Scriptures for the disclosure of Christ, and that
both proposals mutually deepen one another. Yet although I will suggest that de Lubac
provides the best articulation of the relationship between Christ, Scripture and Church in
the economy of redemption, my goal is not to defend de Lubac, but to develop a more
adequate Christian hermeneutic of Scripture which incorporates the insights of all four
authors and ultimately advances the discussion between Frei and Tracy. Consequently, in
each section, after providing a summary of each author‟s thought I will state a theological
proposal to advance the discussion and show its impact on hermeneutical method.
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II. The Relationship between Christ and Scripture
Articulating Scripture‟s place in the economy of redemption requires reflection on
the Church‟s traditional confessions: 1) the Scriptures participate in the Logos, 2) Christ
is the Incarnate Logos and the climax of revelation, and 3) Christ mediates Himself to
readers by means of the Scriptural texts. Here a thicket of issues must be discussed,
including the way in which Scripture and revelation are distinguished but not separated,
the way in which a plain sense reading of Scripture renders spiritual disclosure of Christ,
and the way in which the Scriptures are regarded as God‟s past and present
communication.
Henri de Lubac provides a hermeneutical lens which has potential to clarify these
relationships. The center of de Lubac‟s Scriptural hermeneutics is the claim that Christ is
at the same time both singular Object and Subject of Scripture.883 The Person of Christ is
both the unifying hermeneutical principle of the texts and the active Subject who
addresses readers by means of those texts. This hermeneutical principle affirms the
consistent testimony of the Church that the Scriptures harmoniously witness to Christ and
that the texts themselves participate in Christ as the Incarnate Logos mediates Himself to
readers by means of them. 884 Consequently, this lens illumines the way in which
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De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, I, 237-38), claims that as Object, “Jesus Christ brings about
the unity of Scripture, because he is the endpoint and fullness of Scripture. Everything in it is related to
him. In the end he is its sole object.” As Subject, “Inasmuch as he is the exegesis of Scripture, Jesus Christ
is also the exegete. He is truly Scripture‟s Logos, in an active as well as a passive sense.”
884

Dei Verbum I, #2 reflects this emphasis of de Lubac: “Christ, who is himself both the
mediator and the fullness of Revelation,” and shows that the presupposition that Christ is both Subject and
Object of Scripture is an integral part of the faith of the Church. See
(http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/ documents/vat-ii_const_19651118_deiverbum_en.html. Accessed July 12, 2011)
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Christian reading must both participate in Christ and to preserve the identity of Christ.
Use of this hermeneutical lens will clarify the way in which each author conceives of the
relationship between Christ, Scripture, and the Logos, and will provide a way in which to
incorporate the insights of all four authors into a fuller Christian hermeneutic. In this
section I will first survey the work of each author by means of this lens to see the specific
emphasis of each about the relationship between Christ, Scripture, and Logos. Then, I
will provide a theological proposal about the way in which understanding Christ as
Subject and Object of Scripture can advance the discussion between these authors.
Finally, I will provide specific insights for the relationship between text and reader which
will lead to a more adequate theological interpretation of Scripture.

A. Surveying the Positions of the Four Authors
As each author seeks to show that Scriptural reading renders spiritual reality to
readers, it is necessary for each put forth some argument about the way in which Christ
relates to Scripture, both as its subject matter and as the one who actively uses Scripture
to transform readers. This section, then, will summarize the way in which each author
relates Christ to Scripture as its Subject and Object. I will argue that while no author is
completely successful in showing the relationship, insights from each can be used in
developing a useful hermeneutical framework.
David Tracy: Tracy‟s emphasis lies almost completely on the present disclosure
of risen Christ to the contemporary reader, helpfully reminding Christians that Scriptural
reading is essentially a disclosive, transformative encounter with the living God revealed
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in Jesus Christ. Yet Tracy‟s constant focus on the text/reader relationship keeps his
attention on the way in which readers access and experience this encounter rather than the
way in which Christ mediates this encounter, and hence keeps his project from
adequately describing the way in which Christ stands as Subject of Scripture. Tracy‟s
early model seems to describe Scripture as an intensification of some general revelatory
potential.885 Tracy‟s argument for the potentially disclosive nature of all religious texts
prevents him from showing how Scripture participates in the Logos in a qualitatively
unique way, and hence how the Incarnate Logos mediates Himself to readers as Subject
of Scripture. In his later work, Tracy admits that his conception of Scripture as a
religious classic is difficult to reconcile with the Church‟s affirmation that Scripture
participates in the Logos.886 Tracy attempts to reformulate his discussion of Scripture in
light of contemporary philosophical discussions of presence and absence in writing. 887
This new focus on the dialectic between presence and absence allows Tracy to articulate
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I refer here to Tracy‟s Blessed Rage for Order account specifically. Tracy (“On Reading
the Scriptures Theologically,” 64, nt. 51) has admitted the failure of this account. This account seems to
suggest that Scripture contains a greater intensification of disclosive potential than other religious texts
because Scripture bears testimony to Christ, the greatest Christian classic. Hence Scripture is revelatory
only as a greater intensification of what can be disclosed in lesser ways in other religious texts. In his later
work, Tracy (Analogical Imagination, 231-338), does place a firm priority on Christ as the primary
Christian classic, thus distinguishing Scripture as a secondary Christian classic which holds its status as a
classic by its relation to Christ. Yet Tracy does not quite complete his argument and must still show how
the texts render precisely this Christ to readers.
886

Tracy (“Writing,” 383), claims that Judaism, Christianity and Islam do not see their sacred
texts as “classics, nor even as sacred texts, but as Scripture and thereby as somehow participatory in what is
construed as the revelation of God.”
887
Tracy (“Writing,” 390), claims, “There are good theoretical reasons to hold that the
interplay of presence (in spoken, proclaimed word and sacrament) and Scripture-as-writing in Christian
self-understanding needs more attention for clarifying Christian hermeneutics of Word and Scripture.”
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more clearly the way in which Scripture participates in the Logos and mediates Christ. 888
Hence it is precisely by abandoning his model of the classic that Tracy is able to more
successfully show how Christ stands as Subject of Scripture.
Tracy‟s focus on the classic which discloses truth to readers in front of the text
also makes it difficult to specify exactly how Tracy understands Christ as Object of
Scripture in his early work. Frei‟s persistent complaint is that Tracy does not show how
the whole narrative of Scripture testifies to the unique identity of Christ. Frei argues that
Tracy tends to make the narrative of Christ into a disclosive story about the existential
situation of the contemporary reader, causing the story to be about the existential
possibility of the reader rather than on the identity of Jesus Christ. 889 In Tracy‟s later
work, he recognizes this difficulty and attempts to overcome by showing that Christian
experience is defined in terms of Christ‟s particular identity.890 Tracy‟s attempt to
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Tracy (Ibid), claims, “In Christian self-understanding, except for the unique status of
Christ-as-Logos, there is no claim to full or simple self-presence in either manifesting Word-as-Logos or
proclaimed word as rendering present the Word in distance (Bultmann) or sacrament. There is some
presencing, to be sure, but mediated in and through writing/scripture. Presence is never full, simple, or
whole.” Unfortunately, this new option is suggested only in summary form, and Tracy never really draws
out the implications of this new model.
889

Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 82), explicitly targets Tracy‟s phenomenological
schema of ostensive and non-ostensive referents, complaining that Tracy‟s “interpretation ends up having
two meanings or referents at the same time, Jesus and some general experience,” which Frei feels
necessarily mutes the plain sense of the text and leads to “hermeneutical incoherence.” Frei feels that
Tracy‟s model quickly shifts emphasis to the non-ostensive reference, leaving the ostensive reference as
one instance of general experience.
890

In his later work Tracy, ("Approaching the Christian Understanding of God," in Systematic
Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives, ed. Francis Schussler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1991), 138), insists on the particularity of Christ. Tracy (ibid), claims, “God, for the
Christian, is the one who revealed decisively who God is in and through the message and ministry, the
incarnation, cross, and resurrection of none other than Jesus the Christ. The most profound New Testament
metaphor for who God is remains the metaphor of 1 John: „God is love.‟…However, if this classic
Johannine metaphor…is not grounded in and thereby interpreted by means of the stark reality of the
message and ministry, the cross and resurrection of this unsubstitutable Jesus, who, as Christ, is God‟s
decisive self-disclosure as love, then Christians may be tempted to think that the metaphor is reversible into
„Love is God.‟”
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integrate Frei‟s insistence on plain reading into his own emphasis on plurality and
diversity may yield something of a plan for figural reading, which would show how the
identity of the reader must be grounded in the unsubstitutable identity of Christ.891
Tracy‟s later work suggests that readers may read the literal sense with a great deal of
diversity and plurality, provided that those readings are always ordered to the plain sense
of the Gospel narratives.892 If these later insights were organized into a system of figural
reading, Tracy‟s project could contribute much in showing how Christ as Object of
Scripture.893
Hans Frei: Whereas Tracy is most concerned to illumine the potential for
disclosure rendered in Scripture, Frei is most concerned to demonstrate that the particular
identity of Jesus Christ is the singular Object of Scripture. For Frei, Christ is not an
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Frei and Tracy are very close in their mutual emphasis on a plurality of readings
subordinated to the plain sense of the passion narratives at this point. In his later work, Frei (Letter to Gary
Comstock, 5 (unpublished manuscript, 1984), cited in Higton, Christ, Providence, and History, 84),
emphasizes the legitimacy of a plurality of readings in the Church, provided that they do not undermine the
plain sense. Frei (ibid), claims plainly, “For me „meaning‟ in the gospel narratives is more and more a
combination of 1) the communal-religious interpretive tradition and what it has seen as their primary
meaning; 2) the fact that the tradition has given primacy to their realistic, ascriptive sense; 3) that outside of
that tradition there is no reason to think of any single interpretive move or scheme as the meaning of these
stories; 4) and even within it there is room for others, provided they do not conflict with the primary,
realistic or literal sense; 5) that subordination of understanding to the text…is in no way the same as the
elimination of interpretive understanding and of a possible multiplicity of interpretations.” Tracy (On
Reading the Scriptures Theologically, 43-44), makes almost exactly the same point: “[T] he church has
made clear through the centuries how it fundamentally reads all the canonical books: through their harmony
with the common Christian confession as that confession is more fully articulated in the plain sense of the
passion narratives. Nevertheless, the entire canon already bespeaks so remarkable a diversity of readings of
the common confession and narrative that the diversity should also be theologically affirmed as long as the
plain sense of the common passion narrative is not disowned.” I believe that much advancement of the
dialogue with Frei could be made if Tracy developed this insight into a full program of figural reading.
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Tracy, ibid, 43-57.
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This emphasis on plurality would open space for lively Christian discussions about the way
in which Christ, as Subject, addresses the Church, while allowing such discussions to be judged by their
ability to be related to the plain sense of the Gospel narratives. See Tracy (On Reading Scripture
Theologically, 41 and 59, nt. 17), where he emphasizes that he wishes to add Frei‟s work to his own
without substantially changing his project.
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“Object” of Scripture in the sense that the historical Jesus Christ is the ostensive referent
of Scripture. Rather, the particular identity of Jesus Christ is the singular subject matter of
the whole canon. Frei emphasizes the clarity of realistic narrative to render the Christ, to
whom the whole Scriptures witness, to the reader. Frei then uses figural reading to
extend the narrative of Christ to the whole of Scripture, so that the entire biblical text can
be normatively read as an extension of the story of Christ.
Frei is careful not to equate Scripture with revelation, as Christ is the unique
revelation of God to which the Scriptures bear witness. Yet Frei‟s project of realistic
narrative seeks to remove the gap between text and referent to such an extent that it is
practically difficult to distinguish between Scripture and revelation. For Frei, while
Scripture formally is the responsive texts of the community to the event of Christ, there is
really no practical distinction between Christ and Scripture for readers today. This is the
case because Scripture renders Christ present to the reader. For Frei, as Dawson claims,
“The text does not deliver God to its reader, as though it were a mere channel through
which God might be conveyed. On the contrary, the text that renders the identity of
Jesus, like (although not identical to) the logos incarnate in Jesus, just is, says Frei, the
linguistic presence of God.”894 In realistic narrative, text and event can be logically
distinguished but not practically separated. By eliminating the gap between meaning
and referent, realistic reading causes Scripture to participate in revelation so closely that
Scripture is practically equated with revelation.
While Frei‟s project has yielded tremendous insights in showing that Christ is the
singular Object of Scripture, Frei does little to show that Christ is Subject of Scripture.
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Dawson, Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity, 165-66.
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For Frei, realistic reading renders Christ‟s identity to the reader, and when the reader
recognizes this identity, the reader encounters Christ as present. Yet Frei remains
hesitant to say that Christ speaks to the reader or encounters the reader in a
transformative way. Instead, the reader is simply required to recognize the identity of
Christ to which the whole Scriptures attest and then follow Him. For Frei, the
participation of Scripture in the Logos is limited to the narrative rendering of the Christ.
By so focusing on Christ as Object of Scripture, Frei does not make sufficient room for
Christ‟s transformative presence as Subject of Scripture whom readers encounter readers
through the text. Frei simply claims that Scripture makes the identity of Christ present to
the reader, but he leaves undeveloped both the doctrinal grounding and implications of
this claim. The consequence is that Frei does not really develop the way in which the
Church is transformed by Christ through encounter with Christ in Scripture.
Kevin Vanhoozer: Like Frei, Vanhoozer argues strongly for the primacy of the
literal sense and the centrality of figural reading to render Christ as the singular Object of
Scripture.895 Furthermore, Vanhoozer‟s unique articulation of the whole canon as
actively used by God to incorporate readers into the economy of Triune missions, as well
as his insistence that the canon is the complete and relatively determinate speech action
of God, provide theological presuppositions which allow for the movement from text to
spiritual reality when believers read Scripture. Vanhoozer‟s proposal that Scripture is an
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Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 222), claims the Bible must be read figurally because
figural reading “represents the inner logic or telos of the canon by interpreting the story of Israel and the
story of Jesus as one story,” and because figural reading is “the rule for present-day Christians to make
sense of their stories as Jesus did of his, precisely by reading their own lives in light of the life of Jesus.”
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extension of the Triune missions has great potential for showing how Christ stands as
Subject of Scripture, using it for the purpose of self-revelation to the Church.
Still, Vanhoozer‟s use of speech-act theory may actually prevent Vanhoozer from
showing that Christ is both Subject and Object of Scripture. Despite Vanhoozer‟s
insistence that Scripture is a species of God‟s speaking action, Vanhoozer‟s apologetic
for the closed, determinate meaning of Scripture through his use of speech-act theory
prevents him from showing Christ‟s role as active Subject of Scripture. 896 Vanhoozer‟s
argument that God‟s speaking action is found in the in the supervening illocutionary
stance encoded in the literal sense of Scripture seems to force Vanhoozer to argue that
God‟s speaking action ceased with the closure of the canon. 897 At the same time,
Vanhoozer‟s use of speech-act theory at times shifts the emphasis away from Christ as
sole Object which unifies Scripture and onto the philosophical articulation of God‟s
illocutionary speaking action as the causes of the canon‟s unity, thus practically
detracting from the centrality of Christ as Object of Scripture.

896
“Perlocutionary effect” remains a decidedly general literary category rather than a
theological concept in Vanhoozer‟s project. Vanhoozer‟s apologetic for determinate meaning keeps his
focus on the way in which perlocutionary effect does not influence the meaning of the text, rather than on
the way in which encounter does take place between the reader and the Triune God. Overall the Spirit is
restricted to simply applying to readers a determinate meaning which all readers should be able to grasp,
provided that they apply the correct theological presuppositions to the text. Certainly Vanhoozer wants to
describe conversion and incorporation into Christ, but the philosophical resources of speech-act theory, as
Vanhoozer employs them, really do not prove sufficient to articulate the gracious encounter between God
and reader occasioned by the text.
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God, it turns out, does not really “speak” today, but rather “makes effective” in readers
what God spoke long ago. Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 428), claims, “The Spirit‟s
present-day leading of the community into all truth is best viewed, I believe, under the rubric of
perlocutionary effects….The Spirit thus opens readers‟ minds and hearts so that the words can produce all
their intended effects…the Spirit‟s role is not to add a new sense to the Word, but to energize and empower
the sense—the speech act—that is already there.”
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Henri de Lubac: De Lubac, more than any of the other theologians, emphasizes
that reading Scripture occasions an address by the living, present Christ who stands as
Subject of Scripture. For de Lubac, the Christ who is Object of Scripture is always the
Christ in act, and the reader cannot move from the plain sense of the text to the spiritual
reality without being addressed by Christ as Subject. A Christian reading of Scripture is
always more than reading the plain sense of the text in light of the correct theological
presuppositions. This means, for de Lubac, that the “letter” is always the “mere letter” if
it does occasion transformative result. It is the incorporation of the individual into the
eschatological body of Jesus Christ which only occurs when Christ actively addresses the
reader.
De Lubac is clear that the whole Scriptures must be read in such a way that they
testify to Christ. As Object, de Lubac writes, “Jesus Christ…is the endpoint and fullness
of Scripture. Everything in it is related to him. In the end he is its sole object.”898 Yet de
Lubac‟s emphasis lies decidedly on the side of Christ as active Subject who addresses
readers in the interpretation of Scripture, and seems to argue that Christ is Object of
Scripture precisely because He stands as Subject of Scripture.899 De Lubac shows that,
“It is [Christ] and he alone who explains [Scripture] to us, and in explaining it to us he is
himself explained.”900 Consequently, “Jesus, thus, is Exegete of Scripture in himself, in
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De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 237.
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For example, when de Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 105), speaks of Christ as the
“unique Object” of Scripture and the “totality of its exegesis,” this is so because “Jesus Christ effects the
unity of Scripture because he is its end and its fullness.” In fact, de Lubac seems to believe that figural
reading is incomplete precisely because it would allow the exegete to see Christ as Object without seeing
Him as Subject.
900

Ibid, 106.
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all his mystery. In principle, he is this Exegete from the first instant of his
incarnation.”901
De Lubac‟s persistent difficulty is his tendency to downplay the role of the
literal sense in mediating Christ as he emphasizes the spiritual sense. Consequently, de
Lubac locates Christ‟s role as both Subject and Object of Scripture in the spiritual sense,
not in the literal sense. We have already seen that de Lubac likewise tends to locate
God‟s communicative action in Scripture in the spiritual sense rather than in the literal
sense. A particular challenge arises for de Lubac to show the connection between the
particular Christ rendered in the plain sense and the living, present Christ who addresses
the Church. Likewise, de Lubac must more clearly show the connection between the
plain sense and God‟s communication in the spiritual sense. Where Frei insists that the
literal sense of Scripture achieves just this unity of the Scriptures in Christ as singular
Object, de Lubac so emphasizes the need for the spiritual sense that he does not
adequately show how the literal sense mediates the Christian Mystery.

B. Proposal #1: Christ as Subject and Object of Scripture
As we have seen, locating Scripture in the economy of redemption requires a clear
articulation of the relationship between Scripture, Christ and the Logos. Christian
confession affirms that Christ stands as the full presence of the Logos in human flesh, and
that Scripture participates in the Logos as it bears unified witness to the Incarnate Christ.
Thus while both Scripture and Christ mediate the Logos, they do so in qualitatively
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Ibid, 108. Yet de Lubac (ibid, 109), suggests that Christ is Object most specifically in the
event of the Cross.
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different ways, Scripture is called revelatory as it participates in and bears witness to the
Christ who is revelation. In the economy of redemption, the glorified and present Christ
uses the Scriptures as unique, unified witness to Himself. Through the Scriptures, Christ
mediates Himself to readers in order to incorporate them into His Mystical body, the
Church. Christian reading, then, always moves from text to spiritual reality, as the
recognition of Christ in Scripture occasions encounter with Him which incorporates the
reader into His body. Below, I provide a theological proposal which, using the insights
of all four authors, seeks to provide categories for developing a more complete Christian
hermeneutic of Scripture.
Premise 1: To affirm that Christ is the Subject of Scripture is to necessitate
the recovery of a movement from text to spiritual reality as a normative
hermeneutical principle for Christian reading. This movement from text to spiritual
reality, recovered by de Lubac, has a central and lasting significance for the Christian
interpretation of Scripture, and the explicit acknowledgement of such a movement will
lead to a better articulation of Christian hermeneutical method. All four authors, I have
argued, implicitly see this as the central issue in their hermeneutical projects, although
only de Lubac is able to describe it and thus sufficiently explain its relevance. As de
Lubac has shown, it is impossible to explain the place of Scripture in the economy of
redemption without somehow showing that Christ actively uses Scripture to mediate
Himself to the Church. Reciprocally, it is impossible to read Scripture as Christ‟s
mediation to the Church without likewise recognizing a spiritual dimension into which
the texts draw the receptive reader.
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Premise 2: The affirmation that Christ is Object of Scripture gives priority
to the plain sense reading of Scripture as the means by which Christ is rendered to
readers. This insistence on the plain reading of the literal sense to render the particular
identity of Jesus Christ, recovered by Frei, likewise has enduring value for the Christian
reading of Scripture. The claim that Christ is Object of Scripture shows that the whole
Scriptural witness testifies to Christ as subject matter of the Christian story. This gives
the Gospels‟ narrative witness to Christ a privileged place in the Christian canon, and it
shows that all Scripture is somehow ordered to the realistic narrative which renders the
identity of Christ. Affirming that Christ is Object of Scripture requires some method
such as figural reading to show how the whole Scriptures are a unified narrative which
testifies to the revelation of Jesus Christ. Figural reading not only reads Christ as the
singular subject matter of the closed canon, but it also draws the reader into that story in
such a way that the reader finds her own reality in the narrative of Christ (what Frei calls
“intratextual” reading). Frei‟s emphasis on realistic reading, as well as his extension of
the story of Christ to the whole Scripture and to present readers through figural reading,
provides the best resources for examining Christ as Subject of Scripture.
Premise 3: All properly Christian readings of Scripture must be able to
show the intrinsic connection between Christ as unified Object of Scripture and
Christ as active Subject of Scripture. Articulating Christ as Subject and Object of
Scripture provides a useful hermeneutical lens because it holds together the two
traditional Christian claims about the nature of Scripture which have been recovered by
Frei and de Lubac. First, through Frei, we see more clearly that the plain sense reading of
Scripture, which is ordered to the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ, forms the
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normative hermeneutical framework for Christian faith and practice. Second, through de
Lubac, we see that Christ actively encounters readers by means of Scripture to
incorporate them into His eschatological body, the Church. These two traditional claims,
however, cannot simply be held loosely together. Rather, they must be shown to be
connected intrinsically to one another in the economy of redemption. Here, an
integration of Frei‟s emphasis on the plain sense with de Lubac‟s emphasis on the
spiritual sense is essential for showing how Christ is both Subject and Object of Scripture
in a way connects the plain sense reading with the active address of Christ.
Furthermore, reading Christ as both Object and Subject of Scripture allows
readers of Scripture to participate in the realm of grace, not just nature, as they read.
While it would be tempting to simply associate Christ‟s role as Object of Scripture with
the literal sense and Christ‟s role as Subject of Scripture with the spiritual sense, this
would create a false dichotomy. The biblical texts are Scripture precisely because they
are understood by the community to participate in the Logos through their relation to
Christ. Although the Scriptures participate in the Logos, they are not themselves the
revelation. They are revelatory in that they point to and mediate Christ, who is the
Incarnate Logos. De Lubac is correct when he gives priority to Christ‟s role as Subject
over the rendering of Christ as Object, since the biblical texts are Scripture to the extent
that they are drawn into the divine economy by Christ. Consequently, for the Christian
even the plain reading of Scripture, though equally accessible to all readers, occurs in the
realm of grace, since the very plain reading of the Scriptures is a mediation of Christ,
who stands behind them, unifies them in Himself, and guides the community in reading
them. While the Old Testament texts refer to events which occurred before the covenant
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of grace, the very act of Scriptural reading occurs in the realm of grace as a result of the
completed Scriptural canon unified in Christ. As a result, it would be incorrect to say that
literal reading is a matter of nature and spiritual reading is a matter of grace. Once the
entire corpus of Scriptural texts is unified as canonical Scripture, the literal reading of
Scripture, which renders Christ as Object, is elevated to the realm of grace by Christ
Himself to whom the plain reading always points as a unified witness. 902

C. Advancing Hermeneutical Method in the Text/Reader Relationship
Articulating the relationship between Scripture, Christ and the Logos by locating
Scripture in the economy of redemption yields significant implications for the
relationship between text and reader. This section will return to the discussion of
hermeneutical method and suggest some ways in which each of these authors contributes
to the advancement of a Christian hermeneutic. While most of the discussion will focus
on relating Frei‟s insistence on the literal sense of Scripture with de Lubac‟s insistence on
the spiritual sense of Scripture, all four authors contribute insights which will provide
resources useful for advancing the debate between Tracy and Frei, as Scripture is located
in the broader context of the economy of redemption.
1. The Centrality of Figural Reading: Frei and de Lubac Advancing Vanhoozer
and Tracy
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Vanhoozer‟s insight that the literal sense is the canonical sense provides a helpful way of
articulating this (see Is There a Meaning in this Text, 313).

334

The first methodological consequence of the Christian hermeneutic is the
foundational role figural reading plays in understanding Christ as Subject and Object of
Scripture. Traditionally figural reading has been the central way to both extend the
whole narrative of Scripture to be about Christ and to incorporate the reader into the
world of the text. As Mike Higton notes, “Figural reading had fulfilled two related
functions in pre-critical exegesis: it had exhibited the unity of the canon, particularly the
unity of the Old and New Testament, and it had provided a link between the biblical story
and the readers‟ own time.”903 Going further, David Dawson summarizes the
participatory goal of figural reading in this way:
“Figural reading in the Christian tradition seeks to express the dynamic process of
spiritual transformation in ways that respect the practitioners‟ commitment to both
past and future, both old identity and newly refashioned identity. Imbedded in
figural practice is all the drama of discerning the point of existence and
identifying one‟s place in it, figured as a journey from a former mode of existence
through various states of transformation toward some ultimate end.” 904
The purpose of figural reading is to illumine Christ as the meaning of the Scriptures and
to incorporate the reader into the story Christ as He establishes the Church and leads it to
eschatological fulfillment in the totus Christus.
Conversely, when the practice of figural reading is abandoned, Christ quickly
becomes an existential paradigm of possibility for our present situation rather than our
situation finding meaning in Christ. Dawson summarizes, “what is meaningful is no
longer, as the practitioners of figural reading would have insisted, the mysterious

903

Mike A. Higton, Christ, Providence and History, 145.
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Dawson, Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity, 216.
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transformative interactions of God in history, but rather the deeply subterranean humanity
that all persons share.”905 Without figural reading, it becomes very easy for some
abstract quality to replace Christ as the ground of meaning and reference point from
which all other narratives must be judged. It is precisely this abandoning of figural
reading that Frei calls the “great reversal” from narrative to external meaning systems.
Frei concludes,
[W]hen the pattern of meaning is no longer firmly ingredient in the story and the
occurrence character of the text but becomes a function of a quasi-independent
interpretive stance, literal and figural reading draw apart, the latter gradually
looking like a forced, arbitrary imposition of unity on a group of very diverse
texts. No longer an extension of literal reading, figural interpretation instead
becomes a bad historical argument or an arbitrary allegorizing of texts in the
service of preconceived dogma. 906
It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to maintain an intratextual reading of
Scripture if figural reading were abandoned. Vanhoozer, Frei and de Lubac all think that
figural reading is the sine qua non practice of intratextual Scriptural readings. 907 The test
for any project of figural reading is its ability to hold together both the centrality of Christ
(Christ as Object) and the incorporation of the reader into the narrative of Scripture
through incorporation into the totus Christus (an implication of the premise that Christ is
Subject of Scripture). Here I argue that Frei and de Lubac both develop proposals which
can be mutually beneficial to each other and corrective of Vanhoozer and Tracy.
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Ibid, 212.
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Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 37.
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See Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 223; Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 1-20,
and de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 23.
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Uniting Frei and de Lubac: Even in the description of figural reading it is
impossible to escape a discussion of Christ‟s role as both Subject and Object of Scripture.
Frei and de Lubac illustrate both sides of the dialectic which must govern Christian
interpretation, as Frei stresses Christ‟s place as Object of Scripture while de Lubac
stresses Christ‟s active role as Subject of Scripture. Frei and de Lubac both insist that
Christ is the Subject Matter of Scripture and the entire canon must be read in light of
Him. Yet a fundamental difference exists between Frei‟s insistence on figural reading
and de Lubac‟s insistence on allegory as the foundational principle for unifying the
Testaments in Christ. This disagreement runs deeper than a difference of definition and
highlights a key hermeneutical emphasis which must be clarified. 908 De Lubac insists
that only Christian allegory can adequately explain the transformation of the Old
Testament by the New in Christ, arguing that typological or figural readings cannot make
the sacramental movement from text to spiritual reality. Frei, for his part, worries that
allegory would diminish the efficacy of the literal sense in rendering the particular
identity of Christ and would replace Christ‟s particular identity with some vague
dogmatic proposition. 909 Here it is possible to see most clearly the impact of Frei‟s
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Certainly some of the disagreement between Frei and de Lubac about allegory is simply
based on different definitions of the term. For Frei, allegory is the imposition of an external system of
meaning on the text, while figural reading allows the whole narrative to render its own meaning (see
Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 212). For de Lubac, allegory is reading Scripture in light of the
radical transposition of Christ, its hermeneutical principle, while figural reading, if taken alone, would
reduce Scripture to a mere system of historical correspondence. I find no evidence that Frei ever read de
Lubac‟s work. If he had done so, he almost surely would have been more careful in his distinguishing of
allegory from figural reading. Furthermore,
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Significantly, Frei still sees a valid place for allegory in the history of Christian
interpretation, and claims that allegorical reading is legitimate, so long as it works to unify the whole
Scriptures to Christ. Frei, then, is in a peculiar position, in which he must defend allegory‟s unifying role
in the Church, and yet reject it as a legitimate reading. While Frei disagrees with allegorical interpretation,
he sees allegory as an important part of reading the whole Scriptures as a unified whole throughout the
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emphasis on Christ as Object and de Lubac‟s emphasis on Christ as Subject of Scripture.
Frei is so focused on Christ as Object that he never fully considers the full implications of
Christ as Subject confronting the reader in the text, while de Lubac is so focused on
Christ as active Subject that he never fully appreciates the way the external clarity of the
whole text renders Christ as Object. This difference is motivated to some extent by
different apologetic aims. Frei‟s project seeks to reverse the eclipsing of Christ‟s
particular identity while de Lubac‟s project seeks to show that Scripture is the locus of
the active presence of Christ. Consequently, Frei is most concerned about preserving the
unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ (Christ as Object), while de Lubac is most
concerned about showing how believers are incorporated into Christ (Christ as Subject).
Nonetheless, the disagreement leads to very different understandings between the two
about the way in which believers participate in the economy of redemption.
Frei‟s emphasis on the unsubstitutable identity of Christ leads him to emphasize
that believers only follow that identity from a distance. Dawson claims, “Frei wants to
show how Jesus‟ identity is a consequence of his unique relation to God, a relation that

history of the Church. Frei (“Literal Reading,” 39), claims, “it was largely by reason of this centrality of
the story of Jesus that the Christian interpretive tradition in the West gradually assigned clear primacy to
the literal sense in the reading of Scripture, not to be contradicted by other legitimate senses—tropological,
allegorical, and anagogical. In the ancient church, some of the parables of Jesus…were interpreted
allegorically as referring latently or spiritually to all sorts of types, and more especially to Jesus himself,
but this could only be done because the story of Jesus itself was taken to have a literal or plain meaning.”
In other words, the literal sense (that plain reading which renders ascriptive identity) is the foundational
reading for the Christian faith. Figural reading is an extension of the literal sense (though not the only
possible reading of realistic narrative), as it extends the plain sense from the Gospels to the whole of
Scripture. Allegorical reading is a subordinate and nonessential (although sometimes useful) tool which,
by employing a different criterion of meaning on the text, reinterprets the plain sense of the text (often to
refer to Christ as its meaning).
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human beings cannot share (and therefore cannot usurp).”910 Dawson helpfully
summarizes Frei position in this way:
“Frei‟s notion of figural extension also emphasizes the unidirectionality of figural
reading: figural reading is not a triumphalist retrospective observation of the
extent to which one has superseded a past that has been rightly repudiated; rather,
it is a patient „working through‟ the spiritual dynamics of the disciple‟s movement
from his or her state of figure to one of fulfillment, a working forward in light of
the assurances of Christ‟s first coming but also of the uncertainties of his not-yetrealized second coming. Frei‟s characteristic way of stating this progression is
not, however, to speak about the disciple‟s journey, but about the singularity of
Christ‟s identity (as the expression of God‟s identity), and to describe how figural
readings seek out the complex ways in which that identity is rendered by both Old
and New Testaments….he…continues to describe the figural process more as a
matter of textual interpretation than of historical transformation.” 911
For Frei, the Scriptures establish the condition for the possibility of the Church—
readers can only understand their own identity-in-relation when they have first
recognized the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ. Yet while Frei‟s emphasis on
Christ‟s particular identity is essential his articulation of it is one-sided, for it does not
sufficiently examine the implications of that unsubstitutable identity on the life of the
reader.912 For de Lubac, the Scriptures bring about the transformation of the reader
precisely because they mediate the Christ who stands as Subject of Scripture. De Lubac
always emphasizes that the partial yet deepening incorporation of the believer into the
identity of Christ is the result of being encountered by the Christ about whom the believer
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Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 186.
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Ibid, 212-13.
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Dawson (Ibid, 213), criticizes that “when Frei textualizes body and history in this way [i.e.
that of identity description], the reader—with his or her own body and the bodily effects of his or her
reading—begins to drop out of sight, as all attention is directed to the way the gospel text renders the
identity of Jesus.” Dawson (ibid), suggests further, “The literal reader of the text‟s realistic, narrative sense
gets to encounter Jesus as only Jesus alone is, but the action of Jesus or God impinging upon the embodied,
historical life of the reader is a matter left to take care of itself without much comment.”
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reads. Hence the three aspects of the spiritual sense (allegory, tropology and anagogy) all
show the intrinsic relationship between reader and Mystery that occurs when one moves
from the literal sense to the spiritual sense. 913
Both projects appear indispensable for a Christian reading of Scripture, because
both recapture foundational theological presuppositions about the way in which Christ
stands as Subject and Object of Scripture. Furthermore, it seems that both projects can be
harmonized, provided that different elements of spiritual interpretation are
distinguished.914 In Frei‟s insistence on the literal sense, he remains focused on
safeguarding a method which will preserve the identity of Jesus Christ but he says little
about the capacity of the Church to receive this disclosure or the result of this encounter
with Christ on readers. De Lubac‟s suggestion that a sacramental move occurs as Christ
uses Scripture to mediate Himself to the reader moves beyond Frei‟s focus on method to
address the capacity of the Church to receive disclosure and the result which takes place
when God encounters the reader. Since each describes different aspects of the
interpretive process, there appears to be no real tension between the method Frei proposes
for figural reading and the method de Lubac proposes for allegory. Frei‟s method of
reading the plain literal sense to render the particular identity of Jesus Christ present to
the reader seems to only strengthen de Lubac‟s affirmation that the Christian Mystery is
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As Bryan C. Hollon puts it, “it is through spiritual exegesis that the church moves from an
encounter with the historical Jesus to a union with the cosmic Christ” (Everything Is Sacred: Spiritual
Exegesis in the Political Theology of Henri De Lubac, Theopolitical Visions 3 (Eugene, OR: Wipf and
Stock, 2009), 165).
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Here I speak again of the distinction between theological presuppositions (e.g. that Christ
is Subject and Object of Scripture), capacity (i.e. the unique location of the Church to receive the mediation
of Christ), method (i.e. the rules by which one must read the text) and result (i.e. the encounter that takes
place when believers read the text) developed at the beginning of the chapter.

340

accessible only through the literal sense. Both projects appear to be mutually compatible
and necessary, as the reading of the plain sense does intrinsically lead to the spiritual
interpretation of Scripture as the result of reading the plain sense. The encounter with the
Present Christ who causes incorporation into His eschatological body, is a properly
sacramental movement which is rendered by, but not contained in, the literal sense. 915
Frei and de Lubac Correcting Tracy and Vanhoozer: In light of Frei and de
Lubac‟s insistence on some form of figural reading to relate all reality to Christ, Tracy‟s
lack of interest in figural reading appears significant. In his early work figural reading
does not appear useful to Tracy‟s project, as Tracy was more interested in showing how
Scripture participates in the contemporary situation than in showing how the reader is
incorporated into the narrative of Scripture. Tracy‟s later work expresses appreciation for
Frei‟s insistence on the centrality of Christ as narratively rendered in the Gospels, and
Tracy claims that he can incorporate Frei‟s insistence on the centrality of Christ into his
own project. Yet Tracy never develops a system of figural reading. This lack of interest
in figural reading is a significant indication that Tracy has not completed a hermeneutical
project focused on Christ as both Subject and Object of Scripture who fulfills the
Scriptures in Himself. Tracy still may, in practice, tend to see Christ as the greatest
instantiation of an existential possibility for the contemporary reader. Tracy‟s later work
is clearly committed, in principle, to ordering all Scriptural readings to the plain sense of
the Gospels. Were Tracy to incorporate a system of figural reading into his project, he
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Practically, it appears that it will be a persistent challenge for those who start from allegory
to show the clarity of the literal sense, while it will be a persistent challenge for those who start from figural
reading to account for the transition from text to spiritual reality.
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would do much to clarify the way in which he envisions the unsubstitutable identity of
Christ to establish the hermeneutical rules for Scriptural interpretation. 916
The emphasis on figural reading by Frei and de Lubac may also correct
Vanhoozer‟s project. While Vanhoozer develops a coherent philosophical system for
articulating God‟s authorship of Scripture, Vanhoozer‟s suggestions may actually distract
from the centrality of Christ. Vanhoozer claims with Frei and de Lubac that the practice
of figural reading is indispensable for Christian reading. He argues that figural reading
“is the mainspring of theo-dramatic unity, the principle that accounts for the continuity in
God‟s words and acts, the connecting link between the history of Israel and the history of
the church, the glue that unifies the Old and New Testaments.”917 Yet while Vanhoozer
insists that figural reading is the hermeneutical key to Christian interpretation of
Scripture, Vanhoozer‟s use of speech-act theory (in which God has supervened divine
illocutions on human speech acts so that readers encounter the very Word of God in
Scripture), tends to shift attention from the presence of Christ as both Subject and Object
of Scripture to a more abstract theory of God‟s speech acts. Those who accept
Vanhoozer‟s model must be careful that a philosophical conception of authorship does
not replace Christ as the unifying principle of Scripture. In fact, it would seem that all
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Tracy (On Reading the Scriptures Theologically, 42), claims, “As long as the plain sense
reading of the passion narratives is understood as the fullest rendering of the common Christian confession,
then a diversity of readings of both confession and narrative will inevitably occur.” Here Tracy could
better show how the Scriptures both regulate and this plurality. For example, Telford Work (Living and
Active, 299), suggests, “It is…both significant and discouraging how rarely the status of a particular text is
defended with respect to its roles in the history of salvation that begins in Israel, and climaxes in the earthly
life of Jesus, and continues in the Spirit-indwelt Church. Usually the appeal is to an abstract primitivism or
developmentalism.” It is precisely here that Tracy could complete his project by grounding the diversity of
Scriptural readings in this overarching system of figural reading.
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Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 223.
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“authorial discourse” readings may share this same danger of shifting focus away from
Scripture‟s witness to Christ and onto a philosophical description of God‟s speaking
action. 918 Vanhoozer‟s early work appears to have been guilty of just this reduction, as
Vanhoozer there emphasized the authoritative content of Scripture without
simultaneously showing how readers are incorporated into Christ as they read the text.919
This does not mean that Vanhoozer is wrong to emphasize the primacy of God‟s
authorship or to use speech-act theory to describe it. It only means that there is a constant
danger in allowing a philosophical description of authorship to replace the centrality of
Christ when such a philosophical description seems better fitted for securing the authority
of Scripture. Frei and de Lubac provide a helpful corrective as they emphasize that the
Christ who speaks in Scripture is its singular Object and that all claims to the authority of
Scripture as God‟s Word must be ordered to Christ.
The heart of the problem is Vanhoozer‟s insistence that because both Christ and
Scripture are unique communicative actions of God, both Christ and Scripture must be
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As an example, see here Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical
Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Many
Evangelical attempts which follow Wolterstorff and Vanhoozer and emphasize authorial discourse are
primarily proposals for authority in which Christological and figural readings become minor points, if they
are mentioned at all. For example Jeannine K. Brown, in her Scripture as Communication: Introducing
Biblical Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), centers her whole book around the
implications of speech-act theory for hearing God‟s voice, without any centering of the whole Scriptures on
the Person of Christ. My criticism is not of what such books say, but rather what is left unsaid. Practically,
covenant instruction begins to take over the narrative function of the text and obscure the centrality of
Christ.
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Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 223), corrects this problem in his later work,
claiming, “While universal history may be the locus of divine action, however, the focus of divine action is
the history of Jesus Christ….Jesus Christ is the hermeneutical key not only to the history of Israel but to the
history of the whole world, and hence to the meaning of life, for he is the Logos through whom all things
were created.” Here it is Jesus Christ including His history, which is only rendered in the Scriptures, which
is the hermeneutical key to all understanding of history.
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considered revelation.920 By not adequately distinguishing between Christ as revelation
and Scripture as revelatory, Vanhoozer‟s project continually runs the risk of shifting
emphasis from Christ to texts as he emphasizes the ability to recognize God‟s
determinate speaking action in Scripture. This difficulty appears more clearly when
comparing Vanhoozer with Frei with respect to the distinctions between Scripture and
revelation. Whereas Frei locates the revelatory nature of the text in the elimination of the
gap between sense and reference (thereby allowing the text to participate closely in the
event of revelation), Vanhoozer locates the revelatory nature of the text in the
supervening of God‟s speech acts over human speech acts. For Frei, Scripture is
revelatory because it is realistic narrative of Christ, while for Vanhoozer Scripture is
revelatory because God‟s illocutionary action supervenes upon the intended speech acts
of the human authors. This difference means that the encounter occasioned by the text
between God and reader occurs in fundamentally different ways. According to
Vanhoozer‟s model, disclosure takes place as the reader engages the text with the proper
theological presuppositions. The reader must understand that the words of Scripture are
the communicative action of God, and that these texts are uniquely authoritative and
demand obedient response. According to Frei‟s model, narrative fitly renders the event
of Christ to the reader so that the reader encounters the present, risen Christ. This
difference in emphasis places Frei and Vanhoozer on somewhat different trajectories.
Frei will direct his focus in the text to the event of Christ extended through figural
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Vanhoozer continually emphasizes the close association between words and deeds found in
William Alston, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).
Expanding on Barth, Vanhoozer (Vanhoozer, “A Person of the Book,” 56), claims that speech-act theory
helps to reconcile Barth with Evangelicals by showing that because “God‟s Word is His act,” the revelation
of the Logos in Christ and the revelation of the Logos in Scripture are both forms of revelation.
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reading, and Vanhoozer will direct his focus behind the text for a philosophical
conception of authorship which illumines God‟s past and present action. Distinguishing
between Scripture‟s participation in the Logos and Christ‟s hypostatic union with the
Logos would allow Vanhoozer to articulate a clearer distinction between Scripture and
revelation, which would allow him to better explain how Christ mediates Himself to the
Church by means of Scripture.921
2. The Regulation of the Canonical Sense: Vanhoozer Advancing de Lubac
Despite de Lubac‟s achievement in retrieving the spiritual impulse of precritical
Christian interpretation, many contemporary exegetes have found his project unusable.
This is because they fear that a move from text to spiritual reality may quickly degenerate
into arbitrary and fanciful eisegesis. 922 As one critic has noted, “The exegete can never
feel confidence in an approach to the Bible which is so free of method and control.” 923
Understandably, many interpreters worry that to accept uncritically De Lubac‟s
suggestion that Scripture contains an “infinite forest of meanings” may discount the
importance of genres and grammar, leaving God‟s communication in Scripture
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Telford Work (Living and Active, 95), helpfully distinguishes between “inlibration” (the
Word‟s union with the human words of Scripture), and “incarnation” (the Word‟s union with the human
nature of Christ), showing that God‟s Word in Scripture as “real presence” is different from God‟s Word in
Christ as “full personal presence.” We will see that de Lubac‟s distinction between “incorporation” of the
Logos in Scripture and “Incarnation” of the Logos in Christ would help Vanhoozer clarify the relationship
between Christ and Scripture in a way that would retain the centrality of Christ even as the revelatory
nature of Scripture is explored (see History and Spirit, 422).
922

See Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 314-15.
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John L. McKenzie, “Problems of Hermeneutics in Roman Catholic Exegesis.” Journal of
Biblical Literature 77 (1958): 201, cited in D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 240.
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ambiguous.924 As Boersma writes, “De Lubac appeared to give the imagination relatively
free reign, as long as the interpreter remained within the edifying teaching of the
Scriptures. To specify exactly the cases in which allegory might be acceptable would
probably have struck him as an attempt to limit the „infinite forest of meanings.‟” 925 De
Lubac‟s hesitance to locate Christ‟s mediating action in the literal sense tends, at times, to
suggest that careful exegesis of the literal sense is optional for hearing God‟s speaking
action. Boersma continues, for de Lubac “the most important question was whether the
spiritual meaning was based on the overall teaching of the Scriptures and so „fruitful‟ to
the believer.”926 Williams summarizes the difficulty by claiming that for de Lubac, as for
the early Church, “However subjective a given interpretation may be, so long as there is
linkage with that major allegoria…the interpretation is not without basis.” 927 De Lubac‟s
chief difficulty seems to be that he has not adequately shown the way in which the literal
sense is itself taken up into God‟s communicative action and how it is uniquely fitted to
serve as a locus of God‟s communicative activity.
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De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, 1, 75.
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Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Theologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 188.
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Ibid, 167, noting de Lubac, History and Spirit, 358.
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Williams, Receiving the Bible in Faith, 158-59. De Lubac (History and Spirit, 374-5),
excuses many of the arbitrary employments of the spiritual sense in the early Church by claiming, “If in
fact the detail of their explanations…seems so fanciful, it is because that was not for them the essential
thing. They spread out comfortably „in the vast field of divine Scriptures‟. They had no scruples about
exercising their fertile imaginations there by freely using the „analogy of faith‟…This is because, they
thought, „where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is the freedom to understand.‟” De Lubac (“Old Distich,”
122) defends his position by emphasizing that the singular Allegory to which all others relate is nonetheless
objective: “Allegoriae are never more than the small change of the main allegoria that the believer has
presented initially with all the vigor of his faith, and he is well aware that the work he is doing with the
allegoriae is less assured. Taken one by one, the allegoriae that he discovers can be rather
subjective….But the principle that they should highlight, the major allegoria of Scripture, is always
objective.”

346

For Vanhoozer and Frei, the very essence of Christian revelation is the claim that
God‟s communication to human beings is clear enough to be sufficiently understood.
The Christian reader must be able to approach the Bible with some confidence that she
will, in fact, hear what God intended to say therein. While de Lubac‟s emphasis on
encounter with Christ as Subject of Scripture is certainly essential to Christian reading, it
should not devalue Frei‟s insistence that the opposite is also true: the reader will never
encounter the Christ who is Subject of Scripture in a way that is disconnected from
encountering Christ rendered in the literal sense. If de Lubac‟s description of the
movement from text to spiritual reality is to be adequately appreciated, it must also show
how the plain sense of the text intrinsically mediates the Christian Mystery in a way that
is open to public investigation and dialogue.
In light of Frei and Vanhoozer, one can see that de Lubac does not always
sufficiently appreciate the way in which the closed canon of Scripture regulates
subsequent allegorical interpretation. This issue gets to the heart of much contemporary
concern about de Lubac‟s method, and de Lubac Himself seems to suggest that Christian
interpreters today ought to perform the same task as did the New Testament authors in
exploring allegory in the rich fields of the Old Testament in search of connections to
Christ.928 The key question for de Lubac‟s work must be, „What difference, if any, does
the existence of a closed New Testament canon impose on subsequent allegorical
interpretation?‟

928

Williams (Receiving the Bible in Faith, 210), claims, “For de Lubac, the special concern of
allegory within the larger framework is „the work of redemption which is continued in the Church and its
sacraments,‟ and its task is to trace the significance of prior figures and events in relation to the
accomplishment of that initial Advent.”
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David Williams has suggested that a very great distinction exists between allegory
as it was practiced by the New Testament authors and spiritual interpretation as it is
central to Scriptural interpretation today. Williams argues that the early Church‟s use of
allegory was “not strictly speaking… interpretation …inasmuch as it stems from lived
experience and oral communication rather than encounter with the written texts.” 929
Williams suggests that the apostles did not interpret the Old Testament in light of the
New, as much as they applied the Old Testament to their new experience of the reality of
the risen Christ. With the closure of the New Testament canon, Williams claims, this
situation changed. After the closure of the canon, Christian spiritual interpretation
became primarily an investigation of God‟s communicative action at the level of the
canonical whole. Consequently, allegory (a correlation of individual OT historical events
to Christ), can now be relegated to a non-essential role in biblical interpretation today
without destroying the spiritual sense. 930 Such correlations, Williams claims, may still
have great value, but they must be classified as “applications” rather than interpretation,
since the “[i]nclusion of the NT in the body of authoritative Scripture provides a stable if
many-sided narrative and explanatory center to God‟s action. Drawing what had gone
before into more explicit connection with that center then becomes a matter of discerning
purpose and meaning operative at the level of the canonical whole.” 931 For Williams,
discerning the spiritual sense now is the process of discerning God‟s communicative
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Thus Williams (ibid, 210-12), suggests separating allegory (what he calls the responsibility
to make connections between biblical events) from the spiritual sense (what he calls the “meaning” of the
Bible).
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purpose in the whole canon, rather than exploring continual correlation of Old Testament
types with New Testament antitype.
Williams‟s proposal rightly shows that the interpretive situation is different for
contemporary Christians than it was for the Church prior to the closure of the canon.
Moreover, he helpfully illustrates the regulatory function that the closed canon places on
subsequent readings of Scripture. Frei and Vanhoozer emphasize that the distinctive
change brought about in the Church after the closure of the canon is of chief importance
for intratextual reading. Vanhoozer insists that the literal sense is now the canonical
sense, and consequently certain constraints are imposed on meaning only after the closing
of the canon. For Vanhoozer, the meaning of the text is now relatively stable and clear in
light of its completion. Frei claims further that figural reading ought to follow a linear
motion throughout the canon, thereby respecting the literal sense yet extending the
singular narrative to the whole of Scripture. For Frei, the reader is incorporated into the
world of the text when she reads the text in continuity with its linear development, and
not as interpreting from her own experience, as did the early Church. Frei‟s clear plain
sense and Vanhoozer‟s canonical sense, then, could only be implemented after the
closure of the canon. These programs differ significantly from the practice of allegory in
the early Church in which the apostles interpreted the Old Testament in light of their
experience of the contemporary event of Christ. Together, Frei and Vanhoozer‟s
proposals do not discourage the further correlation of Old Testament types to New
Testament antitype, but they do provide an additional regulatory principle for reading the
whole of recorded salvation history as the plain sense. The completed canon, read as a
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literary whole, does provide a foundation for evaluating the legitimacy of all subsequent
Scriptural correlations.
De Lubac‟s focus on the continuity between the New Testament apostles as
allegorists and successors of the apostles as allegorists tends to discount this decisive
shift.932 A decisive difference does exist between the pre-canonical practice interpreting
the Old Testament in light of the experience of Jesus Christ and the post-canonical
practice of reading all things in light of Christ. Vanhoozer and Frei show that the method
has changed from the experience of the pre-canonical Church to the interpretation of the
post-canonical Church. Christians today are regulated by the closure of the canon in a
way that the early Church could not have been. Vanhoozer‟s “canonical sense” helpfully
brings this decisive shift of method into focus, as it insists that God‟s speaking action can
be discerned after the closure of the canon in a way previously unavailable to the Church.
Frei‟s figural reading shows that the reader is obligated to read plainly in a way that is
now regulated by the contours of the text which testifies authoritatively to Christ rather
than to interpret in light of the Church‟s contemporary experience of the risen Lord.
Consequently, readers can approach Scripture with confident expectation that they
can understand what is plainly written and that their Scriptures plainly bear harmonious
witness to Christ. Plain canonical reading is the indispensable means to understand the
living Christ who mediates Himself to readers through His present communicative
Action. This claim is not meant to contradict de Lubac‟s understanding of allegory, but
only to chasten it in light of the plain literal sense. Readers can indeed access the
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See especially de Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 216-26), who emphasizes that all
successors of the apostles are entrusted with this fundamental task of allegorical interpretation of Scripture.

350

meaning of Scripture through its plain sense and read for understanding just as they can
read any book (with perhaps the necessary theological presuppositions imposed by the
canon). It is through this medium of plain communication that Christ mediates Himself.
It is possible to read Scripture plainly while employing the theological presupposition
that the whole of the story is about Christ, and to extend the story of Christ to all of
Scripture without being thereby obligated to develop connections between the Old
Testament and the New.
3. The Integral Relationship of Text and Event: Frei Advancing de Lubac
All four theologians agree that the result of reading Scripture is encounter with a
Mystery fitly rendered by, but too great to be contained in, the biblical text itself. De
Lubac wants to call the movement from text to spiritual reality a sacramental movement,
yet his suggestion is beset with a certain methodological difficulty which must be
overcome to make this insight work. As we saw in the last chapter, de Lubac often
relegates the text itself to the role of „spokesperson‟ which renders the events of history,
and it is those events which, in turn, sacramentally disclose the spiritual reality. It
remains unclear, on de Lubac‟s account, exactly what role the text plays in the rendering
of spiritual reality. As long as the text only leads to history, the text itself cannot
participate in this sacramental movement, since one natural thing (the “letter”) cannot
sacramentally render another natural thing (history). Here it will be suggested that while
de Lubac‟s sacramental ontology provides a helpful description of the movement from
text to spiritual reality, his framework needs Frei‟s explanation of realistic narrative to
work consistently.
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On Frei‟s account of realistic narrative, de Lubac‟s undetermined gap between
text and event is a false problem, since realistic narrative assumes that there is no gap
between text and referent. The text itself is a fitting vehicle for the movement to divine
reality, as it makes the event present to the reader. Through his use of realistic narrative,
Frei “insists that the flesh or letter is not opposed to, but is rather the fit expression of,
spirit or meaning.”933 Because the text “means what it says,” the text is not a vehicle
which guides the reader to the ostensive referent, but is the God-ordained means of
presenting history to the reader. That history presented to the reader must be
distinguished from, yet can never be separated from the narrative which renders it
present.
Through realistic narrative, Frei illumines the importance of de Lubac‟s claim
that, in the New Testament, the literal sense is the spiritual sense.934 Frei claims, “But
since it is the story of Jesus taken literally that unveils this higher truth, the „literal‟ sense
is the key to spiritual interpretation of the New Testament. In this as in some other
respects, „letter‟ and „spirit‟ turn out to be mutually fit or reinforcing in much orthodox
Christianity, despite the superficially contrary Pauline declaration (2 Cor. 3:6).”935 Based
on a realistic reading of the Gospel narratives, the literal sense fitly renders the spiritual
sense, inasmuch as the text renders an event that shapes the meaning of the entire
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Murphy ("Henri De Lubac's Mystical Tropology," 181), claims, concerning de Lubac‟s
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Christian canon. Thus Frei implies something of a sacramental relationship which takes
place at the level of the text. The literal reading of the text, by realistically rendering
history, is a fit vehicle to move the reader to divine reality, 936 as it renders the Christ who
is present now, who subsequently provides the understanding of the whole picture of
Christian reality. As this literal, realistic story is extended through the whole Scriptures,
all Scripture fitly renders the events of history in such a way that the text itself leads the
reader to the spiritual reality. Frei‟s achievement of method thus clarifies de Lubac‟s
desired move from text to spiritual reality, as it shows how the text fitly render the
spiritual reality. Where de Lubac emphasizes that the Scriptural texts are an
incorporation of the Logos, de Lubac can only carry this claim through consistently as he
shows how the texts present to the reader the very salvation history that the Logos has
effected.

II. The Relationship between Scripture and Church
At this point it is necessary to turn from the theological presuppositions about the
way in which Christ mediates Himself to readers by means of Scripture to an explanation
of the capacity which the Church has uniquely been given to receive the disclosure of
Christ in Scripture. Just as the move from text to spiritual reality is the central movement
in a Christian reading of Scripture which must be explained in the broader context of the
936

For Frei (The Identity of Jesus Christ, 147), “For the believer to know who Jesus Christ is,
to affirm his presence, and to adore him are aone and the same thing…concerning Jesus Christ and him
alone, factual affirmation is completely one with faith and trust of the heart, with love of him, and love of
the neighbors for whom he gave himself completely.” While it seems that these different aspects indeed
need to be distinguished (hence a move from the literal sense to the spiritual sense), Frei‟s emphasis that all
these elements is what the Bible means by Jesus Christ is helpful for understanding the way the text brings
the spiritual reality to the reader.
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economy of redemption, so the spiritual capacity to receive such disclosure must be
articulated within this broader context as well. The Church, as a theological reality,
stands in a unique position where it is uniquely constituted by and drawn into encounter
with Christ by means of Scripture. Some ecclesiological reflection, then, which explains
this unique capacity, must instruct hermeneutical discussions.
Despite its importance, the relationship between Scripture and Church has proven
quite difficult for these four theologians to articulate for a number of reasons. First, as
we have seen in the previous chapters, a tension exists between emphasizing the external
clarity of the Scriptural texts and acknowledging the unique capacity of certain readers to
participate in a qualitatively greater way in Scriptural disclosure. All four theologians
struggle with articulating the movement from text to spiritual reality because they feel the
pressure to emphasize both the clarity of the plain sense and the capacity of Scripture to
disclose spiritual reality to receptive readers. 937 When emphasis lies on the external
clarity of Scriptural reading, it becomes quite difficult to show how some readers are
capable of receiving the disclosure of spiritual reality in a qualitatively greater way than
others. Second, it is in the discussion of receptive capacity that theological
presuppositions about the relationship of nature and grace arise with greatest force. The
way in which each theologian conceives the nature/grace relationship necessarily

937

For Tracy, the authority of Scripture is built, in part, upon its ability to engage intellectual
discussions in the public square with clarity. For Frei, the authority of Scripture is built on its ability to
communicate Christ to the reader with clarity. For Vanhoozer, the authority of Scripture depends on its
ability to be understood by all persons who employ the right theological presuppositions. Consequently,
Tracy‟s focus is on the disclosive capacity of Scripture, yet he wants to make theology public, and therefore
needs to show that Scripture is potentially disclosive to all persons who employ useful hermeneutical
strategies. Frei argues that the Christian community ultimately determines the rules for reading, yet
emphasizes that anyone who reads Scripture according to those rules will encounter the living Christ rather
than simply a story about Christ. Vanhoozer claims that the Scriptures is disclosive to all those who read
plainly with the right theological presuppositions.
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structures the way in which he will describe the disclosure rendered to readers in
Scripture and how readers will receive that disclosure.938 Third, since the Reformation,
both Protestant and Catholic theologians have framed discussions of the relationship
between Scripture and Church in terms of authority. 939 The disagreement between
Vanhoozer and Frei about the location of authority in either Scripture or tradition is
illustrative of this ongoing debate. This debate tends to draw focus away from discussion
of the Church‟s theological nature and role in the economy of redemption. 940
The way in which each author articulates the relationships between external
clarity and unique capacity, nature and grace, and Scripture or Church as locus of
authority leads to very different articulations about the unique capacity of the Church to
receive disclosure. When these three issues are discussed with only the text/reader
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The proposal set forth in this dissertation does not require the theologian to take a specific
position on the nature of grace. The real ongoing issue which sets Tracy‟s work apart from Frei,
Vanhoozer and de Lubac is that Tracy locates the work of the Spirit more with creation than with
redemption. (In that issue, there appear to be many similarities between the disagreement between de
Lubac and Schillebeeckx about the sacramental nature of the Church and the disagreement between Frei
and Tracy about the particular identity of Jesus Christ. The particular identity of Christ and the historical
character of grace as event are closely related, and have significant implications for one another. (For a
good discussion on the debate between de Lubac and Schillebeeckx, see Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the
Church, 109-28).)
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problematic is the location of authority for Scriptural reading, and his arguments against Tracy centers on
either returning to the authority of the plain sense in his early work, or giving priority to the Church‟s selfdescription in constructing hermeneutical method. Vanhoozer also centers his project on the problematic of
authority, emphasizing sola Scriptura and articulating the economy in such a way that the Church is always
responsive to the Scriptures. Consequently, discussions of the unique capacity of the Church in reading
Scripture tend to become mired in questions about the relationship between Scripture and Church as
primary authority for Christian life.
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this role to the magisterium.”
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relationship in view, they necessarily reach impasses. Yet when the relationship between
Scripture and Church is placed in the broader context of the economy of redemption, it is
possible to ease tensions between these issues and provide a helpful description of the
unique receptive capacity of the Church which allows it to participate uniquely in the
disclosure of spiritual reality in Scripture. This section, then, will examine the way in
which each theologian articulates the unique capacity of the Church, as the reading
community, to receive the disclosure of Christ in Scripture. It will then make a
theological proposal, based on the insights of all four authors, which will establish a
helpful framework for advancing the discussion. Finally, it will provide specific
observations which will advance hermeneutical method for the relationship between text
and reader.

A. Surveying the Positions of the Four Authors
This section will show how each theologian attempts to explain the unique
relationship between Scripture and Church in a way which uniquely positions the Church
for reception of Christ in Scripture. I will argue that Frei and Vanhoozer do not provide
adequate theological reflection on the nature of the Church to be able to articulate the
Church‟s unique capacity for disclosure. Only de Lubac provides sufficient theological
reflection to show why the Church possesses a unique capacity to receive disclosure in
the Scriptures, as he describes both Scripture and Church as incorporations of the Logos.
David Tracy “Capacity as Openness to Disclosure”: Tracy‟s early model of the
classic illumines a powerful transcendental insight that all persons possess the condition
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for the possibility of the disclosure of the divine. Tracy‟s project is driven by a theory of
“manifestation” in which all readers engage truth in an already-graced world. 941 All
readers are “fitted” to receive disclosure of the divine because, as created in the image of
God, they are able to recognize the universal gracious work of the Spirit. Yet while
Tracy focuses on the capacity of all persons in receiving disclosure, he says very little
about the way in which participation in the Church affects the believer‟s reading of
Scripture. Two practical factors prevent Tracy from adequately describing the Church‟s
unique capacity for encounter. First, Tracy‟s effort to keep theology a public discipline
practically discourages reflection on the unique capacity of Christians in reading. Tracy
must emphasize the general conditions for the possibility of religious experience to
promote continual public dialogue about religious experience. Second, Tracy wants to
show that a number of religious texts such as Bible, the Koran, etc. are able to disclose a
claim to the whole which is (at least in principle), accessible to all readers. All readers
are constituted in such a way that they could, in principle, be brought to a limitexperience through the text, even if the subject matter disclosed is unique to each
religious classic.942 While Tracy is comfortable talking about a greater and lesser
potential for revelatory experience, and a greater and lesser intensification of disclosure,
he does not feel comfortable discussing a unique capacity for disclosure.
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Philosophy is the most common mode of reflection limit-experiences in this situation of
manifestation. Tracy (The Analogical Imagination, 379), writes that “...the power is now disclosed through
the critical mediations of reason reflecting upon the original experience of wonder in existence only to
yield through the philosophical reflection to a mediated sense of a fundamental trust in the ultimate reality
of God as well as an attendant trust in all reality as graced. Reflection upon that uncanny sense of wonder
discloses the uncanny giftedness of all creation.”
942
This is not foundationalism, but is a low-level observation that texts can and do render
subject-matter. The actual moment of encounter is, for Tracy, as for all three other theologians, a judgment
for theological anthropology and ecclesiology, not philosophy.
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In his later work, Tracy admits that his transcendental model is insufficient to
articulate a truly Christian capacity for disclosure, and he acknowledges that Christians
read for disclosure precisely because they believe that the Scriptures participate uniquely
in the Logos.943 Tracy does describe the theological presuppositions that he feels must
attend a properly Christian reading of Scripture (namely, Jesus Christ is the greatest
instance of God‟s revelation; Scriptural readings must not be in discontinuity with the
apostles; Scripture participates in the eternal Logos). Yet he never really shows how the
Church possesses a unique capacity to receive such disclosure. Both Tracy‟s claim that
the Church understands Scripture as uniquely participating in the Logos and his claim
that the Church is a sacrament require some articulation of this capacity than is possible
through the general model of the classic. As long as Tracy grounds capacity for
disclosure only in general human capacity and the universal work of the Spirit, and not
specifically in Christ as Incarnate Logos, Tracy can only articulate a quantitative
difference between disclosure within the Church and disclosure outside the Church, and
not a qualitative difference. 944
Hans Frei “Capacity as Employment of Method”: Frei‟s early work is based on
the assumption that the texts plainly render a particular identity accessible to all readers.
Frei‟s argument against any external meaning system imposed upon the text requires him
to show that all Scriptural “meaning” is contained in the text and accessible to all readers.
Since there can be no hidden meaning in the text accessible to insiders only, the only
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Tracy, “Writing,” 383-85.
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In the last section, I argue that Tracy has indeed implicitly articulated something of a
qualitative distinction, although he does not develop the implications of his insight.
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distinction between “insiders” and “outsiders” that can exist is that “insiders” are part of a
particular community which is bound by particular theological presuppositions and hone
particular interpretive skills.
In Frei‟s later work, he tends to ground authority in community consensus over
the inherent nature of the texts. But Frei never provides a convincing theological
argument for why the Church decided to read their texts literally. Frei is reticent to
provide a substantive theological description of the Church, and instead focuses on
describing it as a socio-linguistic community. As a result, even where Frei has
opportunity to focus on the theological nature of the community, all discussion about the
capacity of the Church reduces to the way in which the Church as a social (not
theological) community forms rules for method. Although Frei claims that reading the
plain sense should lead to the recognition of the Christ who is living and present, Frei
never sufficiently shows how the reader‟s incorporation into Christ affects subsequent
interpretation. 945 Consequently, Scriptural reading for Frei becomes more of a honing a
set of skills based on observation of the text than a transformative encounter with the
Triune God through the text.946 Conversion, practically speaking, becomes more a matter
of perfecting interpretive method than participating in spiritual transformation. Only
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See Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 141-93, and Bryan Hollon, Everything is Sacred,

106-47.
946

Dawson (Christian Figural Reading, 212-14), provides a very insightful summary of the
differences between Frei and Origen regarding spiritual interpretation. For Frei, Dawson concludes, literal
reading and employment of interpretive skill is necessary to “make sure disciples do not confuse Jesus‟
identity with their own…” (213). See also Cyril O'Regan, "De Doctrina Christiana and Modern
Hermeneutics," in De Doctrina Christiana: A Classic of Western Culture, ed. Duane W.H. and Pamela
Bright Arnold, Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).
who claims, “Understanding the biblical text…is according to Frei more like a skill, a species of knowhow,” so that the focus is on “competence or incompetence in the practice of interpretation.”
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when further doctrinal reflection is given to the way in which conversion affects
subsequent interpretation of Scripture will it be possible for Frei to place Scripture in the
economy of redemption and thus ease the thorny issue of authority.
Kevin Vanhoozer “Capacity as Acceptance of Theological Presuppositions”:
Vanhoozer‟s project is motivated by a desire to show that God is the primary author of
Scripture and that God‟s speaking action is intelligible to all readers in the literal sense.
Vanhoozer suggests that all readers can understand the human speech acts which
compose the literal sense of Scripture. But because believers recognize that God‟s
speech acts supervene on the human speech acts at the level of the canon, they are able to
hear the very speaking action of God as they read. Vanhoozer‟s use of speech-act theory
leads him to argue that the unique capacity of the Church to hear God in Scripture is
almost entirely a matter of applying the right theological presuppositions to the literal
sense. Disclosive reading, for Vanhoozer, is a process of lining up the correct doctrinal
presuppositions and then reading the plain, canonical sense of the text.
At first glance, Vanhoozer appears to have altogether avoided the tricky issue of
capacity by means of a confessional paradigm: those who confess that God is the primary
author of Scripture are, by definition, in the Church and are able thus to hear the voice of
God when Scripture is read. On this account, those who read the literal sense with the
presupposition that Scripture is a covenant document of God do actually hear the voice of
God. Subsequently, when those believers read the plain sense of the canonical
Scriptures, a rule of faith emerges which then determines the confessional boundaries for
being within the Church. Christians, then, enter the hermeneutical circle by
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acknowledging that God is the primary author of Scripture. Subsequently they find
Scripture to establish the clear and authoritative boundaries for their reading community.
Yet it is unclear that Vanhoozer‟s proposal really solves the problem he sets out to
overcome. First, Vanhoozer places a great deal of weight on a particular philosophical
model of authorship as the doctrinal foundation for a Christian hermeneutic. Vanhoozer
is correct in saying that the Church‟s claim that the Scriptures are the Word of God (what
he calls the “Scripture Principle”) and the Church‟s claim that the Scriptures manifest
dual authorship are grounded in the unified witness of tradition. Yet Vanhoozer‟s own
articulation of the Scripture principle and dual authorship is distinctly not a traditional
claim, but is based on speech-act theory, and should not be so hastily argued to be the
faith of the Church.947 Consequently, this understanding of authorship may not have the
strength to ground Vanhoozer‟s whole proposal. Second, Vanhoozer‟s proposal is
supported by a very dense theological scaffolding which only finds credibility within the
Church. Hence the same authority problem which led Frei to locate the authority of
Scripture in the consensus of the Church returns to plague Vanhoozer‟s model. Placing
authority in God‟s communicative action necessitates granting authority to the Church to
recognize and receive that communication. Vanhoozer‟s “Scripture Principle” and his
case for the primacy of the literal sense must both be grounded in some unique capacity
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For example, Brevard Childs ("Speech-Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation," 80),
criticizes “authorial discourse theories” using speech-act theory for attempting to bypass the fundamental
Judeo-Christian claim that “the movement by which scripture becomes the vehicle of divine revelation was
by means of the Holy Spirit. Human words in all their time-conditioned form were received thereby as the
divine voice addressing an expectant recipient. It is to be noted that the human words were not altered into
another form of speech, but as the Written Word became the Word of God for them. The human words
were not transformed into a new form of illocutionary divine discourse, but were now understood and made
alive through a divine activity.” Childs (ibid), concludes, “In my judgment, the most fundamental flaw in
the new hermeneutical theory arises from the failure to understand the role of the church in collecting,
shaping and interpreting the Bible, which is the issue of canon.”
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of the Church to establish fruitful methods for reading. While Vanhoozer‟s typical
approach is to promote a theological argument for God‟s use of the text over the authority
of tradition, until Vanhoozer explores the nature of the Church as a theological reality, his
work will likely only convince those Protestants who already agree with sola Scriptura.
Henri de Lubac “Capacity as Incorporation of the Logos”: Of the four
theologians, only de Lubac explicitly articulates the unique capacity of the Church to
receive the mediation of Christ in the reading of Scripture. De Lubac makes three
important moves which serve to describe the unique capacity of the Church to receive the
disclosure of Christ in Scripture. First, de Lubac clearly distinguishes between Scripture
and revelation, allowing him to subject both Scripture and Church to the event of Christ
and to emphasize that both are used by God to mediate the Mystery of Christ. 948 De
Lubac clarifies this claim by showing that the Church possesses a unique capacity for
reading because the Church, like Scripture and the Eucharist, is an “incorporation of the
Logos” which is grounded in the Incarnate Logos. Hence the distinction between
Scripture and revelation allows De Lubac to provide a theologically rich description of
both Scripture and the Church as fellow incorporations of the Logos and as fellow
mediators of the singular revelation of Christ. This model provides resources to speak of
the Church as having both the unique capacity to receive the disclosure of Christ in
Scripture and the unique capacity to mediate Christ along with Scripture.949
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De Lubac (La révélation divine, 164-65, cited by Moulins-Beaufort, "Henri De Lubac:
Reader of Dei Verbum," 680), claims that Christ, “The revealed object „is transmitted to us whole and
entire by Scripture, and whole and entire by Tradition, both of which are intimately connected.‟”
949

De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, I, 27.
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Second, de Lubac‟s understanding of tropology suggests that readers possess a
unique capacity for disclosure because they bear the imprint of the Logos. De Lubac
builds an argument that all persons are “fitted” to recognize and receive the Logos
incorporated in Scripture because they have the imprint of the Logos on their souls.
When Scripture is read, the individual understands her own history to participate in the
story of the Bible because she participates in the Logos. As the reader fits himself into
the narrative of the Scriptures, de Lubac claims, “Interior experience and meditation on
Scripture accordingly tend to merge in a unique „experience of the Word,‟” in which each
deepens and furthers the other.950 This theological explanation for the efficacy of
Scripture provides a much stronger reason for expecting encounter with the Incarnate
Logos in Scripture than either Tracy or Frei provide. De Lubac moves beyond Tracy‟s
argument for a general capacity for disclosure in all human beings by providing more
adequate theological terminology to describe this capacity as a function of the Logos who
is Incarnate in the particular Jesus Christ. De Lubac moves beyond Frei by showing that
disclosure in Scriptural narrative is not simply a result of narrative being a more fitting
genre to render identity, but is a consequence of the Logos causing a recognition of
identity between the narrative of Scripture and the reader.951
Third, de Lubac grounds the capacity of the Church in a rich understanding of the
totus Christus, in which the Church interprets in light of the “already” of allegory and the
“not yet” of anagogy. As the Church realizes that it is the new reality formed in
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De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 142. De Lubac (ibid, 174), claims, “When the Word
comes to the soul, it is to instruct her in wisdom, and this understanding of the soul with the Word” is not
“imaginary;” rather, “the mystery interiorizes itself within the heart, where it becomes experience.”
951

See De Lubac, History and Spirit, 398.
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relationship to Christ the head (allegory), it realizes also its movement toward
eschatological fulfillment in the totus Christus (anagogy), it interprets Scripture
according to its nature. Here de Lubac establishes a theologically rich description of the
Church which cannot be gleaned through a discussion of phenomenological method
(Tracy), authority (Vanhoozer), or ascriptive identity (Frei). The fourfold structure of
Christian reality is inscribed on the Church by its participation in Christ. The Church, in
return, not only uniquely holds the correct theological presuppositions for reading this
unique text, but is itself “fitted” by Christ for receiving disclosure of Christ. The Church,
as that institution which participates in the Mystery, is the only one which has an intuition
of the Mystery. This intuition toward which the Church yearns allows the Church to
sense which interpretations are legitimately part of its faith.
These three steps allow de Lubac to develop an ecclesiology sufficient to
articulate the way in which the Church participates in Christ as it reads the Scriptures.
De Lubac would insist that the Church is not, as Frei suggests, simply that institution
which follows the identity of Christ and understands its own identity in relation to the
identity of Christ. Consequently, Scriptural reading is not simply a recognition of the
identity of Christ plainly rendered in the literal sense. Furthermore, de Lubac would
insist that the Church is not, as Vanhoozer suggests, simply that community which
responds in obedience to Scripture.952 Consequently, Scriptural reading is not simply the
recognition of and response to divine speaking action. For de Lubac, the Church is
primarily an eschatological reality, the body of Christ which participates already in the
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Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 235, 418, etc.), typically uses Gerhard Ebeling
description of the Church that “the history of the church is the history of biblical interpretation.”
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kingdom, even as it awaits full union with its head. De Lubac‟s emphasis that the
“infusion of the Holy Spirit placed the people of God in an essentially new position” as
“the Spirit of Christ has renewed, transfigured, and „spiritualized‟ everything,” would
allow de Lubac to stress the “already-present” dimension of the Church, and would cause
him to worry that both Frei and Vanhoozer have overlooked the very Mystery of the
Church as a theological reality. 953

B. Proposal #2: Distinguishing the “Imprint,” “Incorporations,” and “Incarnation” of the
Logos
I have suggested that de Lubac‟s ecclesiology has the most developed resources to
describe the unique capacity of the Church to receive the disclosure of Christ in
Scripture. At this point, I will use insights from all four authors to sketch a theological
proposal about the unique capacity of readers within the Church which will provide
helpful insights for the relationship between text and reader. This proposal should
advance Tracy‟s project by showing how disclosure is intensified in certain readers and
provides resources to help Frei and Vanhoozer avoid the problem of locating authority in
either Scripture or the Church.
I will base my proposal on de Lubac‟s distinction between “imprint,”
“incorporation” and “Incarnation” of the Logos as qualitatively deepening modes of
divine presentation. The distinctions between “imprint,” “incorporations” and
“Incarnation” of the Logos are qualitative distinctions and cannot be seen as simply
differences of intensity of the mediation of the Logos. The “Incarnation” of the Logos is
953

De Lubac, The Church, Paradox and Mystery, 51 and 43 respectively.
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the unique and climactic event of human history to which the whole of Scripture testifies.
This testimony of the whole Scriptures to the singular Event of Christ grounds the
importance of the literal sense. The term “incorporation” of the Logos refers to the way
in which the Triune God has drawn certain human realities into God‟s own economic
missions. Scripture, Church, and Eucharist are all called “incorporations” as they
uniquely bear and mediate the presence of the Logos who has been singularly revealed in
Jesus Christ. These human realities all have a sacramental nature, as they present the
Mystery of the Logos to believers as they point to Christ, the Incarnate Logos. Finally,
de Lubac claims that all readers bear the “imprint” of the Logos upon their souls. This,
again, is a qualitative distinction, as it does not suggest a sacramental relationship to the
Logos, but rather allows readers to recognize their own identity in light of the Incarnate
Logos. Together, these distinct mediations of the Logos provide conceptual resources
which show the structure of the economy of redemption and the way in which readers
participate in it.
Premise 1: Every human being is fitted with an “imprint” of the eternal
Logos who is incorporated in the Scriptures and Incarnate in Jesus Christ. This
imprint is a gift of creation and is not entirely eliminated by the Fall. 954 This
principle grounds Tracy‟s transcendental reflection theologically, showing that all
persons do have a capacity for disclosure because they bear an imprint of the Logos
written within them. Mike Higton, providing a charitable (and I believe correct) reading
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At the lowest level, I am agreeing with the legitimacy of de Lubac‟s use of Origen to show
that the image of God contains some trace of the eternal Logos. I am only taking seriously the Imago Dei
imprinted on every human being and am suggesting that response to grace does place the individual into a
qualitatively different situation.
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of Tracy, claims, “Tracy is wanting to say that there is something about human being (the
proximity of „absolute mystery‟ to us) that makes the truth disclosed in Jesus of Nazareth
potentially recognizable as a truth by any human being, even though that truth is
inherently linked to the particularity of Jesus.” 955 Tracy‟s early work focused so greatly
on the „fit‟ nature of human beings to experience the divine that Tracy did not adequately
emphasize the way in which the unsubstitutable identity of Christ rendered plainly in the
Gospels enabled this capacity for disclosure until Frei‟s critique. Yet Tracy has always
worked to tie that capacity of human beings to receive religious disclosure to the
mediation of Christ. As early as The Analogical Imagination, Tracy wrote, “We are
always already in the presence of an absolute mystery….We are…hearers of a possible
revelation or self-manifestation from the freedom of the absolute mystery….But for the
Christian, that revelation (as self-manifestation of God) has in fact occurred in the free
and decisive event called Jesus Christ—a position explicated in systematic theology.”956
Throughout Tracy‟s work, he tries to argue for both the capacity of all readers to receive
disclosure of the divine and the particularity of Jesus Christ in mediating that disclosure.
De Lubac‟s model brings both general capacity and the unsubstitutable identity of Christ
together by showing that the eternal Logos is imprinted on every person by virtue of the
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Higton, “Hans Frei and David Tracy on the Ordinary and the Extraordinary in
Christianity,” 586.
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Citing Rahner, Tracy (The Analogical Imagination, 162), claims “that revelation, as
„transcendental,‟ is always already present in this concretely graced world; that revelation as „categorial‟ is
present in the gratuity of God‟s self-manifestation in the events of „salvation history,‟” specifically in Jesus
Christ (Karl Rahner, Foundations of the Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, (New
York: Crossroad, 1978), pp. 163-62; 206-28). Tracy‟s own comment on Rahner is even more specific:
“We are always already in the presence of absolute mystery—a position defended in „philosophy of
religion.‟ We are, therefore, in fact hearers of a possible revelation or self-manifestation from the freedom
of the absolute mystery…(ibid)”
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work of the Logos in all creation, yet that the Logos is revelation only in the Incarnation
of the Logos.
Furthermore, because the Christian Scriptures participate in the Logos as they
testify to the Incarnate Logos, readers of Scripture are able to recognize an identity
between themselves and the Logos in Scripture in a way that is always grounded in the
Incarnate Logos.957 De Lubac‟s model provides the theological language to describe the
reader‟s capacity for disclosure grounded both in creation and in the unsubstitutable
identity of Jesus Christ as the Incarnation of the Logos. Here every reader has a capacity
to find, in the narrative of Scripture, a “mirror” in which the reader reads his or her
identity. This means that all readers are “fitted” to read more than the plain sense of
Scripture. They are “fitted” to participate in the spiritual reality to which it points by a
certain imprint of identity with the texts which both point to Christ.
Premise 2: Since the Scriptures are an “incorporation” of the Logos which
testifies to the Incarnate Logos in Jesus Christ, the reader is led to the Logos by
reading the plain sense of the text which directs the reader to Christ as the Object of
Scripture. Here Frei and Vanhoozer‟s projects are useful alongside de Lubac‟s
theological description of Scripture as an incorporation of the Logos. Through Frei, we
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My suggestion does not simply propose an alternative form of foundationalism, as the
imprint of the Logos upon the soul is a theological, rather than a philosophical, description of the
commonality of all persons, and is not identifiable through a particular philosophical analysis (see Lewish
Ayres, “The Soul and the Reading of Scripture,” 173-90, who proposes that de Lubac‟s understanding of
the soul as a meeting place between God and human beings can only be described theologically). This
reality of imprint may not be experienced without a particular act of grace and a particular rendering of the
Incarnate Logos mediated by Scripture. Nonetheless, it is a commonality of all human persons and does
describe a common capacity to recognize and respond to the revelation of Christ mediated in Scripture.
Consequently, Tracy may be correct that all persons stand with a capacity to receive the disclosure of
Absolute Mystery, yet it may be equally valid to accept Lindbeck‟s argument that human beings cannot
experience the presence of the Logos without being able to name it (see Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine,
38, for his charge against Tracy).
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see most clearly that the literal sense is the indispensable means to the spiritual reality
and thus plain reading is the normative means to encounter with Christ. Through
Vanhoozer, we understand more clearly the importance of the canonical sense, in which
as Christ emerges as Object of Scripture readers are drawn to the Christ who addresses
the Church as Subject of Scripture. These projects are corrective to de Lubac as they
close the gap between the literal and spiritual senses, showing how the literal sense is
taken up into God‟s communicative action and how the unsubstitutable identity of the
Incarnate Logos is indispensable for the movement to the spiritual sense. Christ‟s
address to readers as Subject of Scripture is intrinsically linked to recognition of Christ as
Object of Scripture. Thus readers are bound to the plain sense of the text so that they
may recognize the identity of the Incarnate Christ as Object and thereby encounter Him
as Subject.
It is important here to emphasize that for the believer, reading both the literal
sense and the movement to spiritual reality occur in the realm of grace. Clarifying this
issue may help to ease a particular tension in Frei‟s writing. For Frei, Scriptural reading
always tended to be an activity for the realm of nature, not grace. Frei argued that
anyone could read the plain sense of the text realistically and recognize that the identity
of Jesus Christ is as the one who is present.958 Still, Frei could never explain why one
person believes and the other does not, even as both read the same plainly rendered
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Frei (The Identity of Jesus Christ, 4), claims, “In our knowledge of Jesus Christ, his
presence and his identity are completely one. We cannot properly think of him as not present, as we can
think of others without their real presence.”
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identity of Jesus Christ.959 The present account proposes that the movement from nature
to grace in the reading of the plain sense may be the difference between recognizing the
unsubstitutable identity of a Person rendered plainly (nature), and recognizing the
intrinsic correspondence between the imprint of the Logos on the human soul and the
Incarnate Logos mediated in the Scriptures (grace). In other words, while any reader may
read the Gospels plainly while remaining in the realm of nature, the believer moves to the
realm of grace when recognition of the particular identity of Jesus Christ reveals to the
reader the correspondence between this particularly rendered Incarnate Logos and the
imprint of the Logos on the individual‟s soul. If this is so, it seems that realistic reading
may render the identity of Jesus Christ as the identity of God. Yet this realistic reading
does not affect the reader‟s own life until the reader recognizes the correspondence
between his own identity and the identity of Jesus Christ when Christ enables the imprint
of the Logos to recognize the Incarnation of the Logos through the Incorporation of the
Logos in Scripture. Consequently, it could be said that for the believer even the plain
reading of Scripture occurs in the realm of grace, insofar as the reader can recognize the
correspondence between his own story and the narrative of Christ rendered in the plain
sense precisely because the Incarnate Logos stands as Subject of the Scriptures,
mediating Himself to the reader through the texts. Hence there is no real dichotomy, as if
recognizing Christ as Object of Scripture were a matter of nature and recognizing Christ
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Frei (The Identity of Jesus Christ, 151-52), claims that although “there is a kind of logic in
a Christian‟s faith that forces him to say that disbelief in the resurrection of Jesus is rationally
impossible…whether one actually believes the resurrection is, of course, a wholly different matter…no
matter what the logic of the Christian faith, actual belief in the resurrection is a matter of faith and not of
arguments from possibility or evidence.” This difficulty is articulated in Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ,
12-25, although Frei simply concludes that he cannot explain how the believer comes to believe and is not
obligated to try to explain this.
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as Subject of Scripture were a matter of grace. Though any reader can recognize the
plain identity of Christ by reading the literal sense in the realm of nature, the believer
recognizes correspondence and is drawn into participation by reading that same literal
sense.
Premise 3: As the reader recognizes and responds to the Incarnate Logos
rendered in the plain sense of Scripture, the reader is changed from simply bearing
the imprint of the Logos to being an incorporation of the Logos as a member of the
Church. This change of capacity is both qualitative and quantitative. 960 On the one
hand, Tracy is correct that the change is one of intensification of receptive capacity for
disclosure, since it is the same Logos which has left an imprint on the individual into
which the reader is now incorporated. Yet on the other hand, the change goes beyond
intensification to a qualitative difference, as the believing reader really is incorporated
into the Logos by incorporation into the Church. Hence the believing reader participates
in Christ in a way that is qualitatively different from someone outside the Church. The
very entry of the believer into the Church makes the believer a fellow incorporation of
the Logos.
Here de Lubac‟s proposed relationship between allegory and tropology is
important for identifying the relationship between the individual and the Church. As the
individual soul is the “microcosm of the perfect Church,” the individual reader becomes

960

See here Dei Verbum‟s claim (I, 5), to a qualitative change: “To make this act of faith, the
grace of God and the interior help of the Holy Spirit must precede and assist, moving the heart and turning
it to God, opening the eyes of the mind…” This must a qualitative change as it is the effected conversion
of the individual.
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an incorporation of the Logos as she is incorporated into the Church. 961 Tropology, as we
have seen, is not a spiritual dimension beyond allegory, but is the specification of
allegory in the individual, thereby relating the individual to the Church and making the
individual an incorporation of the Logos. This means that the believer, by being
incorporated into the Church, bears a qualitatively greater capacity for reception of the
Logos to the extent that the believer participates in the Church.
Premise 4: The only sufficient way to express the relationship between
Scripture and Church is in terms of their intrinsic identity, as the same
unsubstitutable Jesus Christ rendered through the plain sense of the text is the
Christ who constitutes the Church and draws it toward its eschatological end. Just
as the task of showing the intrinsic relationship between Christ as Subject and Christ as
Object of Scripture is essential to the development of a Christian hermeneutic, so the task
of showing the intrinsic relationship between the Christ rendered in Scripture and the
Christ experienced as present in the Church is crucial to the advancement of a Christian
hermeneutic. This means that just as the formative Christian community was compelled
to establish rules for reading based on their experience that the present, risen Christ was
the same Christ rendered realistically in Scripture, so the Church today exists to mediate
this present Christ as the One rendered in a plain reading of Scripture. Consequently, the
Church has authority to safeguard a Christian hermeneutic which will allow Christ to be
mediated as both Subject and Object of Scripture and to renew itself continually by
returning to the Christ who is so mediated in Scripture. Practically, this means that any
attempt to locate authority in either Scripture or the Church will fail to advance a
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De Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, II, 136.
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Christian hermeneutic because it will fail to show the intrinsic relationship between the
two incorporations of the Logos.

C. Advancing Hermeneutical Method for the Text/Reader Relationship
The theological description given to the reading community has significant
implications for the relationship between text and readers. When method is emphasized
without adequately describing the relationship of the Church to Scripture in the economy
of redemption, the task of interpretation becomes largely a skillful employment of literary
or theological rules, in which readers are either required to respect a meaning which is
said to be determinate or are encouraged to conform a meaning to their own selfunderstanding which is said to be indeterminate. 962 This section will examine
Vanhoozer‟s central problematic of authority and Frei‟s central problematic of identity
and will show that both emphases are one-sided because they both attempt to chasten
readers through the plain reading of the text without giving adequate attention to the
intrinsic relationship between Scripture and Church in the divine economy. First, I will
place Vanhoozer and de Lubac in dialogue to show that although they locate Scripture
very similarly in the economy of redemption, Vanhoozer‟s location of the Church forces
readers to posit authority in either the Church or Scripture. Second, I will show that the
very same ecclesiological deficiency that plagues Vanhoozer‟s work is also evident in
Frei‟s project. As a result, Frei also is forced to locate authority either in Scripture or in
the Church. Finally, I will show that the best way to resolve the tension about the
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location of authority is by showing the intrinsic connection between Scripture and
Church. Here I will suggest that de Lubac‟s description of the Church and Tracy‟s later
insights on the theological interpretation of Scripture provide the best resources for
showing the intrinsic similarity between Scripture and Church, and thus advance the
dialogue.
1. Authority in Scripture and Church: Comparing De Lubac and Vanhoozer
For Vanhoozer and Frei, it is necessary to safeguard the plain sense of the text in
order to uphold Scripture‟s authority to confront the Church. Unfortunately, both
authors, the authority issue tends to be posed in terms of an either/or dilemma, in which
the theologian must choose one reality or the other as the ground for Scripture‟s
authority. 963 It is quite informative that the strong disagreement between Vanhoozer and
Frei about whether to place Scriptural authority in the texts or in the Church has tended to
make their two very similar hermeneutical projects appear nearly incompatible with one
another.964
The path to overcoming this impasse, it appears, is through a more explicit
theological description of the Church as a reading community which will appreciate both
963

Historically, the issue of authority has had a significant impact on what de Lubac calls the
“traditional hermeneutic,” since it has been precisely the debate about locating authority in either the plain
sense of Scripture or the Magisterium that has contributed what I am calling the „eclipse of spiritual
interpretation.‟ See Boersma, “Pumpkin Pie,” 253, nt. 48, who claims that much of Vanhoozer‟s focus on
authority illustrates “Congar‟s point that over time Scripture and Church (magisterium) have become
separated, with Protestants focusing on the canon as the rule of faith, and with Catholics assigning this role
to the Magisterium.” De Lubac (The Sources of Revelation, 55-71), chronicles the decline of spiritual
interpretation leading up to the Reformation.
964

Vanhoozer (“The Spirit of Understanding,” 219), complains sharply that with Frei, “It is
the community, ultimately, that enjoys interpretive authority” so that “[i]nterpretive might makes right.”
While I have argued that this is a particularly uncharitable reading of Frei, it illustrates a disagreement
about authority which must be relieved for Christian interpretation to advance beyond the impasse.
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de Lubac‟s insistence that the Church possesses a unique capacity for interpreting
Scripture and Vanhoozer‟s insistence that the Scriptures possess the authority to correct
the Church. When Vanhoozer‟s attempt to locate Scripture in the economy of
redemption is compared with de Lubac‟s, it is possible to see the impact of a better
developed ecclesiology on Christian interpretation. Since both Vanhoozer and de Lubac
address the question of authority within the context of Scripture‟s place in the economy,
the two authors will be placed in dialogue to show how similarly they articulate the role
of Scripture in relationship to the Church. This will specify that the real issue is the role
of the Church in the divine economy.
The Relationship of Scripture to the Church: A close examination of the work of
Vanhoozer and de Lubac reveals a striking similarity in the way each understands the
purpose of Scripture to the Church and the manner in which the Scriptures exercise
authority over the Church. The following seven points illustrate the fundamental
similarity between the two projects. First, both Vanhoozer and de Lubac specifically
speak of Scripture and the Church as human realities which have been drawn into the
economy of redemption to share in the missions of the Triune God.965 Second, both
agree that the Scriptures conduct an active, initiatory mission of confronting and
renewing the Church. 966 Third, both see Scripture playing a causal role over the Church
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Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 177) claims, “To be sure, the biblical texts have a
„natural history‟; they have human authors. Yet these human testimonies are caught up in the triune
economy of word-acts and so ultimately become divine testimonies.” De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, I, 81),
claims, “The sacred books themselves are and remain inspired….„God did not create them and then depart
from the scene. They come from him and exist in him.‟”
966
Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 210), claims, “Word, Spirit, tradition, and church
belong together; all have a vital role to play. Only the Word serves as magisterial norm, however, for only
the written word is the commissioned testimony of the church‟s Lord and Master.” De Lubac (History and

375

in the divine economy by mediating the present, risen Christ to the Church. 967 Fourth,
both ultimately locate the authority of Scripture in the action of the Triune God who uses
it to address the Church.968 Fifth, both agree that Scripture, since it is authoritative as it is
used by God to incorporate readers into the Church, is incomplete until it accomplishes
its eschatological mission.969 Sixth, both suggest that the literal sense of Scripture always
has an authoritative role over the Church to establish parameters for its interpretation
because the Church is incomplete and still sinful. 970 Seventh, both suggest that the

Spirit, 418), claims, „Scripture and Eucharist are thereby joined once again. Both never cease to “build up”
the Church.‟”
967

Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 124), claims his development of his “canonical”
hermeneutic “has everything to do with the church meeting its risen Lord through the testimony of his
commissioned witnesses.” Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 71), argues further, “In the final analysis,
the mission of Scripture is to minister Christ and to build up the body of Christ. This is what God is doing
with his written words: in diverse ways and at diverse times speaking his Son into the world, giving thick
(canonical) descriptions of what he is saying and doing in Jesus Christ…” De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, I,
82), agrees that “Within the Scripture, God resides; by the Scripture, God makes himself known…Scripture
is „fertilized by a miracle of the Holy Spirit.‟”
968

Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 176-77), argues that, “Scripture…is…a mode of
divine communicative action whereby the triune God furthers his mission and creates a new covenant
people....God, in and through the human authors, has an ongoing speaking part.” Vanhoozer
(Remythologizing Theology, 264), claims that “Scripture is a means of ongoing triune communication by
which the church follows her master‟s voice.” De Lubac (History and Spirit, 418), claims, “Scripture is
thus like the voice of Christ speaking to the Church and in the Church; it is his efficacious sign; it thus
assures the luminous presence of Christ to the Church.” De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, II, 81), insists that
“the Word of God…speaks to us still” in Scripture, “reaching the depth of our souls as the limits of the
universe.”
969

Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 165), claims, “The holy script…is both complete and
incomplete. On the one hand, the story of God‟s word-acts in the history of Israel and in Jesus Christ is
finished: the climax of the drama of redemption (cross and resurrection) has been accomplished, its
conclusion (eternal life with God) is sure. On the other hand, without a people to embody it, the script
lacks something essential, for the canon „delivers its meaning only as it is “played out” in patterns of
human action in Church and society.‟” De Lubac (Medieval Exegesis, I, 227), similarly writes, “All that
Scripture recounts has indeed happened in history, but the account that is given does not contain the whole
purpose of Scripture in itself. This purpose still needs to be accomplished and is actually accomplished in
us each day, by the mystery of this spiritual understanding. Only then…will Scripture bear us its fruit in its
fullness.”
970
Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 163), claims that, “Ecclesiology cannot be first
theology because the church enjoys only the first fruits of its salvation. As an eschatological reality, it is
indeed already in union with Christ, but not yet completely so.” De Lubac (The Church: Paradox and
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Church possesses the authority to safeguard Scripture‟s authority so as to enable fruitful
readings. 971 With these similarities, it seems clear that both de Lubac and Vanhoozer
locate the authority of Scripture in God‟s use of the texts and that all subsequent readings
must recognize and submit to that authority.
The Relationship of the Church to Scripture: In light of the close agreement
between Vanhoozer and de Lubac about the active, initiating, authoritative mission of
Scripture and the responsibility of the Church to respond to Christ‟s speaking action in
Scripture, it is all the more significant that Vanhoozer insists on posing an either/or
structure of authority, while de Lubac sees the relationship between Scripture and Church
as one of reciprocity and continuity. It becomes apparent that the real impasse between
the two is not caused by the way each theologian structures the role of Scripture in the
economy of redemption, but rather by the role and reality each gives to the Church in that
economy.
While Vanhoozer is continually focused on showing God‟s missional presence in
Scripture, he does not define the Church as the community which either bears or mediates
the presence of Christ on earth. In fact, Vanhoozer specifically rejects the articulation of
the Church as a sacrament, arguing that “the church is less a sacrament than a means of
Mystery, 24), would likely agree, saying that “this very same Church, is often unfaithful and unsubmissive.
In her members she is a sinner…the Church is also a symbol of perpetual decline and mortality.”
971

Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 123), laments that in the Protestant practice of sola
scriptura authority tends to reside in “individual readers” and claims that his intent “is not to denigrate
church tradition but to locate it properly within the economy of salvation and the pattern of divine
authority. From this perspective, conforming to church tradition is not what is primary: what is primary is
attending to the Spirit who speaks in the Scripture of Jesus Christ….we cannot take for granted that the
content of the apostolic tradition is found in the teaching of the church.” De Lubac (La révélation divine,
158-59, cited by Moulins-Beaufort, "Henri De Lubac: Reader of Dei Verbum," 692), claims, “The
Magisterium merely guarantees that the development of the mysteries of the faith in the minds of believers
remains within the complete and definitive „figure‟ of this mystery. It guarantees that the communion of
these believers remains open to an Object that is „incomprehensible‟…a living Person.‟”
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signifying the divine grace poured out in Christ through the Spirit.”972 Vanhoozer instead
argues, “The form of the church‟s fitting participation in the drama of redemption is
precisely that of mimesis: an imitation of Paul, of God, of Christ.”973 Vanhoozer then
defines the Church as “the company of the gospel, whose nature and task alike pertain to
performing the word in the power of the Spirit.”974 Since Vanhoozer provides this
definition in direct response to a sacramental view of the Church, it is clear that
Vanhoozer intends the phrase “company of the gospel” to replace the phrase “presence of
the triune God,” and the phrase “performing the word” to replace “mediating grace
sacramentally.”975 Any similarities between Vanhoozer and de Lubac about the
responsive role of the Church to Scripture or the authority of Scripture over the Church
should be read in light of this hesitance by Vanhoozer to locate the presence of Christ in
the Church.976

972
Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 401), emphasis his. Vanhoozer does understand his
own position to locate the role of the Church in the economy of redemption in a very different place.
Vanhoozer (ibid, 400-01), claims, “In sacramental theater, ecclesial words and actions mediate the grace of
God. This is one possible construal of how the church participates in the drama of redemption: by
mediating grace sacramentally.” Vanhoozer‟s rejection of the Church as sacrament, then, is not an
oversight, but is significant to his own position.
973

Vanhoozer (ibid, 401), clarifies that this is a “creative imitation, a nonidentical

participation.”
974

Ibid, emphasis his.
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See ibid, 400-01. This argument is particularly interesting, since Vanhoozer (The Drama
of Doctrine, 400), has just claimed that, “Any sufficiently thick description of the church must include
something about the church being not only the people of God but the presence of God in the world.”
Vanhoozer, then, seems to have in mind a model which will allow for Christ‟s presence in the Church but
will grant the Church no authority to mediate that presence other than by extending the Scriptures to others.
976

While Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 153) recognizes the “necessity, even the
inevitability, of tradition,” and yet argues that “Everything depends…on giving an adequate dogmatic
account of their proper ordering [i.e. of relationship between Scripture and Church].” Vanhoozer (ibid,
230), then, emphasizes that “The church is ultimately…the passive recipient of the canonical Scriptures…,”
thus relegating it to a lesser authority.
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De Lubac‟s ecclesiology, in bold contrast to Vanhoozer‟s, emphasizes Scripture‟s
authority within the context of the radical newness of the Church in the economy of
redemption. For de Lubac, “The Church is a mysterious extension in time of the Trinity,
not only preparing us for the life of unity but bringing about even now our participation
in it. She comes from and is full of the Trinity…She is „the Incarnation continued,‟” the
“presence of Christ on earth.”977 De Lubac would claim that Vanhoozer‟s hesitance to
show the Church as bearing or mediating the presence of Christ “does not fully enter into
the logic of the Mystery of the Incarnation,” is “more inspired by the Old than the New
Testament,” and consequently cannot really show what the Church is that is new in the
economy. 978 De Lubac would likely feel that Vanhoozer has implicitly denied the
structure of the Christian Mystery by failing to show the presence of Christ in the visible
Church. 979
From Authority to Capacity: Vanhoozer‟s hesitance to locate Christ‟s presence in
the Church creates some very pressing difficulties for his hermeneutical method which
threaten to topple his whole project. First, for all of Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on the
authority of the closed canon based on God‟s determinate speaking action within it,
Vanhoozer never produces a convincing argument about how the Christian community
recognized just this canon in the first place. Vanhoozer cannot really explain why the

977

Henri de Lubac, The Church: Paradox and Mystery, 24.
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De Lubac (ibid, 25), dislikes the Protestant argument to liken the visible Church to
rebellious Israel, in which a remnant (the invisible Church) will be saved. To appreciate the Christian
Mystery, one must realize that the Church really consists of something that the OT people of God did not.
Christ really is joined to this body in a way that the OT people of God did not have access to. The Church
is really the reality that the OT people of God pointed toward as a sign.
979

Ibid.
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Church had the authority to select certain books rather than others and why it accepted
the literal sense as its normative hermeneutical approach to reading. 980 This problem is
intensified when Vanhoozer claims that the recognition of God‟s speaking action in
Scripture (and hence its authority) takes place at the level of the whole, completed
canon. 981 It is, on Vanhoozer‟s account, unclear how the authority of these texts could
ever have come to light, and hence how the Church could accept them, if the divine
speaking action were not discernable until the canon was closed by the Church. Some
authority must be granted to the reading community in order for the Church to even be
able to select the books which would be the canon or establish normative rules for
reading them. Vanhoozer is so wary of granting authority to the community that he
suggests the Rule of Faith ought to be considered authoritative only as it rightly
summarizes the Scriptures.982 Yet once again Vanhoozer must show how the Church, led
by its experience of the risen Christ, developed a Rule of Faith and established a
canonical Scriptures in fundamental continuity with their experience which then
established the norms for canonical acceptance. While Vanhoozer is right to argue that
980

. For example, Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 149-150), claims that “it is not the
church‟s use but the triune God‟s use of Scripture that makes it canon. That the church recognizes the
canon authenticates the church rather than the canon, which needs no ecclesial approval to be what it is: the
Word of God.” While it is true that God‟s speaking action requires no subsequent validation, it is very
difficult to find this to be a helpful description of how the canon came to be regarded as authoritative.
981

See, for example, Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 179), proposes the phrase
“canonical illocution” to show “what God is doing by means of the human discourse in the biblical texts at
the level of the canon” and Vanhoozer (Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 342), where the resulting
supervening divine illocution is described as: „confessing faith‟ (349), „proclaiming God‟s salvation‟ (342),
„testifying to Christ‟ (342), “bearing witness” (349), or “providing guidance for future generations” (380).
982

Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 206) even claims that “the authority of the Rule [of
faith] depends on its conforming to the Scriptures.” (See his whole discussion on the Rule of Faith,
claiming that it is based on the authority of the canon in The Drama of Doctrine, 203-10). While it is
certainly true that the Rule of Faith is in agreement with the Scriptures, it does not account for the way in
which the Rule served as a causal norm for the formation of the canon and the hermeneutical method
applied to reading the canon as a unified whole.
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the Church must now recognize the authority of the canon, he must explain what gave the
Church the authority to receive its canon, if the closed canon which established the rule
of faith and allowed God‟s speaking action to be heard in the Church.
Second, for all Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on God‟s speaking action in Scripture,
Vanhoozer‟s articulation of God‟s present speaking action to readers remains
unpersuasive, as his account seems to require that God‟s speaking ceased with the
completion of the canon.983 While the Spirit mediates God‟s past speech to present
readers, Vanhoozer‟s model requires that the Spirit only guide the perlocutionary effect
of Scripture.984 Yet the transition between God‟s past, closed, determinate speaking
action and present speaking to the Church simply cannot be accomplished without some
articulation of Christ‟s ongoing presence in the Church. Boersma explains this difficulty
by saying, “If I am not mistaken, [Vanhoozer] means to say that the Spirit confronts
believers with the Scriptures each time anew. As a result, it is difficult to avoid the
impression that believers need to jump the chronological gap between the horizon of their
own context and that of the Scriptures.”985 The movement from past speech to present
speech without some continuity of presence in the community would, on de Lubac‟s
account, amount to little more than a form of extrinsicism. At the very least, it is difficult
983
Vanhoozer (ibid, 152), suggests, “It is precisely as a past performance (i.e., as a discourse
fixed by writing) that the canon serves as normative specification of what God was saying and doing in
Christ.” This claim is, of course, consistent with Vanhoozer‟s claim that God‟s speaking action is equated
with revelation: Revelation ceased with the final apostolic writing, and became discernable with the
closure of the canon.
984

This articulation appears much more driven by a safeguarding of the authority of the past,
closed canon than by a desire to show how the risen Christ addresses His Church. See Vanhoozer (Is There
a Meaning in This Text?, 410), who claims that “the Trinitarian language of „procession‟ is apt: as the
Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, so the literary act proceeds from the author, and so too does
the perlocution (persuading, convincing) proceed from the illocution (claiming, asserting).”
985

Boersma, “On Baking Pumpkin Pie,” 253.
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to appreciate Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on the development of doctrine through “creativity,”
“imagination” and “improvisation” without showing how tradition has some authority to
help form the imagination as it bridges the gap between the past texts of Scripture and the
present Christian community. 986 Here de Lubac‟s emphasis on Tradition as a “living
link” between past events and present reality would provide resources for Vanhoozer to
extend God‟s past speaking action in Scripture to the present reception in believers in a
way that does not change the meaning of Scripture, but deepens that meaning in the
Church. 987 Only if Vanhoozer can show how the Church also participates in the mission
of Christ, and hence a locus of Christ‟s presence and an active agent in mediating it, can
he show how God‟s present speaking action occurs.
Vanhoozer‟s argument that both Scripture and Church are “caught up in” and
“sent” as missions in the Triune economy is remarkably close to de Lubac‟s argument
that Scripture and Church are fellow incorporations of the Logos. Were Vanhoozer to
accept some form of de Lubac‟s distinction between “imprint,” “incorporations” and
“Incarnation” of the Logos, it would seem that his project could show a more intrinsic
relationship between Scripture and Church without undermining the authority of
Scripture. Precisely this theological grounding would strengthen Vanhoozer‟s arguments
against those postliberals who, according to Vanhoozer, have turned the balance of
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These three words form the basis for Vanhoozer‟s “theo-dramatic” model. See especially,
The Drama of Doctrine, 335-44.
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De Lubac would agree with Blondel (“History and Dogma,” 276), that, “In that profound
sense, when it is a question of finding the supernatural in Sacred History and in dogma, the Gospel is
nothing without the Church, the teaching of Scripture is nothing without the Christian life, exegesis is
nothing without Tradition…” The converse, Vanhoozer would insist, is also true!
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authority from Scripture to the Church. 988 Vanhoozer would strengthen his argument for
the authority of Scripture by providing a theologically rich description of the Church
which shows the intrinsic connection between the literal reading of Scripture and the
community to which God speaks by means of the text. Acceptance of some form of de
Lubac‟s claim that the Church “dispenses” the Word because the “Church is for each of
us the place of the Logos,” would ease Vanhoozer‟s project by allowing the Church, as
one “mission” or “incorporation” of the Triune economy to mediate Christ intrinsically
rather than extrinsically. 989 It would also allow Vanhoozer to respond to his specific
hermeneutical difficulties, as he would be able to better articulate how the Triune God
enabled the Church to recognize just those books upon which He would supervene His
speaking action, and why the Church has felt compelled to read their Scriptures literally.

2. Identity in Scripture and Church: Returning to Tracy and Frei
The above comparison between Vanhoozer and de Lubac is particularly helpful, it
turns out, in providing resources to advance the debate between Tracy and Frei. By
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It may seem ironic to suggest that Vanhoozer‟s greatest allies in combating what he feels is
the transfer of authority from Scripture to tradition may be those who hold a high theological view of the
authority of the Church. See The Drama of Doctrine, 1-12, where the chief problematic of the whole book
is the relationship between Scripture and tradition. Vanhoozer writes the book because he fears that “The
prevailing postmodern cultural winds currently blow away from sola scriptura toward tradition” (10). Yet
Vanhoozer may need some argument for the authority of tradition to support his project. Really, I see no
Catholic theologian who would disagree with Vanhoozer‟s particular understanding of sola Scriptura. In
fact, one Catholic theologian, Thomas Guarino, has suggested that many Catholic theologians can “accept
the phrase sola Scriptura” (“Catholic Reflections on Discerning the Truth of Sacred Scripture,” in Your
Word is Truth: A Project of Evangelicals and Catholics Together, ed. Charles Colson and Richard John
Neuhaus [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002], 96), cited in Boersma “Pumpkin Pie,” 250). Thus the issue is
not the authority of Scripture, as the normative Christian argument is that the Scriptures play a corrective
role in relationship to the Church. The real issue is the argument over Christian interpretation, and this is
issue is best worked through by locating Scripture‟s place in the economy of redemption.
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De Lubac, History and Spirit, 420.
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comparing Vanhoozer and de Lubac, I have sought to show that the (largely unnecessary)
dilemma of locating authority in either Scripture or the Church is caused by Vanhoozer‟s
inability to show the intrinsic connection between the Logos incorporated in Scripture
and the Logos incorporated in the Church both of which are grounded in Christ, the
Incarnate Logos. At this point, I wish argue that the way Frei structures his project to
safeguard the identity of Christ leads him into the same either/or dilemma that has
plagued Vanhoozer‟s ecclesiology, and that Frei‟s project would also benefit from
showing the intrinsic unity between the identity of Christ rendered and the experience of
Christ in the Church.
Frei and the Identity of Christ: Vanhoozer‟s description of the Church as
imitation of Scripture is very similar to Frei‟s description of the Church as identity-inrelation to Christ. For both, the Church grows toward its eschatological union with Christ
as it recognizes the plain sense of Scripture and follows the Christ rendered in it. Just as
Vanhoozer‟s chief concern is to emphasize God‟s speaking action in Scripture so as to
safeguard the authority of Scripture to address the Church, so Frei‟s chief concern is to
emphasize the plain sense of Scripture so as to safeguard the particular identity of Jesus
Christ for the Church. Yet for both, unfortunately, this stress on identity and imitation
leads to a practical depreciation on incorporation and participation. Just as Vanhoozer‟s
emphasis on the authority of Scripture prevents him from showing the unique capacity of
the Church to bear and mediate the presence of Christ, so also Frei‟s emphasis on the
identity of Jesus Christ prevents him from showing how the Christian community bears
and mediates the presence of Christ as it follows that identity. For both, the intrinsic
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connection between recognition of Christ and participation in Christ is left
underdeveloped.
A genuine ambiguity exists in Frei‟s description of the Church. On the one hand,
the Church is “simply a witness” to the identity of Jesus Christ depicted in the Gospels.
The Church, Frei emphasizes, “is called upon to be a collective disciple, to follow at a
distance the pattern of exchange…” 990 Yet on the other hand, the Church is “the indirect,
localized presence of Jesus Christ in and for the world.”991 The Church, for Frei, also is
“the public and communal form the indirect presence of Christ now takes.” 992 The first
account emphasizes separation and distance in an attempt to safeguard the particular
identity of Jesus Christ, while the second account speaks of incorporation and divine
constitution in an attempt to connect the unsubstitutable identity of Christ with His
community of disciples. The upshot is that Frei‟s focus on the particular identity of
Christ has prevented him from adequately describing the identity of the Church and the
fundamental connection between those identities. Frei‟s attempt to safeguard Christ‟s
particular identity causes him to undervalue a description of the believer‟s participation in
that particular identity. Dawson claims that for Frei, “Jesus‟ identity is a consequence of
his unique relation to God, a relation that human beings cannot share (and therefore
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Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ, 160.

991

Frei (Identity, 159), claims, “The church is simply the witness to the fact that it is Jesus
Christ and none other who is the ultimate presence in and to the world.” Yet Frei (ibid, 157), speaks of the
Person of the Spirit as being the indirect presence of Christ in the Church.
992
Ibid, 157. Frei (ibid, 159), claims, “The given and instituted, spatial and temporal bases for
the indirect presence of Christ allow the church that relatively permanent institutional structure without
which no community can exist or be self-identical…”
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cannot usurp).”993 Thus although Frei rightly shows that readers can only understand
their own identity-in-relation when they have first recognized the unsubstitutable identity
of Jesus Christ, Frei never spells out the difference between recognition of Christ‟s
particular identity accessible to all and incorporation into that identity by those who
participate in it. Dawson suggests that in Frei‟s work, “The literal reader of the text‟s
realistic, narrative sense gets to encounter Jesus as only Jesus alone is, but the action of
Jesus or God impinging upon the embodied, historical life of the reader is a matter left to
take care of itself without much comment.”994
Frei‟s inability to sufficiently draw Scripture‟s rendering of Christ‟s identity
together with Christ‟s presence in the Church causes the same practical difficulties for
Frei‟s hermeneutics that the authority dilemma has caused for Vanhoozer. Central to
Frei‟s project is his belief that literal reading was not a historical accident but an
outworking of the community‟s foundational belief in the present, risen Christ. Yet Frei
is obligated to show why that those normative rules were established as a result of the
indirect presence of Christ in the Church, and not simply by a matter of community
consensus. Frei often grounds these community decisions in a robust view of God‟s
providence, yet providence is too general of a category to describe the theological
correspondence between Church and Scripture.995 Without some theological argument
describing why the Church felt compelled to establish the literal sense as normative,
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Dawson, Christian Figural Reading, 186.
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Ibid, 213. As Mike Higton (“A Carefully Circumscribed Progressive Politics” 63), puts it,
Frei views the Church as “an unsubstitutable corporate follower of an unsubstitutable Lord.”
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See Mike Higton (Christ, Providence and History, esp. 138), who, as the title of his book
suggests, emphasizes that Frei‟s whole project depended on a robust doctrine of God‟s providence.
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based on the intrinsic relationship between the identity of Christ rendered in Scripture
and the identity of Christ experienced in the community, Frei‟s project is in danger of
placing the construction of the Church‟s own tradition above the triune God who
constituted the Church.996
Tracy and the Identity of the Church: It appears, then, that the disagreement
between Vanhoozer and Frei about the location of Scriptural authority is a symptom of
the same inability to show the intrinsic connection between the Christ rendered in
Scripture and the Christ experienced as present in the community. Here the insights of
Tracy and de Lubac are helpful for resolving this difficulty, as they show why the
experience of the Christian community inherently testifies to the authority of the literal
sense to render the very identity of Christ that they experience. In his later work, Tracy
proposes an insight which, when combined with de Lubac‟s ecclesiology, may advance
the projects of Frei and Vanhoozer as it shows the intrinsic connection between the
identity of Christ rendered in the plain sense of Scripture and the self-identity of the
Christian community as the locus of the presence of Christ. Tracy claims that, in addition
to the genre of narrative so helpfully emphasized by Frei, the genre of proclamation can
also yield important insights about the nature of Christian identity. Tracy defines
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This appears to be precisely the concern of Vanhoozer and Tracy about postliberal method.
Vanhoozer (The Drama of Doctrine, 11-12), seems to indicate that in the postliberal system
“Tradition…effectively trumps Scripture” leading to relativism. Tracy (David Tracy, "Lindbeck's New
Program for Theology: A Reflection," 461), reads Frei more charitably, yet with in Lindbeck‟s work, Tracy
suspects the possibility of “„relativism,‟ „confessionalism,‟ and even „fideism.‟” Admittedly, Frei typically
almost always settles for describing what the early Church did, rather than going on to explain why the
Church felt compelled to do so. See, for example, Frei (Types, 15-16), for his three rules for reading the
literal sense: The Church has reached such a consensus reading (first rule) and the contemporary reading
community cannot go behind what is written (second rule) precisely because the words render the subject
matter (third rule). Frei‟s project always tends to remain simply descriptive rather than providing
theological reasons for why it must have been the case.
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proclamation as the “proclamatory or kerygmatic character of the gospel by speaking of
the ecclesial Christian affirmation of the „event and person (not only the „event‟) of Jesus
Christ.”997 While Tracy admits that reflecting on the genre of narrative is the only way to
“show, and not merely state (confess), who this Jesus Christ, present to us in word and
sacrament, really is for the Christian,” 998 Tracy believes that reflecting on the genre of
proclamation allows the theologian to see the “implications of the common Christian
confession that „I (we) believe in Jesus Christ with the apostles.‟” 999 Thus the genre of
proclamation allows the theologian to articulate “the Catholic sense of how the Scripture
is the church‟s book.”1000 Both narrative and proclamation, then, are complementary to
each other and deepen the insights of the other. 1001
This connection between proclamation and the narrative rendering of Christ has
significant implications for explaining the foundational identity of the Church, and hence
for understanding why the Church has traditionally insisted on reading the plain sense of
Scripture, why it has adopted certain books as its canon, and what capacity it has to
receive the disclosure of Christ in Scripture. Tracy‟s key insight (which remains implicit
in his own work), could be summarized something like this: The genre of confession
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Tracy, “On Reading Scripture Theologically,” 39.
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Ibid, 40.

999

Ibid, 39.

1000

Ibid, 37.

1001

Ibid, 39. Consequently, Tracy (ibid), claims, “The confessional genre and the kerygmatic
categories do defend the first and dominant ecclesial and theological meaning of the „plain sense‟ of
Scripture and thereby are appropriately Christian. However, the confessional genre and the kerygmatic
categories state but fail to show what can only be shown in explicitly narrative terms…just how and why
the identity and presence of Jesus as the Christ is indeed confessed in the common Christian confession, but
is rendered in its fullness only in and through the details of the interaction of the unsubstitutable character
of Jesus and the specific circumstances of his passion and resurrection.”
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reveals the particular identity of the Church, while the genre of narrative reveals the
particular identity of Jesus Christ.

By analyzing the Gospels as proclamation, it is

possible to recognize that the Church is that community which proclaims Jesus Christ as
the Incarnate Logos and which experiences Christ as present. By analyzing the Gospels
as narrative, it is possible to recognize the unsubstitutable identity of that Jesus Christ
who is present. The way to encounter the living, present Christ is through the narrative
rendering of His identity, whiles the way to reflect upon the self-identity of His body, the
Church, is through analysis of the proclamation of the Church‟s common confession.
Tracy rightly makes it clear that there can be no disjunction between the two
modes of presentation of the living Christ, and that each genre reciprocally deepens
reflection on the other. Tracy claims, “If the Christian community means that „Christ‟
and the „Spirit‟ are present through proclamatory word and manifesting sacrament as well
as through various Christian spiritualities of „presence‟, then the Christian community
should try to clarify how Christ is present as none other than this narratively identified
Jesus the Christ and the Spirit is present as the Spirit released by Jesus Christ.” 1002
Reflection on Christ‟s presence in the community naturally intensifies the emphasis on
Christ‟s ascriptive rendering in the Gospel narratives, and focus on the particular identity
of Christ in the Gospels deepens the Church‟s self-identity as the locus of Christ‟s
presence.
Tracy‟s insight, when combined with de Lubac‟s description of the Church as an
incorporation of the Logos, goes a long way in clarifying the continuity between the
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Ibid, 41.
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unique identity of the Christian community and the plain reading of Scripture. 1003 The
Christian community is the locus of the presence of Christ and the Spirit, and that
presence is manifest through the various incorporations of the Logos (i.e. Scripture,
Church and Eucharist). The Church proclaims this presence and interprets Scripture in
light of that presence, recognizing the fundamental correspondence between the narrative
rendering of the identity of Christ and its own story—with an insistence that Scripture be
read plainly to render that identity. In this self-understanding, the Church recognizes its
participation in the Mystery. As the locus of the presence of Christ, the Church cannot
but interpret the particular identity of Christ and receive the disclosure of the Christ who
addresses the Church.1004
Together, the proposals of de Lubac and Tracy show the concern of Frei and
Vanhoozer to locate authority in either Scripture or Church is a false problem. The
Scriptures do have an authoritative function of correcting the Church as they continually
call Christians to the common confession “We believe in Jesus Christ with the apostles”
through the realistic rendering of the narrative of Jesus Christ. The self-identity of the
Church does enhance the authority of the plain sense of Scripture as the Scriptures render
the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ in a way that incorporates the reader into its
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Significantly, Tracy (Ibid, 41), suggests that theologians have a responsibility to “clarify,
beyond Frei‟s narrative analysis, the proclamatory (or kerygmatic) character of the passion narratives as
gospel,” so that “the exact kerygmatic nature of the „manifestation‟ of Jesus as Jesus Christ in the passion
narrative is clearer than a purely narrative account displays.”
1004

Ibid, 41. Tracy (ibid), provocatively suggests that “much could be gained and little lost by
showing how these relatively late passion narratives with their „Jesus Christ kerygma‟ relate to the earliest
apostolic witness of the historically reconstructed „Jesus-kerygma‟….Then one could show, through a
modest genre analysis of kerygma, how the Jesus Christ kerygma of the passion narratives, i.e., the identity
and presence of Jesus the Christ to the Christian community, is in direct kerygmatic relationship to the
relatively non-narrative, but clearly kerygmatic, character of the Jesus kerygma of the original apostolic
witness.”
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story. Since the Church already participates in the Mystery, the Church recognizes the
presence of the living Christ and can do no other than to read the Scriptures in light of
His identity. A chief and authoritative function of the Magisterium of the Church, then,
must be to safeguard the Christian hermeneutic in such a way that believers are able to
encounter Christ in Scripture.1005 D‟Ambrosio‟s claim that “The fact that biblical
allegory has the mystery of the Church as part of its very object means that the Church
and its tradition must necessarily be a principle of interpretation,” 1006 ought not give the
Church an overly-confident reading of Scripture, but rather a chastened hermeneutic.
The Church, by its own internal logic, must safeguard the plain sense which will allow
the text to render Christ as present to readers, and must encourage rigorous self-critique
based upon the plain sense as it attempts to understand the Christ who addresses it.

IV. Conclusion: Scripture and Church Unified in Christ
This chapter has placed all four authors in dialogue within the broader context of
the economy of redemption in order to show that certain impasses between them can be
resolved when the whole context of Scriptural interpretation is considered. As the
relationship between text and reader is seen as only one part of the larger process of
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The emphasis of Dei Verbum is decidedly on the safeguarding of a Christian hermeneutic.
Dei Verbum II, 10, 755-56, claims, “But the task of giving an authentic interpretation of the Word of God,
whether in its written form or in the form of Tradition, has been entrusted to the living teaching office of
the Church alone. Its authority in this matter is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ. Yet this
Magisterium is not superior to the Word of God, but is its servant. It teaches only what has been handed on
to it. At the divine command and with the help of the Holy Spirit, it listens to this devotedly, guards it with
dedication and expounds it faithfully. All that it proposes for belief as being divinely revealed is drawn
from this single deposit of faith.”
1006

D‟Ambrosio, Traditional Hermeneutic, 189.
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Christ‟s communication to the Church by means of the Scriptural texts, certain
hermeneutical tensions are eased. When Christ is articulated as both sole Object of
Scripture and active Subject of Scripture, it is possible to show the harmony between
Frei‟s insistence on the plain sense of Scriptural narrative and de Lubac‟s insistence on
the spiritual sense of the texts. This harmony establishes a pattern for reading in which
the plain sense is understood to render the unsubstitutable identify of the same Jesus
Christ who now mediates Himself to the Church in Scriptural reading. When a unity is
articulated between Scripture and Church as both are grounded in the same risen Christ
and mediate the central Christian Mystery, it is possible to show the necessary harmony
between the plain sense reading of Scripture and the experience of Christ in the Church.
The Church, then, cannot usurp authority over the plain sense of the Scriptural texts, but
neither is it only responsive to them. The more integral the relationship between
Scripture and Church in the practice of the Church, the more the risen Christ will be
mediated by both.
These insights ease certain tensions between the four hermeneutical projects.
First, these insights show the disagreement between Tracy and Frei about plain sense
reading and reading for disclosure to be two inevitable parts of the same interpretive
process. As Tracy corrects his own hermeneutical project to also insist on the plain sense
reading of the Gospels to render the identity of Jesus Christ, he is able to better
emphasize the disclosure of the risen Christ to the reading community. A canonical,
plain sense, figural reading of Scripture mediates Christ who incorporates readers into the
Church. Second, these insights show the disagreement between Frei, Vanhoozer and
Tracy, about the location of authority, to be a largely false issue. The Scriptures have
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authority as the same Christ stands as Subject and Object of Scripture, and this authority
can only be recognized in the community which experiences the authority of Jesus Christ.
Vanhoozer is correct that Scriptural authority is properly grounded in God rather than the
texts themselves, but this does not necessitate a doctrine of sola Scriptura, as Vanhoozer
thinks. Instead, it requires an articulation of the intrinsic relationship between Scripture
and Church which Tracy helpfully identifies in hermeneutical reflection on the Gospels
and de Lubac specifies as the mutual mediation of Christ in Scripture and the Church.
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CONCLUSION:
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PROJECT
In this dissertation I have suggested that many of the hermeneutical impasses
between Tracy and Frei, and consequently between revisionists and postliberals, are the
result of narrowing the focus of hermeneutical reflection to the context of text and reader
without describing the theological realities which always attend a Christian reading of
Scripture. The dissertation has placed in dialogue four theologians with very different
theological emphases in order to show that when their hermeneutical projects are
examined in the broader context of the economy of redemption, many of the apparent
tensions in method are eased or shown to be mutually compatible. As this broader
context of Christ‟s self-communication to the Church is examined, it is possible to
advance the discussion between Tracy and Frei.
As these four different hermeneutical projects were placed in dialogue, it became
apparent that the impasse in method between Tracy and Frei may not best be identified
through the usual classifications (manifestation vs. proclamation, critical correlation, or
narrative theology vs. foundationalism), but instead may be a result of a hermeneutical
focus which examines only the relationship between text and reader. Yet since the goal
of both Frei and Tracy is to show how the texts render a spiritual reality, both authors are
required by their own hermeneutical aims to discuss Scripture in the context of the
economy of redemption in order to complete their hermeneutical projects. The projects
of both Vanhoozer and de Lubac successfully broaden the context of Scriptural reading to
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include God‟s use of the texts and the Church‟s reception of the texts, persuasively
showing that these realities are always necessary elements of reflection on a Christian
interpretation of Scripture. Consequently, the mediation of Christ through Scripture, as
well as the Church‟s capacity to respond to that mediation, must be explained in the
process of articulating a theological interpretation of Scripture. This refocusing of the
theological debates has produced several conclusions.
First, the dissertation suggests that both what de Lubac calls „spiritual
interpretation‟ and what Frei calls „realistic reading,‟ are inevitable and complementary
aspects of a Christian reading of Scripture. Not only have both been central practices of
the Church, but both are dependent upon one another. Here I suggested that de Lubac‟s
claim that Christ is both Subject and Object of Scripture accounts for both spiritual
interpretation and realistic reading, as Christian interpretation always occurs within the
dialectic of understanding Christ as sole Object of Scripture and as active Subject of
Scripture. Consequently, de Lubac‟s insistence that Christ uses Scripture to mediate
Himself to the Church and Frei‟s insistence that the plain sense of the text renders the
unsubstitutable identity of Christ are central parts of Christian interpretation. Both poles
are necessary for Christian reading, as both together allow for a sufficient articulation of
Scripture‟s place in the economy of redemption. Any project that fails to emphasize
Christ as Object will tend to make Christ a type to which some feature of the
contemporary „situation‟ is the antitype, thus reducing Christ to merely one (if
paradigmatic) instance of a contemporary ideal. Any project that fails to emphasize
Christ as Subject will tend to de-emphasize the believer‟s participation in the risen Christ
and may deny the essential movement from text to spiritual reality. This dialectic
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between understanding Christ as Subject and Object, I suggested, is best seen in the
different emphases between Frei‟s figural reading and de Lubac‟s allegorical reading, as
Frei focus primarily on Christ as Object and de Lubac focuses primarily on Christ as
Subject. Here I suggested that Frei‟s project could be improved by more strongly
emphasizing the implications of Christ‟s present address to readers by means of the
Scriptural texts, while Tracy‟s project could be enhanced by developing a method of
figural reading to relate all Scriptural reading to the identity of Christ rendered in the
Gospels.
Examining Scriptural interpretation within the dialectic of Christ as Subject and
Object has allowed certain methodological strengths to be identified and weaknesses to
be corrected. The key methodological difficulty for Vanhoozer is his tendency to focus
more on a particular philosophical construction of authorship than on the Christ who
unifies the Scriptures. Here the projects of Frei and de Lubac provide a correction to
Vanhoozer as they show a method of figural reading that seeks to draw focus from
particular philosophical constructs and onto the event of Christ. The key difficulty in de
Lubac‟s method is his ambiguity in showing the connection between text and event, and
consequently in showing how the texts of Scripture themselves participate in God‟s
communicative activity. Consequently, de Lubac‟s emphasis on allegory tends to
depreciate the importance of method for explaining the plain sense of the text. Here
Vanhoozer‟s emphasis on the closed, canonical sense as the literal sense provides a
helpful solution, as it better regulates the Christian imagination in Scriptural
interpretation. Frei‟s emphasis on realistic reading also provides a helpful solution, as it
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closes the gap between text and event in such a way that the text itself is able to
sacramentally mediate spiritual reality.
This proposal to articulate how Christ is Subject and Object of Scripture does not
depreciate the emphasis on the text/reader relationship in hermeneutical discussions, but
seeks to develop a richer hermeneutical project as it places this relationship in the larger
context of Christ‟s relationship to the Church. Articulating the intrinsic relationship
between Christ, Scripture and Church upholds the plain sense reading of Scripture
without leaving the final word about the meaning of the plain sense to the secular
exegete. Nor does it reduce the authority of the plain sense of Scripture by arguing for
the necessity of a movement from text to spiritual reality. Rather, it locates this authority
in Scripture‟s intrinsic relationship to the Church as both mediate the risen Christ.
Consequently, it upholds the authority of the plain sense of Scripture even as it describes
why the Church had the authority to decide to read Scripture in this way and to establish
its own canon.
Second, the dissertation has suggested that because the primary role of Scripture
in the economy is to mediate the communication of the risen Christ to the Church, then
the Church must have some unique capacity for receiving the disclosure of Christ in
Scripture (i.e. to make the movement from text to spiritual reality). Here I proposed that
de Lubac‟s structuring of the economy provides helpful categories for understanding this
unique capacity, as de Lubac emphasizes that Scripture, Church and Eucharist are
Incorporations of the Logos which are grounded in Christ the Incarnate Logos, and that
all readers have the imprint of the Logos on their souls which enables them to recognize
the intrinsic identity between their own narrative and the narrative of Scripture. This
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description is helpful as it illumines a qualitative difference between the capacity of
believers for receiving the disclosure of Christ in Scripture and the capacity of all readers
outside the Church, while grounding the capacity of both in the action of the Incarnate
Christ.
Furthermore, the description is also helpful because it shows the intrinsic
relationship between Scripture and Church as both mediate the risen Christ. Articulating
the intrinsic unity of Scripture and Church in the economy of redemption shows that
hermeneutical projects which attempt to locate authority in either Scripture or the Church
pose a false dilemma before the theologian. By comparing Vanhoozer and de Lubac,
both of whom explicitly locate Scriptural interpretation in the broader context of the
economy of redemption, it can be seen that the real difference between them is the way in
which each understands the Church relating to Scripture. Vanhoozer constructs his
understanding of the Church in such a way that it is only responsive to, and does not
mediate, the risen Christ. This one-sided emphasis supports Vanhoozer‟s doctrine of sola
Scriptura, yet it leads to a number of tensions in Vanhoozer‟s work which are difficult to
overcome without granting some authority to the Church. De Lubac shows that the
Church is always dependent on the literal sense of Scripture for its life and nourishment,
even as it has authority to protect the literal sense and enable believers to participate in
the mediation of Christ through it. This emphasis on the intrinsic unity between Scripture
and Church has resources to ease Vanhoozer‟s hermeneutical difficulties without forcing
Vanhoozer to yield his insistence on the authority of Scripture.
By placing the discussion of Vanhoozer and de Lubac in dialogue with the debate
between Tracy and Frei, I suggested that it is possible to advance the discussion. Frei‟s
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concern to preserve the plain sense of Scripture causes him to develop an either/or
schema in which he must decide whether to place the authority for the plain sense reading
in the texts themselves or in the Church. Much of Frei‟s later argument against Tracy
attempts to prevent philosophical analysis from overwhelming the plain sense of
Scripture established by the Church, and to do this he insists on Christian self-description
over philosophical description. However, this dissertation suggests that it is because Frei
fails to show the intrinsic unity of Scripture and Church and to ground both in Christ that
his work has reached an impasse with Tracy‟s. Here both de Lubac‟s project, which calls
both Scripture and Church fellow incorporations of the Logos, and Tracy‟s project, which
emphasizes the ongoing need to read the Gospels as both proclamation and narrative,
provide insights for better articulating the intrinsic unity between the Church and
Scripture. Tracy‟s work is particularly helpful as Tracy suggests that the Gospels can be
read as both narrative and proclamation so that they render the identity of Christ and
reveal the identity of the Christian community. This shows how the believer recognizes
her own experience of the risen Christ as intrinsically related to the identity of Jesus
Christ narrated in Scripture. As a result, Christian Scriptural reading recognizes the
intrinsic unity of the identity of Christ even as it draws the reader into the experience of
that risen Christ.
Ultimately, for the Christian, hermeneutical method for reading Scripture can only
be developed as reflection is given to the mediation of Christ to the Church by means of
the Scriptural texts. By explaining the role of Scripture in the economy of redemption, a
number of persistent hermeneutical difficulties which surface in describing the
relationship between text and reader are able to be reevaluated and even resolved. While
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it seems both inevitable and beneficial that theologians will articulate the relationship of
Christ, Scripture and Church in somewhat different ways, the absence of such description
will deprive hermeneutical projects of the resources necessary for the completion of their
tasks. Fifty years after the Second Vatican Council‟s drafting of Dei Verbum, the
Church‟s first major statement on revelation, it is hoped that the Church may be ready to
further develop the implications of the relationship of Christ, Scripture and Church in the
economy of redemption into a more complete system for a Christian reading of the
Scriptures.
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